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Hungary and Dalmatia in 1340

FERENC PITI



Dalmatia was under the supremacy of Byzantium until the millennium, and then of Venice. In 1105 Koloman, king of Hungary (1195–1116) occupied a part of Dalmatia, which is why conflicts between Venice and Hungary became frequent from that time onwards.¹ In the first quarter of the fourteenth century the Dalmatian cities fell into the hand of Venice and the Croatian barons. In 1340 Charles Robert (Charles I), king of Hungary (1301–1342) was planning to carry out a campaign in Dalmatia in order to reconquer those Dalmatian cities and territories which had belonged to Hungary previously but which had been fallen under the influence of Venice and the Croatian barons some decades earlier.² In the end the campaign was not carried out, but through the charters of the year 1340 I try to analyse and explain probably why this undertaking did not occur, obtain an insight into the diplomatic activity of Venice, and show how the problem of the Dalmatian campaign was connected with the Tartars.

The first record of the king's arrival in Dalmatia is a decision of the Venetian State on 9 February 1340 by which the *comites* of Nona (Nin), Arbe (Rab) and Zara (Zadar)³ were ordered to find out information about the king's coming and make a report to Venice.⁴ It needs to be pointed out here that this precedes the papal

¹ For the relations between Hungary, Venice and Dalmatia in 11–13. centuries cf. the relevant parts of Gy. Kristó–F. Makk, *Die erste Könige Ungarns*. Herne 1999; F. Makk, *Ungarische Aussenpolitik (896–1196)*. Herne 1999; Gy. Kristó, *Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale. I. Le temps des Arpads*. Rennes 2000; P. Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen. History of Medieval Hungary 895–1526*. London 2001.

² Zs. Teke, "Dalmácia," [Dalmatia] in *Korai Magyar Történeti Lexikon*. [Lexicon of Early Hungarian History] (henceforth: *KMTL*) Editor in chief Gy. Kristó, eds. P. Engel and F. Makk. Budapest 1994, 159–160.

³ Today in Croatia.

⁴ S. Ljubić, *Listine o odnosajih između južnoga slavenstva i mletačke republike. Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium*. Vol. II. (henceforth: *Ljub. II.*) Zagreb 1870, 59; F. Piti, *Anjou-kori oklevéltár. Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia*. Vol. XXIV. (1340) Budapest–Szeged 2001, (henceforth: *Anjou-oklt. XXIV.*) no. 74.

tithe collector's record dated 20 February 1340 that the Tartars attacked Poland and that this disturbed Charles I and his kingdom.⁵ The Tartars played an important role later but it seems sure that the Hungarian king's prime aim in foreign affairs in 1340 was the Dalmatian campaign.

On 10 March the Venetian doge, Bartolomeo Gradonico (1339–1342) and the Venetian Council published two orders about the Dalmatian case,⁶ because the *comes* of Arbe had made a report to Venice about his discussions with the *comites* Duym Frangepan and Bartholomew Frangepan on the intentions of Charles I concerning Dalmatia. (This means that Venice was informed very early of the Hungarian king's plans partly from the Frangepans.)⁷ That is why the *comites* of Arbe, Nona and Zara were ordered to find out the intentions of other *comites* of *Sclauonia* (as the charters name Dalmatia). This order was repeated many times, which means that Venice possibly feared that Venetian deputies controlling those Dalmatian cities which were under Venetian domination, would be unable to handle the conflict and the Dalmatian citizens would support the Hungarian king.

Venice needed to clarify the intentions of the Croatian barons also. Among them the Frangepans: Duym and Bartholomew, *comites* of Veglia (Krk) and Modrus (Modruš)⁸ were particularly important (especially Duym),⁹ because their territories lay in those parts of Dalmatia nearest to Hungary. By supporting Charles I militarily and politically, the Frangepans could have made the king's way to Dalmatia much easier. What is more, Duym had a function in Hungary, also: he was *comes* of county Posega.¹⁰ So one can understand why the *comes* of Arbe (apart from the manner of the geographical proximity) initially negotiated with the Frangepans.

The primary interest of Venice was to prevent the Hungarian attack taking place, so diplomatic steps were taken, because though Venice could have mobilized soldiers and galleys, it could not have had too much confidence in the cities and citizens of Dalmatia. Venice hindered the trade of these cities, imposed taxes on them and controlled them politically, too. In these cities the Venetian domination and loyalty was represented only by the local *comes* and his soldiers, not by

⁵ *Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia*. Series I, Tomus I, Budapest 1885, 433; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 91.

⁶ G. Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou-korból*. [Memories of Hungarian Diplomacy from the Anjou era] Vol. I. Budapest 1874, (henceforth: *Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I.*) 380–382; *Ljub.* II. 63–64; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 136. and 137.

⁷ On the situation of the Frangepans between Hungary and Venice, and the expectations of both sides towards them cf. G. Wenzel, *A Frangepánok Magyarország történetében*. [The Frangepans in Hungarian history] *Századok* (1890), (henceforth: *Wenzel 1890*) 210, 214.

⁸ Today in Croatia.

⁹ The role of Duym and Bartholomew is accurately discussed by Wenzel 1890, 211–214.

¹⁰ P. Engel, *Magyarország világi archontológiája*. [Secular archontology of Hungary] 1301–1457. Vol. I. Budapest 1996, 164.

the citizens, which is why the Venetian army in the Dalmatian cities needed to be strengthened.

Venice could also have feared that these cities under its domination (e. g. Nona, Trau [Trogir], Spalato [Split], Sebenico [Sibenik], Zara)¹¹ would open their gates one after the other to Charles I because these rich trading centres would have preferred Hungarian rule which could have supported the trade of these cities rather than merely drawing profit from them. (The situation was the same in the case of the ransomed cities under the domination of the Croatian barons.) That is why Venice wanted to keep Charles I far from these cities, and to avoid military confrontation, and against the power of the Hungarian army Venice primarily tried to use diplomatic means in addition to military preparations.

Moreover the Croatian barons (of whom apart from the Frangepans the Subić, lords of Klissa [Klis] and Scardona [Skradin],¹² Nelipich, and the Kurjakovich ought to be highlighted) were often at war with each other, and their loyalty to Venice seemed to be doubtful. But as their military power was potentially useful against Charles I, the negotiations with the barons took an important place in Venice's diplomacy.

One of the charters dating from 10 March illustrates Venice's strategy in Dalmatia in the case of the Hungarian attack: Venice wanted to cut the Hungarians' route from the cities and places providing food, and at the same time to leave them a free way to retire.

On 28 March the Venetian Council promoted three constables to Dalmatia who had many tasks: to exhort the citizens to guarantee Venetian domination, to get to know the intentions of the cities and the barons, to establish a coalition among the barons against Charles I, essentially to organize the defence, to secure the territories and to obtain more news on the movements of the Hungarian king.¹³ Venice took the possibility of the Hungarian attack seriously. This attack could have led to Hungarian repossession of the cities, because the rule of Venice was not really strong in Dalmatia.

It is not only Venetian data which can be related to the plan for the Dalmatian campaign but also a charter of Charles I dated 28 March 1340 by which the king delayed the discussion of the trial between the bishop of Zagreb, Ladislav and his dependants to the day when the king would arrive in Zagreb.¹⁴

It is quite sure that the king would not have left for Croatia because of the trial – this reference was in connection with the Dalmatian campaign. After Zagreb the road went in the direction of the coast, i. e. of the territory of the Frangepans. So all these data show that Charles I still wanted to leave for Dalmatia at the end of March, not as yet disturbed in this sense by the Tartars, whose activity close to Hungary is also highlighted by the data mentioned above.

¹¹ Today in Croatia.

¹² Today in Croatia.

¹³ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml. I.* 382–383; Ljub. II. 64–65; *Anjou-oklt. XXIV.* no. 182.

¹⁴ T. Smičiklas, *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae ac Slavoniae*. Vol. X, *Zagrabiae* 1912, 533; *Anjou-oklt. XXIV.* no. 181.

On 29 March the Venetian Council ordered the constables to go to Dalmatia.¹⁵ Venice started the military fortification of Dalmatia, too: by a command dated 10 April two pedestrian *banderia* were sent to defend Nona.¹⁶

A source from 19 April says that the constables arrived in Dalmatia and started negotiations in Zara and Nona. According to their reports, Charles I would arrive to Dalmatia with his wife and younger son. This suggests that the king was confident and had planned a triumphal entrance. That is why the Venetian Council ordered the *consul* at Zengg (Senj)¹⁷ and local traders to send emissaries to Hungary for news.

So Venice was not satisfied with the news from the Frangepans only, and wanted the traders to spy on the king's plans, and the Council even wrote a letter to the Venetians at Charles I's court to obtain information and send it to Venice by messenger as to (as the source says) "why the king wants to come to Dalmatia and on whose demand".¹⁸ Perhaps Venice was afraid that Charles I would come not only of his own decision but also by invitation of the Dalmatian citizens. The sources do not answer this question but it is not impossible that some of the cities had somehow asked the king to liquidate the domination of Venice or that of the Croatian barons over them.

Venice did not have exact information at this time (and as we will see: for a long time) about how far the king wanted to go, what his aim was, how strong his army was, by whom he was supported, and, if and when he would start and why. Venice was alarmed at this lack of clearness because the arrival of the king and his army could be more and more likely as the end of spring approached.

On 13 May the Council of Venice ordered ten galleys for the constables in order to defend Dalmatia in case of the king's arrival.¹⁹ It is known from a decision of the Council dated 20 May that on 13 May the constables negotiated with the Kuriakovich, namely *comites* Budislav, Paul and Gregory, sons of the late Curia-chus, who proposed a coalition against Charles I between the Kuriakovich, the Frangepans and Nelipich, to deter the king from setting off.

In this matter the constables sent envoys to these barons, and the Venetian Council decided that if this coalition could be brought about, Venice would give military support. The Council also ordered that if the Frangepans would not enter the coalition, the constables should go ahead it with other barons.²⁰

According to an order of the Venetian Council of 1 July, the Council was informed that the constables had gone to the Frangepans to ask what they knew about Charles I's movements. The envoy of Nelipich did not go to the constables, the Frangepans were considered by Venice as an uncertain element from the beginning, *comes* Gregory Kuriakovich expected extreme claims for the coalition,

¹⁵ Ljub. II. 65; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 192.

¹⁶ Ljub. II. 66; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 223.

¹⁷ Today in Croatia.

¹⁸ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 67–68; Ljub. II. 66–68; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 235. and 236.

¹⁹ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 386–387; Ljub. II. 69–70; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 307.

²⁰ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 397–392; Ljub. II. 71–74; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 323.

Nelipich gave no answer about the proposal, and Mladen Subić was not asked to join this league – the coalition of the barons seemed to be failed by this time. It would have been hard to bring about a coalition among the barons against Charles I, for Venice. The seriousness of the situation is shown by the fact that the constables asked Venice to let them return to Venice, because their stay in Dalmatia was unsuccessful and local loyalty towards Venice was diminishing.²¹

Of course, Venice did not let the constables return, but ordered them to continue their work, and moreover nominated three envoys to negotiate with the representatives of the king of Serbia,²² Stephen Dušan (1331–1355). Venice and Serbia, as opponents of Hungary found each other.²³

The Serbian king assured Venice of his friendship, and referring to his enemies in the territories bordering his country, asked for the possibility to escape to Venice in case of emergency. Moreover he suggested a military and commercial alliance²⁴ which was accepted by the Venetian Council on 8 June, when they received the king as “citizen of Venice” agreeing that if in danger he could go to Venice with his children and treasury.²⁵ This decision was confirmed by the doge on 12 June.²⁶ What the king probably had in mind was that a Hungarian attack on Dalmatia could be linked with an attack on Serbia as well possibly with aid from Bosnia as there were close and friendly ties between Hungary and Bosnia.

According to a letter of the Council dated 10 June, the constables reported on 30 May that they had negotiated with the Frangepans who said that Charles I would not go to Dalmatia that year. On the other hand the same letter says that the constables were informed on 5 June by *comes* Gregory Kuriakovich that the king would set off. The basis for this information was (says the source) a letter sent by the Hungarian king to *comes* Gregory, and information from people close to the king.²⁷

There is no more information about this letter of Charles I, so I cannot say what it contained and why the king wrote to *comes* Gregory. Possibly I can interpret apparently two inconsistent pieces of information, that the king’s primary aim by this time was not the Dalmatian campaign, but he did not abandon the plan finally, and tried to find a convenient way to carry out the campaign in the new situation created by the Tartar problem.

The letter of the Council of 12 June clearly says that Charles I will definitely not go to Dalmatia that year because of his physical weakness and the attack of the Tartars (*propter sui corporis infirmitatem et propter invasionem quam fecerunt Tar-*

²¹ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 392–393; Ljub. II. 74–75; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 355.

²² Ibid.

²³ Stephen Dušan made Serbia a powerful state and he titled himself firstly in Serbia as czar. In the fourteenth century there were conflicts between Serbia and Hungary because of boundary problems. Cf. P. Rokay–M. Takács. “Szerbek, Szerb–magyar kapcsolatok,” [Serbs, Serbian-Hungarian connections] in *KMTL* 638–641.

²⁴ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 394–395; Ljub. II. 75–76; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 364.

²⁵ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 396–397; Ljub. II. 76–77; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 366.

²⁶ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 399–400; Ljub. II. 78–79; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 379.

²⁷ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 397–398; Ljub. II. 77–78; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 369.

tari versus partes suas).²⁸ However, it is curious that Venice heard of the Tartars relatively late, though it tried to get information on the king's intentions in many ways, what is more the Tartars surely influenced the king's plans after the beginning of May.

Though the attack of the Tartars against Hungary was surely not as powerful as those against Poland, Charles I was careful, which is why he decided that in the interest of the security of Hungary he would not start the Dalmatian campaign. The exact date of the Tartar attack is not known but the data and relations mentioned above suggest that it could have happened in April, at the latest the beginning of May.

Anyway, Venice did not call the constables back despite the news from Hungary, moreover on 17 June it permitted Nelipich to bring weapons from Venice to Dalmatia.²⁹

The next relevant data is from 17 July, when the doge wrote to the *comes* of Arbe that he had received letters from the *consul* of Zengg and the *comes* of Zara, and these letters had contained reliable news on the king's arrival. That is why the doge ordered the *comes* of Arbe to remain prepared and obtain news on the king's movements.³⁰

It cannot be known what this "reliable information" was, anyhow the doge himself wrote a letter about the affair which shows that Venice did not ignore the possibility of a Hungarian attack. On 3 and 12 August the Council ordered the constables to continue their work as previously, with special regard to reaching agreement among the barons against Charles I.³¹ However, there was no further news on the king's coming in 1340, and the Venetian precaution was addressed the future – Charles I by this time had finally cancelled the idea of a Dalmatian campaign.³²

Glancing over the relevant Venetian sources, I will summarize and explain those events that influenced and changed the king's original plans.

In Hungarian charters of the year 1340 there are data (mainly for the first half of May) which show that some trials were postponed to the fifteenth or twenty-second day after disbanding of the royal army (*residencia exercitus regis*),³³ i. e. to 1341. This means that military preparations were made in the first half of May in Hungary. These postponing charters do not mention Dalmatia but name another target: one of the charters says that some litigants were to set off in the campaign

²⁸ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 400; Ljub. II. 79; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 380.

²⁹ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 401; Ljub. II. 80; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 394.

³⁰ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 401; Ljub. II. 82; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 449.

³¹ Wenzel, *Dipl. eml.* I. 402., 403; Ljub. II. 83–84; *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 476. and 483.

³² The plan of the campaign is briefly mentioned by F. Dobos, *Az Ádria uralmának kérdése a XIV.-ik században*. [On the domination of the Adriatic in the fourteenth century] Kolozsvár 1905, 34; S. Domanovszky–J. Vértess, *Nagy Lajos első hadjárata Velence ellen*. [The first campaign of Louis the Great against Venice.] *Századok* (1900), 786.

³³ *Anjou-oklt.* XXIV. no. 289., 291., 292., 299., 311.

of the kingdom with Palatine William [Drugeth] (...in quadam expeditione regni ... in Ruteniam unacum Wyllermo palatino profecturos fore...).³⁴

In my opinion this is a very important point because it directs the discussion towards the conflicts between Poland and the Tartars (the Golden Horde).³⁵ The palatine's military task would have been to lead a Hungarian army to Ruthenia, which was under the Tartars and not so far from the Hungarian border, and make a side movement against the Tartars who had attacked Poland and made an inroad into Hungary.³⁶

This military movement would have served either the security of Hungary or the friendship between Hungary and Poland. Though the sources mention "royal army" or "army of the kingdom", the task would not have been carried out by the whole Hungarian army. I am sure that in 1340 it was not called together solely for this task, mainly because of the problem of Dalmatia. In this case "army of the kingdom" only means the so called *honor-army*³⁷ of the palatine, i. e. the soldiers of the castles and possessions controlled by him as a palatine. William Drugeth would be the leader of this operation, not the king – sources do not mention the king's intentions to lead any army to Ruthenia.

So at the beginning of May Charles I put the Dalmatian campaign aside to concentrate on the defense of Hungary because of the Tartar attack. However, Venice, as I pointed, despite its diplomatic activity did not received notice until Summer 1340 that Hungarian foreign policy was primarily focused on the Tartars since May. This can mean that in May Charles I did not totally abandon the idea of the Dalmatian campaign, but tried to decide if the Hungarian army could be divided to carry out both tasks. Another attack of the Tartars could have been expected (not to mention the great fear for the Tartars among the Hungarians since 1241/42). In this situation the problem of Tartars pushed the carrying out of Dalmatian campaign into the background.

³⁴ *Anjoukori okmánytár*. [Charterbook of the Angevin era] Vol. IV, ed. I. Nagy, Budapest 1884, 26; *Anjou-okl.* XXIV. no. 286. The campaign was thought as a fact by M. Wertner, *Magyar hadjáratok a XIV. században*. [Hungarian campaigns in the fourteenth century] Századok (1905), 436; and A. Pór, *Magyar-ruthén érintkezések a XIV-ik században*. [Hungarian–Ruthenian connections in the fourteenth century] Századok (1904), 947–948.

³⁵ On the Golden Horde, see B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland 1223–1502*. Leipzig 1943; I. Vásáry, *Az Arany Horda*. [The Golden Horde] Budapest 1986.

³⁶ One can suggest that the real aim of the Hungarian army (beside helping Poland and repulsing the Tartar attack) would have been to acquire the principedom of Halich which was in the interest of Hungary for long time, and whose throne became empty in Spring 1340. I think this is just a theory without any base in the sources: no Hungarian army seems to have fought in Halich in 1340, which anyway was conquered by Poland that year. On Halich cf. M. Font, "Halics," [Halich] in *KMTL*, 252.

³⁷ For the *honor-system* in fourteenth-century Hungary and the military organization, see P. Engel, "A honor," [The Honor] *Történelmi Szemle* (1981), 1–19; Idem, "Adatok az Anjou-kori magyar hadseregről," [Data on the Hungarian army in the Anjou era] in *Analecta mediaevalia*. Vol. I. ed. T. Neumann, Budapest 2001, 73–82.

The campaign against Dalmatia was finally abandoned in July 1340. The reasons were the activity of Venice, the illness of Charles I and above all the Tartars. Charles I did not want his kingdom to be defenseless because of the Tartars. He thought that he could not divide his military forces to fight in Dalmatia and in Ruthenia at the same time. So military preparations began in May 1340, but it was not connected with Dalmatia or Halich, but with the Tartars.

Procrastination and discussions certainly characterised the planned campaign against the Tartars. Charles I had to make a decision: which was more secure for Hungary. He chose defense, though fortunately no more Tartar actions affected Hungary in 1340. I am sure that no Hungarian army set off in 1340 either against Dalmatia or against Ruthenia – there is no exact data from charters or narrative sources which supports movements of Hungarian forces abroad in 1340.³⁸ The armies stayed in Hungary and did not attack foreign territories.³⁹ However, Dalmatia remained a target of Hungarian foreign policy, and finally Louis I the Great (1342–1382), son of Charles I reconquered it later on.⁴⁰

³⁸ The standard Polish scientific literature places the origin of conflicts between Poland and the Golden Horde in the possession of Halich, which was finally conquered by Casimir III, king of Poland (1333–1370). No Hungarian military help or presence in 1340 is mentioned by Polish historians or narrative sources. Cf. for example T. Manteuffel (red.), *Historia Polski*. Vol. I. Warszawa 1958, 450; J. Wyrozumski, *Kazimierz Wielki*. Kraków 1982, 79; R. Grodecki–S. Zachorowski–J. Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*. Vol. I, Kraków 1995, 42. (I owe a debt to Dániel Bagi for interpreting the scholarly literature written in Polish.)

³⁹ Pope Benedict XII (1335–1342) gave spiritual support to Casimir III by letting him and the Polish prelates recruit crusaders against the Tartars not only in Poland, but also in Bohemia and Hungary. The pope negotiated with Tartar envoys, too, in order to solve the Polish–Tartar problem. A. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. Vol. I, Romae 1859, 637–640; *Anjou-okl.* XXIV. no. 471, 472, 490–492.

⁴⁰ On the military connections in the Anjou era between Hungary and the territories mentioned in this article, see Gy. Kristó, *Az Anjou-kor háborúi*. [Wars of the Anjou era.] Budapest 1988.

*Contributions to the Veneration of St. Eligius in Medieval England**

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It can be stated without exaggeration that St. Eligius who was for a long time one of the most popular patron saints of medieval Europe, and whose feast was universally celebrated in western and north-western Europe, particularly in France and Flanders, is not today among the most well-known saints. His person and activity is often confused with that of St. Egidius/Aegidius (St. Giles), following from the simple fact that their Latin names resemble each other. Consequently, it is desirable, first, to refer briefly to the life of the latter. St. Egidius, whose feast-day is 1 September, was an abbot, said to have been born of illustrious Athenian parentage around the middle of the seventh century A. D. Having been touched by divine grace, as his legend says, he gave all his wealth to the poor and took ship for the west. After a long and exhausting voyage he landed at Marseilles. Having spent two years with St. Caesarius at Arles he withdrew to a dense forest near Nîmes. There he spent many years in the greatest solitude. He lived in a cave and his sole companion was a hind. One day the hind was discovered and pursued by a certain king of the Visigoths (Flavius or Wamba by name) who was hunting in the forest. Then, all of a sudden, the hind disappeared and took refuge with St. Giles in his cave. After a while one of the king's huntsmen shot an arrow at a gap into the bushes which sheltered the hermit's cave. Finally, when the king and his man had forced their way through the bushes they found Giles, wounded by the arrow, sitting with the hind between his knees. Having listened to the story of the injured hermit, Flavius begged his pardon, and the king – as compensation – wanted to press generous gifts upon Giles. The hermit refused all the gifts and asked the king to leave him alone. After this affair the king, deeply impressed by the behaviour of the hermit, often visited St. Giles, who eventually asked Flavius to devote his proffered alms to founding a monastery. King Flavius

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agreed to do so, on condition that Giles would become the first abbot of the monastery. Since Giles did not protest this time, an abbey was soon built near the cave. Then, St. Giles went to Rome to obtain recognition from the pope for the monastery. The pope granted St. Giles and his monks several privileges and presented him with two carved doors of cedar-wood. Demonstrating his faith in divine providence St. Giles threw these doors into the Tiber. The doors sailed down the river, crossed the sea and sailed up the Rhône until finally they arrived at the saint's cave. In short, this is the story of the foundation of the famous monastery of Saint Gilles, located in Languedoc, France.¹

In contrast with Giles, Eligius – whose feastday falls on 1 December – was bishop of Noyon and Tournai, and died in 660 A. D., that is nearly half a century earlier than Egidius. The name of Eligius (Eloy/Eloi in French) derives from the Latin verb *eligo*. His name, apparently, refers to the fact that he was a chosen person. His birth and other events of his life are told by the *Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis*. The *Vita* was long attributed to St. Audoenus (Dado), another holy man whom Eligius had met at the royal court of Dagobert I, and whose life was very similar to his own. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the majority of scholars the *Vita Eligii* was written, in fact, not by Audoenus but by a later monk of Noyon: consequently the author is referred to in recent literature as Pseudo-Audoenus.²

The *Vita* tells us that Eligius was a native of Limoges, born at Chaptelat probably around 558. His own name and those of his father, Eucherius, and his mother, Terrigia, show that he was of Roman-Gaulish descent. "By grace of divine prescience" – as his *Vita* continues – "he received the name Eligius, a fitting mirror of his mind. And as a foretaste of what he would do, or indeed what God would do through him, it is fitting to tell what happened before he was born. [...] For when the blessed man was still in his mother's womb, his genetrix had a vision ordained in this matter. She saw a splendid eagle wheeling above her bed crying out to her three times promising I don't know what. And when she awoke, terrified by the reverberating voice, she began to wonder much what the vision might mean. Meanwhile the hour of the birth approached and the mother was beginning to be endangered in the greatest pain. So they called a certain religious

¹ For St. Giles see A. Butler, *Lives of the Saints* (ed., rev., and supplemented by H. Thurston and D. Attwater. New York 1956, Vol. 3, 457–458; M. Zender-J. Wollasch, "Aegidius," in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*. Band I, München–Zürich 1977, 176. For the monastery of Saint Gilles see W. S. Stoddard, "Saint-Gilles-du-Gard," in W. W. Kibler-G. A. Zinn, eds., *Medieval France. An Encyclopedia*. New York 1995, 841–42.

² The most reliable text of the *Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis* is available in B. Krusch, ed., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptorum rerum Merovingicarum. Passiones vitaeque sanctorum aevi Merovingici*. Tomus IV, Hannoverae et Lipsiae MDCCCXCII, (Unveränderter nachdruck 1977), 669–741. It was translated into English by J. A. McNamara. *Medieval Sourcebook: The Life of St. Eligius, 558–660*; <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/eligius.htm>; See also A. Butler, *Lives of the Saints*, op. cit. vol. 4, 455–458; I. Petrovics, "Was There an Ethnic Background to the Veneration of St. Eligius in Hungary?" In: L. Löb-I. Petrovics-Gy. E. Szőnyi, eds. *Forms of Identity. Definitions and Changes*. Attila József University, Szeged, 1994, 77–87.

priest, a man of good repute, that he might pray for her. When he came to her, prophetic words soon seized him and he assured her: "Do not be afraid, mother, for the Lord has deigned to bestow a blessed birth upon you. He will be a holy man and chosen from all his people he will be called a great priest in the church of Christ."³

Eligius's father was an artisan, who recognizing his son's unusual talent for engraving, apprenticed him to the famous goldsmith Abbo, master of the mint at Limoges. Soon after his apprenticeship Eligius went to Neustria and became known to Bobbo, treasurer to Clotaire II in Paris. Once Clotaire II, on his treasurer's recommendation, commissioned Eligius to make a royal throne adorned with gold and precious stones. Eligius managed to make two thrones out of the gold given to him, which turned out to be the origin of his good fortune.⁴ The king admired his skill and honesty and, in addition to taking him into his own household, appointed Eligius master of the mint. Eligius developed a close friendship with Clotaire II and his reputation as a prominent goldsmith soon became widespread. His skill as a craftsman, his official position and his close relationship with the king made Eligius a very important person, whose soul and virtue were not contaminated by the corruption of the court. He was very generous to the poor, distributing large sums in alms to them, and ransomed a number of Roman, Gallic, Breton, Saxon and Moorish slaves. Nor should one ignore the fact that Eligius founded several churches and monasteries, for instance in Solignac, Noyon and Paris. After the death of Clotaire II in 629 his son and succes-

³ J. A. McNamara, *Medieval Sourcebook: The Life of St. Eligius*, op. cit. 1.

⁴ "Volebat enim rex sellam urbane auro gemmisque fabricare; sed non inveniebatur in eius palatio, qui huiusmodi opus, sicut mente conceperat, posset opere perficere. Cum sciret ergo praefatus regis thesaurarius Eligi industriam, coepit eum explorare, si quo modo opus optatum possit perficere, et cum facile id apud eum fieri intellexisset, ingressus ad principem, indicat ei invenisse se artificem industrium, qui disposito sine cunctamine adgrederetur eius opere. Tunc rex mente gratissima tradidit ei copiosam auri inpensam, sed et ipse nihilominus tradidit Eligio; et ille accepto opere cum celeritate inchoavit atque cum diligentia celeriter consummavit. Denique quod ad unius opificii acceperat usum, ita ex ea duo composuit, ut incredibile foret, omnia ex eodem pondere fieri potuisset; nam absque ulla fraude vel unius etiam siliquae inminutione commisso sibi patravit opere, non ceterorum fraudolentiam sectans, non mordacis limae fragmine culpans, non foci edacem flammam incusans, sed omnia gemina fideliter complens, feliciter meriut felix remunerationem. Opus ergo perfectum defert protinus ad palatium traditque regi quam donaverat sellam, alteram penes se, quam gratuitu fecerat, reservatam. Coepit autem princeps mirari simul et efferri tantam operis eligantiam, iussitque ilico fabro tribuere mercedem laboris dignam. Tunc Eligius, alteram sellam in medio prolatam: 'Quod superfuit', inquit 'ex auro ne negligens perderem, huic opere abtavi.'" B. Krusch, *Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis*, op. cit. 672. The author of the *Vita* uses the Latin word sella for throne. It is quite strange that medieval writers translated this Latin word as 'saddle'. It can be stated with a high degree of probability that this might have been the origin of St. Eligius being regarded as a farrier and the patron of farriers. Cf. F. Arnold-Forster, *Studies in Church Dedications or England's Patron Saints*. 3 vols. London 1899, Vol. 3, 472.

sor, Dagobert I, appointed his father's friend as his own first counsellor. It is also worth remarking that Eligius was an excellent diplomat, who later, on a mission for Dagobert, managed to persuade Judicael, prince of the Bretons to accept the authority of Dagobert.

On the death of Dagobert I in 639, Eligius and his friend, Audoenus (Dado) fulfilled their desire to serve God as priests. They left the court and devoted themselves in seclusion to theological studies, eventually entering the priesthood. On the death of Acarius, bishop of Noyon-Tournai, on 13 May 640, Eligius was elected his successor. His election took place at almost the same time as Audoenus was made bishop of Rouen. The new bishops were consecrated together in Rouen on 13 May 641. The apostolic zeal of Eligius led him to convert the inhabitants of his diocese, most of whom were pagans. Though the task of converting the Flemish, Antwerpians, Frisians, Suevi, and the barbarian tribes along the coast was very difficult, Eligius persevered. Since Eligius looked after their sick and protected them from oppression, the barbarians finally relented and many of them were baptized by him. Eligius was a great organizer and a zealous apostle, reputed for his wisdom and kindness, and as good a bishop as he had been a layman.⁵

During the Middle Ages his relics were the object of special veneration. Although he was the patron saint of goldsmiths and metalworkers, coach drivers and farriers had also placed themselves under his protection. In Christian art he is generally represented in the garb of a bishop, with a crosier in his right hand and a miniature church of chased gold on the palm of his open left. Since Eligius was also the patron saint of farriers, he is represented in some cases with a horse's leg. Given the fact that most of his relics have come down to posterity from the fourteenth–sixteenth centuries, as the iconographic analysis carried out by Karin von Etzdorf demonstrates, it is now evident that the veneration of St. Eligius reached its peak in the western part of Europe in the late Middle Ages.⁶

In an earlier work by us we have collected and enumerated the relics that prove the veneration of St. Eligius in medieval Hungary.⁷ These relics could be categorised as follows:

- I. Town seals.
- II. Patron saint of a parish church.
- III. A decoratively painted codex containing the mass of St. Eligius.

⁵ Cf. *Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis*, op. cit.; A. Butler, *Lives of the Saints*, op. cit. 455–458.

⁶ *The Catholic Encyclopedia. An International work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline and History of the Catholic Church*. New York 1909, vol. 5, s. v. Eligius; M. Buchberger, ed., *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*. Zweite, Neubearbeitete Auflage des Kirchlichen Handlexikons. Freiburg im Breisgau 1931, vol. 3, s. v. Eligius; *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, München–Zürich 1986, vol. 3, s. v. Eligius. See also K. von Etzdorf, *Der Heilige Eligius und die Typen seiner Darstellung als Patron der Goldschmiede und Schmiede*. München 1956. (Unpublished PhD dissertation).

⁷ I. Petrovics, "Was There an Ethnic Background to the Veneration of St Eligius in Hungary?", op. cit.

- IV. Panel paintings on the altars of a variety of churches.
- V. Wooden statues.
- VI. An altar.
- VII. Seals belonging to the guilds of goldsmiths.

From the relics the following conclusions could be drawn: 1) The veneration of St. Eligius reached its peak in Hungary more or less in the same period as in Western Europe, that is in the late Middle Ages. However, it must be stressed that one should not overlook the fact that due to wars and other disasters many relics have perished. 2) Eligius was venerated in Hungary primarily as the patron saint of goldsmiths. 3) It is the guild seals that form the majority of the surviving relics. 4) Despite the fact, that Eligius was a very popular saint in Hungary, only one parish church was placed under his protection. This church stood in the town of Temesvár (today Timișoara in Romania). 5) The veneration of Eligius seems to have emerged in connection with the economic reforms launched by Charles I of Anjou, king of Hungary (1301–1342). Due to the mining and monetary reforms of Charles I, the role of goldsmiths and silversmiths had become increasingly significant. Consequently, Hungarian goldsmiths and silversmiths found themselves in the mainstream of European Gothic art.⁸

Unfortunately, at least at the moment, we cannot give a similarly accurate account about the veneration of St. Eligius in medieval England. This is due, primarily, to the fact that we have just started our research into this vast and exciting topic. However, one striking similarity has become apparent already in the very first phase of our investigation: in England, just like in Hungary, there existed only one church that was placed under the protection of St. Eligius in the Middle Ages. This contention is based on the research of Frances Arnold-Forster. This outstanding scholar, in his book of three volumes, entitled *Studies in Church Dedications or England's Patron Saints*, collected the names of patron saints that could be associated with medieval parish churches.⁹ When examining and analysing the names of patron saints, Arnold-Forster dedicated a separate chapter to those French bishops under whose protection a church stood in England. They are as follows: St. Denys, St. Julian, St. Lucian, St. Enurchus (Evortius), St. Cassian, St. Firmin, St. Martin of Tours, St. Britius, St. German, St. Remigius, St. Vedast, St. Vigor, St. Aubin, St. Lo (Lau), St. Medardus, St. Eloy, St. Ouen (Audoenus), St. Genesius, St. Leodegarius, St. Lambert and St. Hubert. The term "French bishops" needs a little explanation: Arnold-Forster, for the sake of simplicity and convenience, uses the word French in a very wide sense, in stead of the more correct terms "Gallican" and "Frankish". We can agree with his argumentation, namely that with the exception of St. Lambert and St. Hubert, Bishops of Maastricht and Liege, the sees of the aforesaid bishops were all within the borders of modern France, and roughly speaking, their names were introduced into England

⁸ Ibid., 81–87.

⁹ F. Arnold-Forster, *Studies in Church Dedications*, op. cit.

after the Conquest of 1066 through Norman channels.¹⁰ The above list shows, on the one hand, that the number of French bishops under whose protection a church had been placed in medieval England was 20, including Eligius and Audoenus, and, on the other, that St. Martin of Tours was the most popular French bishop in England. He, as a patron saint, can be associated with 160 churches in England.¹¹

The list also reveals that in contrast with Eligius to whom only one church was dedicated, Audoenus was the patron saint of three churches.¹² The only church that to date bears the name of Eligius is in Great Smeaton.¹³ Today this is a small place with a few hundred inhabitants only, located in the North Riding of Yorkshire. In the Middle Ages Great Smeaton belonged to the archdiocese of York, but when, in 1836, the bishopric of Ripon was established it became a part of the latter. It also should be mentioned that the dedication of the church of Great Smeaton preserved not the Latin but the French form (St. Eloy) of the name of Eligius. In the opinion of Frances Arnold-Forster in the twelfth century, or perhaps a little earlier, Great Smeaton was donated by one Hardwin des Escalliers, landlord of the place, to St. Mary's Abbey in York. Unfortunately, it cannot be decided who chose the dedication: the Norman noble or the Benedictine Abbey.¹⁴

Nevertheless, says Arnold-Forster, there are scattered traces of various forgotten dedications with the name of Eligius. This fact cautions us that originally not one but more churches might have been placed under the protection of St. Eligius. Let it suffice here to mention just a few examples: around the middle of the seventeenth century in the parish of Tottenham there stood a little chapel known as "The Offertory (i. e. chapel) of St. Loy" and close beside it was a well called "St. Loy's Well". Kingston-upon-Thames also had a chapel whose patron saint was St. Loy. The case of Weedon-Lois in Northamptonshire is also interesting: the existing church of this locality has SS. Mary and Peter as its patron saints, but it is very probable that originally the church had a different dedication. It should be recalled that there was in the parish a mineral spring known as "St. Loy's Well". This well provides us with the key to the name of the parish, which in the early nineteenth century was still written Weedon Loys. This name expresses very clearly the connection of the parish with St. Eligius and shows that the church was re-dedicated later.¹⁵

The next category of relics contain literary works. We used the expression in the plural, though, at the moment, we know only one work that can be associated with St. Eligius. However, it is, undoubtedly, of primary importance, since this is *The Canterbury Tales*, Geoffrey Chaucer's greatest work, designed about 1387,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 434-487.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 434.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 434.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 257, 475.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 472, 475.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 475.

and written for the greater part in heroic couplets.¹⁶ The whole work, and the main Prologue in particular, is very interesting for the vivid picture it presents of contemporary life. A party of twenty-nine – or in other opinion thirty-one, including Chaucer himself – pilgrims are assembled at the Tabard Inn in Southwark, and they want to travel to the shrine of Thomas Becket at Canterbury. Among the pilgrims we find a prioress, Madame Eglentyne by name, who was well-educated, polite, and whose French was “after the school of Stratford-atte-Bowe”.¹⁷ This last statement certainly refers to the fact that Madame Eglentyne spoke the Norman or English version of the French language that was used in the royal court in England. Chaucer tells us concerning Madame Eglentyne that “Hir gretteste ooth was but by Seinte Loy” (Her greatest oath was but by Seinte Loy). This sentence proved to be a mystery for a long time, since nobody understood why the gentle lady had preferred to swear by St. Eligius rather than by any other saint. Finally, Professor Hales who wrote a work on Chaucer in the late nineteenth century discovered that on one occasion St. Eligius positively refused to take an oath demanded by his master, the king himself. St. Eligius at length convinced the king that, at least in his case, an oath was needless. St. Eligius’s *Vita* tells this story in the following way: “For some reason unknown to me, unless it were to obtain greater proof of his fidelity, one day at Rueil in the fields, in my presence, while I was living among the king’s boys, the king ordered some relics of saints brought to Eligius and ordered that he place his hands upon the sacred tokens and take an oath. But moved by divine intuition, he humbly refused all attempted inducements. And when he was more urgently pressed, he soon burst into anxious tears fearing to offend the king but trembling sevenfold to impose his hands on the sacred tokens. Then the king, feeling his fear, and simultaneously marvelling at the man’s great devotion, desisted from forcing him but sent him away with a kinder and gentler manner. His face beaming, he declared him more worthy to be believed than if he had given his oath many times.”¹⁸ Hence,

¹⁶ We used the electronically processed version of Geoffrey Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales* in our study; <http://www.librarius.com/cantels.html>.

¹⁷ G. Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales*, op. cit., the main Prologue, lines 118–162. “And Frenssh she spak ful faire and fetisly,/After the scole of Stratford-atte-Bowe,/For Frenssh of Parys was to hir unknowe.”

¹⁸ “Me presente, nescio quam ob causam, nisi quod facile datur intellegi fidelitatis obtento, dum apud regem puerulus habitarem, quadam die Rotoilo in agro accito rex Eligio quorum reliquias sanctorum praecipiebat ei, ut inpositione manuum sacris pignoribus donaret sacramentum; sed ille divino intuitu verens, recusare humiliter omni nisu temptabat. Cumque instantius id facere compelleretur, anxius valde coepit mox ubertim lacrimas profundere, metuens scilicet regem offendere septuplumque pavens sanctis pignoribus manus inponere. Intuens itaque rex eius timorem simulque mirans tantam viri devotionem, desiit ultra eum cogere, sed magis blande liniterque demulcens laetissimo illum vultu dimisit, pollicens se plus eum ex hoc iam crediturum, quam si multimoda tunc dedisset iuramenta.” *Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis*, op. cit. 673.

stated Professor Hales, an oath by St. Loy would naturally be no oath at all, a simple protestation.¹⁹

The third category of St. Eligius's relics is represented by mural paintings. Let us refer first to the church of Broughton, Buckinghamshire. St. Eloy's figure can be discovered on the south wall of the nave together with that of St. Helena and St. George. The fifteenth century painting also shows blacksmith's tools.²⁰ Next, we would like to call the attention to the memorably intimate, unspoiled church of Slapton, Northamptonshire. The mural painting on the south wall of the south aisle preserved the rare subject of St. Eloy with a horse being shod. The figures were incised with firm lines before being coloured.²¹ The most famous of all mural paintings is the one that can be found on the wall of the church of Shorthampton, Oxfordshire. This small and humble church is of Norman origin, and it was dedicated to All Saints. The figure of St. Eligius can be seen on the south wall of the nave. The painting shows a strange episode from the life of St. Eligius: one day as he was shoeing a horse, the animal, for some reason, became restive and plunged violently. St. Eligius then quietly took off his leg at the first joint, nailed on the shoe and put the leg on again. The horse before the bishop seems to be standing in a sort of crate or wooden frame that gave him support while he was minus a leg. The figure of the horse and his master are fairly perfect on the wall-painting, but unfortunately St. Eligius has lost his head. It is supposed that the guild of farriers have had this picture painted in honour of their saint.²²

This is how we arrive at our next category of relics. All over Europe several bas-reliefs exist that have preserved the above mentioned incident from St. Eligius's legend. The most famous can be seen in the church of Or San Michele, Florence, Italy. In England there is a bas-relief at Durweston, Dorset, now placed over the south doorway. Surprisingly enough, as this bas-relief shows, the person bringing the horse to be shod is a lady of gay appearance and dressed in a fashionable way. The details of the forge and figures are quaint and very interesting.²³ St. Eloy is also represented on a Suffolk bas-relief and on several screens of East Anglia and Devon. Mention should be made of the bas-relief that exists at Win-

¹⁹ F. Arnold Forster, *Studies in Church Dedications*, op. cit. vol. 3, 474-475.

²⁰ A. Caiger-Smith, *English Medieval Mural Paintings*, Oxford, 1963, 132. I am gratefully indebted to Prof. Andrew Ayton (Department of History, University of Hull, England) for his generous help in collecting the most important pieces of medieval English visual sources concerning St. Eligius.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 164; N. Pevsner, *Northamptonshire*, in: *The Buildings of England*, Harmondsworth, 1973, 2nd edn, (Revised by B. Cherry), 404.

²² A. Caiger-Smith, *English Medieval Mural Paintings*, op. cit. 168; J. Sherwood-N. Pevsner, "Oxfordshire," in *The Buildings of England*. Harmondsworth, 1974; 763; P. M. Johnston, "Shorthampton Chapel and its Wall-Paintings," *The Archaeological Journal* 62 (1905) 170-171.

²³ *Ibid.*, 170-171; J. Newman-N. Pevsner, "Dorset," in *The Buildings of England*, Harmondsworth 1972, 191; *An Inventory of Historical Monuments in the County of Dorset*, Vol. III, *Central Dorset*, Part 1. Royal Commission on Historical Monuments (England), 1970, plate 13.

canton church, Somerset, on which also it appears to be a fine lady that has brought the horse to be shod at St. Eloy's forge.²⁴

To sum up we can say that St. Eligius is a good example of a famous saint of antiquity whose cult attained its widest popular diffusion in the later Middle Ages. Despite the fact that in England only one ancient church was dedicated to him – to be more precise: we have unquestionable evidence only in one case – Eligius was a very well known saint. It is partly due to the situation that he was reputed both as an apostolic bishop and a distinguished craftsman.²⁵ The Norman Conquest of England, and consequent Anglo-Norman contacts also played an important role in the diffusion of his cult there. It is not by chance that the English dedications and Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* preserved the French form of his name in preference to the formal Latin Eligius. Finally, and it also should be stressed: our research concerning the cult of St. Eligius in medieval Hungary and England prove that a true picture of the extent of his veneration cannot be given exclusively on the basis of the number of churches that were dedicated to the bishop of Noyon.

²⁴ P. M. Johnston, *Shorthampton Chapel and its Wall-Paintings*, op. cit. 171.

²⁵ D. H. Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints*. 2nd edn., Oxford 1988, 140–141.

Les mouvements de réforme des Bénédictins hongrois au 14^e siècle

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La première Bulle papale portant sur la réforme de l'ordre bénédictin et expressément adressée aux Bénédictins hongrois date de 1225 et provient du Pape Honoré III (1216–1227).¹ Ce document concerne la convocation des chapitres provinciaux suivant le modèle cistercien. Il y est constaté avec insatisfaction qu'en Hongrie les dispositions arrêtées par le 4^e concile de Latran concernant l'organisation des chapitres provinciaux n'étaient peu ou pas du tout respectées. Le Pape confia alors aux abbés de Bulcs et Pécsvárad la convocation d'un chapitre de l'ordre la même année à Madocsa. Il prévoyait que tous les abbés – ou à défaut des abbés les prieurs – des monastères bénédictins seraient tenus d'y comparaître sous peine de sanctions ecclésiastiques. Les abbés des deux monastères cisterciens voisins devaient être aussi invités pour pouvoir assister au déroulement du chapitre. Lors de cette réunion, les présidents du chapitre suivant devaient être également désignés. En outre, le pape Honoré III décréta que tous ceux qui seraient dépourvus de leur office par les visiteurs, pour cause de négligence, devraient être écartés par les évêques du diocèse. Les Bénédictins hongrois commencent donc leurs réformes au 14^e siècle avec la transcription de la Bulle du pape Honoré III datée de 1225.

Le 18 octobre 1327, le chapitre de Nyitra transcrivit, à la demande des abbés de cinq monastères du Nord de la Hongrie (Garamszentbenedek [Hronský Beňadik], Kolos [Klíž], Széplak [Krásna], Zobor [Zombor],² Ludány) le diplôme sus-

¹ L. Erdélyi-P. Sörös, *A pannonhalmi Szent Benedek rend története*. [Histoire de l'ordre de Saint Benoît de Pannonhalma] I–XII/B. Budapest 1902–1916. (dans la suite: PRT) I. n. 76, 663–666; PRT II, 9–10; L. J. Csóka, *Szent Benedek fiainak világtörténete, különös tekintettel Magyarországra*. [Histoire mondiale des fils de Saint Benoît en particulier en Hongrie] Budapest 1969, (dans la suite: Csóka 1969) 544.

² Aujourd'hui en Slovaquie.

mentionné d'Honoré III prévoyant la réunion annuelle des chapitres.³ Cette transcription a été réalisée à l'initiative, à la demande et avec le concours des abbés mentionnés. Les tentatives réformatrices menées au 13^e siècle de l'extérieur, inspirées par le Saint-Siège, ont cherché des solutions aux problèmes propres aux Bénédictins.⁴ On connaît une exception, lorsqu'une mesure a été prise à la suite du rapport d'un abbé de Pannonhalma, mais c'était à l'évidence le fruit de l'initiative isolée de cet abbé. Par contre, un décret édicté suite à une initiative interne et résultant du ralliement de plusieurs personnages n'a pu voir le jour avant le 18 octobre 1327. Il est remarquable que les protagonistes de cette affaire ne sont pas les grands monastères fondés par le roi : parmi ces cinq abbayes seules celle de Garamszentbenedek était de fondation royale, le reste appartenait à des seigneurs laïcs. Cela s'explique probablement par le fait que chacun des monastères en question se trouvait dans le Nord de la Hongrie, sur les domaines ou près des domaines des grands seigneurs provinciaux ; notamment les abbayes de Garamszentbenedek, Kolos, Ludány et Zobor, qui se situait sur le territoire de Máté Csák, tandis que l'abbaye de Széplak relevait de la zone d'influence du seigneur Amadé Aba et ses fils. Ces territoires étaient donc particulièrement exposés, d'abord, à la merci des grands seigneurs, puis aux effets néfastes des luttes unificatrices du roi Charles Robert d'Anjou. Le renforcement politique des grands seigneurs au détriment du pouvoir royal paraissait de plus en plus fort en Hongrie dès les années 1270. Charles Robert d'Anjou tâchait de restaurer le pouvoir royal sur les territoires que les grands seigneurs avaient usurpés en en faisant leurs zones d'influence autonomes. Après que le roi réussit enfin en 1323 à liquider le pouvoir des seigneurs provinciaux, lesdits monastères ont vécu des années plus calmes. Ils ont pu reprendre le mouvement de la rénovation des chapitres, jusque là abandonné, pour améliorer leurs conditions et plus généralement dans l'intérêt de tout l'ordre bénédictin.

Or, il convient de remarquer qu'il existait des monastères bénédictins dans le Nord de la Hongrie,⁵ situés sur le territoire des grands seigneurs provinciaux, mais ceux-ci n'ont joué aucun rôle dans l'engagement du mouvement de réforme lancé par les cinq abbés du Nord de la Hongrie. Parmi les cinq abbayes qui ont sollicité des réformes, quatre se trouvaient sur le territoire de Máté Csák. On peut en conclure que c'est là que la nécessité de la restitution de l'état original s'est révélée la plus urgente. Cette circonstance seule aurait été, bien entendu, insuffisante pour initier une mise au point. Il paraît probable que ces monastères avaient été dirigés par des abbés actifs et consciencieux, fort désireux de régulariser la situation de l'ordre bénédictin, car ils ont choisi comme modèles, parmi les décrets pontificaux d'Innocent III et d'Honorius III, le plus sévère, celui qui a pres-

³ G. Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*. I-XI. Budae 1829-1844, (dans la suite: Fejér) VIII/III, n. 86, 249-250; *Anjou-kori oklevéltár*. [Collection diplomatique angevine] *Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*. 1301-1387. Budapest-Szeged 1990-2002, Vol. XI. (1327) n. 499, 235; Csóka 1969, 549.

⁴ PRT II, 8-9; Csóka 1969, 491-492.

⁵ PRT XII/B, 378, 391, 417.

crit la convocation annuelle des chapitres. Cela se justifiait particulièrement à Széplak, éloigné des quatre autres monastères. Son abbé Szigfrid est celui qui, lorsqu'il devint ensuite abbé de Garamszentbenedek, a participé à tous les mouvements de réforme du 14^e siècle relatifs aux Bénédictins. Sa carrière est tellement liée à la réforme qu'il a été nommé abbé de Pannonhalma en récompense, entre autres, de son activité dans ce domaine.⁶

Certains historiens hongrois supposent que les Bénédictins hongrois tinrent un chapitre de l'ordre dès 1329.⁷ Même si ce fut le cas, le système des chapitres ne put guère fonctionner d'une façon constante, parce qu'en 1332 on retrouve à nouveau une initiative des Bénédictins du pays en ce sens.

Le pape Jean XXII (1311–1334) mentionne dans ses lettres du 22 juin⁸ et 27 juin⁹ 1332 le fait qu'un groupe d'abbés et prieurs bénédictins hongrois s'est récemment adressé à lui, en disant qu'en Hongrie ni les dispositions d'Innocent III ni celles d'Honorius III concernant l'organisation des chapitres de l'ordre n'étaient respectées, et que pour « certaines raisons » il était impossible depuis quelque temps de convoquer des chapitres. Cette période pourrait remonter à l'invasion des Tartares en 1241–1242, et au plus tard à l'anarchie qui caractérise le règne de László IV dit le Couman, de 1272 à 1290. Les « certaines raisons » correspondent probablement à la multitude des petits souverains provinciaux et aux luttes pour la centralisation, très défavorables aux monastères, lesquels se trouvaient déjà à l'agonie depuis l'attaque des Tartares. La preuve que ce n'est point erroné de remonter jusqu'à l'attaque des Tartares est fournie par un diplôme papal de 1344 décidant la reconstruction des monastères qui dépérissaient depuis le temps des luttes contre les Tartares.¹⁰ Bien que les diplômes de l'an 1332 ne répètent pas mot pour mot la Bulle du pape Honorius III, ils en reprennent, pourtant, toutes les dispositions importantes; de plus, le document témoigne d'une référence à Honorius III. Jean XXII décréta en outre que les Bénédictins hongrois devaient tenir un chapitre en 1333 sous la présidence des abbés de Pannonhalma et de Garamszentbenedek, dont l'abbé était déjà Szigfrid, et ainsi de suite dans les années à venir.¹¹

⁶ Sur sa biographie, voir plus spécifiquement: N. Knauz, *A Garam-melleti Szent Benedek-i apátság*. [L'abbaye de Saint Benoît près de la rivière Garam] Vol. I, Budapest 1890, (dans la suite: Knauz 1890) 70–75; V. Fraknói, *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szentszékkal. A magyar királyság megalapításától a konstanzi zsinatig*. [Les relations ecclésiastiques et politiques de la Hongrie avec le Saint-Siège de Rome. De la fondation du royaume hongrois jusqu'au concile de Constance] Budapest 1901, (dans la suite: Fraknói 1901) 165, 194; K. Haiczl, *A garamszentbenedeki apátság története*. [Histoire de l'abbaye de Garamszentbenedek] Budapest 1913, (dans la suite: Haiczl 1913) 37; PRT II, 57–60, XII/B. 100–102, 371; Csóka 1969, 552, 556–557, 589–590.

⁷ Csóka 1969, 549.

⁸ PRT II, n. 105, 370–371.

⁹ Fejér VIII/III, 631–634.

¹⁰ PRT II, n. 130, 397–398.

¹¹ PRT II, 15–16; Haiczl 1913, 15, 37; Csóka 1969, 549–550.

Malgré les tentatives précédemment évoquées, le système des chapitres n'a jamais pu fonctionner correctement. Le pape Benoît XII (1334–1342), le successeur de Jean XXII, a promulgué – pour la première fois depuis les dispositions concernant les Bénédictins du 4^e concile de Latran – une Bulle, intitulée *Summa magistri*, le 20 juin 1336, qui exposait les divers problèmes de la vie bénédictine, y compris les tentatives de réformes nouvelles et globales. Elle est devenue sous l'appellation de *Benedictina*, le symbole des mouvements réformateurs bénédictins du 14^e siècle, malgré le fait que ces décisions soient restées lettre morte presque partout, y compris en France. Cette bulle prévoit à son tour, dans ses premières dispositions, l'organisation des chapitres de l'ordre, mais en adoptant une démarche plus tolérante, conformément à l'esprit du décret d'Innocent III, elle n'envisage que des convocations trisannuelles.¹² La *Benedictina* dispose également sur les chapitres annuels dans les abbayes-mères, quotidiens dans chacun des filiales, sur la consolidation de leur base financière, sur les modalités d'admission dans l'ordre, sur les fonctionnaires de tous les monastères, sur leurs tâches et sur l'organisation de la vie intérieure monastique. Cependant la grande innovation de la bulle consistait à solliciter les études universitaires des Bénédictins. C'est la partie la plus minutieusement élaborée de la *Benedictina*. Les monastères ont été obligés d'envoyer un moine sur vingt à l'Université. Le Bulle papale régleme d'une manière détaillée le mode du choix des futurs étudiants, leurs logements et frais divers, leurs bourses d'études ainsi que le temps prévu pour l'obtention des degrés universitaires.¹³

Un diplôme papal délivré le 11 décembre 1336¹⁴ ordonne le respect des points essentiels de la *Benedictina* pour l'ordre hongrois peut être considéré comme précurseur de l'arrivée de la Bulle en Hongrie (1337). La *Benedictina* arrivera en 1337 en Hongrie. Benoît XII fait fusionner dans une seule province les monastères bénédictins des archiépiscopats d'Esztergom et de Kalocsa. Le pape a confié à quatre abbés bénédictins, dont Szigfrid, abbé de Garamszentbenedek de trouver enfin un lieu convenable pour la première réunion du chapitre de l'ordre, voulue depuis longtemps. Après y être arrivé et tout le monde étant réuni, le chapitre a dû élire un président, étant donné que le rôle des abbés susmentionnés se bornait uniquement à organiser la réunion, sans avoir toutefois la fonction présidentielle. Le fait que parmi les participants se trouve aussi des procureurs montre que le diplôme permet la présence par l'intermédiaire des représentants. Les Bénédictins hongrois se voient habilités par le Pape à renouveler et à suivre les dispositions des anciens chapitres dans la mesure où elles s'avèrent compatibles avec la *Benedictina*. Désormais le Saint-Siège exige des rapports concernant les dépenses et les revenus des monastères afin de pouvoir prescrire le nombre des moines que

¹² Lajos J. Csóka a mentionné les chapitres provinciaux bisannuels. Csóka 1969, 495–496.

¹³ Plus précisément: PRT II, 17–38; Csóka 1969, 495–501, 531. Encore: Haiczl 1913, 37. – l'auteur a daté la bulle par erreur à 1337, en effet cette année est la date de l'arrivée de la bulle en Hongrie.

¹⁴ Fejér VIII/IV. n. 75, 181–187; PRT II, 38. – l'auteur ne fait pas mention parmi les abbés organisateurs, de celui de Garamszentbenedek; Csóka 1969, 550.

les monastères sont susceptibles d'entretenir et combien d'entre eux pourront être envoyés à l'Université.

La lettre notariale des conseillers¹⁵ bénédictins du pape datant du 1^{er} avril 1337 était jointe à la Bulle réformatrice et comportait des dispositions portant sur les modalités d'exécution de celle-ci.¹⁶ On peut supposer que les bénédictins hongrois ont tenu un chapitre provincial dans la même année où la *Benedictina* a été proclamé.¹⁷

Benoît XII dans sa lettre du 15 octobre 1337¹⁸ ordonne à l'évêque d'Eger de récupérer pour l'ordre des monastères occupés par des usurpateurs, d'y installer des moines fiables et d'y faire respecter l'esprit réformateur. Ce processus aurait dû être mis en marche par le chapitre de l'ordre bénédictins, ainsi ce document nous permet-il de nous douter de son efficacité réelle.

Ce diplôme n'est pas le seul à nous avertir des difficultés concernant la réalisation du projet réformateur. Dans un contexte plus large nous pourrions évoquer, en tant que justification, la lettre du haut clergé hongrois de 1338 dans laquelle il porte plainte au pape Benoît XII concernant la politique ecclésiastique du roi Charles Robert. Parmi les atteintes portées contre l'ensemble de l'Eglise le manque des élections du chapitre, la donation du droit de patronage et l'obligation militaire des ecclésiastiques touchent également aux conventions monastiques.¹⁹

Dans l'histoire de la réforme bénédictine c'est le chapitre de l'ordre tenu à Visegrád le 2 juin 1342 qui constitue le premier résultat fidèlement documenté de la lignée favorisant la convocation régulière des chapitres.²⁰ Cette réunion du chapitre s'est occupé de l'affaire des monastères récupérés pour l'ordre par Szigfrid, l'abbé de Garamszentbenedek.

Le large contexte du chapitre de 1342 montre bien que le mouvement de réforme bénédictine ne portait pas uniquement sur l'affaire intérieur de l'ordre. Le simple fait qu'il a eu lieu à Visegrád est signifiant: dans cette ville se trouvait un monastère bénédictin, mais celui-ci était moins important que ceux de Pannonhalma ou Garamszentbenedek. La ville de Visegrád ayant des fonctions d'une capitale pour ainsi dire à l'époque de Charles Robert d'Anjou, on peut dire que le chapitre se déroulait dans le centre royal. Parmi les douze abbés dont nous connaissons le nom, huit dirigeaient des monastères fondés par le roi. Le déroulement de la proclamation de la *Benedictina* en Hongrie était assuré surtout par des organisateurs et des présidents des chapitres venant des monastères de fondation

¹⁵ C'est avec eux que le pape Benoît XII a conféré sur les points de *Benedictina* et ils les ont développé. PRT II, 16.

¹⁶ PRT II, n. 119, 384–385.

¹⁷ Fejér VIII/III, n. 84, 248. – par erreur daté à 1327.

¹⁸ A. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. I-II, Romae 1859–1860, Vol. I, n. 928, 618–619; PRT II, n. 124, 390–393.

¹⁹ Gy. Kristó-F. Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete*. [La mémoire de Charles Robert] Budapest 1988, 186–189.

²⁰ Fejér VIII/IV, n. 309, 604–605; PRT II, n. 128, 395–396; Knauz 1890. 71; PRT II, 38; Csóka 1969, 552.

royale. Ces faits permettent de tirer les conclusions suivantes: au première chef, le chapitre, qui devait sa renaissance au mouvement réformateur et qui le promouvait en même temps, faisait partie de la vie intérieure de l'ordre en 1327, et il était organisé par les monastères de patronage privé. Deuxièmement ledit chapitre sera dirigé par les monastères de fondation royale, il se déroulait au siège du roi sous le contrôle direct de Charles Robert. Il paraît donc que la réforme de l'ordre bénédictin hongrois était une partie de la politique de consolidation du roi à la suite des luttes unificatrices. C'était donc le cas des pays voisins de l'Europe centrale et orientale; en Bohême et en Pologne c'était aussi les souverains qui ont mis en œuvre les réformes monastiques tout en soutenant leur politique.²¹

Avant que le chapitre suivant ait eu lieu Clément VI (1342–1352), successeur de Benoît XII a ordonné le 18 mars 1344 aux abbés, prieurs et abbesses bénédictins d'élire des personnes capables de récupérer et de restituer les droits et propriétés des monastères dépérissant depuis l'invasion tartare, dont le nombre dépassait la quarantaine, les invitant à partager les frais.²²

On peut supposer un chapitre général de l'ordre en 1348, car Ulrik, le nouvel abbé de Dombó, a été élu par la réunion des abbés bénédictins au cours de la même année.²³ Nous ne possédons pas d'autres preuves sur ce chapitre supposé.

C'est bien plus tard qu'une preuve documentaire d'un chapitre suivant celui de Visegrád apparaît le 21 octobre 1366.²⁴ Etant donné qu'on ne s'informe que d'une réunion provinciale en 1342 et d'une autre de 1366, ne pouvant pas prendre pour certain les chapitres supposés de 1337 et de 1348, on peut douter de l'efficacité de la *Benedictina* concernant le mouvement capitral. Cependant un examen détaillé du diplôme du chapitre de 1366 qui contient des informations cachées pourrait en finir avec nos doutes.

Un monastère (Garáb) dont on a des informations issues du chapitre de 1342 se voit de nouveau sous la direction d'usurpateurs. La situation était pire qu'auparavant. Ledit monastère a été pris par Konrad, moine tchèque, dépourvu de lettre de recommandation. Y habitait une femme de mauvaise réputation dont la fille est devenue concubine de celui-ci. Il gaspillait les biens du monastère, et après avoir appris qu'il allait être défait, il a tenté de s'enfuir, en vain car il a été arrêté et transporté à Pécsvárad. Même la vie pécheresse de Konrad peut fournir des informations sur la régularité des chapitres, à savoir qu'il ne s'y présentait jamais. Vu qu'à l'époque du chapitre de Visegrád la vie de ce monastère était conforme aux règles de l'ordre, Konrad a dû occuper la place de l'abbé après 1342, et qu'il ressort des sources qu'il ne fréquentait pas les chapitres, nous pouvons admettre que plusieurs chapitres ont été convoqués entre 1342 et 1366.

²¹ K. Elm, « Les ordres monastiques, canoniaux et militaires en Europe du Centre-Est au bas moyen âge, » in *L'Église et le peuple chrétien dans le pays de l'Europe du Centre-Est et du Nord (XIV^e–XV^e siècle)*, Rome 1990, (dans la suite: Elm 1990) 169, 180.

²² PRT II, n. 130, 397–398; Knauz 1890, 72; Csóka 1969, 589.

²³ PRT XII/B, 432.

²⁴ PRT II, n. 190, 510–513; PRT II, 39; Csóka 1969, 551–553, 558.

Ce fait a été soutenu par l'expression « *pro rite* » qui fait référence au déroulement du chapitre dans le texte du diplôme de 1366, et il suppose aussi une certaine régularité. En plus il en ressort que le chapitre précédent était tenu à Garamszentbenedek, probablement en 1364.²⁵

Loin de parler d'une réalisation parfaite, il est donc à admettre que les dispositifs de la *Benedictina* portant sur la convocation des chapitres ont été plus ou moins respectés en Hongrie. Les procès-verbaux capitulaires non conservés, nous ne connaissons pas les ordres du jour. Un des dispositifs de la *Benedictina* n'a sûrement pas été suivi, notamment celui de l'obligation des études universitaires. On retrouve un nombre très limité de Bénédictins hongrois poursuivant des études à l'étranger. Les universités les plus proches par exemple celle de Vienne et de Cracovie, n'ont pas reçu d'étudiants d'entre eux au cours du 14^e siècle.²⁶

Parmi les pays voisins de la Hongrie en Europe de l'Est en Pologne les réformes ont été lancées sous l'influence de la *Benedictina*, plusieurs monastères formant une congrégation au sens large du terme,²⁷ mais les réformes papales n'ont pas eu beaucoup d'effet.²⁸ En Bohême les abbayes monastiques ont connu une prospérité au 14^e siècle grâce pour la plupart à la politique monarchique.²⁹ La réforme des monastères bénédictins bohémiens était dirigée par l'abbaye de Břevnov; sa compétence ne se limitait pas aux prieurés de sa propre fondation mais grâce aux papes Benoît XII et Boniface IX ont reçu la visitation de tous les abbayes bénédictines bohémiennes.³⁰

En tirant une conclusion générale on peut constater qu'au cours du mouvement réformateur bénédictin en Hongrie du 14^e siècle, parmi les dispositions de la Bulle *Benedictina*, seules celles portant sur la convocation des chapitres provinciaux apparaissent dans le corpus des diplômes de notre pays. Il paraît aussi que ces tentatives, lancées pour la première fois par Innocent III, ont enfin connu un accomplissement vers le milieu du 14^e siècle. L'autre résultat des efforts hongrois consistait en la reprise de quelques monastères perdus, mais on n'en trouve pas de mesures dans la Bulle *Summa Magistri*. Cependant nous pouvons admettre que pour réformer la vie de ces monastères reprises l'on pouvait appliquer les règles concernant le comportement quotidien des Bénédictins.

²⁵ Il est présumable que un chapitre de l'ordre a eu lieu du 1348. Voir la note 22.

²⁶ Même au 15^e siècle on ne connaît que sept moins bénédictins, qui étudiaient à Vienne ou à Cracovie. E. Mályusz, *Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon*. [La société ecclésiastique en Hongrie médiévale] Budapest 1971, 246.

²⁷ Elm 1990, 171.

²⁸ Csóka 1969, 516.

²⁹ Elm 1990, 169.

³⁰ Csóka 1969, 515; Elm 1990, 167.

Places of Authentication (*loca credibilia*)*

TAMÁS KÓFALVI



1. The role and importance of the *loca credibilia*

The places of authentication (*loca credibilia*)¹ were peculiar and long-lasting institutions of the Hungarian legal system. Their formation had a strong connection with the spread of literacy in Hungary as well as to the parallel transformation of the Hungarian legal practices. According to our present conception, their range of activity can hardly be identified with that of any modern official organisations since these institutions, with special roots in the development of Hungarian law, carried out procedures simultaneously covering the tasks of today's public notaries, investigators, and lawyers. As to the definition of the role the places of authentication played in the contemporary administrative system, the literature usually draws parallels with that of the public notaries in Western Europe.² The basis of their activity was, among other things, primarily the prestige created by the literacy of their members and/or the legalising role³ of the written word. Both

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¹ Up to the present, several shorter or longer studies can be read about the charter-issuing activity of the places of authentication, but the completion of a modern synthesis based on detailed research about the particular places of such activity still to be waited. Suggested readings in foreign languages are: F. Eckhart, "Die glaubwürdigen Orte Ungarns im Mittelalter," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung* IX. Ergänzungsband, Innsbruck 1915, 395–558; and Gy. Bónis, "Les autorités de 'foi publique' et les archives des 'loci credibiles' en Hongrie," *Archivum* 12 (1962), 97–104.

² On the history of public notaries in Hungary and their relation to the places of authentication, see I. Barta, "Középkori közjegyzőségeink történetéhez," [On the History of our Medieval Public Notaries] in *Emlékkönyv Szentpéter Imre születése hatvanadik évfordulójának ünnepére*. Budapest 1938, 31–46; J. Köblös, *Az egyházi középréteg Mátyás és a Jagellók korában*. [The Ecclesiastical Middle-Class at the Age of King Matthias and the Jagiellonian Rulers] Budapest 1994, 57–66, (henceforth: Köblös, 1994); Gy. Bónis, "A sasádi tizedper közjegyzői a XV. század derekán," [The Public Notaries of the Tithe Trial in Sasad in the Mid-Fifteenth Century] *Levéltári Közlemények* (1971), 103–113.

³ On the transformation of procedural law in relation to literacy and the development of justification by charters, see A. Degré, "Az irat mint perbeli bizonyító eszköz fejlődése

with private clients and official organisations, the principal token of confidence in the charters issued by the places of authentication was the use of seals possessed by these institutions, earning authenticity in secular legal practices and appearing already in the early phase of their activity.⁴ However, the charters issued by the places of authentication were valid only before secular courts, since ecclesiastical judicature did not accept the authenticity of their seals.

2. *The timescale of the activity of the loca credibilia*

In Hungary the first places of authentication started their activity in the last third of the twelfth century.⁵ The ground-breaking role in their development was, understandably, played by the most important cathedral and collegiate chapters.⁶ However, at the beginning of the thirteenth century other major cathedral and collegiate chapters⁷ followed suit, and from the middle of the same century the convents of outstanding prestige usually of royal foundation also engaged in such activity.⁸

The development of the places of authentication received a significant impetus by Article 21 of the law of 1231 which, in order to avoid malfeasance, ordered churchmen to join the bailiffs (*pristaldus*) in administering official procedures.⁹ The decree of King Louis the Great in 1351 brought a turning point in the growth of the number of places of authentication, since under one of its articles the king had the right to use seals of the smaller convents re-examined.¹⁰ It was needed

a feudális Magyarországon," [The Development of Charter as a Proving Tool in Trials in Feudal Hungary] in *A magyar hivatali írásbeliség fejlődése, 1181–1981*. Magyar Herold – ELTE Történelem Segédtudományai Tanszék kiadványai, Vol. 1, ed. I. Kállay, Budapest 1984, 279–293, (henceforth: MH, 1984); I. Hajnik, *A magyar bírósági szervezet és per-jog az árpád- és a vegyes-házi királyok alatt*. [The Hungarian Judicial System and Procedural Law During the Reign of the Kings of the Árpadian and the Mixed Dynasties] Budapest 1899, 341–377.

⁴ L. Solymosi, "A hiteleshelyi pecséthasználat kezdeteihez," [Contribution to the Beginnings of Seal Usage at the Places of Authentication] in MH, 1984, 91–139.

⁵ For the beginnings of the charter-issuing activity of the places of authentication, see I. Szentpétery, *Magyar Oklevéltan*. [Hungarian Diplomatics] Budapest 1930, 122–125, (henceforth: Szentpétery, 1930).

⁶ Veszprém – 1181; Székesfehérvár – 1184.

⁷ Esztergom – 1208; Győr – 1210; Buda (Budapest) – 1211; Nagyvárad (Oradea) – 1215; Arad (Arad) – 1221; Nyitra (Nitra) – 1224; Zágráb (Zagreb) – 1226.

⁸ On the activity of the Benedictine monasteries as places of authentication an extensive study was prepared by László Solymosi. See L. Solymosi, "A bencés konventek hiteleshelyi oklevéladásának kezdetei," [The Beginnings of the Charter-Issuing Activity of the Benedictine Monasteries as Places of Authentication] in *Mons Sacer 996–1996. Pannonhalma 1000 éve*. Vol. 1, ed. I. Takács, Pannonhalma 1996, 481–498 (henceforth: MS).

⁹ J. Beér–A. Csizmadia, eds. *Történelmünk a jogalkotás tükrében. Sarkalatos honi törvényeikből 1001–1949*. [Our History in the Mirror of Codification. Selections from Our Cardinal Laws 1001–1949] Budapest 1966, 97.

¹⁰ See details in Szentpétery, 1930, 214–215.

because in some ecclesiastical institutions serving also as places of authentication – mainly those convents under secular overlordship and/or those with a particularly small personnel – strong secular influence could be bad to serious doubts about the content of the charters issued there. The defeat at Mohács in 1526 also meant an important milestone in the history of the places of authentication, though the division of the country into three parts in 1541 caused an even sharper break between their medieval and early modern activity.¹¹ As a consequence of the decomposition and/or transformation of the pre-Mohács administrative structures as well as the persistent hot conflicts with the Turks within the country, the archives of the places of authentication partly perished, and partly hidden in places – in most cases under the protection of other ecclesiastical institutions – more secure from the Turkish ravages.¹² Therefore, even if the charter collection of a particular place of authentication remained extant, it was detached, for the whole period of the Turkish occupation, from the everyday life of the territory where the charters were produced and, consequentially, the process of organic development was interrupted. These documents were also in danger of vanishing due to lack of systematic storage, their housing in unsuitable places, and their almost continuous movement from one place to another.¹³ Throughout this period, perhaps one of the biggest problems that the places of authentication had to face was lack of personnel.¹⁴ The troubles caused by this¹⁵ and the necessarily enlarged geographical territories to be covered by their activity were even further aggravated by the general public disorder of the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries. The demand for the activity of the places of authentication and the use of their charters grew significantly after the expulsion of the Turks. In many cases, the charters surviving in the archives of the places of authentication were of great importance for the retrospective justification of proprietorial rights.¹⁶ The places of authentication also played a significant role in the reorganisation of the

¹¹ Up to the present, the basic work on the modern history of the places of authentication is still L. Papp, *A hiteleshelyek története és működése az újkorban*. [The History and Activity of the Places of Authentication in the Modern Age.] Budapest 1936 (henceforth: Papp, 1936).

¹² Naturally, this was not always a trouble-free process as is shown by the calvary of the chapter of Eger between 1596 and 1650. Papp, 1936, 20–21.

¹³ The history of one of the most significant places of authentication surviving the Turkish occupation was studied by L. B. Kumorovitz, "A leleszi konvent országos levéltára," [The National Archives of the Lelesz Convent] *Levéltári Közlemények* (1932), 223–255.

¹⁴ Papp, 1936, 8–17. He listed the causes of the decay of the places of authentication after 1526 as follows: 1) the slackening of discipline in the chapters and convents, 2) the spread of Protestantism, 3) the troubled public order, 4) the Turkish presence.

¹⁵ Cf. Art. 1492/44, and 1552/41.

¹⁶ At that time, the majority of commissions given to the places of authentication was due to the 'neo-acquisition trials'. During the reclamation of proprietorial rights, they were commissioned to write down countless objections and deprivations. On this new role of the places of authentication, see Papp, 1936, 41–42.

administration of the country. Owing to all these factors, the period between the end of the seventeenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries was marked by the renewal of the activity of these institutions.¹⁷ Indeed, due to the – albeit only provisional – revaluation of their role, one can perhaps even speak about their transient second efflorescence.¹⁸ However, the importance of these places of authentication and their organisational dimensions merely shadow their former, fourteenth-century glory.¹⁹ From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, legal literacy gradually slipped into the hands and became the task of secular intellectuals.²⁰ The role of the places of authentication in lower level official administration was rapidly confined by the growing use of the written word in the counties, towns,²¹ and public notaries.²² This process was certainly accelerated by the appearance and advance of the reformed churches in Hungary.²³ As a conse-

¹⁷ For example, the chapter of Nagyvárad (Oradea) from 1693, while those of Pécs and Vác from 1700 onwards revived their activity as places of authentication. However, the restoration of these institutions did not always go without difficulties, since the necessary financial background of their activity and/or the possessions assuring that should have also been restored to the members of these institutions. For the cases of the places of authentication at Turóc (Kláštor pod Znievom), Kapornak (Nagykapornak), and Zalavár, see Papp, 1936, 26.

¹⁸ The extensive readjustment of the activity fulfilled by the places of authentication was accomplished according to the Para. 39–44 paragraphs of the decree issued in 1723 by King Charles III.

¹⁹ It can be stated despite the fact that in the seventeenth–nineteenth centuries new places of authentication arose that were non-existent during the Middle Ages, that is such ecclesiastical institutions gained also the right of issuing charters which earlier were not entitled to do so. Accordingly, for example, on the basis of the Para. 2 paragraph of the Art. 57 article of the law issued in 1647 (reassured by the Para. 3 paragraph of the Art. 56 article of the law of 1741) the chapter at Zengg (Senj), while on the basis of the 15th decree of 1802 the chapter at Besztercebánya (Banská Bystrica), the latter in the place of the charter at Turóc, started functioning as places of authentication.

²⁰ The increasing spread of Protestant as well as Jesuit education and/or the significantly growing presence of the state in education meant a great contribution. The spread of secular literacy effected the way of administration at the places of authentication. In support of the above statement, a good example is the fact that from the seventeenth century onwards it became more or less regular that the clients wrote their avowals at home in their mother tongue and afterwards these avowals were copied word by word into the charters issued by the given places of authentication by this way authenticating the documents.

²¹ To the boom of the charter production of the towns, see B. Bak, "Városi írásbeliség a XVIII. században," [Urban Literacy in the Eighteenth Century] in MH, 1984, 294–310.

²² For the early phase of secular literacy, see A. Kubinyi, "Írástudás és értelmiségi foglalkozásúak a Jagelló-korban," [Literacy and Professional Intellectuals in the Age of the Jagiellonian Rulers] in MH, 1984, 186–208; I. Kállay, "Magánhivatali írásbeliség," [Private Legal Literacy] in MH, 1984, 335–343.

²³ However, the above influence may not have been effecting directly, as in case of having no other possibility it was obvious also for the non-Catholics and the urban citizens

quence of all the above elements, the places of authentication became mere depositories of charters and as such only produced copies of the documents in their custody. Article 35 of the decree of 1874 put a final end to their independent history with its Para. 214 stating that the places of authentication could only prepare authentic copies of the documents preserved in their archives, but could not issue any new charters.²⁴ The activity of the places of authentication embraces almost seven centuries of Hungarian statehood, therefore the charters issued by them represent an extremely rich source-basis for research into Hungarian history.

3. *The loca credibilia and the number of charters they issued*

On the territory of medieval Hungary almost eighty ecclesiastical institutions can be shown to have taken part, for a shorter or longer period, in the issuing of authentic charters. Some thirty per cent of all the documents extant from Middle Ages (1000–1526) are charters issued by chapters and convents, mostly produced as a result of their activity as places of authentication. This percentage likely represents the proportion of actual charter-issuing, as in medieval Hungary a significant part of the charters issued were produced by the places of authentication. This is illustrated in the chart below according to centuries.

<i>Period</i>	<i>Chapters</i>	<i>Convents</i>	<i>Total</i>
1101–1200	4	0	462
1201–1300	3039	536	13886
1301–1400	19422	7383	73260
1401–1500	24487	24109	154499
1501–1526	8945	10689	58874

to turn with their cases to the places of authentication. The impact of Protestantism on the places of authentication was analyzed in Papp, 1936, 11–14.

²⁴ The die-away process at the places of authentication had started earlier, the Art. 35 article of the decree issued in 1874 simply canonized an already settled situation. To prove this statement, László Papp – on the basis of the relevant protocols – mentioned the following data: “[...] the chapter at Esztergom from 1850 till 1854, that is during five years, issued altogether ten authenticated charters, moreover its majority was done for the canons of the chapter. [...] Between 1854–1863 the Esztergom chapter did not function as a place of authentication, while in the following ten years, between 1863–1872, it issued twelve charters, with the exception of three, again all to its own canons. The situation was not much different at any other places. The Zalavár convent from 1861 (restart) until 1867 (end), during seven years, emitted twenty-two charters, and that meant a relatively high number.” Papp, 1936, 50. As a comparison – on the basis of the electronic database prepared by the National Archives of Hungary (MOL) about the pre-Mohács (i. e. pre-1526) charters –, between 1350–1354 the chapter at Esztergom issued 59 charters, while between 1363–1372 this number was 65.




Table 1. *The changes in the charter-issuing activity of the chapters and convents in relation to all extant medieval charters (Item/year)*

The extant material shows that the rate of charter-issuing by the places of authentication grew with decreasing intensity during the Middle Ages. The deceleration was evident, primarily, in the activity of the chapters, which in the case of the convents happened to a lesser degree. These changes are shown in the chart below.

	Chapter	Increase		Convent	Increase	
		db	%		db	%
1201-1250	706			52		
1251-1300	5182	+4476	86	976	+924	94,6
1301-1350	16716	+11534	69	4376	+3400	77,6
1351-1400	21210	+4494	21	9881	+5505	55,7
1401-1450	22733	+1523	6,6	19510	+9629	49,3
1451-1500	25250	+2517	9,9	27488	+7978	29
1501-1526	17454			21004		

PLACES OF AUTHENTICATION (LOCA CREDIBILIA)




Table 2. *The changes in time undergone in charter-issuing activity of the chapters and convents in proportion to all the extant medieval charters*

Due to the this tendency, from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards, the Hungarian convents issued more charters than the chapters usually with higher prestige, education, and personnel. This feature is represented by the chart below.




Table 3. *The shift in the proportion of the charters issued in chapters and convents between 1350-1520*

This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the canons of the chapters were less in the need of the income deriving from the authentication activity than the monks of the convents.

4. *The stages of activity done by the loca credibilia*

The places of authentication carried out their authentication role essentially for two large client-groups, and on that basis two main forms of activity developed.²⁵ One of these groups was constituted by private clients who came to these institutions to arrange their various legal matters (such as buying and/or selling, mortgages (*inipignoratio*), exchanges of immovable/movable goods, arrangements for wills, avowals, etc.), and thereby gained written and authentically sealed evidence, of their case. Certainly, the clients most frequently made their declarations (*fassio*) in the church, but it can also be rightfully presumed that in those cases when many witnesses were involved their reception of happened in the open air. In front of the places of authentication the parties involved could appear not only personally, but also through their authorised representatives (*procuratores*). For these representatives separate letters of commission were drawn up which could be validated for a single case, for a determined period of time, or with general validity.

The other group using the places of authentication was constituted by official bodies involved in legislation²⁶ in relation to actual phases of any legal procedure. The places of authentication, by separate letters of mandate (*mandatum*), were commissioned to carry out different legal actions (such as inspection of boundaries (*reambulatio*), seisin of estates to new owners (*statutio, introductio*), inquiry, transcription of charters, etc.), after which the institutions concerned prepared written reports (*relatio*). In such cases, the place of authentication concerned usually sent its own commissioner, whose task was to act as a witness at the procedure carried out by his secular colleague and on return home to certify that the legal steps of the given process had been carried out.²⁷ Most probably, the selection of witnesses from the places of authentication was determined by various elements collectively. Since the external authentication activity meant several days spent far from the community of the chapter and/or the convent, in a secular environment – resulting in serious trial concerning discipline and the observance of liturgical obligations especially in case of monks – only the most reliable persons were sent for these external tasks. Certainly, the very old and/or

²⁵ On the circle of people using the places of authentication, see in details Szentpétery, 1930, 127–128.

²⁶ Practically, any official participants in the legislative process (king, palatine, seneschal, county, ban, etc.) could call upon the places of authentication to carry out particular legal acts.

²⁷ For an exemplary analysis of the external activity fulfilled by the chapter at Pécs, see L. Koszta, *A pécsi székeskáptalan hiteleshelyi tevékenysége (1214–1353)*. [The Activity of the Cathedral Chapter of Pécs as a Place of Authentication (1214–1353)] Pécs 1998, 105–116 (henceforth: Koszta, 1998).

feeble people, despite their spiritual constancy, were not used for carrying out such external activities. However, maturity was not only essential in order that the person could easier resist the attractions of secular life, but also because during the procedures there was a great need for firm knowledge of composition and writing skills and, at the same time, the commissioners should be familiar with all the details of the appropriate legal procedures. On the other hand, the chapters and convents carried out the different tasks of authentication, above all, obviously, the issue of charters, for money. Clearly this was particularly the case with poorer communities.²⁸ In practice, of course, the quantity of work would have principally determined the circle of commissioners sent out from the places of authentication. If a given chapter or convent was not able to send enough delegates competent in every respect to fulfil the large number of commissions, other people would clearly be sent from time to time. If the number of commissions for external procedures was too great for the places of authentication to confine the work to one of their members, the chapters or convents in question could also commission the priests of the parishes under their jurisdiction to help.²⁹ In the practice of the larger places of authentication, there are examples to be found even for sending out apprentices. Sometimes it happened that the places of authentication carried out external procedures at the request of private persons, though each of such cases had a well-defined reason behind it. Usually, the illness, that is the confinement to bed of the persons giving the avowals – commonly testators – provided the reason for calling a witness from a certain place of authentication. Another reason could be if women wanted to make avowals, in cases they were frightened to travel to the place of authentication due to the dangers of journey.

The scope of activity of the places of authentication covered the territory of the whole country. As in the case of external procedures – in order to prevent possible abuses – more places of authentication were commissioned with the same procedure, the spheres of operation of the places of authentication, in fact, overlapped with each other. The main principle in selecting a place of authentication was that it was situated in the county of the particular legal case. However, this principle was often disregarded if a place of authentication in the neighbouring county was closer. Though four places of authentication (the chapters of Buda and Székesfehérvár, the Bosnian chapter, and the Székesfehérvár Hospitaller

²⁸ Taking into consideration the difficulties of travel in the Middle Ages, the external authentication activity was a tiring job and was not completely safe, therefore those churchmen not necessarily in the need of the income deriving from such activity – having, for example, a lucrative prebend – tried to avoid being involved in such commissions. In the chapters, principally, the simple canons classified by József Köblös as 'serving canons' undertook these tasks. Köblös, 1994, 79–80.

²⁹ In case of appointing parish priests, it was not necessary that the parish church concerned should be under the jurisdiction of the involved place of authentication. In the practice of the cathedral chapter of Pécs, for example, the major criteria of selection was that the parish church should be close to the landed property involved in the particular legal case. Koszta, 1998, 109.

commandery) were given country-wide authority to issue charters, the territorial sphere of action, in principal, was shaped by everyday practice.

The compiling and issue of the charters finalised the authentication processes – both in cases of internal and external cases. In the case of avowals and/or procedures accomplished outside the place of authentication a memorandum was prepared. The draft charters and, eventually, the charters themselves were produced on the basis of these memoranda. In compiling of the charters certain patterns, existing formulae were used collected into separate books – formularies – or taken from documents issued earlier. Several formula-charters are extant written only to provide model texts for the different types of legal cases. The completed charter was read over and, in necessary cases, was corrected by the person in charge, usually the *lector* or his deputy, the *sublector*. From the fifteenth century, the completion of checking was more and more frequently indicated on the back of the charters as well. The language of the charters until the mid-nineteenth century was Latin. Apart from sporadically occurring vulgar expressions, however, from the sixteenth century onwards, certain parts (e. g. attestations) were put into the charters in Hungarian. However, from the seventeenth century onwards, the whole text could be in Hungarian. Para. 6 of Article 6 of the decree issued in 1840 instituted the compulsory usage of Hungarian in issuing charters, even though the places of authentication were by that time hardly in action.

The last, but perhaps the most substantial phase of the process of issuing charters was the authentication itself. The early method was to prepare a chirography (*chirographum*) when the content of the charter was written twice, one below the other, separated by the first letters of the alphabet, and afterwards the document was cut into two through these separating letters. One part of the charter created in this manner was given to the person or institution concerned, while the other copy (*par*) remained at the issuing place of authentication. The most important authenticating instrument was the seal kept by the *custos* or his deputy, the *subcustos*. The seal was most frequently placed on the charters pendantly or impressed. The places of authentication always used one-sided seals. At certain places two different seals were in use simultaneously, the major one (*sigillum maius*) used for issuing letters of privilege and the smaller one (*sigillum memoriale*) employed in any other cases. The seal-figure usually portrayed the patron saint of the given chapter or convent and/or his/her attribute(s). In addition to the seal of the particular place of authentication, on several occasions, the seal of the head of the community, its abbot or provost, was also placed on the charter.

The applicant had to pay for issuing and sealing the charter.³⁰ The fee, primarily, depended on the character and type of the charter itself, that is how richly it was decorated and how elaborately it was composed. From the money paid for issuing the charter the *lector* and the notary (*notarius*) usually got a separate sum. The places of authentication preserved the texts of the charters issued in the form

³⁰ L. B. Kumorovitz, "A leleszi konvent pecsételési- és oklevéltaxa-lajstromai," [The Sealing and Charter Issuing Fee-Registers of the Lelesz Convent] *Levéltári Közlemények* (1929), 312–325.

of copies or through copying them into registers, so later they were able to produce transcripts about the original documents. In the beginning, these copies, together with the treasures of the church, were usually stored in the sacristy. Later, due to the growing number of documents and their more frequent use, they were placed in separate rooms (e. g. in the *scriptorium*). From the seventeenth century onwards, it became quite frequent that the parties involved appeared at a given place of authentication with an already prepared draft, and the institution only composed an introductory and a closing part to the submitted document and gave it back as an already authenticated charter.

5. *The historical value of the charters issued by the loca credibilia*

The charters issued by the places of authentication serve as important sources of general history and of other fields. These documents are especially significant for ecclesiastical historical research. The ecclesiastical historical data to be gained from the charters concerned can be divided into two major groups. The first set of information relates to the places of authentication themselves as ecclesiastical institutions. Nevertheless, in investigating this data, it must be taken into consideration that the charters issued by these places of authentication were official legal documents, thus direct information about these places as ecclesiastical institutions only appeared in the texts to a small extent. However, this makes them even more valuable for church history, since in most cases they convey irreplaceable knowledge from other sources. Such data might have crept into a charter, if the particular place of authentication itself had somehow been involved in the matter.³¹ In particular, it could happen if the place of authentication had acted in the legal case as an ecclesiastical landlord. The charters issued in such proceedings, contribute beyond measure to a better understanding of the landed properties and serving personnel of the chapters and/or convents carrying out the authentication activity.

One of the most significant values of the charters issued by the places of authentication that they make possible a knowledge of the persons playing a role in this activity and thus of the number of people in these institutions. Since, at the end of several charters, in order to increase the credibility of the given document, the dignitaries of the chapter or convent (*series dignitatum*) were also often listed.³² This happened in particular in the case of letters of privilege, that is in charters assuring especially important rights issued in solemn forms.³³

³¹ The places of authentication, though as far as we know there were no relevant legal inhibitions, tried to avoid issuing charters concerning their own matters to prevent later insinuations. Szentpétery, 1930, 127.

³² In case of the cathedral chapter of Pécs, see Koszta, 1998, 110–111.

³³ On the analysis of these lists of dignitary, see Zs. Hunyadi, "A székesfehérvári johanita konvent hiteleshelyi tevékenysége az Árpád-korban," [The Activity of the Székesfehérvár Convent of the Knights of St. John as a Place of Authentication in the Árpadian Period] in *Capitulum I. Tanulmányok a középkori magyar egyház történetéből*. ed. L. Koszta. Szeged 1998, 54–55 (henceforth: *Capitulum I*); T. Kőfalvi, "A pécsváradi kon-

Certain ecclesiastical persons are mentioned in the charters, who, in the majority of cases, did not appear in any other sources, therefore these documents are the major and basically the only source of information concerning them. This cognition is important not only in itself, but because through them significant conclusions can be deduced about the ecclesiastical layer they represent.³⁴

The second set of information to be gained about ecclesiastical history from the charters consists of data about the situation in the various institutions dealt with by the places of authentication. Here the first example to be mentioned are those when other institutions visited a particular place of authentication to have it issue charters about their own legal matters or have it transcribe their own charters. Significant ecclesiastical historical data could get into the documents issued by the places of authentication during the inquiries fulfilled on commission, the audition of witnesses and/or the transcription of letters of mandate. Through the reports on the malfeasance committed against churches, the economy and population of several ecclesiastical properties can be studied.

There are many cases when the places of authentication carried on legal procedures against ecclesiastical landlords, and these are extremely interesting if both the accused and the plaintiff were churchmen or ecclesiastical communities.

Besides church history, the charters issued by the places of authentication can also contain valuable data for local history, genealogy, economic history, linguistics, and material culture.

vent hiteleshelyi tevékenysége az Árpád-korban (1254–1301),” [The Activity of the Pécsvárad Convent as a Place of Authentication in the Árpadian Period (1254–1301)],” in *Capitulum I*, 144–146.

³⁴ From this viewpoint, the investigation of the world of the chapters promises results, since the mobility and economic significance of the monks are much smaller in scale than those of the ecclesiastical middle-class and/or the secular priests. This is discussed in Köblös, 1994.

Francescani, eretici e repressione antiereticale nell' Ungheria del 15. secolo

GYÖRGY GALAMB



Fra i movimenti ereticali diffusi nell' Europa del 15 secolo il più noto è l' hussitismo in Boemia. Questo ha esercitato una grande influenza anche in Europa Centrale e in particolare in Ungheria, mentre l' effetto di altre eresie, per esempio quella di penisola Balcanica è trascurabile. Come vedremo, il carattere dell' eterodossia di Bosnia è discusso, e non vi fu nessun corrispondenza fra le due correnti eppure, tutt' e due s' affacciarono in Ungheria nel 15 secolo.

In questo studio ho intenzione di fare un bilancio storiografico delle ricerche, e di mettere in rilievo alcuni nuovi risultati, non trascurando neanche i problemi rimasti irrisolti, sui quali potranno vertere le indagini ulteriori.

La ricerca sugli eretici presenta diverse difficoltà – in quanto le fonti sono per lo più frammentarie e di seconda mano, create dalla parte avversa.¹ Le fonti relative ai gruppi eterodossi dell' Europa Centrale sono ancor più scarse, manca inoltre la letteratura canonistica e inquisitoriale. Ciò nonostante che la storia politica e dottrinale dell' hussitismo sia stata molto più messa in luce rispetto alle diverse eresie precedenti dell' Europa Occidentale. Le testimonianze di altra natura, per lo più giuridica, rarefatte del resto in un periodo successivo, in certe regioni, anche in Ungheria dalle devastazioni dei turchi, evidenziano la presenza delle eresie solo casualmente. Allo stesso tempo, i nuovi metodi rendono possibile lo studio più dettagliato delle fonti e, in questo modo, il superamento – almeno su certi punti – delle affermazioni della letteratura specifica degli ultimi decenni.

¹ E. Dupré Theseider, *Mondo cittadino e movimenti ereticali nel Medio Evo*. Bologna 1978; Sull' interpretazione delle eresie e degli eretici da parte degli autori ecclesiastici: L. Paolini, "L' eresia e l' inquisizione. Per una complessiva riconsiderazione del problema," in *Lo spazio letterario del Medioevo*. Vol. I, *Il Medioevo latino*, dir. G. Cavallo, Cl. Leonardi, E. Menestò. Vol II, *La circolazione del testo*. Roma 1994, 362–378.

Per quanto concerne l'eresia di Bosnia, essa non può esser considerata dilagata in Ungheria, ma, come vedremo, in una certa misura i suoi riflessi arrivarono oltre i confini meridionali del Regno d'Ungheria. Le fonti relative al funzionamento del potere centrale, come per esempio la corrispondenza fra i sovrani ungheresi ed i papi, e le bolle di quest'ultimi, riportano notizie prima di tutto sugli eretici di Bosnia e sulle ripetute intraprese militari, condotte contro di loro da re Emerico, Andrea II, Luigi il Grande, chiarificando l'*histoire événementielle* delle realtà eterodosse della penisola Balcanica.² Si capisce, che queste intraprese sono la principale preoccupazione delle fonti, e non la descrizione del contenuto dottrinale delle eresie. Le missioni domenicane durante il 13. secolo,³ e nei secoli successivi quelle francescane e la loro vicaria di Bosnia⁴ furono altri mezzi della politica papale nella regione. Le fonti provenienti dai due ordini mendicanti che riguardano le realtà eterodosse ivi esistenti riportano più informazioni, ma sono per lo più scarse e in generale concise o frammentarie.

La diffusione dei movimenti eterodossi in Ungheria ha raggiunto il suo culmine nel 15 secolo. Le manifestazioni precedenti, studiate da György Székely, rivelanoglia all'epoca di Carlo I d'Angiò⁵ l'influenza dei valdesi e dei "bogomili" in Transilvania. Abbiamo notizia, nella seconda metà del 14 secolo della presenza di flagellanti e della graduale diffusione dei gruppi valdesi, prima di tutto nella parte sud-occidentale del paese, nei comitati Somogy, Zala e Vas.⁶ È degno di attenzione, che la traduzione ungherese della parola stessa 'eretico' (*eretnek*), occorre per la prima volta in una proscrizione del comitato di Zala, e la persona coinvolta è designata come Johannes Cheh, cioè Boemo,⁷ il che rivela forse, che le influenze eterodosse arrivarono dalla Boemia anche prima del 15 secolo. Anche le decisioni delle assemblee comitali e i documenti giuridici di tanto in tanto parlano degli eretici. L'attività degli inquisitori Petrus Zwicker e Martinus de Praga mette in luce i gruppi di valdesi presenti in centri importanti come Sopron e Vác.

² F. Šanjek, *Les 'chrétiens' bosniaques et le mouvement cathare, XII^e-XV^e siècles*. Publications de la Sorbonne N. S. Recherches 20, Bruxelles-Paris-Louvain 1976, 72-76; J. V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans. A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*. Ann Arbor 1987, 453-481.

³ Šanjek, 69-71.

⁴ J. V. A. Fine, *The Bosnian Church: a New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries*. East European Monographs 10, New York-London 1975, 180-187; H. Holzapfel, *Manuale historiae ordinis fratrum minorum*. Friburgi Brisgoviae 1909, 143; J. Džambo, *Die Franziskaner im mittelalterlichen Bosnien*, Werl/Westfalen 1991, 77-114.

⁵ Il primo re d'Ungheria (1301-1342), che appartenne al ramo ungherese degli angioini, nipote di Carlo II, re di Napoli (1285-1309).

⁶ Gy. Székely, "Az egyházi nagybirtok újjászervezése" [La riorganizzazione della grande proprietà ecclesiastica], in *Tanulmányok a parasztság történetéhez Magyarországon a 14. században*, a cura di Gy. Székely, Budapest 1953, 364-367.

⁷ Székely, 370.

La sentenza inquisitoriale ci rende note le loro dottrine.⁸ Tuttavia l' infiltrazione dei valdesi in Ungheria potrebbe essersi realizzata anche a partire dall' Austria.

La diffusione dell' hussitismo è ben delineata dalla storiografia precedente per cui non si insisterà sull' argomento. Ne vanno tuttavia menzionati i momenti più importanti. Uno dei fautori più noti di Jan Hus, Hieronymus da Praga ebbe la possibilità di predicare alla corte reale a Buda, davanti a Sigismondo nel 1410. Il re indignato per le parole audaci e le critiche indirizzate alle autorità ecclesiastiche e secolari e istigato dal messaggio di Zbiněk, arcivescovo di Praga, prima l' incarcerò e poi lo fece cacciare dalla corte.⁹ Battista da Sebenico, provinciale francescano di Dalmazia, ricevette delle facoltà inquisitoriali valide anche in Transdanubio il che dimostra la larga diffusione degli eretici. Nella stessa regione, in un piccolo villaggio, a Kzsok, le autorità ecclesiastiche dovettero privare dal rango il parroco del luogo, probabilmente per le sue convinzioni eterodosse. A Zagabria si scoppiarono delle sommosse contro il vescovo e contro la Chiesa.¹⁰ Durante il 15 secolo Sopron resta un centro con notevole presenza degli eretici e Sigismondo vi esiliò vedova di Venceslao, re abdicato di Boemia, la regina Sofia, che simpatizzò con le idee dell' hussitismo.¹¹

Sono inoltre presenti nella parte nord- occidentale del paese dei guerrieri hussiti arrivati o rifugiati dalla Boemia sotto la guida dei condottieri, fra i quali Jan Giskra costruì quasi uno stato indipendente nei dintorni di Trnava, in conflitto permanente con la popolazione indigena, il che ha indotto alcuni autori a ritenere questo il motivo principale della mancata diffusione dell' hussitismo in questa regione. Ci sono infatti solo casi sporadici di radicamento locale e restano pochi i contadini sotto l' influenza dell' eresia, e l' alleanza di nobili con gli hussiti rimane occasionale, come nel caso del castello di Tapolčany.¹²

⁸ J. Házy, *Sopron középkori egyháztörténete*. [Storia ecclesiastica della città di Sopron nel Medioevo] Győregyházmegye múltjából 1, Sopron 1939, 12; Sui valdesi in Austria e in Ungheria occidentale, e la pubblicazione delle sentenze: H. Haupt, "Waldensertum und Inquisition im südöstlichen Deutschland seit der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 3 (1890/1), 337-411.

⁹ Sulla predicazione di Hieronymus a Buda: G. Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*. Vol. X/V, Buda 1843, no. 39; P. Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszi mozgalom és uralom története Magyarországon*. [Storia dei movimenti e del dominio hussiti-boemi in Ungheria] Budapest 1917, 146.

¹⁰ La facoltà di Battista da Sebenico: P. Lukcsics, XV. századi pápák oklevelei. [I diplomi dei papi di XV secolo] Vol. I, Budapest 1931, no. 431; Sui eventi di Kzsok: E. Mályusz, *Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon*. [Società ecclesiastica nell' Ungheria medievale], Budapest 1971, 227-228; Sui eventi a Zagabria: Gy. Székely, "A huszitizmus és a magyar nép," [L' hussitismo e il popolo ungherese] *Századok* 90 (1956), 348.

¹¹ Házy, 11-14; K. Mollay, "Sopron ismerkedése a huszitizmussal" [Sopron fa la conoscenza dell' hussitismo] *Soproni Szemle* 18 (1964), 333-335; L. Verbényi, "A huszitizmus egyik fő támogatója Sopronban," [Una faitrice dell' hussitismo a Sopron] *Soproni Szemle* 21 (1967), 43-47.

¹² Tóth-Szabó, 101, 119, 151.

La storiografia marxista in Ungheria ha accentuato le dimensioni del malcontento religioso, e la connessione con le tensioni sociali. Non è alcuna prova però, che nella rivolta contadina di 1437, la più grande nel medioevo in Ungheria, condotta da Antal Nagy (nominata anche Budai) abbia avuto un qualche ruolo il malcontento religioso, oltre a quello sociale. Le fonti relative agli eretici non evidenziano in una maniera particolare i problemi sociali. Inoltre, la storiografia marxista ha semplificato il contenuto dottrinale delle correnti ereticali, ipotizzando un'impronta esclusivamente taborita, escludendo i calicisti e gli orfaniti¹³ e, al tempo stesso riteneva, che nei movimenti ungheresi si fossero riflesse anche le credenze degli eretici bosniaci, ed ha tentato di dimostrare, che le diverse correnti ereticali, quali l' hussitismo e l' eresia dei cosiddetti "patarini" di Bosnia, si fossero intrecciate in quel periodo.¹⁴ Le fonti però, come vedremo, non giustificano queste concezioni.

Il culmine dei movimenti in Ungheria si verifica alla fine degli anni trenta del 15 secolo. Le fonti provengono per lo più da Giacomo della Marca, vicario osservante di Bosnia fra 1435 e 1438. Entro i quadri dell' ordine francescano, l' osservanza ha cominciato ad espandersi nel territorio ungherese in senso stretto fin dalla fine del 14 secolo, partendo dalla vicaria degli osservanti di Bosnia, fondata nel 1339, proprio nel periodo immediatamente precedente il vicariato del francescano italiano.¹⁵ Giacomo ebbe uno scopo molteplice: la riforma del clero, la riforma dell' ordine e, in veste di inquisitore, la lotta contro gli eretici. Per questo motivo la sua attività provocò gravi conflitti in Bosnia.

Fra le poche fonti ce ne sono due particolarmente preziose, entrambe in connessione con l' attività inquisitoria di Giacomo Marca. Egli ha composto un *Articuli husitarum*, servendosi delle esperienze vissute in Ungheria;¹⁶ inoltre sono conservate nel suo lascito alcune lettere ricevute dai prelati, magnati e re.¹⁷ L' altra sono le *Reprobationes*, un commento scritto dal cardinale Torquemada alle opinioni raggruppate in 38 punti degli eretici di Moldavia. Fra questi eretici c' erano anche quelli che fuggirono dall' Ungheria meridionale per le persecuzioni di Gia-

¹³ Tóth-Szabó, 166; Székely, "A huszitizmus...", 566-569.

¹⁴ Székely, "A huszitizmus...", 557. sgg.; Toccheremo più avanti il problema della prima traduzione della Bibbia in lingua ungherese. Accanto al dibattito vertente intorno al carattere ussita del testo, alcuni storici gli attribuivano impronte dualistiche, dovute agli eretici di Bosnia.

¹⁵ J. Karácsonyi, *Szent Ferencz rendjének története Magyarországon 1711-ig*. [Storia dell' ordine di San Francesco in Ungheria fino al 1711], vol I., Budapest 1922, 311-324.

¹⁶ Vat. lat. 7307; in questo codice si trova una delle versioni del *Dialogus contra fraticellos*. Sulla datazione più precisa: Gy. Galamb, "San Giacomo della Marca e gli eretici di Ungheria," in *San Giacomo della Marca e l' Europa del '400, Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Monteprandone, 7-10 settembre 1994*, a cura di S. Bracci, Padova 1997, 211-220.

¹⁷ Il luogo della conservazione: Napoli. Mettiamo in rilievo prima di tutto quei documenti, che fanno qualche cenno del carattere delle eresie di cui parlano: Fejér, nno. 389, 390, 394, 462; E. Fermeňžin, *Acta Bosnae potissimum ecclesiastica ab anno 925 usque ad annum 1752*. Zagrabiae 1892, nno. 762-764, 767.

como della Marca.¹⁸ I due documenti, molto vicini l' uno all' altro, rendono possibile il confronto del carattere delle diverse correnti eterodosse in Ungheria alla metà del 15. secolo.

Entrambi i testi sono caratterizzati da un pluralismo dottrinale. Quanto all' *Articuli husitarum*, i paragrafi non riguardano infatti solo i taboriti, ma anche i calicisti.

Analizziamo prima la sua "tematica":

- eucaristia e rito: 1-4, 8, 10. (digiuno), 11. (le feste), 63;¹⁹
- la negazione dei sacramenti: 21-22;²⁰
- il rifiuto del culto dei santi e della Vergine: 5-8, 14-15, 28, 30;²¹
- il disprezzo della venerazione delle immagini e della croce: 12, 13, 62;²²
- il divieto dell' omicidio: 10;²³
- la critica del papato: 16-20; 31, 32, 40, 42, 49, 50, 55;²⁴

¹⁸ Le sigle sono riferiti da Th. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, III, Roma 1980. Mi sono serviti i manoscritti seguenti: Vat. lat. 974, 976, 2580, 5606. Su Torquemada: Th. M. Izbicki, *Protector of the Faith. Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata and the Defense of the Institutional Church*. Washington 1981.

¹⁹ Gli *Articuli husitarum* sono conservati nella Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana sotto il segno Vat. lat. 7304. ff. 23r-24v. La loro pubblicazione: Lukcsics, 20-25. 1. *Quod omnes tenentur communicare sub utraque specie*. 2. *Quod in missa sufficit legere solam epistolam et evangelium et sine paramentis et sine viatico et ubique licet celebrare die ac nocte et in domibus et silvis. Et uterque sexus cantat in missa cantilenas*. 3. *Quod layci literati conficiunt corpus et sanguinem Christi et tenent, quod possint conficere*. 4. *Quod consecrabant in vasis ligneis, ubi comedunt et bibunt*. 9. *Quod nullus tenetur ieiunare in vigiliis sanctorum et in quatragesima, quia hoc non precipit deus*. 11. *Quod nullum festum debet celebrari, nisi dies dominicas, quia alia festa inventa sunt ab hominibus*. 63. *Quod portant sanguinem Christi in flaschone de corio [decorio] secrete ad communicandum suos*.

²⁰ 21. *Quod crisma et extrema unctio et aqua benedicta nihil valet*. 22. *Quod fons baptismi est inventio hominum, quia Christus in flumen baptisatus est*.

²¹ 5. *Quod in hostia est sola caro Christi et in calice solus sanguis*. 6. *Quod omnia nomina sanctorum deletunt de missali*. 7. *Quod virgo Maria cum alyis sanctis non possit [potuit] nos iuvare, nisi solus Deus*. 8. *Quod non debemus nos genuflectere beate virgini Marie necque alyis sanctis, nisi soli deo*. 14. *Quod non est necesse signare se signo crucis*. 15. *Quod non debemus adorare reliquias, quia invente sunt ex avaricia*. 28. *Quod virgo Maria pulchre [pulchre] depicta apparet meretrix*. 30. *Quod non oportet credere dicta sanctorum, nisi sanctam scripturam*.

²² 12. *Quod non debemus adorare figuras, quia diabolus est in eis ad derisionem hominum, quia si mittitur asinus in ignem [unguem] fugit, sed crucifixus in truncho comburitur*. 13. *Quod non debemus depingere crucifixum neque crucem*. 62. *Quod venerantes ymagines sunt ydolatre*.

²³ 10. *Quod nullus malefactorum debet occidi, quia [qui] audistis, quod dictum est antiquis, non occides*.

²⁴ 16. *Quod papa non habet maiorem auctoritatem, quam simplex sacerdos, quia dicit: Quorum remiseritis peccata*. 17. *Quod indulgentie non sunt vere nec papa possit dare*. 18. *Quod privilegia papalia non sunt observanda*. 19. *Quod nullus debet esse maior, etiam papa et imperator, quia omnes sumus fratres in Christo*. 20. *Quod neque papa neque imperator possunt facere legem, sed sufficit observare legem divinam*. 31. *Quod ab uno latere carte pingunt Christum pauperem cum asino et ab alio papam cum equis et pompis*. 32. *Quod depingunt papam missam celebrantem et diabolus ministrat ei et demones in circuitu*. 40. *Quod vicarius Christi superbus non est dignus preesse uni adolescentule [adelescentule]*. 42. *Quod ecclesia Romana est simulata et sinagoga sathanae et inventio hominum et mater fornicationis et origo et fons omnis*

– il rapporto fra clero e laici: 22–27, 36, 51. (trasmissione della salvezza); 29 (purgatorio); 33, 38 (scomunica, interdetto); 34 (la negazione del celibato); 59, 60 (la predicazione);²⁵

– la corruzione e la ricchezza del clero: 35, 37, 39, 41, 43–45, 53, 54, 56, 58;²⁶

– la critica del diritto canonico e della gerarchia ecclesiastica: 47, 48, 52, 57;²⁷

– la Bibbia: 30;²⁸

– la proibizione del giuramento: 46.²⁹

La divisione tematica dimostra la mancanza di una struttura definita. La maggior parte dei temi inizialmente trattati e raggruppati ritorna più avanti e più volte, come se alla prima redazione certi particolari fossero sfuggiti all'attenzione dell'autore. Ciò suggerisce, che la redazione dell'elenco ebbe luogo immediatamente sul posto, ancora in Ungheria.³⁰

mali. 49. Quod leges ecclesie narrant fabulationes et papa in talibus non est papa, sed subversor. 50. Quod hi, qui sunt cum papa, sunt increduli lupi et subversores. 55. Quod in curia Romana non sunt pastores, sed perditores.

²⁵ 22. *Quod fons baptismi est inventio hominum, quia Christus in flumen baptisatus est. 23. Quod sacerdos non tenetur dicere officium divinum, nisi pater noster. 24. Quod quilibet laicus et mulier possit audire confessionem et absolvere. 25. Quod non debet genuflectere in confessione ante sacerdotem, nisi ante deum. 26. Quod sacerdotes debent custodire bestias sicuti alii homines. 27. Quod suffragia non valent pro mortuis. 29. Quod purgatorium non est. 33. Quod excommunicatio non est timenda neque observanda, quia [qui] dum homo maledicit: deus benedicit. 34. Quod episcopus possit ducere in uxorem virginem et quod religiones et canonici sunt inventi a diabolo. 36. Quod sacerdos in mortali non possit absolvere. 38. Quod prelati excommunicantes populum dei sunt membra diaboli et antichristi. 51. Quod clerici faciunt se adorare, ut dy, sed Petrus non permisit se adorari a Cornelio et suspendatur cum Haman [Naman] superbo. 59. Quod quando prelati mandant in virtute obedientie invocato Christi nomine, quod non predicent [predicant] capellis, sed potius [potius] debent dicere, invocato diabolo in virtute [et] antichristi non predicare in capellis. 60. Quod quantumcumque [quantumque] sit parvus, potest predicare.*

²⁶ 35. *Quod non debet aliquid offerri in altari etiam candeles, quia symonia est et avaricia. 37. Quod clerici circa temporalia occupati sunt membra diaboli. 39. Quod clerici ostendentes pietatem circa temporalia bona sunt hypocrite et hostes sancte ecclesie. 41. Quod sacerdotes circa decimas et temporalia et honores occupantes sunt heretici. 43. Quod sacerdos habens proprium habet centum demonia in anima. 44. Quod, qui vult absolvi in curia Romana, apportet bursam plenam et absolvetur ab omnibus peccatis. 45. Quod sacerdotes gaudent cadaveribus propter avariciam, sicut corvi. 53. Quod patriarchatus, archiepiscopatus, archidiaconatus, inventi sunt ex superbia et avaricia et sequuntur dyabolum. 54. Quod prelati sunt amatores equorum et feminarum et concubinary uxorum aliorum. 56. Quod sacerdotes sunt pastores prebendarum et non animarum. 58. Quod de ecclesia fecerunt speluncam latronum et celebrant non populo: sed pro pecunia.*

²⁷ 47. *Quod plus vult papa ex auctoritate observari canones: quam novum et vetus testamentum. 48. Quod leges ecclesie sunt contempiones et cavillationes et sunt subversiones recti iudicii. 52. Quod exactiones pape sunt symoniace heresis [...], sed ipsi pietatem extimant. 57. Quod sacerdotes [sunt] simplices subiecti prelati et episcopis possunt predicare [predicere] ipsis contradicentibus.*

²⁸ 30. *Quod non oportet credere dicta sanctorum, nisi sanctam scripturam.*

²⁹ 46. *Quod iuramentum est omnino illicitum.*

³⁰ Più dettagliatamente: Gy. Galamb, "San Giacomo della Marca e gli eretici di Ungheria," in *San Giacomo, della Marca e l'Europa del '400, Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Monteprandone, 7–10 settembre 1994*, a c. di S. Bracci, Padova 1997, 211–220.

Gli *Articuli* da una parte fuor di dubbio dimostrano la presenza delle dottrine taboritiche, quali la negazione del purgatorio (29), dell' ordine ecclesiastico (58) il rifiuto del giuramento (46) e della rappresentazione della croce (12, 13, 14), ma dall' altra se ne distaccano in quanto mancano il chiliasmo e l' antiintellettualismo contro le città e le università che permeavano in misura sempre crescente, le idee taboritiche a cavallo degli anni dieci e venti del 15 secolo.³¹

Al tempo stesso, però, nell' elenco si leggono anche le idee tipiche dei calicisti. Lo provano la lingua dotta, la lingua dell' Università di Praga, da sempre il focolare delle idee utraquiste. I punti 50-54 riecheggiano uno dei discorsi di Jan Hus, che non poté essere pronunciato a Costanza, davanti al concilio, ma che, dopo la sua morte, si diffuse nei circoli eterodossi ed è stato trasmesso dalla cronaca di Petrus Mladenowicz³²

Mladenowicz:

Increduli et subversores sunt tecum, lupi non oves sunt, talium tamen tu pastor utilis consideratio...

Quomodo autem superbiunt clerici a supremo ad infimum adorari cupientes ut dii? prohdolor ocularis monstrat cotidiana conversacio. ubi est Petrus Christi humili vicarius qui Cornelium gentilem coram se procedere inhibuit. ...Et factum est, cum introisset Petrus obvius venit ei Cornelius et procidens [procedens?] ad pedes eius adoravit. Petrus vero elevavit eum dicens: surge et ego ipse homo sum. ... Quocontra Aman superbissimus adorari cupiens ab hominibus factus confusus, patibulo, quod Mardocheo paraverat, est appensus. ... Caveant ergo superbi episcopi, prelati et clerici ne propter superbiam cum Aman superbissimo dampnabiliter suspendantur.

Inde et Simonis questum estimant pietatem dum exacta et data vel caucionata pro gradu episcopatus vel dignitatis altioris magna pecunia ab illis dicitur magna [?] fore gracia.

Unde ad quemlibet talium exclamando sanctus Bernardus super cantica ita dicit:

Articuli:

50. *Quod hi, qui sunt cum papa, sunt increduli lupi et subversores.*

51. *Quod clerici faciunt se adorare, ut dy, sed Petrus non permisit se adorari a Cornelio et suspendantur cum Haman superbo.*

52. *Quod exactiones pape sunt symoniace heresis legi [?], sed ipsi pietatem extimant.*

53. *Quod patriarchatus, archiepiscopatus, archidiaconatus inventi sunt ex superbia et*

³¹ La cronaca di L. de Březina, *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*. I. Abt. Scriptores, VI. Bd, Theil II. Wien 1865, II/I 391, 399.

³² La cronaca di P. Mladenowicz, *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*. II/I. 105-320; il frammento: 307-311.

o elate o ambiciose, sequere ducem tuum dyabolum, omne sublime videant et appetant oculi tui, festina multiplicare redditus, inde Archidiaconatum evola. inde ad Archiepiscopatum aspira...

Equi amatores in feminas et emissarii facti sunt unusquisque ad uxorem proximi sui hiniebat et qui sunt illi, ostenditur ibidem

avaricia et sequuntur dyabolum.

54. *Quod prelati sunt amatores equorum et feminarum et concubinary uxorum aliorum.*

Un'altra considerazione ci rafforza nell' affermare la presenza dei calicisti. Alla fine dell' elenco si trova infatti una versione dei "quattro articoli di Praga", sunto delle loro posizioni. Le coincidenze, per esempio nel caso dell' articolo 4, con la versione di Laurentius de Březina, cronista boemo dell' epoca, evidenziano le influenze tutt' altro che indirette dei circoli universitari di Praga agli eretici ungheresi:

Laurentius de Březina:

"Quarto, quod omnia peccata mortalia et specialiter publica alieque deordinationes legi Dei contrarie, in quolibet statu rite et rationabiliter, per eos, ad quos spectat, prohibeantur et destruantur... In clero autem sunt simoniace hereses et exactiones pecuniarum a baptismo, a confirmatione, a confessione, pro eucharistie sacramento, pro sacro oleo, a matrimonio et a XXX missis taxatis aut ab aliis missis emptis aut forisatis (sic) aut a missis defunctorum, orationibus, anniversariis et sic de aliis, a predicationibus, a sepulturis, et pulsationibus, a consecrationibus ecclesiarum, altariorum (sic) et capellarum, pro prebendis et beneficiis, pro prelati, dignitatibus personalibus, palliis et emtionibus et vendicionibus indulgentiarum et alie innumere hereses, que ex his oriuntur et polluant ecclesiam Christi. Moresque impii et injusti, ut sunt impudici concubinatus, cum augmento profano filiorum et filiarum alieque fornicationes, ire, rixe, contentiones, frivole citationes et hominum simplicium pro lubitu vexationes et spoliationes, avarie censuum exactiones offertorium.

Articuli husitarum:

Quod peccata mortalia manifesta non sunt subicienda maxime in clero, ut symoniaci, hereses, exactiones pecuniarum pro baptismo, confirmatione, confessione, communionem, pro oleo sacro, pro matrimonio, pro XXX missis tassatis vel alys missis defunctorum anniversarys, pro sepultura, pro prebendis et beneficys et prelaturis, dignitatibus, vendicionibus indulgentiarum et alie hereses innumere, que polluant ecclesiam dei, prohibeantur concubinarii, impudici fornicatores, frivole citationes, expolaciones [sic] simplicium hominum, censuum exactiones.

Questo frammento è preceduto dal commento seguente: "*Quod synodus celebrata in placha 1426. die 17. Junij, ubi statuerunt observare usque ad mortem infrascriptos articulos videlicet.*"³³

In base alla datazione, è molto probabile, che si tratti del sinodo tenuto nella chiesa di Týn a Praga nell' giugno-agosto dell' anno stesso, convocato da Zygmunt Korybutowicz, nobile polacco, aspirante al trono di Boemia contro gli "eretici" (cioè i taboriti). Il sinodo ha confermato le tesi di Ján Pribram, maestro dell' università di Praga, propugnatore del credo dei calicisti moderati. Dunque, questa tradizione del testo può esser stata conservata solo da persone appartenenti all' ambiente dell' Università.

Queste precise correlazioni sembrano avvalorare l' originalità del testo redatto dall' inquisitore, benché non si possa escludere categoricamente, pur non essendoci alcuna prova, che l' inquisitore avesse letto le cronache di Mladenowiz e Brzezina.³⁴ È molto più probabile, che si sia informato direttamente attraverso gli eretici interrogati. Un certo disordine del testo e, al tempo stesso, una certa conformità alla realtà del momento sembrano, tuttavia, ribadire la formazione originale del testo stesso.

Non è certamente possibile, da un punto di vista metodologico tener presente solo il contenuto formale dei diversi articoli, nell' individuare la corrente eretica relativa. Nel medioevo gli appartenenti ad un movimento ereticale, determinato da una specifica realtà socio-religiosa, hanno confessato "credenze" formalmente uguali, ma con contenuto e significato particolare. Per questo, qualsiasi corrente eterodossa può esser identificata in base alle diverse "opinioni" solo se quest' ultime costituiscono un insieme specifico, che proprio per la sua essenza particolare caratterizza una corrente data. Tenendo presente queste considerazioni, va notato subito, che nel testo non appare nessuna traccia delle asserzioni dualistiche, ritenute tipiche degli eretici di Bosnia.

Vi sono degli articoli che, formalmente, potrebbero avere una connotazione dualistica, come il rifiuto della croce e della Vergine (7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 28), ma questi sono, in questo caso, innestandosi in un altro contesto, segni caratteristici dell' atteggiamento dei taboriti. Senza scendere nei dettagli dottrinali, per i taboriti dal rigetto della croce, non deriva la negazione dell' incarnazione (il che sarebbe davvero una traccia del dualismo o almeno di docetismo), bensì esso consegue dalla proibizione della rappresentazione di Dio, che si estende anche sul piano degli atti di venerazione. Anche le posizioni ascritte dal Březina ai cosiddetti picardi contestano queste usanze partendo dal timore dell' idolatria.³⁵

³³ Vat. lat. 7307, f. 24v.

³⁴ La biblioteca ben conosciuta dell' inquisitore non contiene né opere, né glosse che dimostrerebbero la familiarità degli autori citati. Sui volumi e sulle opere conservati nella biblioteca. Vedi A. Crivellucci: *I codici della libreria raccolta da S. Giacomo della Marca nel convento di S. Maria delle Grazie presso Monteprandone*, Livorno 1889.

³⁵ *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II/I, 504.: "*dicunt christianos esse ydolatras propter imagines sanctorum et crucem Christi crucifixi*".

A tal proposito i cronisti, per esempio Laurentius de Březina parlano dell' influsso esercitato dai picardi sul movimento hussita. Per questo, alcuni storici distinguono una tappa del "libero spirito" del movimento hussita.³⁶ Alcuni altri autori hanno ribadito che nell' elenco figurano le loro tesi.³⁷ Ma gli atteggiamenti più tipici dei cosiddetti picardi, quali il chiliasmo, l' antiintellettualismo (di cui abbiamo già fatto menzione in relazione ai taboriti), la negazione della presenza eucaristica, i riti orgiastici (accentuati, ovviamente dagli autori ostili verso di loro), mancano negli Articoli. Va anche tenuto presente, che dopo 1421 le opinioni dei gruppi nominati "picardi" furono assorbiti nel complesso delle tesi asserite dai taboriti. Da allora in poi possiamo ritenere ingiustificato parlare di loro come un gruppo ben individuabile fra i raggruppamenti eterodossi, tanto più che gli esponenti più radicali furono massacrati dai soldati di Jan Žižka.³⁸ Le notizie concernenti i picardi risalgono quindi esclusivamente agli anni 1418-1421. C' è dunque un grande intervallo cronologico. Per questo, condivido l' opinione di Robert Lerner, che ha messo in dubbio, in complesso, l' influenza dei picardi sugli hussiti.³⁹ Secondo questo autore i cosiddetti picardi non possono essere giunti dalla Picardia e dall' Artois, dove in quel periodo si svolsero processi solo contro i valdesi. Inoltre, quelli che arrivarono a Praga, vissero nei quadri delle famiglie, il che contraddice ai costumi dei picardi, ma è ammesso dai valdesi. La denominazione 'picardo' può essere derivata così, non dal nome Picardia ma da 'beghardo', la qualificazione dei diversi gruppi eretici presenti nei territori tedeschi vicini alla Boemia, immediatamente prima della vittoria degli hussiti. I partigiani di questi gruppi possono essersi introdotti a Praga in quegli anni. Essi aspiravano alla perfezione individuale d' indole mistica, mentre per loro era alieno il chiliasmo carico delle esigenze sociali, il quale potrebbe essere stato trasmesso agli usiti per altra via.⁴⁰

Gli Articoli husitarum sono stati composti nel 1436 in Transilvania ovvero nelle parti centrali d' Ungheria, ma non in Ungheria meridionale, altrimenti Gia-

³⁶ E. Werner, "Die Nachrichten über die böhmischen 'Adamiten' in religionshistorischer Sicht" in Th. Büttner-E. Werner, *Circumcellionen und Adamiten. Zwei formen mittelalterlicher Haeresie*. Berlin 1959, 79-92; H. Kaminsky, *A History of the Hussite Revolution*. Berkeley-Los Angeles 1967, 353-358.

³⁷ T. Kardos, *A huszita Biblia keletkezése*. [La genesi della Bibbia hussita] A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság Kiadványai, 82. Budapest 1953, 3-4, 24; Székely "A huszizmus...", 557.

³⁸ F. Palacký, *A huszitizmus története*. [Storia dell' hussitismo] Budapest 1984, 295-313; Kaminsky, 431-432 (sull' azione di Žižka.), 454-456. (sulle idee concernenti l' eucharistia che sopravvivevano fra i taboriti); M. D. Lambert, *Medieval Heresy. Popular Movements from Bogomilism to Hus*. London 1977, 321-324; G. Leff, *Heresy in the Later Middle Ages: the Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent c. 1250-1450*, Manchester-New York 1967, II, 701-703.

³⁹ R. E. Lerner, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages*, Notre Dame-London 1972, 119-124.

⁴⁰ I. Döllinger, *Beiträge der Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters*. II. München 1890; *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum* II/I, 391, 399.

come farebbe menzione dei patarini, come lo fanno due lettere suggerite da lui.⁴¹ Egli può esser considerato un esperto in questo campo: scriveva dei trattati contro i bosniaci, e probabilmente conosceva la tradizione trattatistica antieretica francescana.⁴²

L' altra fonte di notevole rilievo di questo argomento sono le *Reprobationes* di Torquemada, composte nell' estate del 1442, che trattano degli eretici in Moldavia. In conseguenza delle persecuzioni di Giacomo, che raggiunsero l'apice nel 1439 gli eretici fuggirono dall' Ungheria meridionale, come narra anche la *Chronica fratrum minorum*, cominciata da uno dei vicari di Bosnia, Balázs di Zalka e scritta poi dai suoi continuatori.⁴³ Si capisce, che i francescani di Bosnia organizzarono più missioni in questa regione per far ritornare all' ortodossia gli eretici fuggiaschi. La nascita del testo corrisponde bene alla cronologia di queste spedizioni: alla fine della prima e, immediatamente precedendo la seconda, nell' estate del 1442.⁴⁴ Le esperienze dei membri della prima missione si riflettono nel proemio del testo, che parla palesemente della possibilità di servirsi dei commentari aggiunti dal cardinale nel campo della propaganda antieretica.⁴⁵ Possiamo, dunque, supporre che nelle *Reprobationes*, almeno in parte siamo di fronte alle idee degli eretici provenienti dall' Ungheria meridionale. D' altronde la Moldavia fu, fin dagli anni venti, luogo di esilio degli hussiti, boemi e polacchi. Questi, da parte loro, si infiltrarono anche in Transilvania, come rivela una lettera del vescovo di quella diocesi.⁴⁶

Questo testo rispecchia tesi eterodosse parzialmente divergenti da quelle che sono identificabili negli *Articuli husitarum*. I punti concordanti racchiudono le idee taboritiche, come la proibizione dell' omicidio,⁴⁷ il rifiuto del giuramento,⁴⁸ che sono peraltro presenti nelle numerose eresie occidentali fin dal 11. secolo.⁴⁹ I due elenchi si accordano pressapoco sul piano ecclesiologico, condannando la

⁴¹ Fermeđžin, nno. 762, 764; Fejér, no. 462. Un' interpretazione delle lettere: Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 248.

⁴² D. Lasić, *De vita et operibus S. Iacobi de Marchia*. Falconara Marittima 1974; Sulla trattatistica francescana relativa agli eretici bosniaci: Šanjek, 140-146.

⁴³ "Tunc etiam duo literati de eadem Kamancze, videlicet Thomas et Valentinus, cum quibusdam hominibus insanis et mulierculis consilio inito, nocte recedentes ad Regnum Moldaviae intraverunt, ubi iidem duo clerici haeresim praedictam seminantes...": Blasius de Zalka, *Chronica fratrum minorum de observantia provinciae Boznae et Hungariae*, in F. Toldy, *Analecta monumentorum Hungariae*. Pesthini 1860, (repr. curavit G. Érszegi, Budapestini 1986), 240.

⁴⁴ *Bullarium Francuscanum*, Nova Series I, 1431-1455, ed. U. Hüntemann, ad Claras Aquas prope Florentiam 1929, nno. 1816, 1818.

⁴⁵ "...petentibus quibusdam religiosi viris sanctitatis tuae nunciis in causis et negociis fidei in regnis Scithie, Bosne et Moldaviae...". É vero che l' introduzione contenente queste frasi (*Prohemium*) manca nella versione del 1442 e figura nelle altre versioni senza datazione: Vat. Ottob. lat. 497. 187r; 718. f. 67r; Vat. lat. 976. f. 71r.

⁴⁶ Fejér, X/VII, no. 389.

⁴⁷ *Articuli*: 10, *Reprobationes*: 5.

⁴⁸ *Articuli*: 46, *Reprobationes*: 19.

⁴⁹ Sul giuramento: P. Prodi, *Il sacramento del potere*, Bologna 1992.

Chiesa di Roma e i poteri che gli aveva concesso il diritto canonico, particolarmente il diritto di scomunicare i fedeli, riprovando la gerarchia; e inoltre, biasimando i preti che hanno commesso peccato mortale, assolvono tuttavia i fedeli.⁵⁰

Quanto alle differenze dei due testi, dobbiamo registrare che nelle *Reprobationes* non sono presenti la tradizione colta, e le idee dei calicisti, rintracciabili negli Articoli husitarum.

Gli eretici di Moldavia sono più radicali nella rivendicazione ai laici del diritto di predicare (pecca mortalmente, chi non predica), giudicano più duramente gli ordini monastici (condannando i fondatori), e si schierano per la partecipazione delle donne nella vita religiosa (possono confessare e dare l'assoluzione).

Uno degli articoli, però, contraddice la concezione dei taboriti sul rifiuto della dottrina della transustanziazione. In origine, a cavallo degli anni '10 e '20 il propugnatore entro il movimento hussita di questo rifiuto fu Martinek Hůska, perseguitato per le sue idee ed infine ucciso. Ma poco più tardi, prima di tutto in conseguenza dell' influsso delle idee di Václav Koranda, la dottrina della transustanziazione e della presenza eucaristica venne scartata anche dai taboriti. Questi ultimi affermarono, che il pane e il vino non contengono "sostanzialmente" il corpo e il sangue di Cristo, ma solo *sacramentaliter* o *figuraliter*. Anche i loro preti ribadirono questa posizione, per esempio durante il dibattito con i maestri calicisti dell' università di Praga nel 1431.⁵¹ Le *Reprobationes* non fanno cenno a questi argomenti; un' altra tesi, però, che è in connessione con le polemiche sulla transustanziazione, ci si trova: "*Dicunt, quod corpus Christi et sanguis post elevationem revertitur ad substantiam panis et vini naturalis.*"⁵² Se i francescani, che hanno riportato quest' opinione, possono ritenersi affidabili, il contenuto di quest' articolo s' oppone alle tesi dei taboriti, secondo i quali il pane conserva la sua sostanza e si trasforma solo in senso seguente: "...*dicimus, quod ... est credendum Iesum eiusque verum corpus et sanguinem in sacramento altaris esse veraciter, sacramentaliter, ac spiritaliter veri panis et vini remanente substantia, non autem cum omnibus proprietatibus tam essentialibus quam accidentalibus...*"⁵³ L' articolo 2 delle *Reprobationes* però non dice affatto che la sostanza del pane rimanga, ma – badiamo bene – afferma che il corpo di Cristo viene ripristinato (*revertitur*) in pane. Da quest'articolo, logicamente, non segue il rifiuto della transustanziazione, perché solo dopo di essa può

⁵⁰ Articoli 36, *Reprobationes*: 26.

⁵¹ L' articolo 20. del 1420: *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II/I, 439; Kaminsky, 454–456. I documenti del dibattito nel 1431 sono pubblicati da A. Molnár–R. Cegna (a cura di), *Confessio taboritarum*. Fonti per la Storia d' Italia 105, Roma 1983. sull' eucaristia: 78–79 (*Confessio taboritarum*), 346–347 (*Articuli sacerdotum Taboriensium supra dictis articulis magistrorum in pluribus contrarii*), 359 (*Responsio sacerdotum Taboriensium ad articulos praemissos sinodi Pragae celebratae per eosdem*). Tutto questo, del resto, contraddice la concezione dei cosiddetti picardi, che secondo il *Tractatus contra errores picardorum* (1422) affermarono: "*Christus verus Deus et homo non possit esse multiplicative simul et semel in pluribus locis in communicantibus.*"; poi dissero che il vero Dio sia presente nell' eucaristia solo *sacramentaliter*: Döllinger, 691.

⁵² *Reprobationes* 2.

⁵³ Molnár–Cegna, 359.

accadere la ritrasformazione. Possiamo dunque supporre che in questo caso affiorino le idee degli orfaniti, una terza corrente del movimento hussita, i quali, oppostamente ai taboriti ed ai calicisti, non hanno abbandonato la convinzione nella transustanziazione.⁵⁴

Gli orfaniti vissero in Moldavia fin dagli anni venti, dopo essere fuggiti dalla Boemia e dalla Polonia. La loro presenza in questa regione ha fatto nascere l'ipotesi, che uno dei loro capi, Peter Payne, ci fosse giunto durante i suoi viaggi.⁵⁵ Al tempo stesso, non possiamo escludere che i gruppi di orfaniti possano essere giunti anche dalla Sirmia, cioè dall' Ungheria meridionale, insieme ad altri gruppi eretici in fuga per le persecuzioni di Giacomo della Marca. Difatti, i condottieri mandatici dall' imperatore Sigismondo nel 1437 per combattere i turchi, furono di quella fede.⁵⁶

Nell' elenco del cardinale Torquemada balza, però, subito all' occhio il punto 16.: *"Dicunt Christum non esse passum, neque vere mortuum"*. Quest' asserzione mette in dubbio la natura umana di Cristo e l' incarnazione. L' articolo non si ricollega agli altri, che accentuano il rigetto della croce e della crocifissione, infatti in quest' ultimi si tratta solo della negazione della venerazione degli oggetti.⁵⁷ È vero che, emerge qualcosa di simile dai picardi: *"non esse memorandam passionem christi Domini"*,⁵⁸ *"Jesus Christus non sit verus deus et homo"*, ma, in contrasto a questo, lo stesso elenco, in un altro punto che connette il problema a quello della presenza eucaristica, accetta che Cristo diventò uomo: *"Christus verus Deus et homo non possit esse multiplicative simul et semel in pluribus locis in communicantibus"*.⁵⁹ Gli ussiti ritenevano, che nel regno di Cristo non ci fosse dolore e, per questo, non viene venerata l' Eucaristia; infatti, i fedeli si nutriranno della memoria della vittoria del Salvatore, e non di quella della sua passione. Né in questa idea si manifesta la negazione della veracità della passione, ma solo di ciò che essa rappresenta, in una prospettiva escatologica.⁶⁰ Non possiamo, dunque, vedere nell' articolo 16 un influsso dei picardi.

⁵⁴ Sulle incongruenze fra le dottrine dei taboriti e degli orfaniti Palacký, 298–314; Lambert, 339. Sulle convinzioni di Žižka, il capo degli orfaniti: Kaminsky, 466.

⁵⁵ Su Payne e sul suo viaggio in Moldavia: S. Fest, "Adalékok az első magyar bibliafordítás kérdéséhez" [Contributi alla questione della prima traduzione della Bibbia in ungherese], in *Angol philologiai tanulmányok – Studies in English Philology*, II, Budapest 1937, 21–41.

⁵⁶ Il diploma reale è pubblicato da Tóth-Szabó, 370–371; Sulla campagna del 1437: P. Engel, "Magyarország és a török veszély Zsigmond korában," [Ungheria e il pericolo ottomano all' epoca di Sigismondo] *Századok* 128 (1994), 284.

⁵⁷ Laurentius de Březina, inserendo uno degli elenchi contenenti delle idee dei picardi, ci fa sapere: "...de signo crucis nihil credunt asserentes quod nec venerari jam crucem in qua Christus pependit ... nec lanceam, nec Christi tunicam in consutilem, nec peplum Marie virginis...; et quod sacerdotes hoc invenerunt propter lucra sua": *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II/I, 504.

⁵⁸ Döllinger, II, 702–703.

⁵⁹ Döllinger, II, 691–692.

⁶⁰ *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II/I, 399.

Senza dubbio siamo di fronte a un' influenza del dualismo, che non poteva arrivare che dalla Bosnia. Apparentemente, non si tratta di un preconcetto inquisitoriale, un topos, che emerse nella mente dei francescani nel registrare le opinioni eretiche, tanto è vero altri punti non contengono delle convinzioni dualistiche. La mancanza di altri articoli caratteristici dei dualisti dimostra, che i missionari in questa occasione sono "innocenti", non influenzati dai topos tradizionali. Torquemada invece non a caso si accorse della carica dualistica dell' articolo, commentando che "*Articulus iste qui fuit primo Manicheorum*" – non assegnando a nessun altro articolo questo contenuto. Così l' influsso degli eretici di Bosnia si rispecchia solo in un punto delle fonti.

Come nell' elenco di Torquemada così nelle altre fonti sono sporadiche le menzioni in territorio ungherese (o a settentrione di esso) di persone o gruppi dualistici. L' attendibilità di queste poche notizie è, per giunta, discutibile. Nel 1414 un signore ungherese, János Maróti si rivolse al papa Giovanni XXIII. La sua lettera riporta che in un territorio presso il fiume Sava vivevano numerosi pagani, che per l' incoraggiamento dei patarini non obbedivano al vescovo di Pécs e non gli pagavano la decima. Per trovare il rimedio supplicò il papa di nominare preposito il rettore della chiesa della sua famiglia e di mettere sotto la sua giurisdizione i parroci del territorio, sottraendoli alla giurisdizione del vescovo.⁶¹ È chiaro che il signore, mosso dai suoi interessi finanziari volle compromettere gli abitanti della zona chiamandoli pagani e patarini.

Le prove di una presenza dualistica potrebbero ritrovarsi nei due diplomi che giustificarono l' attività di Giacomo della Marca. Il diploma dato da László Tamási il 23 settembre del 1437 racconta, che in Ungheria meridionale, in Sirmia, accanto ai cristiani vivono anche greci, hussiti e bosnenses.⁶² L' altra è una lettera di Giacomo, vescovo di Sirmia, (il testo della quale, del resto, è quasi identico a quelle scritte da un altro prelato, Giuseppe, vescovo di Bosnia, e da un signore, László Maróti nell' interesse di Giacomo della Marca) che afferma, che fra i fiumi Danubio e Sava abitano insieme cattolici, greci e patarenos.⁶³ Queste fonti però devono essere prese in considerazione con cautela. La struttura del testo infatti rivela che fu proprio l' inquisitore a far redigere queste lettere come testimonianze positive della sua attività. Egli, ovviamente, fu considerato nel campo dell' "eresiologia" un' autorità incontestabile, l' opinione del quale non poteva esser messa in dubbio. Giacomo, da parte sua, poteva pensare, che, essendo la Bosnia vicina, gli eretici potessero infiltrarsi in Ungheria. Se avesse avuto informazioni di rifugiati arrivati dal Sud del fiume Sava per qualsiasi motivo (per esempio a causa dell' espansione musulmana) sarebbe stato normale identificarli con i pata-

⁶¹ J. Koller, *Historia episcopatus Quinqueecclesiensis*, vol. III, Posonii 1784, 311–313.

⁶² Fejér, X/VII, no. 462. "*mediante nostra conscientia testamur et pollicemur, maiorem partem praedictarum parcium Sirmiae Rascianos inhabitare, licet tamen quaedam civitates et villae christiano nomine fungantur; tamen in quam pluribus Rasciani et etiam Bosnenses cum Christianis mixtim commorantur. Quaedam civitates et villae sectis haereticorum Bosnensium ac Husitarum infectae per plurimos annos extiterunt...*".

⁶³ Fermendžin, nno. 762, 763, 764.

rini, una categoria tradizionale dell'eresiologia della chiesa occidentale e dei francescani.

Negli anni '40-'60 del secolo scorso, ha esercitato una grande influenza fra gli studiosi il fatto che la prima traduzione della Bibbia in ungherese, realizzata alla metà del 15. secolo, avesse forti impronte del dualismo ritenuto tipico degli eretici bosniaci. La cronaca dei francescani sopra menzionata racconta, che

"Tunc etiam duo literati de eadem Kamancze, videlicet Thomas et Valentinus, cum quibusdam hominibus insanis et mulierculis consilio inito, nocte recedentes ad Regnum Moldaviae intraverunt, ubi iidem duo clerici haeresim praedictam seminantes..." e ivi "utriusque testamenti scripta in Hungaricum idioma transtulerunt".⁶⁴

È stata discussa a lungo dagli studiosi ungheresi, se il carattere della traduzione fosse ortodossa od eterodossa. Fra gli anni quaranta e sessanta prevalse la concezione, secondo la quale i traduttori, Thomas e Valentinus fossero stati influenzati anche dalle dottrine dualistiche, che s' affacciano più o meno palesemente nel testo.⁶⁵ Questa concezione è già stata confutata in modo convincente (meno convincente è però il tentativo di porre in dubbio che la nascita del testo, almeno in parte, sia legata ad ambienti hussiti).⁶⁶ Tuttavia in uno dei codici si trova una glossa a margine in lingua ungherese (non della stessa mano dei traduttori, beninteso) che si può a stento interpretare diversamente da una traccia delle convinzioni dualistiche. Secondo la glossa, aggiunta al Libro di Daniele (7: 13-14), "Gesù è tutt' uguale con Dio ed è Dio." Quest' osservazione ha senso solo se la interpretiamo come un' opposizione alle credenze dualistiche e docetiche, le quali non riconoscono l' incarnazione di Dio. Queste evidenze, insomma, sono sporadiche e non dimostrano la presenza massiccia delle dottrine dualistiche, contrastando le affermazioni della storiografia precedente, ma gettano luce sulla loro esistenza e l' infiltrazione casuale ed accidentale nel territorio ungherese.

Queste tracce sporadiche hanno un certo rilievo dal punto di vista delle diverse ipotesi formulate negli ultimi decenni sul carattere degli eretici bosniaci. Alcuni storici negli ultimi decenni hanno messo in dubbio l' immagine tradizionale del carattere dualistico delle credenze dei "krstjani" di Bosnia. Šarjek e Fine hanno giustamente polemizzato con la storiografia precedente, che ha assegnato agli eretici di Bosnia unilateralmente le tesi dei bogomili. Tuttavia, talvolta, in seguito a una lettura forzata delle fonti, sono giunti a conclusioni esagerate, sottolineando come le fonti provenienti dalla Bosnia, scritte in lingua slava autoctona, tacciano assolutamente sui dualisti e dichiarando forzatamente inattendibili le

⁶⁴ Blasius de Zalka, 240.

⁶⁵ T. Kardos, *A huszita Biblia keletkezése*, 9-19.

⁶⁶ S. Károly, "Első bibliafordításunk szellemi szava," [La parola 'spirito' della prima traduzione ungherese della Bibbia] *Magyar Nyelv* (1955), 303-311; F. Szabó, "A huszita biblia és állítólagos patarén elemei," [I pretesi elementi patarinici della Bibbia hussitica] *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 70 (1966), 146-153.; F. Szabó, "Huszita-e a Huszita Biblia" [La Bibbiahussitica fosse davvero hussitica] *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 93 (1989), 118-127.

fonti in lingua latina.⁶⁷ È vero peraltro, che le tracce dei dualisti in questo gruppo di fonti sono tanto scarse, che la concezione tradizionale della presenza massiccia (per lo meno nel 15. secolo) dei dualisti in Bosnia, penetratici partendo da Bulgaria e così identificabili con i bogomili è difficilmente sostenibile. Ma i pochi passi delle fonti redatte in Ungheria evidenziano l' esistenza – sporadica è vero – di gruppi d' indole dualistica sia nella penisola Balcanica, sia in Ungheria meridionale, ai margini della chiesa di Bosnia dei "krstjani", indipendente da Roma e di carattere monastico, con una liturgia di lingua slava, tratti, che rendono possibile attribuirgli – per lo scopo di comprometterla – l' etichetta "dualista".

Tornando al nostro argomento, si può in generale affermare che in Ungheria ci furono tre diverse zone fortemente influenzate dalle correnti ereticali. La prima fu la parte settentrionale del paese, dove i condottieri capeggiati da un certo Ján Giskra, di origine boema, fondarono fra gli anni quaranta e cinquanta quasi uno stato indipendente. Al tempo stesso i suoi soldati stranieri rimasero dei nemici all' occhio degli abitanti indigeni, e perciò il loro hussitismo (taborita e orfanita) poté diffondersi solo molto limitatamente. Quanto alle altre due regioni, la Transilvania e la Sirmia le due fonti principali, l' *Articuli husitarum* e le *Reprobationes* del cardinale Torquemada rendono possibile la comprensione del contenuto individuale delle correnti ereticali ivi propagate. In base agli *Articuli* è possibile sostenere che taboriti e calicisti potrebbero essere diffusi nel centro del paese e nel Transilvania, dove avrebbero potuto ricevere un appoggio dai taboriti residenti in Moldavia. Possiamo supporre a buon diritto che nelle *Reprobationes* si rispecchino invece – almeno in parte – le asserzioni dei taboriti e forse degli orfaniti che prima della fuga nel 1439, vivevano in Sirmia, fra i fiumi Danubio e Sava. Ciò è reso plausibile dal fatto, che i successori di Giacomo della Marca nella sede del vicario della vicaria di Bosnia, avendo evidentemente notizie della fuga del 1439 (come le aveva il continuatore della Cronaca francescana del Balázs di Zalka) organizzarono ripetutamente delle missioni in Moldavia.

Abbiamo visto, che negli *Articuli* si delinea un' immagine dell' eresia in parte di indole intellettuale, che si manifesta nei punti concordanti con il discorso di Giovanni Hus tenuto davanti al concilio di Costanza. Ci sono anche altri articoli che esprimono le esigenze del basso clero. Altre fonti confermano che in Ungheria è spiccatamente alto il numero dei chierici fra gli eretici. Alla fine degli *Articuli* Giacomo della Marca afferma, che fra gli eretici si trovavano ugualmente laici e chierici.⁶⁸ Lo stesso pensava un altro Giacomo, vescovo già menzionato di Sirmia,⁶⁹ in due bolle del papa Eugenio IV a lui inviate ci conserva delle informa-

⁶⁷ Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, passim. Šanjek accentua la contraddizione di una struttura organizzativa tipica delle chiese dualistiche e del sistema dottrinale dei bosniaci, nel quale egli – in base delle fonti autoctone – non scopre le tracce del dualismo. Una valutazione più equilibrata è quella di Lambert, 148.

⁶⁸ "*Quorum omnium hereticorum inter sacerdotes et seculares conversa sunt predicacionibus mei fratris Jacobi gracia dei cooperante homines XXV: m.*": Vat. lat. 7307. f. 24v.

⁶⁹ Fejér, X/VII. no. 443. "... [*Jacobus de Marchia*] in circum vicinis partibus ante dictae Ecclesiae nostrae plurimos haereticos, tam clericos, quam laicos haereticae pravitatis maledictorum Hussitarum [...] diligenti inquisitione reperit".

zioni su di un prete chiamato Andreas Michaelis. Egli (insieme ad altri chierici non nominati) per le sue idee eretiche fu inizialmente escluso dall'ordine ecclesiastico ma, più tardi, avendo abiurato la propria eresia, denunciando pubblicamente quella dei suoi compagni probabilmente ottenne l'assoluzione.⁷⁰ Da una supplica di Balázs da Kamonc veniamo a sapere che Giacomo fece mettere al rogo due presbiteri diventati eretici.⁷¹ Lo stesso supplicante, secondo la *Chronica fratrum minorum* aveva fatto l'università a Praga, da dove tornò in Ungheria infettato (infectus) dall'eresia. La stessa opera racconta che Giacomo inquisitore fece riesumare dalla tomba due parroci, quello di Belcsény (Beočin) e di Szentmárton sospettandoli d'eresia. Il testo menziona che furono due chierici, Valentinus e Thomas a tradurre la Bibbia.⁷² A Kamonc (Kamenica), sulla riva del Danubio scoppiò una vera rivolta contro l'inquisitore la quale portò alla liberazione di tre persone, già attaccate alle pile del rogo, e degli altri accusati dal carcere fra essi il nuovo parroco di Belcsény, Valentino.⁷³

Fatta eccezione per gli eventi di Kamonc (e forse per quelli di Pécs, da dove, ancora nel 1437 l'inquisitore fu cacciato, ma forse per motivi strettamente ecclesiastici, poiché predicò contro la corruzione del clero)⁷⁴ non abbiamo nessuna prova della connessione fra i movimenti sociali e l'eresia. Le fonti concernenti la rivolta contadina di Transilvania del 1437 non fanno nessun riferimento agli eretici. La paura dei prelati di essere trucidati, un motivo che ricorre nelle lettere indirizzate a Giacomo, può esser ritenuta piuttosto un luogo comune.⁷⁵ Oltre alla questione della decima, neanche nell'elenco di Giacomo si manifestano le tensioni sociali.

Dopo l'apice degli anni trenta, l'eresia in Ungheria si presentò nello spazio solo scarsamente e nelle periferie del paese, nel senso sociale solo accidentalmente e sporadicamente, senza diventare una forza simile all'hussitismo di Boemia. Tuttavia, durante la sua dimora in Ungheria Giovanni da Capestrano ricevette informazioni sulla esistenza di hussiti in Transilvania nel 1456.⁷⁶ Ancora, nei dintorni della città Sopron i diversi condottieri ussiti, Konrad Weichtrachter e Hinko Tamfeld rappresentarono a lungo, fino agli anni '60, una minaccia permanente tanto da tentare l'assedio della città stessa. Infine, re Mattia ruppe la loro resistenza e fece seppellire vivi i loro predicatori. Quelli che rimasero in vita, fu-

⁷⁰ *Bullarium* I, no. 306.

⁷¹ *Bullarium* I, no. 1098.

⁷² Blasius de Zalka, 240.

⁷³ Fermendžin, 786.

⁷⁴ Gli abitanti di Pécs furono ammoniti dallo stesso Sigismondo imperatore: Fejér, X/VII, no. 427. Giacomo stesso rievocò le sue predicazioni a Pécs nei suoi *exempla*: S. Jacobus de Marchia, *Sermones dominicales*, Falconara Marittima 1975, intr., testo e note di Renato Lioi, vol. IV, 48, 63.

⁷⁵ Fejér, X/VII, nno. 392, 393, 443.

⁷⁶ B. Pettkó, "Kapisztrán levelezése a magyarokkal," [Epistolario di Giovanni da Capestrano e gli ungheresi] *Történelmi Társ* 34 (1901), 187-188.

rono esiliati in Moldavia, come testimonia la tradizione annotata da un frate francescano di 17. secolo, Marco Bandino.⁷⁷

Alla fine del secolo l'eresia scomparve, ma il malcontento religioso si sfogò in un'altra maniera, innestandosi alla fine del 15 secolo nei movimenti sociali, i quali furono animati dalle predicazioni degli osservanti. Le tensioni sociali sfociarono in una delle rivolte più grandi dei contadini in Europa Centrale, quella condotta da György Dózsa, attorniato da numerosi francescani dell'osservanza.⁷⁸ In questa sede sarebbe troppo esaminare in particolare il paradosso, per il quale l'osservanza francescana, la cui diffusione in Ungheria fu efficacemente promossa anche da un inquisitore e godeva l'appoggio dei signori e dei re, divenne la base del malcontento popolare.

⁷⁷ K. Mollay, "Macskakő - Katzenstein," *Soproni Szemle* 17 (1963), 122-135; 132-134.

⁷⁸ J. Szűcs, "Ferences ellenzéki áramlat a magyar parasztháború és reformáció hátterében," [Un corrente francescano dell'opposizione nel retroscena della guerra dei contadini e della Riforma in Ungheria] *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 78 (1974), 409-435.

The Outline of the Turkish–Hungarian War between 1520 and 1526

FERENC SEBŐK



After the death of King Mathias (1458–1490) the Turkish–Hungarian frontier remained generally peaceful. But the word “peaceful” should not be taken literally. This only meant that large-scale military operations led by the sultan himself did not take place. János Hunyadi dealt an annihilating defeat to the Turkish army, which had been engaged in the siege of Belgrade in 1456, and since then the Turks had been reluctant to launch large-scale military operations against the Hungarian Kingdom. King Mathias had kept the situation along the border firmly in his hands, and Turkish raids aimed at the realm or her frontiers were heavily defeated at the hands of the king’s captains. During the reign of king Wladyslaw II (1490–1516) nothing seemed to have changed, Turkish raids were answered by similar Hungarian incursions into the territory of the Turkish Empire. In fact, the situation was steadily worsening for the Hungarians, the upkeep of the border fortresses and the salary of soldiers took up two-thirds of the king’s revenue.¹

Following the death of Wladyslaw II, his son, the young king Louis II (1516–1526) sought to keep up the peace with the Turks. On 1 April 1519, the last Hungarian–Turkish cease-fire agreement was signed for the duration of three years with sultan Selim, who was engaged with the pacification of his empire after his large-scale conquests in the East.

The situation changed fundamentally in September 1520, when sultan Selim I died, and was succeeded by his son, Suleyman I (the Magnificent). According to Turkish tradition the peace treaty made by the former ruler became invalid, so

¹ The period is dealt in detail in: F. Szakály, “A török–magyar küzdelem szakaszai a mohácsi csata előtt (1365–1526),” [Phases of Turco–Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács (1365–1526)] in *Mohács. Tanulmányok*. ed. L. Rúzsás and F. Szakály, Budapest 1986, 11–57, and also see the literature there.

one of the first things the new sultan did was to send his envoy, Chiaus Behram to Hungary to renew the treaty. At least that is what the sultan said later. In the light of subsequent developments we can safely state that the real aim of the envoy was on the one hand to find out how deep-rooted was the Hungarians' determination to withstand the Turks, on the other hand to lull the Hungarians into a false sense of security. The pretext for the declaration of war was the fact, that the Hungarian king did not give a definite answer to the peace offer of Chiaus Behram, but held him in a sort of respectable captivity in Buda, which was not at all an unusual practice in contemporary diplomacy. However, Suleyman considered this a *casus belli*, and in the spring of 1521, 65 years after the debacle of Belgrade, a Turkish army led by the sultan was heading towards Hungary.

The events of the 1521 campaign are well known: Belgrade, Šabac and Zimony (by now a part of Belgrade) fell, and with this the Hungarian defence system practically collapsed. King Louis II summarised the situation in one of his letters in these words: "Our realm is now open to the Turks on rivers and on dry land, and will not be peaceful and pleasant until Belgrade and Šabac are in the hands of the enemy."² In connection with this I still have to make the surprising contention, that from the Hungarian viewpoint the 1521 campaign should be considered as a partial success. My argument is based on the following. The objective of a war is the conquest of territories. To achieve this goal one must occupy certain fortresses of strategic importance, but occupation is not the goal, only a means to conquer the whole, or a large part of, the country. Consequently, the aim of the defensive party is to seek to prevent all this, in other words, to keep the fortresses of strategic importance to achieve the ultimate aim, the protection of territorial integrity.

If we apply this train of thought to the 1521 campaign, we find that the Hungarian military command managed to reach the ultimate goal, they succeeded in protecting the territorial integrity of the realm (with the exception of Szerémség, Sremska in present day Yugoslavia), but the fortresses of strategic importance fell victim to the war. Of course, this line of thought is only valid if I can prove that the Turks did not only want to occupy a few strongpoints, but wanted to break through deep into Hungary. That is, they did not only want a tactical, but meant to achieve a strategic breakthrough.

In relation to this Turkish sources are extant, according to which the definition of Turkish military objectives took place in a military conference held in Sofia. During the conference the sultan stated that he wanted to march towards Buda itself and intended to break Hungary with a single decisive blow. However, the older and more experienced pashas, especially Grand Vizier Piri drew Suleyman's attention to the fact, that it would be risky to lead the whole army against Buda without taking the border fortresses, primarily Belgrade.³ The most vulnerable point of contemporary armies was the question of supply. If there were

² *Acta Tomiciana*. Vol. VII, Posnan 1857, 306–307.

³ J. Thury, *Török történetírók*. [Turkish Scriptoris] Vol. II, Budapest 1896, 6–9, 42–46, 119–145.

strongpoints in Hungarian hands along the supply lines of the Turkish army, these garrisons would make it impossible to supply the army with ammunition, food and fodder, which could have led to catastrophic defeat. Accordingly, the pashas advised the sultan to take the border fortresses first, and then, to march on towards the heart of the country.

The sultan chose a combination of the two plans, and divided the troops into two army groups: Grand Vizier Piri surrounded Belgrade in the first days of July and started the siege, while the other army group launched the siege of Šabac, with the aim of taking it quickly, which would be followed by throwing a bridge over the river Sava, and intrusion into Hungary proper. The Turks managed to achieve only 50 percent of their plan. Although they took Šabac with a single attack, and built the bridge over the river, Belgrade remained firmly Hungarian during the course of July. To make matters worse, the swollen river Sava swept away the bridge, causing supply problems for the troops, who had already broken into Sremska. The Turkish command received bad news from the reconnaissance units too: in the heart of the country at several points troops were massed with the aim of relieving Belgrade from the siege.

The troops of Palatine István Báthory consisting of border defence units and battalions from southern Hungary were deployed between the rivers Danube and Tisza. János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, who had originally prepared for the defence of Transylvania proper, now having discovered the real Turkish intentions, lined up his forces along the river Tisza. The king left Buda in the middle of July, but marched slowly to make it possible for more soldiers to join his army. There were two factors, which made the centralisation of all forces nearly impossible. One of them was the huge extent of the territory to be defended. When the Turks began their march, it was not clear, whether they would go for the west through the valley of the river Sava, or towards the heart of Hungary, or towards Transylvania. It meant that troops should be held in reserve for the defence of all these territories. By the time it became clear where the Turks would strike, it was too late to concentrate the forces garrisoned along the long border.

The other factor was the question of supply. Food and fodder were quite expensive before harvest. Most of the Hungarian army consisted of cavalry; horses needed an enormous amount of fodder, which was partly transported by the army itself, partly obtained in the vicinity of the theatre of war. Before harvest prices were higher, then they were considerably lower. Therefore a large part of the Hungarian army could only be mobilised in full force now and also in 1526 at the turn of July and August.

The Turkish command being aware of these facts, decided to take Zimony after destroying smaller castles in Sremska, and then to concentrate their forces and to take Belgrade, which would be the prime achievement of the 1521 campaign. This decision was not made because they were afraid of the Hungarian army, which was anyway quite small (although it would be a mistake to underestimate its deterrent value), but because the river Sava had swept away the military

bridge, and because Belgrade was withstanding the siege even at the beginning of August.

At this point, with all the Turkish forces concentrated around Belgrade, a systematic siege began, which consisted of round the clock bombardment of the battlements, attempts at scaling and sapping the walls. The defenders repelled all the attempts at scaling, repaired the destroyed bastions and towers, but their situation grew steadily worse and worse, first they had to give up the city, then the Turks managed to undermine and blow up the strongest bastion, so they had to withdraw to a tower. As their number fell to under seventy, and they were all wounded, and the food and water supply and the ammunition ran out, on 29 August they gave up the fortress when free withdrawal was granted. Now the once proud stronghold of great fame resembled a heap of rubble and debris.

The defenders cannot be blamed for the loss of the fortress; they did everything they could to preserve it. But a successful defence cannot be guaranteed without a relieving force, in the absence of which static defence can fulfil its task for only a limited period of time. Why did the Hungarian army not relieve Belgrade? I have already referred to the problems of concentration of forces. At the moment Belgrade fell the Hungarian forces having grown to several ten thousands were in camp at Mohács, which is about 130 miles from Belgrade. To cover this distance by forced marches an army would need at least 10 days, but in this case soldiers and horses would be exhausted. If they did not cover the distance at forced marches, 20 days would be needed. So the relieving army was simply unable to reach Belgrade in time to prevent its fall! According to some views the Hungarian command was reluctant to engage the Turks in pitched battle. This could really have been the case, but the underlying principle was not necessarily cowardice, but realistic calculation. Contemporary strategy was based on the tradition of Vegetius (*De Re Militari*), according to whom one must avoid pitched battles because of their uncertain outcome. It would have been mere irresponsibility to expose the only existing army of the country to almost certain defeat.

In this situation the Hungarian command made the only possible decision: to wait until the main Turkish forces withdrew and then to attempt to recapture Belgrade. Accordingly, the army stayed in camp at Mohács and waited for the withdrawal of the Turks, which took place in the middle of September, as they did not intend to be caught up in further military operations in Hungary in this part of the year. Suleyman had Belgrade rebuilt, left a garrison of 3,000 there and began his long march home. Now the time was ripe to launch a campaign with the limited objective of retaking Belgrade. However, an epidemic broke out in the Hungarian camp, against which the only solution was to disband the army as soon as possible, but before that everybody made a vow to return the following year to attempt the recapture of Belgrade.⁴

⁴ These events are discussed in detail in F. Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: a vég kezdete," [Belgrade, 1521: The Beginning of the End] in F. Zay, *Az Lándorfeji vár elveszésének oka e vót és így esött*. Budapest 1980, 85–153.

In 1522 the Turks were engaged in the siege of Rhodos, which could have offered a good opportunity to try and achieve this plan. However, the country was paralysed by lack of financial resources. After the loss of Belgrade the king convened the diet, which seemed to have realised how dangerous the situation was and an unprecedented high tax was offered, but people were reluctant to pay it the following year. To make matters worse, the king, in order to meet his short-term financial needs, resorted to debasing of the currency, which totally ruined the country's economy. The king spent a greater part of 1522 in Bohemia to stabilise his power there and to convince the estates to support his efforts against the Turks.

Along the border open warfare began, fortunately the main Turkish forces were occupied elsewhere, so the Hungarians had to face only local Turkish units. Both sides managed to achieve successes in this struggle. In 1522 János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania broke into Wallachia, expelled the pro-Turkish voivode, and helped to crown a pro-Hungarian voivode. The most spectacular Hungarian victory was accomplished in 1523, as a result of the appointment of Pál Tomori as archbishop of Kalocsa. Tomori had been an excellent soldier before he entered the Order of Saint Francis. Now he became responsible for the organisation of the defence of Lower-Hungary. Shortly after his accession to his see, in two battles in Sremska he defeated the army of Pasha Ferhat, who had been looting and pillaging the country there.⁵

Next year, however, the Turks gained an important victory by capturing the fortress of Szörény (now Turnu-Severin in Romania), the last Hungarian-held strongpoint on the Lower-Danube. With this, the first line of defence totally collapsed, the only exception being Jajca (Jajce) in Bosnia, which held out until 1527. The lack of financial resources made it impossible to launch the offensive aimed at recapturing Belgrade, still, efforts were made to strengthen the line of defence. As a result of Tomori's resolution Titel, Szalánkemén and Pétervárad (now all in Yugoslavia) were strengthened to withstand gunfire. The latter could be counted as the main stronghold after the fall of Belgrade.

In 1525 Jajca, which had been under nearly continuous siege, was on the verge of collapse. It was only at the last moment, when Kristóf Frangepán, a former condottiere in Italy managed to relieve it and supply into it with great difficulty. This feat of arms was the last success of the Hungarians before the battle of Mohács.

At the beginning of 1526 reliable information arrived in Buda about the sultan's determination to launch a decisive campaign against Hungary. Pál Bakics Serbian voivode, who had participated in the sultan's military conference, in which they discussed the ways and means to launch a campaign against Hungary, fled to the Hungarian court. He informed the king about what was to be expected. Louis II established contact with all the rulers of Europe in order to

⁵ A. Kubinyi, "A szávaszentdemeter-nagyalaszi győzelem 1523-ban (Adatok Mohács előzményeihez)," [The Victory Of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyalaszi in 1523 (Data on the Precedents of Mohács)] *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* (1978), 194-222.

obtain substantial help against the infidel.⁶ Because of the Habsburg-Valois antagonism, which divided contemporary Europe no substantial aid could be given to Louis II. The king could rely only on Hungary's military force, but the mobilisation and concentration was hindered by the same factors as in 1521: the prelates and noblemen had to wait until the end of the harvest to deploy their units, and those units, which had been garrisoned along the border, were scattered and difficult to concentrate, as the Turks were careful enough to keep their military objectives in secret. Hungarian military command was hesitant, e. g. János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania at first got an order to break into Wallachia and catch the Turks off balance, and then he received another, which instructed him to join the king's forces in Hungary. By the time he managed to find out that the latter order was correct and he managed to mobilise the Transylvanian troops (which faced the same problems as the ones in the rest of Hungary), it was too late. By that time the Turks were closer to the point of concentration than Szapolyai's forces.

The sultan began crossing the River Sava at the beginning of July; then he marched towards Buda, following the line of the River Danube. He took all the castles in his way. The small fortifications did their best to slow down the enemy, but after a few days of resistance they had to be abandoned. Pétervárad (today part of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia) put up the strongest resistance, which lasted for two weeks. Pál Tomori, with his troops numbering about 4,000, had to watch passively the fall of Pétervárad from the other side of the River Danube, as they were too few to hinder it in any way.

Meanwhile the main Hungarian forces were gathering in Tolna, then they marched to Bata, and finally to Mohács. A few days before a military conference was held, where they decided to engage the enemy in pitched battle, even in spite of the great numerical superiority of the Turks. Together with those reinforcements, which arrived on the last day, there were about 24-25,000 troops with the king. Cautious estimates put the number of the Turkish army at 54-55,000, Pál Tomori estimated the combatant forces at 75,000. Contemporaries and military historians of later centuries agree that the Turkish army was followed by a huge number of secondary, auxiliary troops, whom Tomori called "a miserable rabble".

If we take only the main forces into consideration, there was a two- or three-fold numerical superiority. In such a situation the defensive party might have a fair chance of success. But due to its composition, the Hungarian army, consisting mainly of cavalry, was not apt for defence. In these circumstances there was only a very small chance of victory. The only factor the Hungarian army could rely on was the element of surprise.

Because of the relative scarcity of sources we do not know much about the actual battle. In a study I made a new attempt at reconstructing the engagement

⁶ See, e. g. F. Sebők, "Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a mohácsi vész időszakában," [English-Hungarian Relations at the Time of the Battle of Mohács] *Acta Historica. Különszám* (1991), 33-39.

by putting together the pieces of information we possess.⁷ What we know for sure is that the battle began with the attack of the Hungarian cavalry, which took the Turks by surprise, because they had thought that the engagement would take place the following day and had set about making camp. But by the time Tomori could deploy the second battle formation, the Turks had already managed to overpower the Hungarians and make them flee from the battlefield leaving about 15,000 casualties behind. Subsequently the sultan could march on and take Buda without any serious resistance, then he crossed the Great Hungarian Plain between the rivers Danube and Tisza, and in October he left a devastated country behind. The withdrawing Turks were harassed by Szapolyai's Transylvanian troops, but they were unable to cause serious loss to the enemy.

Summing up this phase of Turco-Hungarian warfare we can come to the conclusion that now the characteristics of the struggle have changed substantially. During the time of king Mathias seemingly equal forces faced each other, and the Hungarians were able to keep the Turks at bay. Now the overpowering military potential of the Turkish Empire began to make itself felt. Suleyman's father, Selim nearly doubled his realm, and he left a legacy to his son: to expand towards the west. Suleyman appeared in the European theatre of war and diplomacy as an opponent of the Habsburg dynasty (which meant that he was practically an ally of the Valois), and his main military objective was the capture of Vienna. In order to achieve this goal Hungary's resistance had to be destroyed first. By 1526 Suleyman succeeded in breaking down Hungary, and he was confident, that the next step would be the siege and capture of Vienna. So the first great phase of Turco-Hungarian warfare ended in an unprecedented Turkish victory, and several more decades were to pass, before it became clear that the Turkish Empire was unable to wipe out Hungary. The Turkish occupation, though it lasted for a long time, also marked the beginning of the long decay of the empire of the sultans.

⁷ F. Sebők, "Újabb szempontok a mohácsi csata megítéléséhez," [The Battle of Mohács from a new perspective] in *"Magyaroknak eleiről". Ünnepi tanulmányok a hatvan esztendő Makk Ferenc tiszteletére*. ed. F. Piti, Szeged 2000, 457–471.

Богдан Хмельницкий как „регент Украины”¹

БЕАТА КЕРТЕСНЕ ВАРГА



В 1648 году Хмельницкий, провозглашенный в Запорожской Сечи гетманом, поднял восстание против Польши, которое привело к созданию автономного украинского гетманства и открыло новое измерение в его существовании. Вопрос о том, была ли Украина государством, или же она оставалась только восставшей частью государства польско-литовского, – вопрос чрезвычайно спорный в исторической литературе.² Этот вопрос является важным, потому что положение Украины в период 1648–54 гг. определило и её дальнейшую судьбу.

При переговорах с польскими комиссарами в начале 1649 года Хмельницкий так определял границы „Казацкой Украины” – „река Горынь и Припять, а от Брацлавского и Подольского воеводств по Каменец”.³ Фактически власть гетмана ограничивалась только выше указанными пределами. Во главе украинского народа становился гетман, получающий свою власть от всенародной рады (т. е. народного собрания) и осуществляющий её вместе с казацкой старшиной. Гетман – глава всей исполнительной власти, он обладает также законодательной властью и осуществляет полномочия верховного судьи. Таким образом, на Украине Хмельницкого налицо все три составных элемента государства, – мы видим единую территорию,

¹ *Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Бантыш-Каменским*. Москва 1858, 74.

² Выдающиеся современники этой эпохи уже сознавали, что Украина – государство. Юрий Крижанич в сочинении *«Описание пути от Львова до Москвы»* писал: „...самому царскому величеству не стыдно назваться вечным гетманом Поднепровским, Волынским и Подольским, потому что такое гетманство то же, что и великое княжество, если не царство...”

³ *Летопись с. Величко*. Киев 1848, 173.

единый народ, а также верховную власть, до 1650 г. неограниченную и независимую.⁴

Когда же возникло и как образовалось это новое государство? После побед 1648 года к Хмельницкому явились послы всех соседних государств поздравить его в связи с новым положением. Все послы предлагали гетману союз и покровительство, все стремились использовать окрепшую силу казаков. Это было международным признанием нового государства.

"...послы прибыли в 1649 г. после торжественного въезда Хмельницкого в Киев... Соседние державы признавали его за ... монарха, посылая к нему послов..."⁵

Как же отнеслась к этому Польша? Польско-литовское правительство не признавало Хмельницкого „самодержцем русским“, как он называл себя комиссарам. Только в 1658 г. в Гадяцком договоре с Выговским Речь Посполитая впервые признала „Великое княжение Русское“ равным Великому Княжеству Литовскому и самой Польше.

Несмотря на это, большинство украинских и польских историков считает, что в период 1648–1654 гг. Украина была самостоятельной военно-демократической республикой.⁶

Первым и привилегированным сословием самостоятельной Украины было казачество, доступ в которое во время восстания был возможен для всех. На самом деле, сословные границы исчезли из общественных отношений: все стали равны по правам, отличаясь друг от друга лишь фактическим положением. Отделялись казаки, т. е. отбывающие военную службу, от неказачей, т. е. людей, которые не могли или не хотели её нести. Лишь одно православное духовенство составляло привилегированную группу, но и оно не замыкалось в сословие. Это "однородное" общество разбивалось на полки – деление, преследующее прежде всего военные, но затем и административные цели.

Но такое упрощенное общественное состояние, обеспечивавшее своей простотой значительную степень социального равенства, – не только сословного, правового, но и экономического, – не могло долго сохраняться в силу как внешних, так и внутренних причин: соседние сильные государственные организмы, втягивавшие Украину в сферы своего влияния, должны были интенсивно воздействовать на ее общественный строй, и молодое украинское общество не могло развиваться независимо от социальных тенденций того времени.

В первое время после 1648 года все, кто не был мещанином или духовным лицом, считал себя казаком. Особенно интенсивно пополнились ряды казачества крестьянами, сбросившими с себя феодальные путы, но уже с 1651

⁴ С 1950 г. Хмельницкий фактивно признал над собой сюзеренитет турецкого падишаха.

⁵ А. Я. Ефименко, *История украинского народа*. Киев 1990, 72.

⁶ Н. Б. Розенфельд, *Присоединение Малороссии к России (1654–1793)*. Петроград 1915, 12.

г. старшина начала принимать меры для того, чтобы ограничить переход посполитых в казачество. К 1654 году число казаков определялось приблизительно в 100 тыс., что с семьями составляло около 500 тыс. человек, т. е. половину тогдашнего населения Украины.

Казаки пользовались весьма значительными привилегиями и правами. Они были освобождены от всякого рода податных и натуральных повинностей, неся вместо них военную службу. Они имели исключительное право заниматься некоторыми важнейшими в крае промыслами. Кроме того, их неотъемлемой привилегией было и право свободного выбора всех должностных лиц.

Организации казачества соответствовала организация всей Украины: военно-сословное построение казачества совпадало с административно-финансовой системой всего государства. Основной единицей и территориальной, и административной, и финансовой, и военной был полк, который пришёл на смену прежним старостам. Что касается власти, осуществляющейся на этой территории, то её можно представить в виде трех concentric circles, из которых наибольший радиус имел круг власти генеральной казацкой старшины, средний радиус – полковой и наименьший – сотенной.

Отдельно от городского казачества организовалось Запорожье – „вольный орден”⁷ низовых казаков, над которыми стоял кошевой атаман, пользовавшийся большой самостоятельностью и независимостью по отношению к гетману.

Вторым сословием „Казацкой Украины” было мещанство, в положении которого также произошли перемены. С этого времени мещане постепенно расширяли свои имущественные (напр. право владеть землей) и политические права (напр. большая самостоятельность самоуправлений в судебных делах), и вместе с тем они совершенно освобождались от воинской повинности.

Что касается духовенства, то оно пользовалось в своей внутренней жизни почти неограниченной автономией, так как находилось под юрисдикцией далёкого константинопольского патриарха.

Помимо двух основных сословий – казачества и мещанства – мы видим на Украине остатки шляхты, а также крестьянство. Эти две категории явились во время восстания 1648–1654 гг. в преобразённом виде, т. е. наступало полное социальное переустройство.

В 1649 году Зборовский договор дал полную амнистию всем шляхтичам и обещал, что в будущем должности и чины в воеводствах киевском, брацлавском и черниговском будут раздаваться исключительно местным шляхтичам православной веры. Договор расширял и права православной иерархии, вводя киевского митрополита в сенат Речи Посполитой. Польско-литовское правительство повышало количество казацкого войска до 40 000 и предоставляло гетману право в определённых районах вписывать в казац-

⁷ Там же, 15.

кий реестр и крестьян как королевских, так и шляхетских имений. Часть крестьянства таким путём вводилась в привилегированные ряды казачества, но более многочисленная масса крестьян оставалась по-прежнему подчинённой.

Таким образом Зборовский договор сохранил в неприкосновенном виде тот сословный строй, против которого направляло свои удары восставшее по призыву Хмельницкого крестьянство. Договор сохранял между возросшим по своей численности казачеством и оставшимся под властью помещиков крестьянством ту же резкую разграничительную черту, которая существовала между ними и до восстания.

Исполняя Зборовский трактат, Хмельницкий издал грозные универсалы, которые должны были вернуть крестьян возвращающейся на свои земли шляхте. Но эти универсалы ни к чему не привели, и гетман вынужден был разрешить всем „казаковать”.⁸

Белоцерковский договор 1651 г. явился результатом тяжёлого поражения, которое казачье войско потерпело под Берестечком, поэтому значительно сократились права и льготы восставших, добытые под Зборовом. Число казачьего реестрового войска снижалось по двадцати тысяч и это войско должно было располагаться исключительно в королевских имениях киевского воеводства. На практике, однако, этот трактат оказался ещё менее жизнеспособным, чем Зборовский. Казачество и теперь не вмещалось в рамки условленного реестра, а крестьянство по-прежнему не хотело знать над собой власти однажды изгнанных „ляцких панов”.

После Белоцерковского договора начали складываться две группы владельцев. Одна включала прежних владельцев, а вторая группа державцев – казачью старшину.

А каковы же были политические стремления Хмельницкого? Целью всей своей политики гетман поставил борьбу с Польшей, и с этой целью он, благодаря его громадному дипломатическому такту и умению, создал вокруг себя крепкую стену вольных и невольных союзников. Со стороны Москвы Хмельницкий обезопасил себя непрестанными просьбами о протекции, со стороны Турции – прямым принятием в 1650 г. турецкой протекции, Молдавию он заставил принять брак сына Тимофея с дочерью молдавского господаря, а Швецию гетман натравливал на Польшу.

Однако Украина, отделившись вследствие социальных, религиозных и политических причин от Польши, не могла долго просуществовать самостоятельно.

Само географическое положение Украины, расположенной на равнине, не имеющей естественных защитительных границ и окруженной с юго-запада турецкими вассалами, с запада врагами ляхами, а с северо-востока Москвой, указывало на невозможность долгового самостоятельного бытия. Если бы Хмельницкий добровольно не вошёл в союз с окружающими государствами, его бы поглотили сразу, ибо слишком заманчиво и для Турции,

⁸ *Летопись Г. Грабянки*. Киев 1854, 93.

и для Москвы было бы иметь силу Украины у себя в подчинении. Для гетмана это было ясно с самого начала, и он немедленно начал переговоры с Москвой и Турцией.

Не порывая фиктивной вассальной зависимости от Турции, Хмельницкий начал хлопотать о „протекции“ Москвы. Русско-украинские переговоры имеют долгую историю. Ещё в 1622 и 1625 гг. украинское духовенство, вследствие усиливающихся религиозных притеснений, обращались к царю с просьбой принять украинские земли в своё подданство.⁹

В начале восстания 1648–1654 гг. сам гетман говорил:

„... я думаю, ни у кого нам нельзя просить помощи, кроме москалей... они православные и ради одной с нами веры могли бы за нас вступиться...“¹⁰

Сношения самого Хмельницкого с Москвой начались в 1648 г. в значительной степени под влиянием Константинопольского патриарха Паисия. В 1648 г. он переписывался¹¹ через посланцев с царем, выражая желание видеть „православного христианского государя“ на польском престоле, т. е. мысли о подданстве у гетмана ещё не было, но появилось желание видеть православного царя на троне польских королей.

Одной из существенных задач московских государей была защита православной веры и эта черта проходит через всю политику Москвы. Алексей Михайлович, конечно, был очень рад возникшей на Украине смуте, так как всякое ослабление старинного врага – Польши – служило усилению России. С этого времени царское правительство тайным образом поддерживало казаков, позволяя им селиться в царских владениях и покупать в России хлеб.

На самом деле Москва играла роль друга и поляков и восставших, во любом случае рассчитывая иметь свою выгоду: победят поляки, царь явится искренним другом, всегда находившимся в готовности помочь своим союзникам; победят казаки, они должны быть благодарны Москве за дружественный нейтралитет.

Хмельницкий требовал от царя более прямой политики:

„...хотите воевать с нами..., или хотите быть нашими приятелями? Если последнее, так прибывайте к нам на помощь, а мы, как случись, обязаны будем отслуживать вам во всякое время...“¹² – писал гетман в Москву.

Но на все эти просьбы, которые неизменно сопровождались требованием помощи против ляхов, из Москвы отвечали, что если польский король гетмана и его войско освободит, тогда царь изволит принять их под свою руку. Но и после этого сношения казаков с Москвой не прерывались.

⁹ На ходатайство Иова Борецкого в Москве ответили знаменательной фразой, что „Царь с Патриархом об этом подумают, когда у казаков против поляков будет соединение и укрепление...“ П. А. Кулиш, *Материалы для истории воссоединения России*. СПб. 1879, 230.

¹⁰ Н. Н. Костомаров, *Историческая монография Богдана Хмельницкого*. СПб. 1884, т. I, 72.

¹¹ *Акты ЮЗР*. Т. III, 253.

¹² Костомаров, 79.

В 1648 году Хмельницкий послал в Москву для ведения переговоров Мужилковского, посольство которого было тайной не только для украинского народа, но и для казацкой старшины. Цель миссии Мужилковского состояла в том, чтобы на месте разведать, как русское правительство посмотрит на казацкое восстание и какое значение придаёт ему, и вместе с тем Мужилковский должен был попытаться заручиться помощью.

Со своей стороны, царское правительство, хорошо осведомленное о положении дел на Украине через своих пограничных воевод, видело крайнюю необходимость вступить в сношения с Хмельницким, чтобы узнать о его дальнейших намерениях.

Долго царь не давал ответа казацкому послу, так как он колебался: помогать... но на каких условиях? Какие выгоды в свою очередь может извлечь Москва из этой помощи? Константинопольский патриарх говорил, что Хмельницкий желает поступить под высокую руку государя, а Мужилковский о том ни слова.¹³ Москве надо было иметь точные сведения, чего казаки желают и что может Москва от них получить? С таким запросом был послан к гетману гонец Василий Михайлов.

Царский посол привёз от гетмана грамоту, в которой Хмельницкий просит принять его и всё запорожское войско под высокую руку государя и послать своих ратных людей под Смоленск.¹⁴ Но Алексей Михайлович ответил, что ему ратных людей под Смоленск послать не доведётся, потому что у него с Польшей заключен вечный мир.

Если бы царское правительство хотело помочь казакам – возразил на это гетман – то оно может это сделать, не нарушая мир с Речью Посполитой, таким образом: у государя есть вольные люди – донские казаки; запорожские казаки пошлют их звать к себе на помощь, а царь бы им позволил на помощь прийти.

Этот практический совет казацкой старшины не был принят Москвой. Русские бояре отвечали послу Хмельницкого, что пусть лучше казаки пошлют своих послов в Польшу на сейм и уговорят панов, чтобы вместе с казаками избрали своим королем русского государя, а если у них король уже избран, то они помирились бы на том, чтобы запорожскому войску быть в подданстве Алексея Михайловича без нарушения вечного мира между Польшей и Россией, и если паны на это согласятся, тогда царь примет украинцев под свою высокую руку.

В своей грамоте Богдан Хмельницкий сказал следующее:

„... Да мы и теперь свободны..., теперь в Польше и Литве выбран королем Ян Казимир, которого мы не выбрали, не короновали и креста ему не целовали... Польши и Литвы... опасаться нечего: без нашего запорожского войска везде они будут худы... теперь счастье само даётся в руки государя: без всякого ущерба он может получить большое государство и множество людей... и если государь нас не

¹³ Акты ЮЗР Х, № 8, 172.

¹⁴ Там же, 183.

принимает и от своей милости оттоняет, то нам кажется, что мы православные христиане ему не годны и милостивым к нам быть не хочет..."¹⁵

Хмельницкому не могло не казаться обидным, что Москва не хочет понять его великой идеи, но он всё-таки не терял надежды когда-нибудь привлечь царя к своим планам.

Казацкие посольства в Москву не принесли Хмельницкому каких-либо выгод. Правда, Алексей Михайлович всё время войны украинцев с поляками держал по отношению к нему дружественный нейтралитет, предоставив даже свободу донским казакам помогать ему, но активного участия в событиях не принимал. Почему же русское правительство в течение 6 лет не рискнуло принять Украину под свое подданство, несмотря на просьбы казаков? Вернее всего на этот вопрос можно ответить словами гетмана: в Москве опасались Речи Посполитой, потому что польско-литовское государство причинило России в прошлые годы большое разорение. А кто мог поручиться, что если казаки будут приняты в подданство царя, крымский хан останется спокойным?

В 1651 г. царский посол Богданович уже милостиво похвалил Хмельницкого за желание поддаться к царю, а в этом же году состоялось постановление Земского Собора: в случае, если польский король не удовлетворит многих обид, нанесенных царю, то Собор решит принять Богдана Хмельницкого в русское подданство.

Поражения под Берестечком и Белоцерковский договор меняли отношения гетмана к Москве. До этого времени он добивался помощи царя, хотя бы ценой подданства; когда же это ему не удаётся, он получает необходимое той же ценой от Турции. Но хан в критическую минуту ему изменил, и Хмельницкий остался один. В результате этого с 1652 г. он делался настойчивее и определеннее в своих просьбах к русскому правительству. Но государь отвечал опять уклончиво, предлагая казакам переселиться на свободные земли в Московском государстве. Хмельницкого это не удовлетворяло и в 1653 году он грозил отдаться Турции.¹⁶ Эта настойчивость, наконец, заставила царя принять решение. 14 марта того же года тайно было решено согласиться на домогательство казацкого гетмана, но Москва делала ещё одну последнюю попытку – она уговаривала Польшу примириться с казаками на условиях Зборовского договора, указывая, что в противном случае она будет считать казаков свободными от присяги подданства.

22 июня 1653 года царское правительство послало казацкой старшине грамоту с извещением о согласии на принятие в подданство, 1 октября вопрос ставится на обсуждение Земского Собора, а 8 января 1654 г. Богдан Хмельницкий и всё запорожское войско приводится к присяге.

Такова долгая эпопея русско-украинских переговоров, в которой характерны настойчивость гетмана и нерешительность царя. Чем последняя была

¹⁵ Там же, 222.

¹⁶ Там же, 321.

вызвана? Недостатка в желании присоединить Украину у московского правительства не могло быть – это отвечало и традиционной политике собирания земли, и задачам общей русской политики XVII века – расширения до естественных границ, возвращало Москве Киевскую землю, укрепляло авторитет царя как защитника веры православной, делало границу России более защищенной. Но Москва была осторожна: она боялась начинать войну с Польшей и Алексея Михайловича сильно смущали сношения Хмельницкого с Турцией и Крымом. Но когда стало ясно, что Хмельницкому грозит опасность, вследствие которой он может навсегда отдалиться от Москвы и соединиться с султаном и ханом, Москва, наконец, решилась объявить гетману о своём согласии.

И сам Хмельницкий, убедившись в невозможности отбиться собственными силами от польских притязаний, принял решение окончательно оторваться от Польши и соединиться с Москвой. В свою очередь русское правительство, упорно, несмотря на все просьбы украинского гетмана, уклонявшееся от прямой помощи ему, пока не имело достаточной уверенности в слабости Речи Посполитой и не видело в такой помощи реальных выгод для себя, теперь охотно приняло предложение Хмельницкого о присоединении Украины к Москве.

Официально причиной согласия в решении Земского собора 1653 г. выступила защита „Святых Божих церквей” и нежелание, чтобы „Малороссия” поддалась Турции. Вместе с тем под это нарушение мира с Польшей подводился юридический фундамент – царь объявлял, что так как Ян Казимир не исполнил своей присяги не притеснять православных и не преследовать веры, то тем самым он освободил все православное население Польши от подданства, и „они присягой королевской стали вольны”.¹⁷

„Казацкая Украина”, отделившись от Речи Посполитой, прожила самостоятельной государственной жизнью шесть лет. За это время Хмельницкий уже привык к своему „царственному” положению, но ему более, чем кому-либо, была ясна невозможность долго устоять одному, и волей-неволей в 1654 г. ему пришлось узаконить свои отношения с Москвой.

Украинская старшина хотела бы поставить Малороссию в положение приблизительно такого же вассала Москвы, какими были для тогдашней Турции Венгрия, Молдавия и Валахия. Вассала, обязанного уплачивать своему сюзерену определённую дань и выставять вспомогательное войско, но за то пользующегося полной свободой в своих внутренних делах и даже некоторой самостоятельностью в сфере внешней политики.

В украинской исторической литературе¹⁸ результат Переяславского соглашения 1654 года обычно характеризуется, как династическая уния Украины с Московским государством. Во главе этого вассального государства должен был стоять выборный гетман, носивший свой сан пожизненно и не нуждавшийся в утверждении царя, а лишь извещавший его о своем

¹⁷ Царское правительство таким образом официально назвало Украину.

¹⁸ *Акты ЮЗР X*, № 8, 391.

избрании и приносивший присягу на верность. За пределами этих вассальных отношений Малороссия получала широкую внутреннюю автономию и удерживала самостоятельный социальный строй. Серьёзной новостью в этой области являлись только численное увеличение реестрового казачества и расширение его привилегий.

Сами условия соединения Украины с Москвой на самом деле носили форму скрепленного двумя сторонами договора.¹⁹ Договорные статьи явились результатом длительных переговоров и тщательного обсуждения всех вопросов, в которых участвовали две равные стороны. Эти статьи заключают права и обязанности для каждой стороны, и определяются самим Московским правительством как „договорные статьи“, как трактаты.

Противники теории договора²⁰ указывают на то, что в Переяславе в январе 1654 г. никаких договоров не заключали, а Малороссия раньше присягнула, а потом получила жалованную грамоту, и Москва утвердила статьи.

Читая статьи 1654 г., мы прежде всего видим, что вся установившаяся политическая жизнь Украина сохранялась неприкосновенной. „Малороссии“ обеспечивались не только те права, которыми пользовались раньше „заяснейшими королями польскими“, но и те преимущества, которые она себе завоевала после 1648 г.

Богдан Хмельницкий чувствовал себя гетманом старого типа, представителем не только страны, сколько одной определённой общественной группы, живущей своими обособленными интересами. И это обстоятельство наложило резкий отпечаток на характер условий, привезенных посланцами Хмельницкого в Москву. В ряду этих условий на первом месте были поставлены права и привилегии казачества, сохранение за ним полной свободы самоуправления, своего совершенного независимого суда и всех вообще казацких „вольностей“. За этим следовали просьбы об определении числа казацкого войска в 60,000 человек; о свободном выборе гетмана; о пожаловании гетману на булаву Чигиринского староства, о неприкосновенности казацких земельных имуществ и о назначении жалованья всему войску казацкому. Наряду с этим в „статьях“ Хмельницкого говорилось и о других отраслях управления и о других общественных классах, но уже далеко не с такой обстоятельностью.

При таких широких правах, выговоренных себе Малороссией, она, присягая на вечное подданство царю и его наследникам, обязывалась им „служить, прямить и всякого добра хотеть“. Не так было на практике. Во все время гетманства Хмельницкого число казаков осталось неограниченным и сам гетман определял его более 100 тысяч; местные сборы поступали в бесконтрольное распоряжение гетмана и никакого жалованья из этих сумм

¹⁹ Д. Н. Эварницкий, *История запорожских казаков*. Т. I–III. Спб. 1895; М. Грушевский, *Исторія України-Руси*. Том 9. Київ 1928.

²⁰ Розенфельд, 30.

войску не уплачивалось, вместе с тем, в своих международных дипломатических отношениях гетман выходил далеко за рамки договорных статей.

Сам Хмельницкий смотрел на эту связь с Москвой как на вассальную зависимость. Он действительно не исполнил указа царя соединиться с русской армией, ссорился с московскими воеводами. Когда Москва заключила перемирие с Польшей и обратила свои силы против Швеции, Хмельницкий заключил договор с Швецией и Ракоци о тройственном разделе Речи Посполитой. В отношениях с Карлом и Ракоци гетман чувствовал себя как равный с равным, несмотря на присоединение Украины к Москве, а с царем он чувствовал себя стесненным.

Но тройственный союз распался и Хмельницкий осознал бесполезность одиночной борьбы с Польшей. В то же время Москва оставалась во всё его гетманство корректной и спокойной. Она не забывала, что гетман принял царское подданство "по добровольному и непринужденному изволению своему". Но когда Богдан Хмельницкий умер, Алексей Михайлович немедленно предъявлял свои притязания на точное исполнение Переяславского договора и начинал активно проводить свой взгляд на этот договор, как на средство подчинения.

Невозможность самостоятельной, независимой жизни стала ясной после 6-летней жизни „без государя“ (т. е. царя) и необходимость жить под защитой другого, сильного государства была признаваема казацкой старшиной. Но союзом и подчинением Москве многие были недовольны – одни из-за польско-шляхетский симпатий (духовенство), другие из-за боязни полного подчинения (некоторые полковники). Рядом с недовольством Москвой уже в ту эпоху намечалось стремление опереться на Турцию, что впоследствии использовал Дорошенко, и на Швецию – торная дорожка для Мазепы.

Les officiers du génie français et la Hongrie au 18^e siècle

LAJOS KÖVÉR



L'étude de l'image de la Hongrie au 18^e siècle ne peut se faire sans examiner le niveau de développement technique. En effet, ce critère revêtait une importance primordiale au siècle des Lumières, et avait même une valeur référentielle surtout lorsqu'on parlait d'un pays étranger. On retrouve aussi cette notion dans l'Encyclopédie dont le sous-titre (*Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*) signale déjà une sorte d'égalité entre les sciences, les arts et les métiers.¹

Bien que les origines de l'implantation du génie moderne remontent en Hongrie à l'époque de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi (1703–1711), les idées du Prince dans ce domaine ne se sont réalisées que vers le milieu du 18^e siècle sous l'effet des mesures de politique culturelle de Marie-Thérèse. Nous devons en même temps tenir compte des guerres turques de la fin du 17^e siècle puisqu'on trouvait encore en Hongrie, durant les premières décennies du 18^e siècle, bon nombre d'experts militaires français qui avaient participé aux opérations lancées à la fin du siècle précédent en vue d'expulser les Turcs.

Pour cette raison, on trouve des noms de famille français chez des personnes ayant servi soit dans l'armée impériale, soit dans l'administration camérale. On peut citer par exemple le nom du général Mortaigne qui fut promu en 1691 commandant de la forteresse de Szeged. Mais au cours de cette année-là, il fut blessé dans une bataille contre les Turcs et il mourut. Il fut enterré à l'église des Franciscains à Szeged.

Au cours de cette période, plusieurs ingénieurs militaires français ont également travaillé en Hongrie. Ils y ont dirigé les travaux de fortification ou de démolition de châteaux après le départ des Turcs. Le plan de reconstruction de la forteresse de Szeged fut élaboré par un officier du génie français du nom de De la Croix Paitis. Son nom est aussi lié à une carte de 1713, représentant la Hongrie du Sud. La présence militaire française se fait aussi signaler par le fait que de nom-

¹ Cf. le *Discours préliminaire* de l'*Encyclopédie*, écrit par D'Alembert. Cf. encore K. Simonyi, *A fizika kultúrtörténete*. [Histoire culturelle de la physique] Budapest 1986, 293–301.

breux soldats ayant des noms français ont servi dans les garnisons de Hongrie. La garnison de Szeged a compté entre 1731 et 1733 des soldats du régiment de Lorraine. Il est évident que des Français de Lorraine ont aussi servi dans ce régiment. Ce n'est donc pas le fait du hasard si on trouve des épitaphes de quelques soldats français dans l'église des Franciscains de Szeged.²

La guerre d'indépendance du prince François II de Rákóczi, qui a éclaté juste après la libération du joug turc, n'a pas pu se passer des relations avec l'étranger. Les raisons principales de cette attitude relevaient de la politique militaire. Ainsi la diversion hongroise devint une alliée « évidente » de Louis XIV qui luttait à cette époque pour la succession espagnole. Un des premiers résultats de cette alliance fut justement l'appui intellectuel qui se manifesta dans les activités des officiers du génie français en Hongrie.

Dans le royaume de France, en lutte permanente contre l'étranger depuis le milieu du 17^e siècle, on nomma dès 1688 des ingénieurs royaux qui ne s'occupèrent à partir de 1712 que des commandes d'Etat. Les activités des officiers du génie français comprenaient dès cette époque le développement du réseau routier et la construction des ponts, des canaux et des ports. Pendant la première moitié du 18^e siècle, ils firent entrer dans la culture européenne des travaux d'architecture hydraulique et de tracés fluviaux (donc de transformation de l'environnement naturel).³ Nous tenons à signaler ici que le repeuplement du Banat (sud de la Hongrie) au 18^e siècle a été organisé et dirigé par le gouverneur général Florimond de Mercy (1666–1734) qui était originaire de la Lorraine. Il a réalisé, avec l'aide de spécialistes français, l'assèchement des marais, l'implantation de la viticulture et de l'industrie de la soie.⁴ Le prestige et l'importance des activités du génie se manifestent aussi par la traduction en hongrois en 1778 du manuel de Garnier, officier du génie français, qui allait servir d'ouvrage de base. Deux décennies plus tard, on publia la deuxième édition du livre d'András Dugonics « *sur la science* », dont un des chapitres les plus importants traite justement de la science des ingénieurs-géodèses⁵. Tout cela est évidemment le résultat d'un long processus.

² L. Palásti, *Francia családnevek Szegeden a XVIII. században*. [Noms patronymiques français à Szeged au 18^e siècle] Szeged 1959, 43.

³ K. Zelovich, A M. Kir József műegyetem és a hazai technikai felsőoktatás története. [L'Université Royale de Technique József et l'enseignement supérieur technique en Hongrie] Budapest 1922, 13–14.

⁴ L. Baróti, *Adattár Délmagyarország XVIII. századi történetéhez*. [Base de données à l'histoire de la Hongrie du sud au 18^e siècle] Temesvár 1893, 7; M. Horváth, *Magyarország története* [Histoire de la Hongrie] t. VII, Budapest 1873, 158.

⁵ F. Kováts, *Az utak', és utszák' építésének módja, melyet írt Gautier úr, Frantziai Országban Királyi Indzsenér, és a Hidak', Töltések', Ország-Utak', s Városi Utszáknak Inspektóra. Mostan pedig, hasznos megjegyzésekkel megbővítve, és szükséges Táblákkal megékesítve Magyarúl kiadott Kováts Ferentz M. O. E. Matematikus*. [Les modes de construction des routes et des rues] Pozsony–Kassa 1778. Cf. J. Szinnyei, dir., *Magyar írók élete és munkái*. [Vie et oeuvres d'écrivains hongrois], t. VI, Budapest 1899, 1214–1215. A. Dugonics, *A tudásköszönés két könyve, melyekben foglaltatik a Betűvetés (algebra) és a Földmérés (geometria)*. [Deux livres des Sciences contenant l'algèbre et la géométrie] Pozsony–Pest 1784. Du-

Le premier grand groupe d'ingénieurs français est arrivé en Hongrie en passant par la Pologne afin d'appuyer la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi.⁶ Le prince fait même mention dans ses *Mémoires* du fait que quelques officiers et ingénieurs français sont arrivés à Miskolc de Pologne. De la part du roi de France, un gentilhomme nommé Fierville, fut mandaté comme ministre du roi auprès du prince.⁷ Ce dernier était en fait le chevalier Louis Fierville le Hérissy, premier représentant de Louis XIV à la cour de Rákóczi. On doit aussi souligner parmi les officiers du génie le nom de Louis Le Maire. Il assura une part des tâches militaires (lors du siège d'Esztergom, les batteries furent aussi ordonnées d'après son plan). Louis XIV lui confia en outre à titre provisoire en 1710 un travail d'agent secret⁸ politique.

Dans les mémoires de Rákóczi, on trouve évidemment les noms de nombreux ingénieurs français, surtout (à côté de Le Maire) ceux de Jean-François de Rivière, Barsonville, Damoiseau, Saint-Just et La Motte.⁹ Ce dernier avait été plus tôt un des aides de camp du maréchal Vauban connu et reconnu partout en Europe. Dans son mémoire adressé au prince Rákóczi, La Motte proposa la création de deux arsenaux nationaux, basés à Kassa et à Munkács. Le projet prévoyait un troisième centre à Érsekújvár, encouragé surtout par le prince. Le mémoire de La Motte servit de toute façon de base à l'organisation de l'armée des insurgés.¹⁰ Les décrets de Rákóczi consacrés à l'industrie de l'armement ont été en partie fondés sur ce mémoire. Un des décrets selon lequel la fabrication des produits de l'armement ne serait autorisée que d'après des dessins techniques approuvés par le prince exprima certaines velléités de « standardisation » suggérées par La Motte.¹¹

L'enceinte fortifiée du château de Munkács, de forme heptagonale régulière, doit être rattachée au nom du brigadier du génie Damoiseau. La forteresse de Munkács, facile à défendre, est construite sur un rocher escarpé recouvert de peu de terre. C'est ici que le prince créa en 1706 une manufacture produisant pour l'armée les draps qui se sont vite révélés d'une grande importance.¹²

gonics voulait ainsi protester contre le décret impérial de Joseph II, qui fit de l'allemand la langue obligatoire de l'enseignement. Il prouvait qu'on pouvait traiter en hongrois même des « sciences élevées ». Cf. encore idem, *A tudákosságnak III. könyve: A három szögellések (trigonometria) és IV. könyve: a csúcsos szelésekről (de sectionibus conicis)*. [Le III^e livre des Sciences: la trigonométrie; IV^e livre: sécante parallèle] Pozsony-Pest, 1798. Cf. Szinnyi, t. II (1893), pp. 1115–1117.

⁶ B. Köpeczi, *A Rákóczi-szabadságharc és Franciaország*. [La guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi et la France] Budapest 1966, 56–63.

⁷ Rákóczi, Ferenc, *Emlékiratok*. [Mémoires] Budapest 1985, 120.

⁸ Köpeczi, 161–175.

⁹ Rákóczi, 198, 226, 242, 252, 279–283, 301–305, 322–325.

¹⁰ B. Köpeczi–Á. R. Várkonyi, *II. Rákóczi Ferenc*. [François II de Rákóczi] Budapest 1976, 170 et 199.

¹¹ G. Heckenast, *Fegyver és lőszergyártás a Rákóczi-szabadságharcban*. [Fabrication des armes et des munitions pendant la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi] Budapest 1959, 82–83.

¹² I. Rosta, *Fejezetek Magyarország technikátörténetéből*. [Chapitres de l'histoire de la technique en Hongrie] Budapest 1995, 121–122.

Il revint à Damoiseau, entre autres, la gestion du plan directeur d'attaque lors du siège de Medgyes. Le brigadier devait être un ingénieur très bien formé : même Rákóczi remarqua dans ses mémoires que Medgyes aurait pu être prise plus facilement si le comte Forgách avait suivi les conseils de Damoiseau concernant le placement des batteries. Il n'en fut rien, et, bien que Medgyes eût été prise après une longue lutte meurtrière, l'ingénieur demanda sa révocation du service à cause de son différend avec le comte.¹³ Ce ne fut pas le seul cas où le commandement et les connaissances de génie militaires se trouvèrent en antagonisme. Rákóczi fit remarquer au général borgne Bottyán que celui qui s'occupait en passant des fortifications croyait aussi s'y connaître. Pour cette raison, il ne prêta jamais attention au lieutenant du génie envoyé par le prince, et construisit sa tête de pont d'après ses propres conceptions.¹⁴

Sans doute en raison des activités des ingénieurs français en Hongrie, François II de Rákóczi, attiré lui-même par les sciences de l'ingénieur, prêta une attention toute particulière aux questions techniques.¹⁵ Pour des raisons de politique militaire, il considérait évidemment la sidérurgie comme une activité très importante. Pál Jányi, propriétaire de Sajógömör et habitant à Rozsnyó fut nommé inspecteur des forges du comitat Gömör. On construisit dans ce comitat trois fonderies de fer. Une fabrique d'épées fut fondée à Dobsina. On envisagea l'établissement d'une usine de faux à Koszteviarszka, près de Besztercebánya. A Libetbánya, on s'occupa de la fonte d'obus et de bombes.¹⁶

Outre les intérêts bien réels du génie militaire, le prince Rákóczi s'intéressait aux sciences naturelles et à la technique. Il s'intéressait en général aux constructions techniques. Il porta une attention particulière aux activités d'István Simándi, professeur au collège calviniste de Sárospatak, qui venait de rentrer de son voyage d'études. Le professeur avait ramené de nombreux instruments de physique et fut le premier en Hongrie à enseigner la physique de manière empirique.¹⁷

Les relations techniques entre la France et la Hongrie furent intenses au 18^e siècle non seulement dans le domaine du génie militaire, mais aussi dans celui du génie civil. Montesquieu visita en 1728 Újbánya et ses environs. Il en fit mention dans ses mémoires, ainsi que de la « machine de feu » (machine à vapeur) qu'il y avait vue. Parmi les spécialistes des mines et de la métallurgie, l'ingénieur des mines Gabriel Jars, d'origine lyonnaise, vint en 1757 en Hongrie afin d'étudier les moyens d'extraction et d'utilisation des minéraux. Il publia un livre sur ce voyage

¹³ Rákóczi, 160.

¹⁴ Ibid., 165. Cf. *Mercurius Veridicus ex Hungaria*, édition fac-similé, Budapest 1979, 85-86. Le journal de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi, premier journal hongrois, a commencé à paraître (encore en latin) le 26 mai 1705. Les premiers numéros, édités par l'imprimerie Brewer de Lőcse, ont encore porté le nom *Mercurius Hungaricus*.

¹⁵ Il est curieux par exemple de noter qu'en 1702, lorsqu'ils se réfugiaient dans le château de Brezán (Brzezani), en Galicie, Rákóczi et Bercsényi se cachaient sous l'identité des officiers du génie français. Voir Köpeczi-R. Várkonyi, 107.

¹⁶ *A Magyar Mérnök Egyesület Közlönye* (1898), 497.

¹⁷ Köpeczi-R. Várkonyi, 298; Szinnyei, t. XII (1908), 1028-1029.

à Lyon en 1774. Il y décrivit aussi ses expériences hongroises. Il évoque entre autres que le béliet hydraulique fut fondamentalement modernisé par József Hell. Celui-ci avait découvert que les pistons de la pompe pouvaient être agités non seulement par la vapeur, mais aussi par de l'eau sous haute pression ou par de l'air comprimé.¹⁸ Ainsi est née en 1749 la machine à colonne d'eau et en 1753 la « machine à air ». La description de cette dernière nous est restée grâce aux travaux de Miklós Boda et de Kristóf Traugott Delius, deux professeurs à l'Académie des Mines de Selmec. La machine à air élevait 23,5 m³ d'eau par heure à une hauteur de 32 mètres. Outre la machine à air de Hell, Kristóf Traugott Delius résuma plusieurs autres systèmes mécanisés dans son ouvrage. Son chef-d'œuvre parut à Vienne en 1773, sous le titre « Introduction à la théorie et à la pratique des mines, ainsi qu'à la connaissance des sciences de la trésorerie des mines. »¹⁹

A côté de la construction et des mines, les données géographiques du pays se sont révélées d'une importance primordiale pour le régime des eaux. Les premières grandes constructions hydrauliques de la Hongrie commencèrent au début du 18^e siècle, après la libération du pays du joug ottoman. Selon l'opinion qui fait l'unanimité, des ingénieurs en hydraulique et des géologues, avant le commencement des travaux contre les inondations, s'étaient occupé d'un territoire de 3987672 arpents cadastraux qui avait été recouvert d'eau dans le bassin des Carpathes durant la majeure partie de l'année. Outre cela, quelque 2,736,876 arpents cadastraux furent recouverts temporairement. On peut donc estimer à 6,724,548 arpents cadastraux les terres appartenant à l'empire des eaux. Étant donné que presque la moitié du territoire du bassin des Carpathes se trouve au niveau des plaines, le résultat fut qu'un quart des terres de ce type furent recouverte d'eau. Cela représentait une grande partie du territoire du pays. De plus, c'était là que se trouvaient les terres agricoles les plus fertiles. On observa même que les chaloupes transportant le sel à travers la Grande Plaine quittèrent le lit de la Tisza et, pour raccourcir le chemin, se dirigèrent « directement » vers Szolnok. D'importants intérêts économiques ont donc motivé ces changements.

La première raison de la régulation des cours d'eau a été la protection de la région de Temes. La construction de canaux d'approvisionnement et de fuite entre le Temes et le Béga eut lieu grâce à des ingénieurs français. Ces travaux furent suivis par ceux de l'assèchement des marais des frontières militaires du Sud. Les activités des officiers du génie français ont visiblement dépassé, dès le début, les devoirs strictement militaires, puisqu'ils ont aussi été les auteurs des premières cartes et les premiers acteurs conscients de la lutte contre les inondations.

L'image ne serait pourtant pas complète si on ne mentionnait pas, à côté de l'importante contribution des ingénieurs français, le fait que les sciences techniques ont aussi connu en Hongrie un essor au 18^e siècle. Ce n'est pas le fait du ha-

¹⁸ J. F. Michaud, *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne*. t. 21, Paris 1818, 415-416. J. Faller, « Kétszáz évvel előtt használtak először sűrített levegőt vízemelési célokra, » [Il y a deux cents ans, on a utilisé pour la première fois l'air comprimé à élever de l'eau] *Bányászati Lapok* (1953/10), 516-521.

¹⁹ Rosta, 126.

sard si, vers la fin du siècle, on a justement voulu moderniser la formation des ingénieurs français en imitant l'exemple hongrois.

Dans un rapport présenté à la Convention Nationale en septembre 1794 au nom des Comités de salut public, d'instruction et des travaux publics, Fourcroy, grand organisateur de l'instruction en France, attire l'attention sur le fait que « *le service des armées de la République exige impérieusement des ingénieurs de plus d'un genre; le besoin s'en fait sentir à chaque instant, et devient de jour en jour plus pressant.* »²⁰ Pour cette raison, il faudrait:

« 1^o des ingénieurs militaires pour la construction et l'entretien des fortifications, l'attaque et la défense des places et des camps; pour la construction et l'entretien des bâtiments militaires, tels que les casernes, les arsenaux, etc.;

2^o des ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées pour construire et entretenir les communications par terre et par eau, les chemins, les ponts, les canaux, les écluses, les ports maritimes, les bassins, les jetées, les phares, les édifices à l'usage de la marine;

3^o des ingénieurs-géographes, pour la levée des cartes générales et particulières de terre et de mer;

4^o des ingénieurs des mines pour la recherche, l'exploitation des minerais, le traitement des métaux, et la perfection des procédés métallurgiques;

5^o enfin, des ingénieurs constructeurs pour la marine, pour diriger la construction de tous les bâtiments de mer, leur donner les qualités les plus avantageuses à leur genre de service, surveiller les approvisionnements des ports en bois de construction et en matériaux de toutes les sortes. »²¹

Il rappelle par la suite que la physique et la chimie sont enseignées en France seulement d'un point de vue théorique alors qu'en Hongrie on fait déjà autrement:

« L'école des mines de Schemnitz [Banská Štiavnica] en Hongrie nous fournit un exemple frappant de l'utilité de faire exercer ou pratiquer par les élèves les opérations qui sont la base de ces sciences utiles. Des laboratoires y sont ouverts et munis des ustensiles et des matériaux nécessaires pour que tous les élèves y répètent les exercices et voient de leurs yeux tous les phénomènes que les corps présentent dans leur union. »²²

Ce texte nous permet de dresser deux constats. Le premier relève de la formation empirique qui fut implantée en Hongrie par István Simándi et qui était encore bien vivante à la fin du 18^e siècle, et cela même si plus d'un avait jugé ses méthodes de « diaboliques » au début du siècle. Le second concerne la formation technique hongroise qui a servi d'exemple pour l'Europe surtout en ce qui concerne formation d'ingénieurs des mines.

²⁰ Ibid., 134.

²¹ Michaud, t. V (1816), 367-370.

²² *Moniteur*, Vendémiaire 8 de l'An III (29 septembre 1794), 37.

Pál Rosti's Cuba in 1857

GYÖRGY KUKOVECZ



The Author and his Work

In 1861 a book was published in Pest which opened a window for Hungarian readers on Latin America: *Uti emlékezetek Amerikából* (Memories of Travels in America) by Pál Rosti.¹

The author, Pál Rosti (1830–1874)² made up his mind some time in the early 1850s to realize his childhood dreams and make a tour in the New World roughly following the route of Alexander von Humboldt in a land which was almost completely unknown to the Hungarian public of the day. His decision was also motivated by the fact that after the fall of the 1848–1849 Hungarian revolution and war for independence, living under the system of Austrian oppression he could not see other possibilities of acting for national advancement than the fields of arts and sciences.³ After several years of careful preparations⁴ he started the big journey on 4 August 1856 sailing from Le Havre, France for the USA on the French steamliner "Alma". Returning two years later, he landed on 8 August 1858 in Southampton, UK.

¹ P. Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek Amerikából*. [Memories of Travels in America] Pest 1861, ed. G. Heckenast, Facsimile edition: Budapest 1992, (henceforth: Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek...*).

² This short paper does not have room for a detailed biography of Pál Rosti. Recently a study of Károly Kincses was published by the Hungarian Museum of Photography and Balassi Kiadó at the same time as the facsimile edition: *Rosti Pál 1830–1874*. [Pál Rosti 1830–1874] Budapest 1992, (henceforth: Kincses).

³ Cf. Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek...*, Foreword.

⁴ In the autumn of 1849 Rosti went into voluntary emigration to Germany and he studied chemistry at the University of Munich for four years. In 1853 he returned home and spent a year in Pest studying geography and ethnography. In December 1854 he travelled – presumably legally – to Western Europe, to England and France. He learned photography because he was convinced that the new technique was the best method to diffuse geographical knowledge. See P. Rosti, "Úti vázlatok. Olvastatott a Magyarhoni Földtani Társulat 1859-ki február 28-án tartott szakgyűlésében," [Sketches of Travels. Read at the meeting of the Hungarian Geological Society on 28 February 1859] in J. Szabó, ed., *A Magyarhoni Földtani Társulat Munkálatai*. Pest 1863, Vol. II, 160.

The "Humboldtian" trip to Latin America started on 12 January 1857 when Rosti arrived at Havana, Cuba from New Orleans and ended on 7 April 1858 in the harbour of Veracruz, Mexico. The special feature of Rosti's journey was his interest in photography which was still in its infancy in those years. Rosti learned the new technique in Paris some time between 1854–1856. In the course of his tour in Latin America he made nearly fifty serviceable photographs of the sights of the countries he visited. He can thus be considered one of the pioneers of Latin American photo-history and he is doubtless one of the first landscape-photographers of the New World.

So Rosti's travels in America resulted in two works for posterity. One of them and the first to be published was the famous *Fényképi Gyűjtemény* (Collection of Photos) exhibited for the Hungarian public at the beginning of 1859 in the National Casino. Experts agree that Rosti's photos are of unique value in the history of Hungarian photography but there are numerous questions and uncertainties around them. As far as we know neither before nor after his Latin American trip did Rosti take photographs, only his Latin American pieces have survived. Of these, four albums are known, three of which are located in Hungary. Unfortunately no negatives indicating his technique have survived so we do not know exactly whether he used the so-called collodium-procedure or the Le Gray wax-paper-negative method.⁵ We don't know either where he made or had the copies made though the albums containing them were prepared for certain in Paris, in the workshop of Despierres, the court bookbinder and they were ready by 1 November 1858. On this day Rosti visited his ideal, Baron Alexander von Humboldt, in the latter's residence in Berlin-Tegel and presented one of the albums to him.⁶

The contents of the three albums located in Hungary are not identical. The copy in the National Széchenyi Library which was originally given to the Hungarian National Museum contains 45 pictures, the album in the Museum of Photography which came into the collection from the legacy of Ágoston Trefort contains 47 pictures, the album of the Loránd Eötvös Geophysical Institute contains 40 pictures. Out of the maximum 47, four pictures show parts of Havana, 11 photograph landscapes and buildings in Venezuela, and the remaining 32 commemorate Rosti's experiences in Mexico⁷. Though in the mid-nineteenth century numerous lifelike engravings and many photographs were made of the different regions of Latin America, Rosti's photos are doubtless a valuable source for the historians of the visited countries.

⁵ Károly Kincses is of the opinion that Rosti used the Le Gray waxpaper-negative method. Cf. Kincses, 23–24.

⁶ Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek*..., 70. According to the author Humboldt recognized and greeted among the pictures the photo about the giant "Zamang del Guayre" tree, the tree which he himself described in his work *Voyage aux régions équinoxiales* (Cf. *op. cit.*, Tome V, 142).

⁷ Kincses presumes that at least six albums were made with Rosti's photos. See Kincses, 20.

The other result of Rosti's journey considered more important by the author himself was the book entitled *Uti emlékezetek Amerikából* (Memories of Travels from America), published in 1861 in Pest, which as mentioned before opened a window to Latin America for the Hungarian reading public. Prior to this book only scattered newspaper articles and geography books translated from other languages informed those people who could read only Hungarian about the distant continent. More profound or detailed knowledge – e. g. the works of Humboldt – was available only for those who could read foreign languages (especially German and French).⁸ Rosti's work is the first original Hungarian report based on personal field experiences about such important countries of Latin America as Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico.

Rosti's lavishly illustrated large format book consists of 194 pages and a table of contents. The short *Foreword* is followed by three major units clearly separated even by the pagination of the chapters re-starting in each part. Though our short paper is confined to an introduction and analysis of Rosti's experiences in Cuba it seems necessary to outline the structure of the whole work.

The first part divides into nine short chapters and bears the title "Habana". Eight chapters (pp. 3–31.) deal with Rosti's Cuban experiences, the last one (pp. 32–36) relates his journey to La Guayra, Venezuela, via St. Thomas.

The second part (pp. 39–119.) is entitled "Venezuela". It contains 17 chapters, the last two dealing with Rosti's experiences in Trinidad and his journey to Veracruz, Mexico. After a general introduction to the country and a description of Caracas the author thought it necessary to divide the book into three major parts: "A. The seaside region. The valley of Aragua. B. Llanos. C. The Orinocco (sic!) region." In contrast to the other two main parts of the work, the chapters dealing with Venezuela are well known to historians specializing in Latin America since these parts were published in Spanish in 1968 under the title *Memorias de un viaje por América*.⁹

The third part (pp. 107–194.) of the book is entitled "Mexico" and consists of 19 chapters. This unit is relatively the largest (87 pages) and has an extra *Introduction* (pp. 107–109).

The book is well-proportioned as the sizes of the major parts correspond to the length of time Rosti spent in the given country and also the readers are taken into consideration e. g. he knew that the events in Mexico were of great public interest. Rosti spent two months in Cuba, five in Venezuela and seven in Mexico where he had to break his journey because of the approaching civil war. We

⁸ It is well known that Humboldt published his works in French. In the 1830–1840s in Hungary there was a great interest in French culture and language, many members of the educated, reformist gentry and the intellectuals knew the works of Alexander von Humboldt. Rosti was made to learn about Humboldt's travels presumably in his childhood by his geography teacher Antal Vállas.

⁹ P. Rosti, *Memorias de un viaje por América*. Introducción: Prof. T. Wittman. Traducción y notas: J. Sárosi, Universidad Central de Venezuela. Publicaciones de la Escuela de Historia. Serie: *Varia* III (1968).

know that he had planned to visit Peru as well but for unknown reasons this visit did not take place.

Rosti used the photographs, the products of his exhausting efforts to illustrate the book. As the printing technique of the day was not able to reproduce photographs a young painter, Gusztáv Klette made lithographs about some of the pictures. Under the direction of Rosti the lithographs were supplemented by drawings of persons whom the photographs could show only dimly or in no way at all because of the considerable length of the time of exposure. Woodcuts were made of another group of the photographs, the editor Gustav Heckenast ordered them from D. Freemann. The final result was a lavishly illustrated book with two coloured pictures, 13 lithographs, 25 woodcuts and two steel-engravings (these last were not based on Rosti's photographs but the editor bought the publishing right of the engravings of J. M. Rugendas from the G. G. Lange Verlag in Darmstadt).¹⁰

Cuban Impressions

At the end of a pleasant three-days voyage, embarking from New Orleans, Pál Rosti disembarked in Havana on 12 January 1857 and he left the island on 12 March 1857 for Venezuela via St. Thomas. His book makes it clear that originally he had intended to spend only two weeks in Cuba. We do not know what made him change his mind, why he stayed much longer. He mentions, that he had planned to travel also in the inner parts of the island and wanted to see other famous towns apart from Havana e. g. Trinidad and Sant-Yago de Cuba (sic!) but "shortage of time and other circumstances" kept him from doing so.¹¹ The increasing danger of yellow fever and the growing heat are given as reasons for his departure: he had not yet got used to the extreme heat of the climate and thought it safer and better spend the high summer in Caracas located at a higher altitude.

The Cuba part of the *Memories of Travels...* can be read as an intelligent snapshot recording the impressions of two months. This snapshot raises at least two intriguing questions.

The first one asks how authentic Rosti's pieces of information were for his contemporaries, how valid in the long run his statements and judgments were based on two months' experiences remembering that his book was the main source of information about Cuba's social and economic system for the Hungarian reading public.¹²

¹⁰ Kincses, 25.

¹¹ Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 32.

¹² Information about Cuba were not abundant in nineteenth-century Hungary. Readers could use some geographical works like the *General or Universal Geography* by Canabich (Pest, 1817.) translated by István Czövek into Hungarian; or the *Manual of Geography* (Pest, 1831) by Elek Zádor which gave the geography of the countries of the world after foreign models. Every now and then a newspaper article was published about the island (e. g. a description of Havana by an unknown refugee of 1848 in the 20 July 1850 issue of the *Pesti Hírlap* [Pest Journal]). Still, until the publication of Rosti's book Cuba was *terra incognita* for the Hungarian public.

The second one asks how far Rosti's book can serve as a historical source for present day research. Does it offer information which confirms, colours or modifies the results of modern historiography? Would it be worthwhile for Cuban historiography to rely more heavily on Rosti's vision of Cuba and to incorporate it into works analysing mid-nineteenth century problems? This second set of questions attracts two comments at the very beginning. Latin American research in Hungary is of course well acquainted with Rosti's book and relies on it when dealing with nineteenth-century problems of the continent. The best example is Tibor Wittman's book *Latin-Amerika története* (A History of Latin America) in which Rosti is quoted in both the Venezuela and Mexico parts.¹³ Also, the Cuba chapters of the *Memories of Travels...* are not completely unknown in Cuba. Salvador Bueno's book *Cinco siglos de relaciones entre Hungría y América Latina*¹⁴ gives an ample and basically correct survey of Rosti's book and goes into details about the Cuba chapters though his interpretation is partly (but not completely) based on Wittman's study published in Spanish.¹⁵ However, as far as we know, in spite of Salvador Bueno's pioneering work Rosti's book has not left its mark on Cuban historiography in the last quarter century and has not been used in works analyzing the problems of the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁶ So we feel encouraged to attempt within the confines of a short paper to introduce and interpret the Cuba chapters of the *Memories of Travels...*, being fully aware that a really successful introduction to the international research community would demand the publication of Rosti's book in Spanish or in English.

Pál Rosti's book *Memories of Travels in America* contains eight chapters dealing with Cuba:

- I. Habana leírása általában (General Description of Havana)
- II. Egy vasárnap Habanában (Sunday in Havana)
- III. Habana égálja. Sárgaláz (The Climate of Havana. Yellow fever)
- IV. Czukor-ültetvények. Czukorgyártás (Sugar Plantations. Fabrication of Sugar)
- V. Rabszolgaság (Slavery)

¹³ T. Wittman, *Latin Amerika története*. [A History of Latin America] Budapest 1971, 150, 270, 292–293, 329. A Spanish version of this book was published as well. Ádám Anderle's book (*Szabadságra született Amerikánk* [Our America Born to be Free] Budapest, 1983), deals with Rosti's impressions in Mexico. There exist many scattered references to Rosti which emphasize his photographic work but do not deal with the main work, the *Memories of Travels...*

¹⁴ S. Bueno, *Cinco siglos de relaciones entre Hungría y América Latina*. Budapest 1977. Bueno introduces Rosti's book in general, and on pp. 115–117 he gives a more detailed description about the Cuba chapters.

¹⁵ See T. Wittman, *Observaciones de un viajero húngaro sobre la Venezuela de los últimos años de Monagas*. Foreword to the 1968 Venezuelan edition of Rosti's work.

¹⁶ The literature on Rosti has about one notable Cuban reference apart from Bueno's book. A study was published by María Eugenia Haya (*Apuntes para una historia de la fotografía en Cuba, Casa de las Americas*, 1979.) which mentioned Rosti as one of the pioneers of scientific photography. C. p. Kincses, 9.

- VI. Szabad szerecsenyek s kevert vérűek (Free Blacks and Mixed Races)
- VII. Szabad telepítvények (Free Settlers)
- VIII. Dohány és szivargyártás (Tobacco, and Fabrication of Cigars)

The ninth chapter (Habanából St. Thomas és La Guayrába – From Havana to St. Thomas and la Guayra), closing the first part, deals less with Cuba its main interest being the voyage to Venezuela. In it Rosti draws a very vivid picture of travelling conditions in the Caribbean with great emphasis on the advancement of shipping, stating that "one can leave Havana any week by steamliner not to mention the numerous sailing ships leaving each day towards each part of the world."¹⁷ It is clear from the text that Havana had far better communication with the USA than with Spain: meanwhile steamliners go to New Orleans and New York twice a month, to Mobile and Charlestown once a month, to Cádiz only one ship per month.

The Cuba part of the *Memories of Travels...* is the best-written and most homogeneous part of Rosti's book considered as a narrative literary text. It is also enigmatic and mysterious in a way.

It is mysterious because in contrast with the parts dealing with Venezuela and Mexico the author does not refer either to his ideal Humboldt or to any other authors or sources.¹⁸ Nevertheless, he most certainly used some and did not restrict himself to his own notes. The details of contracts with Chinese coolies or some data in the chapter about tobacco cultivation betray it. But in this homogeneous narrative text he does not quote even his own notes or his letters sent to Hungary though in other parts of the book this happens several times.¹⁹

The text is mysterious also because it displays a Cuba without history. Rosti does not write anything about the history of the island, his work is a snapshot in the true sense of Havana and her surroundings. This is remarkable because in the Venezuela part he does not only describe the dictatorship of president Monagas but briefly relates the history of the country's becoming independent. As for the history of Mexico, he gives quite a detailed account and dwells on the country's political life and institutions in a separate chapter. In the case of Cuba not much more than casual remarks refer to the island being a colony of Spain or inform the reader that the governor, the captain-general of the island is General Jozé (sic!) de la Concha at the time of Rosti's visit.²⁰

¹⁷ Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 32.

¹⁸ Rosti quotes Lucas Alaman's book "*Historia de Megico*" (sic!). He refers to Humboldt several times (e. g. Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 45, 70, 139, etc.). He quotes the 1856 Mexican statistics on demography referring to the newspaper *Noticias de la ciudad de Mexico*.

¹⁹ He recalls his trip to the Llanos by referring to his diary, even the title of the chapter is "A Trip to Llanos after my Diary." See Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 79–90. Several times he quotes his letters sent to Hungary. E. g. he builds into the text a letter sent from the island of St. Thomas (*op. cit.*, 103–104.) and another from Mexico (*op. cit.*, 166–167.) in which he analyzes the political situation of January 1858.

²⁰ Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 12.

Rosti does not write about the political problems of the colonial system. His readers learn nothing about the great slave rebellions of the previous decades or about annexionism, the Creole political ambition to solve the problems of the island by joining the United States.²¹ There's no doubt that Rosti arrived at Havana in a blessed period of tranquility, of political standstill. But it is hard to believe that he did not know about the political problems of the island since he had prepared for the trip in New Orleans, one of the centres of annexionist Cuban emigration. Prior to this, during his travels in the United States he probably met a considerable number of Hungarian emigrants, and in New Orleans too, he was the guest of his former teacher, Antal Vállas. It is hard to believe that he did not hear about the expeditions of Narciso López to liberate Cuba and about the members of the Hungarian emigration who had taken part in the last revolutionary action.²² True, by 1855 the first wave of annexionism had calmed down, the organizations of Cuban emigrants in the USA dissolved. But in Cuba the movement was most probably a frequent topic of conversation especially after the Pintó plot revealed in 1855.²³ We do not know whether lack of knowledge or some other reason made Rosti avoid political problems in the Cuban part. We suppose that the main reason was of a political nature. While criticising sharply Mexican and Venezuelan politics the author did not want to enter into discussing delicate problems concerning the interests of a European power which was on friendly terms with Austria.

Finally, Rosti's Cuba-image is mysterious because he writes almost nothing about his social connections. Presumably he had entry into the so called "good society" and acquired most of his information from these circles. Also he was in touch with members of the plantation aristocracy. But we almost know nothing about his actual acquaintances in Havana.

A survey of the chapters of Rosti's book reveals that he was interested in three major topics in Cuba. The compulsory topic of travel books comes first: the description of the host city and its social life. Secondly, he gives an account of the economic characteristics and specificities of the country. The chapters dealing with sugar processing and the tobacco industry serve this purpose. Last but not least, and in close connection with this former subject, he deals with the problems of coloured people which can be read – from another point of view – as an attempt to analyze the labour force problems of Cuba. The detailed analysis of slavery, the description of the social status of free Blacks and Mulattoes and the special problems raised by the importation of a labour force – the coolies – from China give evidence about this third field of his interest.

²¹ Cf. L. Bethell, ed., *Cuba. A short History*. Cambridge, 1993, 10–20; F. Portuondo, *Historia de Cuba 1492–1898*. La Habana 1965, 345–418; R. Guerra Y Sanchez, *Manual de historia de Cuba*. La Habana 1971, 553–643.

²² Cf. Á. Anderle, "A 48-as magyar emigráció és Nárciso López 1851-es kubai expedíciója," [The Hungarian Emigration of 1848 and Narciso López' Cuban Expedition of 1851] *Századok* 107 (1973), 687–709.

²³ Cf. Portuondo, *op. cit.*, 371–372.

Rosti judges Havana beautiful but dirty. "The streets of the inner town are narrow, filthy and dark, the pavements are unusually narrow and one has to be on guard all the time in fear of being run down by the 'volante' equipped with broad wheelbase." (...) "Filth and untidiness belong to the character of Havana. Ugly half-naked children are rolling around on the ground with *negritos*..."²⁴ On the other hand he finds very attractive the promenade dividing the old inner and the new outer town (*paseo de Isabel II-da*) and the streets of the rapidly developing outer parts especially the so-called *calzadas* (*Calzada de la reina, Calzada del monte*) fringed with trees and bungalows in Italian style.²⁵

Havana people appear in Rosti's book as friendly and hospitable though somewhat untidy in the daytime. Women receive their visitors with loose hair, wearing dressing-gown and slippers, without stockings and over-garments. They dress up properly only in the evening when they drive out in the *volante* to shop or to take a walk.²⁶

Rosti was fascinated by the *volante*, this vehicle "constructed denying all the known laws of equilibrium" and very characteristic of Cuba. He gives a thorough and detailed description of it and thinks it fit even to be a part of the coat-of-arms of the city.²⁷

As for work, the morning hours were regarded as the most intensive in Havana. Rosti gives a very vivid and lifelike descriptions of the market place and the harbour. The European traveller (and his readers) found it strange that cattle were butchered in the market place and cows were milked there, under the eyes of the customers. The bread-seller (*panadero*), the poultry-seller and the fodder-seller (*malojero*) carrying a whole stack on his horse are introduced as well.²⁸

In Rosti's book the readers could follow a complete Havana Sunday. The day started between 6 and 9 in the morning going to church, at 11 people crowded in the *Valle de Gallos* where the big national entertainment, cockfighting started. At 4 pm. the other major entertainment, bullfighting invited the public. About five o'clock the good society's favourite pastime commenced: splendid *volantes* invaded the *Paseo de Tacón* and everybody went for a ride. Public entertainments ended in the *Plaza de Armas* where next to the governor's palace an excellent military band gave a concert at 8 pm. each day.²⁹

However, descriptions of cockfights, bullfight, pleasure-driving are perhaps less interesting for the reader of our day than Rosti's account of a religious service. Havana in the mid-century seems much more religious than in later years. Rosti was surprised to see that in the Havana churches no chairs or benches were provided. The maids of the ladies going to church carried carpets and small chairs and the women – ladies and black maids alike – settled themselves in the

²⁴ Rosti, *Úti emlékezetek...*, 4–5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 6–12.

centre of the church on these carpets. The gentlemen were standing or kneeling at the sidewalls. Church music was also a surprise to Rosti. On the one hand he could hardly bear the very special interpretation of the black orchestra playing the masses of Haydn or Mozart, on the other hand he had to listen often to fashionable Italian opera-pieces on the church organ during the service.³⁰

Church was one of the scenes of temporary earthly equality. The cockfight was the other. In the *riñadero* all differences of rank melted away, high class gentlemen cheered and shouted together with low class people in common excitement and bets were even made for large sums between people of very different social status. These oral bargains were held in respect, the looser paid. But at the end of the cockfight the short-term acquaintances were over.³¹

Describing Havana life, Rosti adds lots of details to the picture of American influence though he does not mention that, by that time, the US was the most important consumer of Cuban sugar. But we can learn from his book that in the financial chaos of the island the US dollar (called: *peso sencillo*) and its change, the dime had become more and more frequently used as currency. In the more distinguished Cuban houses *American rocking chairs* gave comfort to the inhabitants. Havana was a popular winter resort for wealthy American ladies, and in the fashionable caf  s like the Dominica the excellent ice cream was kept cold with the help of ice imported from the lakes around Boston. The Cuban rail system followed the American model, the locomotives and carriages were purchased in the US.³²

Relying on Tibor Wittman's works Hungarian writers tend to emphasize that P  l Rosti suggests a brighter, more optimistic vision of Cuban society and the economy than of Venezuela or Mexico which were independent countries but struggling with deep political crisis. This opinion is doubtless an authentic one though we think that Rosti shunned political problems intentionally. On the other hand we know that in the first couple of months in 1857 the island was politically stable after the uproar of the annexionist movement had calmed down and also the blessings of an economic boom, the prospering sugar industry could have been felt since 1855. The Crimean war increased demands and crisis was not approaching until the summer of 1857 when Rosti had already left. In the summer a considerable number of plantation owners became ruined in a short time and some banks depending on the boom went bankrupt as well.³³ But Rosti visited a sugar factory, the *ingenio Isabel* in January 1857.³⁴ So we can say that he made a snapshot of the sugar industry as well in the last favourable stage of a period of boom.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 6–7.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

³² *Ibid.*, 4, 5, 12, 15–16.

³³ See Guerra, 566–568; J. Le Riverend, *Historia econ  mica de Cuba*. La Habana 1974, 358–363.

³⁴ Rosti, *Uti eml  kezetek...*, 15–19.

Rosti describes in detail a typical half-mechanized sugar factory. The *ingenio Isabel* was a terminal in 1857 for the railway line starting from Havana and later going towards Matanzas via Güines.³⁵ Also it lent its name to a nearby settlement La Isabel still existing in our day.³⁶ So Rosti's book can offer an interesting source to Cuban researchers dealing with local history. The plantation supplying the sugar factory extended to cc. 50 *caballería* (c. 670 hectares) and altogether 400 slaves (including women and children) lived and worked on it. The *ingenio Isabel* belonged to the old-type sugar factories which produced the bulk of Cuban sugar. Sugar-cane was squeezed already with the help of steam-engines but the other phases of the technology – condensing the *guarapo*, cleaning and refining the raw sugar, etc. – were done in the traditional way about which Rosti gave a fairly exact description. Rosti visited the nearby sugar factory *Unión* as well which was more modern, equipped with vacuum-boilers, steam-pumps and centrifuge, with gas-light installed in the factory buildings, the *batey*. The work of the approximately 500 slaves of this factory was less exhausting according to Rosti than the work of their fellows in the *ingenio Isabel*. 50–60 Chinese workers were employed as well especially for the more delicate tasks. Rosti also heard about even greater *ingenios* much better equipped. In these the buildings and machines themselves were worth more than a million pesos and they yielded almost as much to their owners in a year³⁷

So Rosti experienced the metamorphosis of the sugar industry which was accelerating in the 1850s.³⁸ Thirty years earlier the wilderness had reigned in the place of the *ingenio Isabel*. It began to flourish in 1849 when the railway reached the plantation. In the second half of 1850s, according to Rosti, the *ingenio Isabel* secured an average of 300,000 forint, c. 150,000 dollar (*peso sencillo*) as income to its owner who is referred to in the book as "Don C. F.". This was regarded as a relatively modest income – "*una renta regular*" – among plantation owners.³⁹

Visiting the *ingenio Isabel* made it possible for Rosti to encounter directly the problem of slavery to which a long part is dedicated in the book.⁴⁰ The owner of the *ingenio Isabel* tried to convince his guest that his slaves were happy and slavery was a form of good luck, a life without daily problems. Rosti severely rejects this general Cuban opinion and the system of slavery as well. The most revolting element of slavery for him is the fact that a human being is compelled to place his whole life at someone else's disposal because God created him black.⁴¹ Rosti accepts some of the stereotypes characteristic of his age, e. g. he believes that col-

³⁵ Cf. O. Zanetti, O.-A. García, *Caminos para el azúcar*. La Habana 1987, 27–63, 69.

³⁶ See *Atlas de Cuba*. La Habana 1978, 118–119.

³⁷ Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek...*, 19.

³⁸ Cf. Le Riverend *op. cit.*, 151–173, and M. Moreno Friginals, *El ingenio. Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar*. La Habana 1978, Vol. I–III. This is the best work known to us about the Cuban sugar industry.

³⁹ Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek...*, 19.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 17, 20–23, etc.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

oured people are less intelligent than whites but he is sure that this is the consequence of maltreatment and the lack of education. He thinks Cuban slavery altogether milder than the North American, especially the Louisiana version. In Cuba the work at the sugar plantations is the most exhausting. Rosti gives a detailed account of the five month long *zafra*, the sugar-cane harvest, about the hard work done in six-hour shifts almost without a break. The building where the slaves live on the *ingenio Isabel* is like a prison, "the rooms of the Blacks are miserable holes, dark cells."⁴² Urban slaves lived in better circumstances especially if they were good cooks, coachmen or masters of some other important trade. Such a skilled slave was worth 1,500–2,000 dollars in the second half of the 1850s.⁴³

Pál Rosti did not see any chance for the abolition of slavery as an institution. But he thought the humanity of the Havana people promising; they treated their slaves "kindly" and often gave them their liberty. The other way towards liberty was the so-called *coartación*. This old invention gave the possibility for self-liberation to the slave as once he had saved 50 dollars he could make his master determine the sum of his ransom and start the manumission procedure based on paying installments.

As a consequence of these two possibilities and of demographic growth the number of free Blacks and Mulattoes was steadily growing in Havana, and a good number of important professions were mainly in their hands. This group produced the majority of musicians whose art was much disliked by Rosti who was well educated in music but starting from the world of European harmonics he did not understand and therefore did not enjoy Cuban music. But he thought that racial prejudices against free blacks were weaker in Cuba than in the USA so there was a chance in the society for the peaceful and free coexistence of whites and blacks in the long run.⁴⁴

The chapter describing the situation of the Chinese labour force is very important as a historical source. The Hungarian traveller most certainly was one of the first foreign observers of this as the importation of Chinese coolies had started only ten years earlier, in 1847, to lessen the increasing shortage in the labour force.⁴⁵ The first "contractual slaves" had been liberated not much earlier than Rosti's visit. Rosti is exceedingly well informed on this field. For instance he describes the contents of the contracts much the same way as historiography does today (8 years of work, 4 pesos wage per month, obligatory place of work, etc.) and draws the conclusion that within the confines of these contracts the Chinese "are actual slaves for 8 years."⁴⁶ Their assimilation into Cuban society seemed to be difficult, their work produced profit only for plantation owners, tobacco fac-

⁴² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 24–26.

⁴⁵ Cf. e. g. P. Deschamps Chapeaux-J. Pérez De La Riva, *Contribución a la historia de la gente sin historia*. La Habana 1974, 115–162, 191–250.

⁴⁶ Rosti, *Uti emlékezetek...*, 26.

tory owners and for trading houses specializing in the importation of Chinese (e. g. *Cambell et Comp.*, mentioned by Rosti).

Pál Rosti closes the book on his Cuban peregrination with a optimistic chapter about the second biggest branch of the Cuban economy namely the tobacco industry.⁴⁷ He stresses the exquisite quality of the *Vuelta de abajo* (sic!) tobacco produced mainly by smallholders. According to his information this tobacco growing region gave work for c. 60–70,000 people in the mid-1850s. A detailed description is given of the sorting of tobacco leaves and the preparations for producing cigars. The major phases of production are explained, and we learn that 150 tobacco factories worked in Havana including around 30 first class ones. The two great rivals were Cabañas and Partagas. The latter produced the "Figaro" brand highly approved by the author.

With the last snapshot closing the chapter Pál Rosti, the Hungarian pioneer of popularizing Latin America in writing and pictures shows us a smoking Havana. A city where everybody (men and women alike) everywhere and almost all the time smoke: life goes on with a *tabaco* (cigar) between the lips. But in this very last picture – as a sign of the changing times – in the parlours of the ladies the *cigarette* makes its appearance, waste tobacco-bits wrapped in paper made by Spanish soldiers in their spare time.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 28–31.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

Über die geschichtlichen Probleme der Gründung der Einheitspartei

JÓZSEF SIPOS



Im Februar 1922 wurde die Einheitspartei [Egységes Párt] vom Ministerpräsidenten Gr. István Bethlen und von dem Bauernpolitiker István Nagyatádi Szabó, dem Präsidenten der Kleinlandwirtpartei (*Kisgazdapárt*), gegründet. Diese wurde eines der wichtigen Elemente der Konsolidierung des politischen Lebens. Man kann sogar behaupten, dass Bethlen und Nagyatádi durch die Gründung dieser Partei – durch diese Art und Weise der Machtausübung – eine Regierungspartei ins Leben gerufen hatten, worauf sich die politische Elite stützen konnte. Die Elite passte sich den Veränderungen der innenpolitischen Kräfteverhältnisse an, wodurch sie den Staat bis 1944 im Wesentlichen ohne größere politische Krisen führen konnte. Die Bedeutung der Einheitspartei für die Politikgeschichte wurde jedoch von den Historikern weder in der Zwischenkriegszeit noch in der Zeit des Staatssozialismus noch nach der Wende entsprechend beachtet. Wegen des Mangels an Grundforschung sind die Meinungen der Historiker, die die Synthesen schreiben, weder über den Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Einheitspartei, noch über den Eintritt von Bethlen und der Gruppe der Dissidenten in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte, noch dessen Umgang identisch. Die genauere historiographische Darstellung dieser Probleme kann hier – wegen des begrenzten Umfangs – nicht durchgeführt werden. Deswegen sind nur die Autoren und deren Synthesen zitiert, die für unser Thema aus dem Aspekt der *historiographischen Forschung* wichtig sind, und über die Gründung der Einheitspartei gegensätzliche und sogar in sich widersprüchliche Darstellungen bieten. Ich möchte damit ihre Standpunkte diskutieren und so meine Thesen darlegen.

Sándor Pethő schrieb in seinem Buch *Világostól Trianonig* (Von Világos bis nach Trianon), das 1925 erschien: „am 5. Januar [1922] traten Bethlen und die ihn unterstützenden Dissidenten in die Partei von Nagyatádi ein.“ Er datierte die Gründung der Einheitspartei auf diesen Zeitpunkt.¹ Dezső Nemes stimmte einer-

¹ S. Pethő, *Világostól Trianonig. A mai Magyarország kialakulásának története*. [Von Világos bis nach Trianon. Die Geschichte der Entstehung des heutigen Ungarns] Budapest 1925, S. 335

seits in seiner 1956 herausgegebenen Studie, die als Prolog zu einer Quellenausgabe verfasst wurde, damit überein, namentlich, dass „der Eintritt von Bethlen und seiner Gruppe in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte“ am 5. Januar geschehen sei. Andererseits schrieb er auch, dass „die Dissidenten unter Bethlens Führung am 2. Februar [1922] in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte einzogen.“ Unter den Dokumenten kann ein am 2. Februar 1922 erschienener Bericht von der Ungarischen Nachrichtenagentur (*Magyar Távirati Iroda; MTI*) gefunden werden, der uns „über die Vereinigung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte mit der Gruppe der Dissidenten“² informiert.

Diese widerspruchsvollen Behauptungen führten dazu, dass in der Synthese des zweibändigen *Magyarország története* (Geschichte Ungarns) – dessen Chefredakteur Erik Molnár war, und das im Jahre 1964 und 1967 veröffentlicht wurde – steht, dass „Bethlen und die Politiker um ihn am 5. Januar 1922 zum Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte erschienen, und ihren Beitritt ankündigten.“ Im chronologischen Durchblick dieser Ausgabe steht, dass die Einheitspartei am 5. Januar 1922 gegründet worden sei.³ Ich löste diese historiographischen Widersprüche in meinem 1973 erschienenen Essai unter dem Titel *A Kisgazdapárt kormánypárttá bővülése* (Die Erweiterung der Kleinlandwirtepartei zur Regierungspartei) auf, indem ich bewies: 1) Am 5. Januar zeigte Bethlen am Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte nur das an, dass „ich persönlich und auch meine Freunde sich mit dieser Partei fusionieren wollen.“ 2) Die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nahm schon am 25. Januar das Attribut „bürgerlich“ an. 3) Bethlen und die Dissidenten schlossen sich am 2. Februar 1922 der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an, und dadurch wurde die Einheitspartei gegründet. 4) Dieser Prozess und auch der nachkommende Eintritt in die Partei – kurz, aber doch nicht genau ausgedrückt – können als *die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Regierungspartei* beschrieben werden.⁴

Im 1976 veröffentlichten achten Band des zehnbändigen *Magyarország története* (Geschichte Ungarns) – dessen Redakteur György Ránki, Tibor Hajdu und Loránt Tilkovszky waren – ist nicht genau beschrieben, wann die Einheitspartei gegründet wurde. Hier wurde nur festgestellt, dass Bethlen „seine Vorstellungen dem Vorsitzenden der Partei der Kleinlandwirte vom 5. Januar 1922 an mehrmals darstellte, und endlich hat man eine Vereinbarung über den organisatorischen Rahmen der neuen Regierungspartei am 23. Februar 1922 getroffen.“ Im chronologischen Durchblick kann nur gelesen werden, dass am 5. Januar 1922 „Bethlens erste bedeutende Rede beim Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte im Interesse

² D. Nemes, „A fasiszta rendszer kiépítése és a nép nyomora Magyarországon 1921–1924,“ [Der Ausbau des Faschismus und das Elend des Volkes in Ungarn 1921–1924] in *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919–1945*, 2. Bd, Budapest 1956, S. 63, 65, 265.

³ E. Molnár, Chefred., E. Pamlényi, Gy. Székely, Red., *Magyarország története* [Geschichte Ungarns] 2. Bd, Budapest 1967, 380–381, S. 586.

⁴ J. Sipos, „A Kisgazdapárt kormánypárttá bővülése,“ [Die Erweiterung der Kleinlandwirtepartei zur Regierungspartei] in *A Szegedi Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Diákköreinek Kiadványai*. Red. J. Kóbor und J. Sipos, Szeged 1973, S. 45–61.

der Gründung der Einheitspartei gehalten wurde.“⁵ Ferenc Pölöskei schrieb in seinem Buch *Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919–1922* (Horthy und sein Machtsystem 1919–1922) – das 1977 erschien –, dass Bethlen „seine Partei am 23. Februar 1922 gleichzeitig mit der Liquidation der Partei der Kleinlandwirte gründete.“ An diesem Tag sei nämlich das Präsidium der Einheitspartei gewählt worden.⁶

Im Gegenteil dazu kann im von Péter Gunst zusammengestellten *Magyar történelmi kronológia. Az őstörténettől 1970-ig* (Ungarische geschichtliche Chronologie. Von der Vorgeschichte an bis zum 1970) gelesen werden, dass „István Bethlen und seine Parteigänger (die ehemaligen Dissidenten) am 5. Januar 1922 zum Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte erschienen, und dann am 2. Februar der Partei der Kleinlandwirte beitraten, die unter dem Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei (Einheitspartei) zur einzigen Regierungspartei wurde.“⁷ Diese Ansicht ist auch in dem Kapitel von Ignác Romsics präsentiert, das in der 1985 veröffentlichten von Sándor Balogh redigierten Synthese unter dem Titel *Magyarország a XX. században* (Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert) erschien: Seiner Meinung nach konnte es Bethlen nur nach heftigen Diskussionen schaffen, „am 2. Februar 1922 gemeinsam mit weiteren 20 konservativen und konservativ-liberalen Abgeordneten durch die Partei der Kleinlandwirte als Mitglied aufgenommen und als „Führer“ anerkannt zu werden.“⁸

Gegen diese Behauptungen und Datierungen erschienen im Handbuch *Magyarország történelmi kronológiája* (Geschichtliche Chronologie Ungarns), das von Kálmán Benda zusammengestellt und vom Verlag Akadémia 1982 herausgegeben wurde, neue Thesen: „Bethlen teilte [am 5. Januar 1922] im Klub der Partei der Kleinlandwirte den Wunsch mit, die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zu vereinigen.“ Am 22. Februar 1922 „vereinigte sich die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte. Der neue Parteiname: Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei.“ (Das sich um diesen Zeitraum handelnde Kapitel wurde von Judit Fejes zusammengestellt.)⁹ Ignác Romsics sah in seiner 1991 veröffentlichten erfolgreichen Bethlen-Biographie, dass „das wesentliche der neuen Vorstellungen [des Ministerpräsidenten seit Ende 1921] der Bruch mit den Legitimen... und ... die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Regierungspartei war.“ Demnach „unterschieden die Mitglieder der Gruppe der Dissidenten am 1. Februar ihre

⁵ *Magyarország története 1918–1919, 1919–1945*. [Geschichte Ungarns 1918–1919, 1919–1945] Gy. Ránki, Chefred., T. Hajdu und L. Tilkovszky, Red. Budapest 1976, S. 445, 1244.

⁶ F. Pölöskei, *Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919–1922*. [Horthy und sein Machtsystem 1919–1922] Budapest 1977, S. 189.

⁷ P. Gunst, Red. *Magyar történelmi kronológia. Az őstörténettől 1970-ig*. [Ungarische geschichtliche Chronologie. Von der Vorgeschichte an bis zum 1970] Budapest 1979, S. 475.

⁸ S. Balogh et al. *Magyarország a XX. században*. [Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert] Budapest 1985, S. 133.

⁹ K. Benda, Chefred. *Magyarország történelmi kronológiája 1848–1944*. [Geschichtliche Chronologie Ungarns] 3 Bd, Budapest 1982, S. 884.

Beitrittserklärung und schlossen sich formal [an die Partei der Kleinlandwirte] an“, aus der durch diese Art und Weise die Einheitspartei wurde.¹⁰ Im Gegenteil dazu wird im von Jenő Gergely, Ferenc Glatz und Ferenc Pölöskei zusammengestellten Handbuch *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919–1944* (Parteiprogramme in Ungarn 1919–1944) behauptet, dass Bethlen „am 5. Januar 1922 mitteilte: seine Partei, die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei [KNEP] will sich mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte vereinigen,“ in die er mit Hilfe der ehemaligen Politiker aus der Arbeitspartei „die Kleinlandwirte integriert hat, die die Selbstständigkeitsbestrebungen der Kleingrundbesitzer vor Augen haben. Die Partei wurde offiziell am 22. Februar 1922 unter dem Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei (mit bekannterem Namen: Einheitspartei) gegründet.“¹¹

Diese Behauptungen sind fast in jeder Synthese rezipiert worden.¹² Es kann noch im 1998 herausgegebenen Buch *Magyarország a két világháború korában 1914–1945* (Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1914–1945) von Mária Ormos, die diesen Zeitraum ausgezeichnet kennt, gelesen werden, dass Bethlen „Anfang Januar 1922 den Klub der Partei aufsuchte, und bekannt machte, seine eigene Partei, die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei, mit den Kleinlandwirte vereinigen zu wollen. Das hieß praktisch, dass der Ministerpräsident mit seinem etwa zwei Dutzend Anhängern am 22. Februar 1922 der Partei der Kleinlandwirte beitrat und die neue Organisation den Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei aufnahm.“ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) Im Widerspruch dazu wird im chronologischen Teil behauptet, dass „István Bethlen und seine Anhänger [am 2. Februar 1922] in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintraten, die den Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei aufnahm (im Allgemeinen ist die als Einheitspartei genannt).“¹³ Gegenüber der Ansicht von Mária Ormos und Ignác Romsics meinen Jenő Gergely und Pál Pritz in dem im selben Jahr veröffentlichten Buch *A trianoni Magyarország 1918–1945* (Trianoner Ungarn 1918–1945: „In der Fachliteratur ist die Konzeption bis heutzutage anzutreffen, dass Bethlen und seine direkten Gesinnungsgenossen sozusagen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte „beitraten“, (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) dann organisierten sie die Einheitspartei, die zukünftige Regierungspartei. In der Tat war gar nicht davon die Rede, sondern von der Vernichtung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, die Marginalie von Nagyatádi und der gestiefelten Abgeordneten.“¹⁴ Vielleicht schrieb aus diesem

¹⁰ I. Romsics, *Bethlen István. Politikai életrajz*. [István Bethlen. Politische Biographie] Budapest 1991, S. 142, 145.

¹¹ J. Gergely, F. Glatz, F. Pölöskei, Red. *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919–1944*. [Parteiprogramme in Ungarn 1919–1944] Budapest 1991, S. 64.

¹² I. Belényi–D. Gyapay, *Magyarország rövid története*. [Kurze Geschichte Ungarns] Budapest 1992, S. 552; Zs. L. Nagy, *Magyarország története 1918–1945*. [Geschichte Ungarns] Debrecen 1995, S. 100; I. K. Tarsoly, Chefred. *Magyarország a XX. században*. [Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert] 1. Bd, Szekszárd 1996, S. 55.

¹³ M. Ormos, *Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1914–1945*. [Magyarország a két világháború korában 1914–1945] Debrecen 1998, S. 101–102, 290.

¹⁴ J. Gergely–P. Pritz, *A trianoni Magyarország 1918–1945*. [Trianoner Ungarn 1918–1945] Budapest 1998, S. 60.

Grund Ignác Romsics in seiner 1999 veröffentlichten hervorragenden Synthese *Magyarország története a XX. században* (Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhundert) auf folgende Art über diese Frage, um seine frühere Meinung zu korrigieren: „Gleichzeitig mit der Änderung des Wahlrechtes änderte Bethlen auch die bisherige Parteistruktur. Im Laufe des Jahres 1922 schaffte er, beide große Parteien, die Vereinigte Partei der Kleinlandwirte (die war anders genannt – J. S.) und auch die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei aufzulösen, und diese zum Teil zu verschmelzen.“ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) Im chronologischen Durchblick steht auch schon bei ihm: „am 22. Februar 1922 wurde die Einheitspartei unter der Führung von István Bethlen gegründet.“¹⁵ Jenő Gergely und Lajos Izsák beschrieben in ihrem Buch *A huszadik század története* (Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts) die Schaffung der Einheitspartei auch als die Auflösung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte und der Christlich-nationalen Vereinigungspartei, sagten aber nichts über den Zeitpunkt der Gründung dieser Partei.¹⁶ Im Gegenteil dazu kann in der 2001 veröffentlichten Gyula Gömbös-Biographie von Jenő Gergely gelesen werden, dass „István Bethlen an der Spitze der Dissidenten in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte einzog, so dass die Einheitspartei durch die Vereinigung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte mit den Dissidenten entstand.“¹⁷

Dieser historiographische Überblick beweist, dass es über den Zeitpunkt, die Form und die Weise der Beurteilung der Gründung der Einheitspartei nicht zum einheitlichen Standpunkt gekommen ist. Im Gegenteil! In der Fachliteratur findet man einander widersprechende Behauptungen. Es kommt aber auch vor, dass derselbe Autor zwei verschiedene Zeitpunkte der Organisierung der Einheitspartei angab, bzw. seine ehemalige Meinung beurteilt. Aus der Fachliteratur könnten noch dazu ähnliche widersprüchliche Behauptungen zitiert werden. Dafür gibt es hier und jetzt keine Möglichkeit, sie sind vielleicht auch überflüssig. In meinem Essai unternehme ich in Auseinandersetzung mit den oben genannten Bestimmungen folgende Beweisführungen: Die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei vereinigte sich nicht mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte. Die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei war nicht Bethlens Partei. Anfang Januar 1922 zogen sich Bethlen und seine Anhänger in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nicht ein. Die Partei der Kleinlandwirte legte sich das Attribut bürgerlich nicht am 22. Februar 1922 zu. Der Ministerpräsident mit seinen zweidutzend Anhänger trat in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nicht am 22. Februar 1922 ein. Die Einheitspartei wurde nicht am 22. Februar 1922 gegründet. Bethlen schaffte es nicht, die Partei der Kleinlandwirte aufzulösen und sie mit der KNEP zu verschmelzen. Die Einheitspartei wurde durch die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte ge-

¹⁵ I. Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*. [Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhundert] Budapest 1999, 224, S. 589.

¹⁶ J. Gergely–L. Izsák, *A huszadik század története*. [Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts] Budapest 2000, S. 61–62.

¹⁷ J. Gergely, *Gömbös Gyula. Politikai pályakép*. [Gyula Gömbös. Politische Laufbahn] Budapest 2001, S. 118–120.

gründet. Danach wollen wir die wichtigsten Thesen näher ins Auge fassen, die den in den Synthesen lesbaren Behauptungen widersprechen.

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Erstens lohnt es sich klar zu machen, dass die KNEP nicht die Partei Bethlens war. Der Parteivorsitzende war bis zum 4. Januar 1922 Gyula Gr. Andrassy. Er teilte gerade am 4. Januar in der Sitzung der KNEP mit, dass er – wegen der Haltung einiger Parteimitglieder, wie sie sich bei der Anerkennung des Dethronisierungsgesetzes und danach benahmen – austreten würde. Er und seine königstreuen Gesinnungsgenossen attackierten auch am nächsten Tag in der Nationalversammlung Bethlen und seine Regierung heftig, bzw. führten sie durch die Unterstützung der katholischen Priester eine weit verbreitete legitime Propaganda im Staat. (Übrigens vereinigte sich Andrassy und seinen 10 königstreuen Abgeordneten am 15. Januar mit der Christlich-nationalen Partei von Friedrich, und gründeten die Christlich-nationalen Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei. Friedrich veröffentlichte die Gründung am 21. Januar in der Sitzung im Abgeordnetenhaus.)¹⁸ Aus diesem Grund erschien Bethlen am Abend des 5. Januar zum Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, wo er der legitimistischen Propaganda den Kampf ansagte und zum Schluss seiner Rede meinte: „diese Partei ist der Fels, worauf das zukünftige Ungarn aufgebaut werden könnte (minutenlanger Beifall), ich und meine Freunde wollen uns mit dieser Partei *vereinigen*. (Jubel. Die Parteimitglieder stehen wieder auf und jubeln begeistert dem Ministerpräsidenten zu.) Ich bitte euch das Gleiche zu tun. (Beifall und Jubeln ohne Ende.)“¹⁹ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.)

Wen hat er „Freunde“ genannt? Was passierte danach? Die treuesten politischen Freunde und Unterstützer des Ministerpräsidenten waren die Abgeordneten der sogenannten Dissidenten, die schon früher aus der KNEP und der Partei der Kleinlandwirte ausgetreten waren, und schon eine Weile die Gründung der Einheitspartei angestrebt hatten. Sie äußerten sich auf der Sitzung am 6. Januar: „Dadurch, dass jeder in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintreten soll, kann die Einheitspartei nicht gegründet werden.“²⁰ Sie waren also in dieser Zeit noch gegen die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei. Für die Aufklärung des Missverständnisses veröffentlichte die Ungarische Nachrichtenagentur (MTI) am 7., dass Bethlen am 5. nur „die Bereitschaft mitteilte sich mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zu *vereinigen*.“²¹ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) Am 5. Januar 1922 besuchte also Bethlen die Partei der Kleinlandwirte, aber er wollte diese nicht mit der KNEP, sondern mit seinen Freunden, also mit den Dissiden-

¹⁸ J. Kardos, *Legitimizmus. Legitimista politikusok Magyarországon a két világháború között*. [Legitimismus. Legitimistische Politiker in Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeit] Budapest 1998, S. 84–91.

¹⁹ *Gróf Bethlen István beszédei és írásai*. [István Gr. Bethlens Reden und Schrifte] 1. Bd, Budapest 1933, S. 225. Siehe auch: A Kisgazda, 5. Januar 1922.

²⁰ *Új Nemzedék*, 8. Januar 1922.

²¹ *Pesti Napló*, 8. Januar 1922.

ten vereinigen. Das zeigt also deutlich, dass zu der Zeit weder er, noch seine Anhänger in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintreten wollten!

Im Folgenden bezweifle ich also die Behauptung, dass die Partei der Kleinlandwirte am 22. Februar 1922 das Attribut bürgerlich angenommen hätte. Bethlen versuchte Ende November 1921 seine eigene Einheitspartei aufgrund seines Programms und der Auflösung der Parteien zu gründen. Dagegen wollten Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger die Konzeption über die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte als alleinregierende Partei einsetzen und damit auch das Programm und das Attribut „bürgerlich“ annehmen. Bethlen und seine Anhänger wollten dies damals noch nicht.²² Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger waren nur unter diesem Umstand bereit die Einheitspartei zu gründen. Dagegen traten drei Mitglieder der liberalen Gruppe aus der Partei aus. Die komplizierten und den ganzen Januar laufenden Verhandlungen wurden eng mit dem von Bethlen und Klebesberg unterstützten Gesetzesvorschlag über das Wahlrecht verbunden. Dadurch sollten – wie bekannt – die offenen Wahlen auf dem Land wieder eingeführt werden. Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger waren aber zu dieser Zeit dagegen. Aus diesem Grund übte der neokonservativ-agrarische Flügel ihrer Partei, die Gruppe von Gömbös und Bethlen, Klebesberg, bzw. Horthy politischen Druck auf sie aus. Nach der am 25. Januar bei Horthy stattgefundenen Sitzung äußerte sich Bethlen: er sei jedoch für die auf dem Land offenen Wahlen, wie im Gesetzesentwurf vorgeschlagen wurde, dessen Anerkennung aber die Regierung nicht von Parteien abhängig gemacht habe. In der Nationalversammlung soll also jeder nach seinem Gewissen stimmen.

Das beruhigte den liberalen, agrardemokratischen Flügel der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, weil sie daran glaubten die Mehrheit für die Geheimabstimmung sichern zu können. Demzufolge wurde am selben Abend in der Sitzung der Partei die folgende wichtige Entscheidung getroffen: „Die Partei behauptet, als Verkörperung der offiziellen christlich-agrarischen Gedanken, die ehrliche Durchführung der Bodenreform, die durch die Gesetze 1920/I. (Nationalversammlung) und 1920/XVII. (Kompetenz des Verwesers), und 1921/XLVII. (Dethronisierung) festgehalten wurde, gegen aus allen Richtungen kommenden Angriffe zu bewahren. Die Zeit ist soweit, alle, die mit Gedanken der Partei einverstanden sind, in die Parteimitgliederschaft zu nehmen. Die Partei nimmt das Attribut „bürgerlich“ an, wie das im Dezember 1921 beschlossen wurde und wartet mit brüderlicher Liebe auf alle aus der Schicht der Produktion und der geistigen Arbeit, die bereit sind mit den Millionen der Arbeiter der Agrarschicht zusammen, Hand in Hand für die Auferstehung und Stärkung des unabhängigen Ungarns zu arbeiten.“²³

Der Kern dieses Beschlusses ist also, dass die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nur diejenigen in ihr Lager rief, die ihr Programm anerkennen, besonders die Durchführung des Bodenreform, den bisherigen Rahmen der Verfassung, die Erweite-

²² J. Sipos, „Nagyatádi Szabó István és a második Bethlen-kormány megalakulása,“ [István Nagyatádi Szabó und die Entstehung der zweiten Bethlens Regierung] *Szabolcs-Szatmár-Beregi Levéltári Évkönyv* XV (2001), S. 155–286.

²³ *Világ*, 26. Januar 1922, Kisgazda 5. Februar 1922.

rung der Kompetenz des Verwesers und das Dethronisierungsgesetz. Letztes verhinderte den Eintritt der Königstreuen und Ultralegitimen, also der katholischen und legitimen Großgrundbesitzer und des legitimen Klerus in die Partei. Die Erweiterung des Parteinamens um das Attribut bürgerlich heißt jedoch, dass es nicht um die Vernichtung der Partei ging – wie es bisher in der Fachliteratur mehrheitlich behauptet war –, sondern um die Absicht ihrer Erweiterung zur Regierungspartei. Worin lag also das Kompromiss? Worum es sich in der Stellungnahme nicht handelte: Sie förderte weder die geheimen Wahlrechte und die Demokratisierung der Verwaltung, noch das von Bethlen betriebene Reform des Herrenhauses.

Die Partei der Kleinlandwirte legte sich also das Attribut bürgerlich nicht am 22. Februar 1922, sondern am 25. Januar zu. Es geschah freiwillig, nach den Regeln der Innerparteidemokratie. Als Gegenleistung dafür drängte der liberale, agrardemokratische Flügel von Bethlen in der Nationalversammlung vom 26. Januar auf die gesetzliche Anerkennung des Unfallversicherungszuschlages für Landarbeiter und Diener und die Beschleunigung der Verwirklichung des Bodenreformgesetzes. Sie akzeptierten, dass das Gesetz über die Wiederherstellung des Herrenhauses – das auch schon vor der öffentlichen Rechtskommission war – in der Nationalversammlung besprochen wird. Das konnte aber nicht mehr im Februar 1922 geschehen. Dieser Gesetzesvorschlag wurde von den Abgeordneten nur nach dem Tod Nagyatádis diskutiert, also nach dem 1. November 1924.

Demnächst muss kurz bewiesen werden, dass der Ministerpräsident mit seinen zwei dutzend Anhänger nicht am 22. Februar der Partei der Kleinlandwirte beitrat, sondern am 2. Februar. Hieraus schließe ich darauf, dass die Einheitspartei am 2. Februar gegründet worden ist. Gleichzeitig muss auch das Missverständnis behoben werden, dass die Anhänger des Ministerpräsidenten keine Mitglieder der KNEP waren. Den am 25. Januar anerkannten Beschluss der Partei der Kleinlandwirte sendete Nagyatádi am 28. im Namen der Parteivorsitzenden den Dissidenten. Er fügte einen Brief bei, worin er formulierte: „*die Erweiterung des Parteirahmens*“ sei beschlossen worden und er hoffe auf die Verwirklichung der Vereinigung mit den Dissidenten, die bedingungslos [Bethlen] folgen.“²⁴ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.)

Nachdem die Dissidenten diesen Brief und den Beschluss der Partei der Kleinlandwirte in die Hand bekommen hatten, wurde ein Dokument herumgegeben um die Vereinigung mitzuteilen. Dieses Dokument wurde zuerst vom Ministerpräsidenten Bethlen unterschrieben. Am 1. Februar schlossen die Dissidenten die Liste der Unterschriften auf dem Anschlussdokument ab. Bethlen und die Gruppe von den Dissidenten, bzw. zwei Parteilosen (Károly Ereky und József Tasnádi-Kovács) und bloß ein Abgeordneter der KNEP (Lajos Szádeczky-Kardoss) traten am 2. Februar 1922 in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte an. In der Zeit schlossen sich – mit Bethlen – 22 Abgeordneten der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an. Das erschien jedoch – obwohl es ziemlich auch widerspruchsvoll ist – 1956 in einem Prolog eines Dokumentbandes von Dezső Nemes. Das chronologische

²⁴ *Népszava*, 26. Januar 1922.

Handbuch von Péter Gunst, das sechs Auflagen erlebte, und die vor 1999 geschriebenen Bücher von Ignác Romsics – wie gesehen – betrachteten den 2. Februar 1922 als den Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Einheitspartei.²⁵

Im Gegenteil dazu wurde die Einheitspartei in den nach der Wende geschriebenen Synthesen am 22. Februar 1922 gegründet, nur Jenő Gergely behauptet den 2. Februar 1922. Wer hat Recht? Die parlamentarische Debatte des Gesetzesvorschlags über das Wahlrecht war bis zum 16. Februar abgeschlossen. Gleichzeitig lief das zweijährige Mandat der Nationalversammlung ab und Horthy – nach dem Vorschlag des Ministerpräsidenten – löste die Nationalversammlung auf. Bethlen sagte in der am selben Tag organisierten Abschlussparty der zur alleinregierenden Partei erweiterten Partei der Kleinlandwirte: „Die Koalitionsregierungen waren in Ungarn immer zum Tode verurteilt. Man braucht eine Einheitspartei um die Last der Regierung in Ungarn tragen zu können, nur dann kann sie die Vorteile auch genießen. Wir konnten ...eine Einheitspartei... *bis heute nicht bis zum Ende* verwirklichen, wir müssen sie vor den Wahlen verwirklichen.“ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.). Bethlen wollte „das Zusammenhalten von den unteren, oberen und mittleren Ständen“ auf diese Weise erreichen. Nagyatádi erkannte, dass es vor der Gründung der Einheitspartei theoretische Kämpfe gäbe, auch zwischen ihm und dem Ministerpräsidenten, aber er hoffte darauf, dass die theoretischen Grundlagen fest stehen. Er hielt besonders diejenigen für gefährlich, die „die Königsfrage durch Putsch lösen wollten und wollen“ und „die im Land zwischen den Konfessionen Streit anstiften.“ Unter den veränderten Umständen müssen wir „die verfassungsmäßigen Fragen in Ordnung bringen“ – sagte er, was das aber konkret heißen sollte, legte er nicht ausführlicher dar.²⁶

Als Gegenleistung für die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte gab Bethlen der Agrarsphäre weitere wirtschaftliche Subventionen: Nach seinem Vorschlag bewilligte der Ministerrat am 17. Februar den 11,800,000 Kronen Zuschlag zu den Ausgaben für Sachanlagen, die zu den unter dem Landwirtschaftsministerium arbeitenden wirtschaftlichen Fachausbildungsstätten gehören. Außerdem wurde der Export der gemästeten Schweine um 4000 erhöht, bis am 27. Januar 8,000 pro Monat erlaubt wurden.

Am 17. Februar wurde von dem Ministerpräsidenten – unter der Bevollmächtigung der ehemaligen Vorsitzenden der Partei der Kleinlandwirte – an die folgenden Parteien appelliert: die außerparlamentarische Nationale Mittelpartei, die ein Teil der ehemaligen Arbeitspartei von Tisza war; an die Ungarische Ordnungspartei, die die ehemalige Verfassungspartei zusammenbindet; bzw. an die Vereinigte Unabhängige und 48er Partei. Ihre Mitglieder wurden aufgerufen sich der Einheitspartei anzuschließen. Demzufolge verkündete die Nationale Mittelpartei ihre Auflösung und beschloss den Einzelbeitritt ihrer Parteimitglieder. Am selben Tag teilten die Ungarische Ordnungsparteivorsitzenden mit Bethlen in

²⁵ Nemes, vgn. S.62–67.

²⁶ *Szózat*, 17. Februar 1922 ; *Kisgazda* 26. Februar 1922.

einem Brief mit, „mit Freude die Gründung der Einheitspartei mitzumachen.“ Zum Eintritt der zwei Parteien in die Einheitspartei kam es am 24. Februar.²⁷

Am 22. Februar aber geschah kein politisches Ereignis, das zur Behauptung der neuen Synthesen führen würde, wonach die Einheitspartei durch die Vereinigung der KNEP mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an diesem Tag gegründet worden sei. Woher kam dieses Datum und dieser Zusammenhang in den neuen Zusammenfassungen? Wie gesehen, konnte dieses Datum und dieser Zusammenhang zum ersten Mal im von Kálmán Benda zusammengestellten akademischen Handbuch *Magyarország története kronológiája* gelesen werden. Danach tauchte dieses Datum – meines Wissens – in einem chronologischen Überblick eines Universitätslehrbuches *Magyarország története 1918–1975* (Geschichte Ungarns 1918–1975) auf, das von Sándor Balogh, Lajos Izsák, Jenő Gergely und Gizella Föglein geschrieben wurde und 1986 erstmals erschien: „22. Februar 1922. Die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei vereinigte sich mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte von Nagyatádi unter dem Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei (bekannter Name: Einheitspartei).“ Dies wird übrigens im Kapitel des Buches, in dem es um die Gründung der Einheitspartei geht, nicht behauptet. Es gibt also schon innerhalb des Lehrbuches einen Widerspruch.²⁸ Das 1982er akademische Handbuch gilt also als Quelle für die Feststellungen der neuesten Synthesen, wonach die Gründung der Einheitspartei am 22. Februar 1922 geschehen sei. Dieses Datum ist unannehmbar, weil an diesem Tag kein nach solcher Art erklärbares Ereignis passierte. Akzeptabler scheint der 2. Februar 1922. Einerseits, weil Bethlen und die Dissidenten dann in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintraten, andererseits betrachteten die Politiker und Tageszeitungen der Zeit diesen Zeitpunkt als den Tag der Gründung der Einheitspartei. Aus diesem Grund – nach vielen Diskussionen und Missverständnissen – empfehle ich dieses Datum.

Die Wahl der Einheitsparteivorsitzenden fand am 23. Februar statt. Hier sagte Bethlen zur Beruhigung des unzufriedenen liberalen agrardemokratischen Flügel: „Ich kam hierher nicht um das Prinzip, die Programme der Partei zu verändern, sondern um diese zu *ergänzen* und zu vervollständigen.“ (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) Ich kam nicht hierher – sagte er – „um der Partei den demokratischen Charakter zu nehmen, um das demokratische Parteiprogramm auf ein reaktionäres Programm zu reduzieren.“ Nach seinem Vorschlag wurden die Parteivorsitzenden und der Verwaltungsausschuss durch die Parteiversammlung gewählt.²⁹ Bethlen empfahl Nagyatádi zum Parteivorsitzenden, Gásztón Gaál zum Mitvorsitzenden zu wählen, das andere Amt des Mitvorsitzenden sollte besetzt werden. Die Vizepräsidenten wurden: István Sokorópátkai Szabó, István Rubinek, Zoltán Meskó, Bálint Szijj, Gyula Gömbös und Gyula Fay von den Dis-

²⁷ *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919–1945*. [Akten zur Geschichte der Gegenrevolution 1919–1945] 2. Bd, S. 268ff.

²⁸ S. Balogh et al. *Magyarország története 1918–1975*. [Geschichte Ungarns 1918–1975] 2. Auflage, Budapest 1988, S. 62, 341.

²⁹ *Világ*, 25. Februar 1922.; *Kisgazda* 5. März 1922.

sidenten. Sie vertraten die innerparteilichen Richtungen. Nagyatádi rechnete vor allem mit Szijj, Meskó und Gaszton Gaál. 20 Mitglieder des Verwaltungsausschusses wurden diesmal gewählt. Von diesen gehörten nur drei zu den ehemaligen Dissidenten, 12 waren Anhänger Nagyatádis, 5 gehörten zum neokonservativ-agrarischen Flügel der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, die in mehreren Fragen mit dem Ministerpräsidenten und den Dissidenten einverstanden waren. Nach Bethlens Vorschlag wurden 4–5 Sitze für die später Beitretenden freigehalten. Die Parteiminister und Staatssekretäre wurden von Amts wegen Mitglieder des Verwaltungsausschusses. (Bethlen hatte zu dieser Zeit kein formelles Amt, aber in der Tat war er der eindeutige Führer der Partei.) Die Zusammenstellung der Parteivorsitzenden war also nicht Bethlens Werk, obwohl er die Liste der Personenempfehlungen vorgeschlagen hatte. Das war ein *Kompromiss* zwischen ihm und Nagyatádi. Die Zusammensetzung entsprach den innerparteilichen Kräfteverhältnisse und dem Prinzip, dass die Beitretenden nur ihrem Zahlenverhältnis gemäß Vertretung im Vorstand bekommen dürfen. Aufgrund der Zusammensetzung der Vorsitzenden durfte Nagyatádi das Gefühl haben, einen annehmbaren Kompromiss mit Bethlen abgeschlossen zu haben, dass er und seine Anhänger ihr politisches Gewicht in der Einheitspartei bewahren und somit auch die Richtung und den Inhalt der Konsolidierung beeinflussen können.

Die Frage lautet: Kann dieser Zeitpunkt als das Datum der Parteigründung betrachtet werden? Die Synthese des 8. Bandes der zehnbändigen *Geschichte Ungarns* behauptete, dass „eine Vereinigung über die Organisationsrahmen der neuen Regierungspartei am 23. Februar 1922 erzielt wurde.“³⁰ In Wirklichkeit wurden nur die Vorsitzenden und der Verwaltungsausschuss der neuen Partei gewählt, und das nicht einmal endgültig. Der Name der Partei wurde schon am 25. Januar um das Attribut „bürgerlich“ erweitert. Über die Organisationsrahmen sagte Bethlen nur, dass es die Aufgabe des Verwaltungsausschusses sei „die Zentralbehörden auf dem Land und in der Stadt aufzubauen und zu organisieren.“ Ferenc Pölöskei bestimmte aber in seinem Buch *Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919–1922* (Horthys Machtsystem 1919–1922) dieses Datum als den Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Einheitspartei. Die Mehrheit der Historiker waren anderer Meinung, bzw. bezeichneten fälschlicherweise den 22. Februar als den Tag der Parteigründung. Die Wahl der Landesvorsitzenden der Einheitspartei wurde auch von den Zeitgenossen nicht als Parteigründung betrachtet.

Der Einheitspartei traten – wie schon erwähnt – am 24. Februar die von Zsigmond Gr. Perényi geführte *Nationale Mittelpartei* und ein Teil der *Ungarischen Ordnungspartei*, die von Károly Grecsák geführt wurde und einen Teil der ehemaligen Verfassungsanhänger zusammenfasste, bei. Die erste Vorstandssitzung der Einheitspartei fand am 28. Februar statt. Bethlen teilte hier mit, dass er nach der letzten Parteiversammlung Gyula Gömbös gebeten habe, das Amt des geschäftsführenden Vizepräsidenten zu übernehmen. Zu Vizepräsidenten wurden Gr. Perényi und der pensionierte Generalleutnant Dezső Molnár; in den Verwaltungsausschuss Vilmos Gr. Lers, Imre Gr. Károlyi und László Almássy gewählt. Damit

³⁰ *Magyarország története 1918–1919, 1919–1945*, S. 445, 1244.

war die formelle Mehrheit von Nagyatádi und seiner Anhänger innerhalb des Parteivorstandes aufgehoben. Die Kräfteverhältnisse zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi glichen sich auf dem Papier aus, aber die Initiative hielt Bethlen in der Hand.

Danach machte Gömbös das Parteistatut und den Plan der Wahlvorbereitungen bekannt – diese Texte sind noch unbekannt. Bethlen veröffentlichte den vom Ministerrat angenommenen Verordnungsentwurf des Wahlrechtes, und bestand wieder auf die Einführung der offenen Wahlen auf dem Land. Nagyatádi argumentierte für Geheimwahlen. Er wurde von Mihály Dömötör und Sándor Simonyi-Semadam unterstützt. Bethlen behauptete, da es hier um Regierungsmaßnahmen gehe, trage nur die Regierung und nicht die Partei die Verantwortung. Simonyi-Semadam bestritt auch diesen Standpunkt, blieb aber am Ende in der Minderheit. Nach der Sitzung äußerte sich Nagyatádi über die Frage des Verzichts auf Geheimwahlen: *In Bewahrung seines prinzipiellen Standpunktes* beuge er sich der verfassungsrechtlichen Erklärung des Ministerpräsidenten. Wie allgemein bekannt, veröffentlichte Bethlen die Wiederherstellung der Wahlrechtsverordnung über die offenen Wahlen in den Landwahlbezirken danach, am 2. März. Nach dem Brief Bethlens vom 17. Februar löste sich die *Vereinigte Unabhängige und 48er Partei* wegen innerer Streitigkeiten auf, dann trat der ehemalige linke Flügel (ungefähr 40 Personen) unter der Führung Pál Hoitsys am 2. März der Einheitspartei bei. Von ihrem Beitritt erhofften sich Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger eine Verstärkung ihrer eigenen innerparteilichen Positionen.³¹

Wie bewerteten die Historiker bisher die Gründung der Einheitspartei? Laut dem 8. Band der 1976 erschienenen *Geschichte Ungarns* „war die Einheitspartei durch Bethlens Plan so gegründet, dass Nagyatádi und seine Parteianhänger ihre totale Niederlage anfangs gar nicht erkannten.“³² (Hervorhebung von mir – J. S.) Diese Feststellung wurde von Ferenc Pölöskei 1977 so weiterentwickelt: „Bethlen gründete also seine Partei gleichzeitig mit der *Auflösung* der Partei der Kleinlandwirte. Nagyatádi Szabó, der mit dem ehrenvollen Präsidentenamt belohnt war, hat die Bedeutung der Ereignisse nicht einmal geahnt, da er sowohl hinsichtlich seiner Konzeption als auch angesichts seines taktischen Gefühls weit hinter Bethlen stand, der die führende Gestalt der Gegenrevolution wurde.“³³ Das 1988 erschienene Universitätslehrbuch von Sándor Balogh, Lajos Izsák, Jenő Gergely und Gizella Föglein behauptete, dass „der Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi in der Wirklichkeit den Tod der Partei der Kleinlandwirte bedeutete.“³⁴ Nach dem 1993 erschienenen Buch von József Nagy unter dem Titel *A Nagyatádi-féle földreform* (Die Bodenreform von Nagyatádi) wäre der Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi „ein historischer Irrtum von Nagyatádi Szabó“, wodurch die Bauernpartei von ihm „an die Aristokraten verkauft wurde.“³⁵

³¹ J. Sipos, *A Kisgazdapárt Egységes Párttá bővülése*. [Die Erweiterung der Kleinlandwirtepartei zur Einheitspartei] Manuskript, S. 65.

³² *Magyarország története 1918–1919, 1919–1945*, S. 445.

³³ Pölöskei, *Horthy és hatalmi rendszere*, S. 189.

³⁴ Balogh et al. *Magyarország története 1918–1975*, S. 62.

³⁵ J. Nagy, *A Nagyatádi-féle földreform*. [Die Bodenreform von Nagyatádi] Eger, 1993.

Diese einseitigen Feststellungen, die Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger unmöglich machen, über ihre totale Niederlage und ihren Verrat sprechen und Bethlens politische Genialität überschätzen, entsprechen meiner Meinung nach nicht den historischen Fakten, deshalb halte ich sie für übertriebene Behauptungen.

Die Bewertungen der Synthesen nach der Wende entsprechen bezüglich unseres Themas auch nicht immer den geschichtlichen Tatsachen. Folgende Feststellungen halte ich für falsch: Die KNEP wollte sich mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte vereinigen; Bethlen habe sich mit Hilfe der Politiker der ehemaligen Arbeitspartei „die Kleinlandwirte, die die Bestrebungen der selbständigen Kleingrundbesitzer unterstützten [in die KNEP] einverleiben wollen“³⁶; es ginge um „die Auflösung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, um die Marginalisierung von Nagyatádi und der „gestieften“ Abgeordneten.“³⁷ Auch die Meinung von Ignác Romsics kann ich nicht akzeptieren, wonach Bethlen „beiden großen Parteien, die Vereinigte Partei der Kleinlandwirte und die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei aufzulösen und zusammenzuschmelzen vermochte.“³⁸ Ich halte auch die Ansicht über die Entstehung der Einheitspartei nicht für gerechtfertigt, dass „der wahrhaftige Kräfteverhältnisse verdeckende operettenartig-veranstaltete „Handschlag zwischen Nagyatádi und Bethlen“ in der Tat so viel bedeutete, dass Bethlen und seine Gruppe mit seinem Einzug in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte die eigentlichen Landwirte, Nagyatádi und die Bauerndemokratie fordernden „Gestieften“ ausgebootet haben.“³⁹

Hier kann man – um diesen Prozess kurz zusammenzufassen und zu bewerten – vielmehr über die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei sprechen. Warum? Weil die Gründung der Einheitspartei durch die Erweiterung des Namens, Organisationsrahmens und der Programme der Partei der Kleinlandwirte geschah, aber weder durch die Einschmelzung, die Auflösung der Partei und die Marginalisierung von Nagyatádi, noch durch die Zersetzung und teilweise Verschmelzung der zwei Parteien. Nagyatádi wurde der Parteivorsitzende, seine Anhänger bekamen bedeutungsvolle Ämter im Parteiverwaltungsausschuss. Den Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi halte ich also nicht für einen Verrat des Bauerpolitikers, sondern für einen Kompromiss. Um das Ausmaß dieses Kompromisses gibt es zur Zeit Streit zwischen meinen verehrten Kollegen und mir. Sie nehmen im Wesentlichen die schematischen Feststellungen an, die schon seit mehreren Jahrzehnten existieren. Ich akzeptiere diese dagegen nicht, weil meine Grundforschungen beweisen, dass sie mit den geschichtlichen Fakten nicht übereinstimmen. Aus diesem Grund befürworte ich die Diskussion. Es ist unsere gemeinsame Aufgabe, den Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi und die Konsolidierung Bethlens genauer als bisher zu bewerten.

Für die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei spricht auch, dass im Frühling 1922 ihre Organisationen im Bezirk, in den einzelnen Be-

³⁶ Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919–1944, S. 64.

³⁷ Gergely–Pritz, *A trianoni Magyarország*, S. 60.

³⁸ Romsics, *Magyarország története*, S. 224.

³⁹ Gergely–Izsák, *A huszadik század története*, S. 64.

zirken, in der Stadt und auf dem Lande – soweit der Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi anerkannt war – nicht aufgelöst, eingeschmolzen, sondern zu Organisationen der Einheitspartei umgewandelt wurden. Über diesen Prozess gibt es aber noch keine genügenden Informationen. Wahrscheinlich veränderte sich der Charakter der lokalen Parteiführung: Sie verminderte den bäuerlichen und verstärkte den Herren-, Beamter- und Kleriker-charakter. Das heißt aber noch nicht, dass sich der bäuerliche Charakter der Parteiwähler und -mitglieder auch verändert hätte. Die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei ist die Form des Kompromisses, wodurch nicht nur in den obersten Schichten, sondern auch anderswo gesichert werden konnte, dass der Besitzbauernstand – vor allem für die Dorfreichen – staatlich und lokalpolitisch zu vertreten wird und die Durchsetzung seines Interesse ermöglicht ist. Aus diesem Grund betrachte ich die Einheitspartei – mindestens bis zum Tod Nagyatádis – nicht nur als die Regierungspartei, die „auf dem Gleichgewicht zwischen den Großgrundbesitzern, Großbürgern und Herrenmittelstand beruht,“ sondern auch als die politische Vertretung des Besitzbauernstandes. Genau deshalb bin ich auch mit der Ansicht nicht einverstanden, dass „die Auflösung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte auch soviel bedeutete, dass die Landwirtsgesellschaft bis 1930 keine eigene politische Organisation hatte.“⁴⁰ Da die Einheitspartei, also die Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei, die Regierungspartei selbst gleichzeitig auch die Bauerpartei war. Diese politische Konstruktion und die offene Wahlen auf dem Land sicherten die politische, gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Konsolidierung der 20er Jahre und die jeweilige Mehrheit der nachkommenden Regierungsparteien. Aus diesem Grund gebe ich Hirata Takeshi Recht: Die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei „kann als eine der wichtigsten Schritte von Bethlens Konsolidierung betrachtet werden – politisch bedeutete sie die gemeinsame Distanzierung des Bauerstandes und der Großgrundbesitzer gegen den Arbeiterstand.“ Und damit „trug die Bauerpartei im Endeffekt zum Aufbau der Regierungsordnung“ in Ungarn bei.⁴¹

Die Quintessenz meiner Konzeption ist, dass der wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche, soziale und politische Inhalt der Konsolidierung Bethlens ohne den politischen Kampf des liberalen, agrardemokratischen Flügels der Partei der Kleinlandwirte und von István Nagyatádi Szabó konservativer gewesen wäre. Ohne sie hätten die Grundbesitzer und der Herrenmittelstand keine solche Bodenreform und keine landwirtschaftliche Sozialpolitik erlaubt, wozu sie dadurch gezwungen waren. Die Konsolidierung hätte noch wenige menschliche und politische Freiheitsrechte und Bauerninteressen vertreten. Deshalb müssen die Tätigkeiten der Bauerpolitiker und ihrer Anhänger, die im Interesse der Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei tätig waren, und ihre innerparteiliche Arbeit unumgänglich erforscht werden.

⁴⁰ Nagy, *Magyarország története 1918–1945*, S. 100.

⁴¹ H. Takeshi, „A Bethlen-konsolidáció a nemzetközi politológiai irodalom tükrében,“ [Bethlens Konsolidierung nach der internationalen politologischen Literatur] *Rubicon* (1997/1), S. 13f.

"Shylock is whetting his blade"

Fear of the Jews in Hungary during World War II

LÁSZLÓ KARSAI



In the summer of 1943 László Németh, the distinguished Hungarian writer appraised the possibilities of the war in a speech made before his fellow thinkers and writers, and soon to be published in print as well. As he said, he had been watching the war "with deep pessimism from the first moment" because he thought whether the Germans, the English or the Russians were going to win it, it would be a great trial for Hungarians. In August 1943, Németh saw that the Germans could not win, and that this would have the following consequences: "...there is a peace here, with them [i. e. the Jews – L. K.] as its prompters and even as its appointed redeemers... the revengeful Jewry, without self-criticism, must have grown extremely strong during the last four or five years as opposed to the shy respecters of culture, and he must be deaf to knife whetting who fails to hear that it is the heart that Shylock wants..."¹ His fellow writer, Gyula Gombos spoke even more explicitly when refusing a bourgeois democratic or a socialist-leftist development for the same reason: one could not expect anything concrete from either but the "wild revenge of the Jews."²

Had a Jewish refugee from Poland heard or read these speeches, he would probably have started to wonder what these Hungarian writers were afraid of since the Jews had "hardly" been molested in the Carpathian Basin so far. Arrow-Cross and other extreme right-wing members in the House of Representatives showered reproaches upon the government of Miklós Kállay even in the winter of 1943 particularly because of the "fruitlessness" of its Jewish policy. According to Count Miklós Serényi³, the Jews were still able to exploit Hungarian peasants

¹ László Németh spoke during the lectures and discussions of the summer camp of *Magyar Élet* at Balatonszárszó. Budapest 1943, 49.

² Gy. Gombos, *Magyar út* [The Magyar way] quoted in Gy. Juhász, *Uralkodó eszmék Magyarországon 1939–1944*. Budapest 1983, 306.

³ Count Serényi was one of the best friends of vitéz László Endre. Endre was sub-prefect in Pest County, the largest in Hungary between 1938 and 1944, and became one of the

on a million and a half acres, one could hardly see an open shop-window in Budapest at Yom Kippur, and industry was still "firmly held by Jewish hands".⁴

In trying to answer the question of what "people" thought of the Jews during World War II, a few fundamental characteristics of the Hungarian Holocaust need to be considered. With respect to the number of dead Jews "only", the Hungarian Holocaust might appear "average." The Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices murdered about 550,000 of the 825,000 Jews who lived within the borders of Hungary as redrawn by 1941.⁵ However, on March 19 1944, the day that German troops occupied Hungary, more than 90% of those Jews were still alive. Hungary was the only ally of the Nazis during World War II that tried to settle the Jewish question in a constitutional way, by legislation.⁶ The so-called Jewish Acts between 1938 and 1942 and a series of executive orders connected to them excluded the Jews from civic equality. Their economic, entrepreneurial, and employment possibilities were restricted, the latter especially for professionals. Marriage between Jews and Gentiles was prohibited, and extramarital sexual relationships between them qualified as race defilement (*Rassenschande*).⁷ In the summer of 1941, more than 18 thousand Jews of allegedly irregular citizenship were handed over to Nazi murderers at Kőrösmező; In January 1942, more than 700 Jews (and thousands of Serbs) were massacred at Újvidék (Novi Sad). Apart from these cases, however, the only Jewish lives in immediate danger were those of the Jews conscripted for unarmed forced military labour. Approximately one and a half million acres of land owned by Jews were expropriated, but the factories, banks and even real estate of the Jews were not touched. As a police report on the morale of the population pointed out in the autumn of 1941, "The Jews admit that there are no other countries in Europe where they could live so comfortably."⁸ Despite the repeated demands of the Germans, the cabinet of Kállay (9 March 1942 to 22 March 1944) would not force the Jews to wear the yellow star of David,

most zealous collaborator of Eichmann as under-secretary in the Ministry of the Interior from the spring of 1944.

⁴ *Képviseelőházi Napló* [Journals of the House of Representatives] (henceforth: KN) 1939–1944–Vol. XIX, 52. (14 December 1943).

⁵ Between 1938 and 1941, parts of historical *Felvidék* [Northern Hungary], Subcarpathia, Northern Transylvania and parts of *Délvidék* [Southern Hungary], lost after World War I, were re-annexed with the assistance of Hitler and Mussolini.

⁶ This was pointed out by Géza Benkő, MP of the governing party in a criticism of the radical proposals (demanding ghettos, yellow stars, and deportation) of the extreme right. KN–1939–1944–Vol. XVI, 427. (2 December 1942).

⁷ For the Hungarian Holocaust in detail, see R. L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary*. 2 vols. New York 1994. Revised and enlarged Hungarian edition: Budapest 1997.

⁸ Report on the morale of the population no. 41/8–1941 (concerning the period from 11 September to 10 October) from the police headquarters at Nagyvárad to the Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior. (Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives] (henceforth: OL)–K149–Belügyminisztérium reservált iratok. [Ministry of the Interior – reserved documents]–651. f.–2–1941–7–6000).

then move them to ghettos and deport them. The "Jew protecting" policy of the Kállay cabinet has several explanations: it was feared that if they deported the Jews, the Hungarian economy would collapse. In the wake of Stalingrad, the influence of conservative, moderate anti-Semites had increased, who were looking primarily to Mussolini. As long as Rome refused to surrender its Jews, Budapest (and Bucharest) had something to refer to.⁹

Who feared the Jews' revenge in Hungary, and when and why? In order to be able to answer these questions with an at least approximate precision, we have studied journals of parliamentary debates, police and gendarmerie reports on the morale of the population in addition to newspapers, which were published under the conditions of a functioning, though restricted, parliamentary system, and limited by prior military censorship.

According to one of the oldest anti-Semitic topos, the God of the Jews, as well as the Jews themselves are revengeful. According to anti-Semites, the Jews live by the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" (Leviticus 24:20) while the forgiving God of Christians teaches, "ye resist no evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Mt 5:39). *Új Magyarország*, the daily paper of László Baký's¹⁰ national socialist party quoted deputy *Reichs* press chief Sündermann with deep approval saying that Germany regarded itself as being at war with the Jews of the world, whose every act barely hides Jewish "faces distorted by Old Testament hatred."¹¹ One of the authors of *Magyarság*, the paper of Arrow-Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi, held forth thus: "Jews embody hatred on earth, they are prototypes of inhumanity. How could it be otherwise, when their national religion itself prescribes as a commandment the humiliation, hatred, and indeed, the elimination of non-Jews." Following a brief historical survey, the writer continues: "We can feel no pity for the Jewish people, since the complete elimination of the twenty million Jews of the world could only partially compensate for the horrible evil deeds they have committed against mankind as a whole."¹²

The figure of the criminal, bloodthirsty Jew appears in medieval anti-Jewish writings as well. Jews, the murderers of Christ were regarded as satanic creatures, capable of all kinds of other crimes. A number of the elements of anti-Jewish Christian teaching were successfully built into their anti-Semitic propaganda by the Nazis and their Hungarian comrades. The Jewish *bioterrorist*, infecting the Aryan race, spreading diseases like syphilis, the *moral terrorist*, causing moral destruction and spreading prostitution, and the *cultural terrorist*, spoiling traditional arts and inventing *avant garde* and surrealism were joined after 1918 by the judeo-

⁹ Ch. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office A Study of Referat D II. of Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943*. New York-London 1978.

¹⁰ László Baký, retired gendarme major, confidant of the Nazis, was one of the chief organizers of the deportation of the Jews as under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior from 24 March 1944 onwards.

¹¹ *Új Magyarország*, 10 October 1943, 4.

¹² L. L.[evatic], *Szálnalom nélkül* [Without pity]. *Magyarság*, April 18, 1944, 5.

bolshevist *revolutionary terrorist*, spreading pacifism, stabbing the fighting army in the back. In the winter of 1942–1943, these Jews were complemented by the figure of the *military terrorist* Jew, initiating the world war, and generally responsible for the protraction of the hostilities and for the barbaric bombings that inflicted so much suffering on the civilian population.

The Hungarian press discussed the massacre at Katyn as proof of the vengefulness and inhumane cruelty of the Jews. Referring to sources in Berlin, *Új Magyarország* reported that the massacre at Katyn was executed by "Jewish kosher butchers" commissioned by Stalin and followed the blueprint provided by Soviet-Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg, their ultimate goal being the extermination of all European races.¹³ Milotay reports the extermination of one and half million Polish civilians carried off to Siberia and of ten thousand Polish officers, prisoners of war, projecting a vision of "Siberian horrors, Europe thrown to mass death, mass extermination, massacre, and the depths of mass graves" – in the case of a Soviet victory. What Milotay writes about is darkness and cruelty inconceivable to the European mind, heart, and imagination, demonic and satanic depravity, a true apocalypse.¹⁴ The perpetrators of the massacres at Katyn and elsewhere were Jews, the GPU units were commanded by Jews, and even 60% of the assigned executioners were Jews, another journalist wrote.¹⁵

In Hungary, the defeat in World War I, and the loss of two thirds of historical Hungary was all blamed by anti-Semites on the subversive activities of Jewish liberal bolsheviks. They remembered with fury and shuddering fear the Hungarian Soviet Republic proclaimed on 21 March 1919 and its Jewish leaders headed by Béla Kun.¹⁶ The reign of terror of the "brigand Jews of the sewers" in 1919 turned Hungarians into "hunted animals" for four months, the journalists of the extreme right wrote frequently during 1942–1944.¹⁷ It was precisely that, another Jewish-communist "reign of terror," that the anti-Semites of the political right was afraid of. And they really began to be afraid when, prisoners of their own propaganda, they slowly realised that the axis powers were not going to win the war. László Baký, Ferenc Szálasi and their comrades, i. e. the representatives of the Hungarian *extreme right*, trusted in the final victory of the Axis until as late as April 1945. The conservative, moderate anti-Semites, watching the military developments of the war more realistically, had started to be afraid of the Red Army and the revenge of Jews right after Stalingrad.

¹³ *Új Magyarország*, 16 April 1943, 2.

¹⁴ I. Milotay, "Katyn," *Új Magyarország*, 2 May 1943, 1.

¹⁵ I. vitéz Csicsery-Rónay, "A leálcázott kommunizmus," [Communism in disguise] *Új Magyarország*, 20 August 1943, 3.

¹⁶ "...it took the horrors of the bolshevist terror for hatred to flare up in us against them [i. e. the Jews – L. K.], along with the feeling of mortal danger," wrote István Milotay in his article entitled "Gyűlölettel vagy gyűlölet nélkül?" [With or without hatred?] *Új Magyarország*, 13 September 1942, 1. See also L. Marschalkó, *Kik árulták el 1918-ban Magyarországot*. [Who betrayed Hungary in 1918] Budapest 1944. Reprinted: Budapest 2000.

¹⁷ I. Milotay, "Közös cél, közös sors, közös harc," [Common goal, common destiny, common struggle] *Új Magyarország*, 1 February 1942, 2.

The war was regarded both in Budapest and in Berlin as a Jewish war, a world war started by Jews and waged for Jewish interests. Zoltán Bosnyák, one of the most eminent Hungarian anti-Semites declared in the spring of 1943, "...there can be no doubt that the Jews of the whole world, filled with unrestrained hatred and insatiable vengefulness, wanted this war. United in one tight spiritual unit, all the Jews in the world, from the ghettos in the Ukraine to the City of London and the Wallstreet [sic!] in New York, wanted retribution and satisfaction at any price" – only because Germany and Italy had dared to defy their aspirations to world hegemony, said Bosnyák.¹⁸

Following Goebbels, right-wing journalists in Hungary also claimed that bolshevism exposed a people of nearly 200 million to Jewish terror.¹⁹ Since the officer corps of the Red Army had been judaized, they claimed, that army was nothing but "the obedient and willing instrument of Jewish world imperialism."²⁰ The expressions "bolshevist sceptre," "red terror" gained acceptance in official usage. Calling upon the inhabitants of his town to cultivate unploughed lands, or to contribute to charities, the mayor of Mohács often mentioned the struggle against the "red, bolshevist sceptre."²¹ Róbert Haála, a member of Parliament watched with understanding what he said was the rumour-mongering, subversive machinations of the Jews disrupting the unity of the nation because, as he said, "...the war is waged to eliminate the Jews from Europe, therefore, they are defending themselves."²²

A great number of gendarmes also held that the Jews, all of them, were enemies, worse than the bloodiest minded communists. One gendarme sub-lieutenant reported to his superiors already in the summer of 1941: "The truth is that Jews are the enemies of the system developing at present – all Jews, without exception, whether they are poor, rich, merchants, landowners, religious or converts, etc." He also made concrete proposals: Jewish men between 18 and 50 ought to be interned, their radios, firearms confiscated.²³

The author of a confidential report delivered to deputy chief commissioner of the police József Sombor-Schweinitzer was of the opinion that with the anti-Jewish acts and decrees passed and issued so far "we have excited [the Jews] against ourselves," but "no significant or final measures have been taken."²⁴ "Let us not stop at halfway," demanded György Oláh, a member of Parliament; if we take

¹⁸ Z. Bosnyák, "A zsidókérdés jövője," [The future of the Jewish question] *Nemzetőr*, 7 May 1943, 1, 3.

¹⁹ J. Ambrus, "Dobjátok el az Istent, testvéreké!" [Drop God, little brothers!] *Nemzetőr*, 5 March 1943, 1.

²⁰ (no author given) "Zsidók a Szovjetunió hadseregében és flottájában," [Jews in the Army and the Navy of the Soviet Union], *Magyarország*, February 13, 1944, 8.

²¹ Baranya Megyei Levéltár – Pécs – Mohácsi polgármesteri i. – 2759/1943 and 3475/1943 [Baranya County Archives – Pécs – papers of the mayor of Mohács].

²² KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVIII, 575. (3 December 1943).

²³ Report No. 201/1941. of the mixed station at Törökszentmiklós to the detective subdepartment HQ, VI. Gendarmerie District, July 2, 1941 (OL-K149-651. f. 11/33).

²⁴ OL-K149-651. f.-12-3.

away the lands of the Jews, its "logical consequence" can only be locking them up in ghettos. The Jew, divested of his property, Oláh argued, "is fearfully dangerous." The publican without his liquor licence, the tobacconist without a tobacco market, the timber merchant, the cement merchant and the paraffin merchant stripped of their concessions are now being joined by impoverished Jewish proletarian elements, Jewish landowners, tenants.²⁵ More than one million Jews in Hungary today are an enemy within, declared Ákos Eitner MP. Once the government "has thrown down the gauntlet to the Jews..., they ought to expect that the Jews accept that challenge, and inveterate hatred and vengefulness are among the racial qualities of the Jews," argued Eitner.²⁶

It was not only lower rank gendarme or police officers that bombarded their superiors with proposals concerning the Jews. Arrow-Cross member of Parliament Gábor Vajna, who would be Szálasi's Minister of the Interior after 15 October 1944, demanded in the House of Representatives in the spring of 1942 the suppression of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions co-operating with it as one of "the urgent measures to be taken towards the solution of the Jewish question."²⁷ Vajna submitted his proposal with reference to battle-worn, valiant soldiers, to "the public mood of the whole of Christian Hungary," emphasizing that upon learning of "all those horrors and crimes that the Jewry of the world have committed against the nations and peoples of Europe," Hungarians unanimously demand a solution to the Jewish question. Vajna proposed decreeing the mandatory wearing of the yellow patch, compulsory earlocks for Jewish men,²⁸ the marking of Jewish businesses, restrictions on the travelling of Jews, and sending them to labour camps in the Ukraine.

His fellow member of Parliament, Károly Maróthy remarked regretfully a few months later that "we do not dare to collect [the Jews] in ghettos" despite the fact that "it was they themselves that declared war on us," despite the fact that they listen to Moscow and London on the radio, commit acts of sabotage, indeed, some Jews would like to see the streets paved with Hungarian skulls.²⁹ According to the morale report of the Ministry of Defence and Propaganda (*Nemzetvédelmi és Propaganda Minisztérium*, henceforth: NPM) industrial workers all over the country were convinced that the Jewish managers of the factories were sabotaging, "even under the strictest control," by, for example, employing their workers only part-time under the pretext of a shortage of raw materials.³⁰

The fear of Jews was increased by the news of Jewish partisans. One journalist wrote of Tito's partisans, known never to take prisoners, as escaped convicts, in-

²⁵ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 460. (10 June 1942).

²⁶ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVI, 329. (27 November 1942).

²⁷ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 196. (29 April 1942).

²⁸ This proposal, according to the *Journals of the House of Representatives*, excited "considerable amusement" in the House.

²⁹ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 321, 324, (2 June 1942).

³⁰ OL-K64-1943-41-664. Strictly confidential morale report of the NPM for 26 April to 1 May 1943.

ternational, bloodthirsty terrorists emphasizing that a number of "communist agitators of the Jewish race" were fighting among their ranks. They made Mosha (Moses) Pijadet one of Tito's deputies, claiming that his other lieutenant was originally called Fisher, and was, therefore, a Jew.³¹ And it was regarded as a really horrifying example of Jewish inhumanity and moral depravity that Jewish girls also fought among the Jewish partisans on the Russian front behind the German lines, and, what is more, "they showed great self-sacrifice" in the process.³² In the summer of 1943, the NPM was informed of 2,500 Russian parachutists dropped at Kőrösmező, accompanied by a great number of Jewish forced military labourers, who "intended to sneak into the country to start disruptive activities."³³

The editors of right-wing newspapers were watching out for signs that could be interpreted as indicative of the vengefulness of Jews. A Jewish poet, according to *Új Magyarország*, encouraged his readers to take notes of the many cruel words and deeds they come up against, and add them to the others. The journalist believed that instead of working diligently, the Jews "were collecting documents for the revenge."³⁴

The newspapers also published judicial decisions that punished Jews who behaved in a threatening way. Merchant Ede Fisher was sentenced to seven months imprisonment for saying, "All Christians will have been hanged before the last Jew is carried out of Hungary." Office-boy László Berkovics received two months for claiming that "Only the Soviet[Union] has order, there the roads are paved with Christian heads. In Palestine we shall do the same."³⁵

Kaufmann demanded the sterilization of the German people, Varga, a Hungarian, wanted to send ten million German men to do forced labour for life in Siberia, Félix Langer would plunder the Germans and have their men work for years rebuilding the destroyed countries – the papers went on and on in that vein, reporting the alleged revengeful designs of Jews.³⁶ Editor-in-chief István Milotay tells in an editorial of his paper of regularly receiving anonymous letters trying to intimidate him, promising "merciless retribution, calling to account, and punishment" for him and his extreme right-wing comrades.³⁷

Undaunted, Milotay continued his anti-Semitic incitement, but the number of those who were watching the developments on the military scene with growing anxiety was steadily increasing during 1943. The Ministry of the Interior regularly had the German and Slavic language broadcasts of the radios in Moscow

³¹ V. Görgey, "Tito," *Új Magyarország*, 29 December 1943, 1.

³² *Új Magyarország*, 16 May 1943, 4.

³³ OL-K64-1943-41-664. Strictly confidential morale report of the NPM for 26 July to 1 August 1943.

³⁴ *Új Magyarország*, 20 May 1942, 4.

³⁵ *Új Magyarország*, 13 May 1942, 2.

³⁶ F. Vajta, "Béketervek béke nélkül," [Peace plans without peace] *Új Magyarország*, 18 May 1943, 1, and *Magyarország*, 18 June 1944, 9.

³⁷ I. Milotay, "Fenyegetnek," [They threaten] *Új Magyarország*, 31 October 1943, 1.

and Kuybishev monitored, and their contents summed up and reported. Newscasters in Moscow noticed as early as in January, 1943 that Prime Minister Kállay, earlier introducing anti-Jewish measures by the dozen, had completely stopped paying attention to the Jews. According to a commentary from Moscow, "Hungarian government circles can see that Hitler's boat is sinking, and are trying to save their skins."³⁸ Antal Pándi, one of the Arrow-Cross members of Parliament said it to the face of the government supporters in the House, "...we know that you had one opinion before Stalingrad, and had a different opinion after Stalingrad."³⁹

Before the winter of 1942–1943, the Jews were verbally abused, but they were not feared. In September 1942, a military specialist discussed the "death throes of the Red Army at Stalingrad."⁴⁰ The landing of the British and American forces in North Africa (7 November 1942), and the fall of Mussolini (25 July 1943) created a great stir in Hungary. The confidential morale report of the NPM in May 1943, based on a national survey and collection of data emphasized that since the defeat of Rommel's army in Africa the behaviour of Jews has become "gloating and offensive."⁴¹

Jews were exerting fatal, destructive influence on Hungarian public opinion as well, the Arrow-Cross claimed. Vajna asked indignantly in the House of Representatives, "How could militarist propaganda be made in this country when at least a hundred thousand radios bellow London and Moscow and at least one and a half million Jews and Jewish hirelings spread the news of Moscow and London every day?"⁴² Jewish propaganda was successful if the comments of Ferenc Rajniss (member of Parliament of the right-wing *Magyar Megújulás Pártja* [Party of Magyar Renewal]) are to be trusted, "Nor can we afford to have some people in the internal destruction look upon Soviet Russia, armed to the teeth, like hypnotised chickens, and spread destruction at home saying there is nothing to do, Hungary is unable to defend herself."⁴³ The morale report of the NPM for July 1943 says that the conspicuous wealth of the Jews, the advantages they enjoyed in terms of housing, the salary of the physicians on forced military labour, and the good time the Jews enlisted for military forced labour were having in general "... is not so much generating passions as rather reflects a feeling of resignation" because people relate the "good time" of the Jews to the development of the war.⁴⁴

³⁸ OL-K149-651.f.-10/21-BM Központi Rádióállomás jelentései [reports of Central Radio Station, Ministry of Internal Affairs], 5/1943. (5 January).

³⁹ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIX, 77. (15 December 1943).

⁴⁰ V. Görgey, "A legnagyobb győzelem," [The greatest victory] *Új Magyarország*, 24 September 1942, 1.

⁴¹ OL-K64-Külügyminisztérium reservált politikai i. [reserved political papers of the Foreign Ministry]-1943-41-664. Morale report of NPM, 10-16 May 1943.

⁴² KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVII, 164. (24 November 1943).

⁴³ KN-1939-1944-XVIII.vol.- 270. (26 November 1943).

⁴⁴ OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 5 to 11 July 1943.

The frightened people, fearing, among other things, the revenge of the Jews started manoeuvring for positions, tried cautiously to render services, or at least to indicate that they had not meant whatever they had been doing or saying in the previous years. According to the morale report of the NPM for May 1943, many people all over the country thought that the estates of Jews were given to "state employees, military officers and administrators with connections because in the case of changes they would return the estates of their own will to the original owners."⁴⁵ The morale report of the NPM for July 1943 established again that "manoeuvring phenomena" could be observed among the public.⁴⁶ In November 1943, Milotay wrote about a society "living in blind carelessness, self-confidence, or *anonymous anxiety*," sharply criticizing those who could take good times only. These people in the old days had outdone everyone in anti-Semitism, glorifying Hitlerism and Fascism, but then "they started, first silently then with growing speed, slipping away, and turning against, first secretly, later more and more openly, everything they had noisily be swearing upon and pledging their word to when there were victories only, and belonging there meant success and advantages."⁴⁷ The businesses of Jews had been claimed and obtained by citizens, peasants living "in blind carelessness, self-confidence." During the research commissioned by the Yad Vashem Archives I have been conducting with my colleagues⁴⁸ in the provincial archives of Hungary we have found masses of papers that prove that as long as it could be done "legally," assisted by the authority of the state, common people claimed the businesses, lands, etc. of their Jewish neighbours without inhibitions. However, due to the developments of the military situation, more and more people started living in what Milotay called "anonymous anxiety," trying to oblige the "other" side as well.

Zoltán Sztinyai wrote with a contemptuous jeer about a friend of his, whose political coat was always cut according to the latest fashion. When the Maginot line seemed unbreakable, he was humming French songs, then started to abuse the decadent Gallic spirit and glorify the German genius imbued with natural force. Now he has turned his coat again, is worried about the fate of the country, renewing his connections with leftist persons, old friends, whispering with them in hidden corners of cafés. According to Sztinyai, his friend would be on the march for ever, always under victorious standards, contemptuous of those who remain true to themselves.⁴⁹ Róbert Haála, member of Parliament, was also of the opinion that fear, manoeuvring for position, turning coats were spreading all over the place. Many people were able to whine and fear only, in high society bets were being made about the outcome of the war, and "a great game of ma-

⁴⁵ OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 17 to 23 May 1943.

⁴⁶ OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 19 to 25 July 1943.

⁴⁷ I. Milotay, "Marxék színészei," [The actors of the Marxes'] *Új Magyarország*, 21 November 1943, 1.

⁴⁸ Judit Molnár, Zoltán Vági, Gábor Kádár, László Csősz, Zsuzsa Toronyi, Sándor Gáspár, Tamás Majsai.

⁴⁹ Z. Sztinyai, "Köponyeggondok," [Coat problems] *Új Magyarország*, 19 December 1943, 8.

noeuving for positions is going on because everyone would like to know where to step, to the left, to the right, or to the middle because the outcome of the war is doubtful," said Haála.⁵⁰

The "evasive operations" of the German army were celebrated in vain by the right-wing press. The maps published every day in the papers clearly showed how the front was approaching the Carpathian Basin from the east. Those on the extreme right in Hungary were hoping until the Spring of 1944 that if the British and the Americans tried to open the second front, the invasion would be frustrated.⁵¹ László Baký declared in February that the eastern front would be dwarfed in significance by the second front, and the decision would be made in the west, "...and we believe that Europe will be victorious."⁵²

A perusal of the June numbers of *Magyarság* reveals that until 12 June it was firmly believed that the invaders would be repelled from the Atlantic Wall with a bloodied nose. It was only on June 14 that the correspondent of *Magyarság* reported from Berlin that "Germany wants to give her enemies the decisive battle in the heart of France."⁵³

Perhaps this is where the answer lies as to why the Hungarian authorities were ghettoizing and deporting Jews in such an suprematic way, at times, indeed, enthusiastically in the spring of 1944. There were a number of possible reasons for the behaviour of the Hungarian authorities in 1944. Regent Miklós Horthy remained in place, appointing Döme Sztójay, his former ambassador to Berlin Prime Minister, thus giving real legitimacy to the new cabinet. The decade-long anti-Semitic propaganda, the "legal" deprivation of Jews of their rights and property had made officials, police and gendarme officers, as well as the population at large accustomed to viewing the Jews as enemies, second-class citizens. Hungarian civil servants, the members of the armed forces were well disciplined, and knew their duty. Now they were ordered to plunder and deport the Jews, and that is exactly what they did, they carried out their orders.

It was, to some extent at least, the successes of the invasion forces that forced Regent Horthy to stop the deportations on 6 July 1944, thereby temporarily saving the lives of approximately 250,000 Jews in Budapest. Horthy's decision had other motives as well: he was under serious pressure by his conservative friends and advisors, including former Prime Minister István Bethlen and others. At the end of June, he received telegrams from King Gustave V of Sweden, President Roosevelt, and Pope Pius XII. The leaders of the Hungarian churches, including

⁵⁰ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVIII, 573-575. (3 December 1943).

⁵¹ "...the year 1943, with its four, unexpected crises - the defeat at Stalingrad and the Don, the surrender of the Italians, that caused by the German evasive operations early in the autumn, and finally that intended by the terror bombings - have failed to stagger Europe," wrote the military expert of *Magyarság* with forced optimism. E. vitéz Zách, "Gondolatok az őszi csata mélyén," [Thoughts in the depths of the autumn battle] *Magyarság*, 21 December 1943, 4.

⁵² *Magyarság*, 10 February 1944, 1.

⁵³ *Magyarság*, 14 June 1944, 1.

Calvinist bishop László Ravasz, also asked him to reconsider his Jewish policies. It is also possible that he believed that Under-Secretary of the Interior Baky was concentrating considerable gendarmerie forces around Budapest at the end of June 1944 not in order to deport the Jews of the capital but in preparation for a *coup d'état* against him. The Central Jewish Council was also diligently spreading the rumour that if the Jews were taken from the capital, the western Allies would carpet-bomb Budapest. Fearing for his power and the population of the capital, the Regent finally gave in to pressure, stopped the deportations, and even ordered the gendarmes to leave Budapest.⁵⁴

The German occupation of Hungary, the stigmatization of the Jews with the yellow star, the organization of ghettos, collecting camps and then the deportations all contributed to the growing fear of the Jews. One of the reasons was the increasingly devastating bombing raids of the British and American air forces. Major cities and railway junctions had not been seriously bombed before the spring of 1944. The Hungarian press, however, regularly reported on the "terror raids" against German cities. This is what a German woman said to the military correspondent of *Új Magyarország* in May, 1943: "What goes on here has nothing to do with the war. The international Jews are exercising their sadistic instincts here. The English, the Americans, and their Negro pilots are merely blind instruments in the hands of that satanic race."⁵⁵

The figure of the barbaric, murderous Jew often appears in the Hungarian press in 1944. "We must indict the Jews for the increasing savagery of the war, for the bombing of the civil population, women, and children, for the destruction of hospitals... Why do they stain themselves with crimes that cry to heaven, with mass murder... It is they who drive hatred to fury, who demand the destruction of Europe..." wrote one extreme right-wing journalist.⁵⁶

It was a view widely held among people that the British and American bombers spared the lives of Jews. The "pollsters" of the NPM reported in June, 1943, that "according to rumour-mongers," the war was lost. However, many people believed that "Hungary is not bombed because the Jews here are not treated as they are in other countries, and because there are many Jews in Hungary and in Budapest."⁵⁷ After the first seriously damaging air raid in the Spring of 1944, the military correspondent of *Magyarság* was obliged to point out not without some surprise that "On April 3 the fallacy was proved wrong that Budapest would be exempted from all kinds of terrorist attacks by the three hundred thousand people of an alien race [i. e. the Jews – L. K.] residing there."⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Braham, *The Politics*, Ch. 25.

⁵⁵ V. vitéz Görgey, "Zaporozsje–Berlin–Ostende," *Új Magyarország*, 6 October 1943, 5.

⁵⁶ K. Koltai, "Vádirat a zsidóság ellen," [Indictment against the Jews] *Magyarság*, 16 April 1944, 17.

⁵⁷ OL-K64-1943-41-664. Confidential morale report of the NPM for 7 to 13 June 1943.

⁵⁸ E. Zách, "Schaffhausetől – Budapestig," [From Schaffhausen to Budapest] *Magyarság*, 5 April 1944, 1.

However, what the military expert understood and wrote did not convince the inhabitants of great cities. When it became widely known that the Jews in Budapest would be moved to ghettos, Under-Secretary of the Interior Endre hastened to set the minds of the population of the capital at rest: "We do not intend to collect the Jews into a closed Jewish quarter. Jews will be concentrated everywhere, i. e. in the vicinity of factory buildings, railway stations, etc. where hostile air raids can be expected."⁵⁹ Endre was probably aware that the Allies did not care who lived where. He probably had Jews moved into the neighbourhood of railway stations in Csepel because he wanted to have as many Jews as possible killed if war factories and railways were bombed.

The air raids provided the Arrow-Cross with a new opportunity to write articles about the satanic warfare of the Jews, a manifestation of their six-thousand-year old sadism.⁶⁰ A constantly recurring claim of these articles was that the terrorist bombers dropped satanic devices in the form of dolls, which, when picked up by innocent children, exploded in their hands.⁶¹ After visiting a German camp for prisoners of war, Vince Görgey described his experiences among "Jewish, Indian, and Negro" pilots in an article.⁶²

However, the fear of Jews, of the Red Army fighting for the Jews, and of Jewish-Negro-Indian terrorist bombers was not general. Tens of thousands were only too glad to grab the opportunity and eagerly jumped at the fortunes of the Jews collected in ghettos, collecting camps and then cattle-trucks. Housing departments were besieged, and the movables of the Jews, where possible, were stolen and carried away.⁶³ Hungarian writer Sándor Márai wrote with deep contempt and desperation in the spring of 1944: "Cold May. I shiver in the sun. Nothing to talk about with people. Like you cannot argue with a drunk or a lunatic: the Hungarian middle classes have gone mad and drunk from the Jewish question. The Russians are at Kőrösmező, the English and the Americans over Budapest, and this society, obsessed and foaming at the mouth, wants to talk about nothing but the Jews."⁶⁴

To the genuine satisfaction of Eichmann, more than 437,000 people were deported from Hungary between 15 May and 6 July 1944, most of them to Auschwitz, as the result of the co-ordinated, orderly, at times definitely enthusiastic "work" of tens of thousands of gendarmes, policemen and railwaymen. In May 1944, Márai prayed in his diary for God to give the Jews enough strength to bear the persecution, torture and oppression. "And then, he continued, if they have survived the persecutions, give them strength not to lose their heads, not to be-

⁵⁹ *Magyarság*, 16 April 1944, 4.

⁶⁰ *Magyarság*, 25 April 1944, 1.

⁶¹ *Magyarság*, 9 May 1944, 5; 10 May, 4.

⁶² V. vitéz Görgey, "Amerikai terrorbombázók társaságában, zsidó, indián és néger pilóták között," [In the company of American terrorist bombers, among Jewish, Indian, and Negro pilots] *Új Magyarság*, 22 April 1944, 5-6.

⁶³ Braham, *The Politics*, Ch. 19-21.

⁶⁴ S. Márai, *Napló 1943-1944*. [Diary 1943-1944] Budapest 1990, 156.

come hunters running amok. Give them strength to be strong enough to have human stature and patience. Because all that revenge begets is new passions."⁶⁵ Márai also knew very well that hundreds of thousands were being plundered and carried off to their deaths in the spring and summer of 1944 by the Hungarian authorities, the accomplices of the Nazis. The Jews would indeed have needed God's help to suffer all that peacefully, without wishing to retaliate. Ottó Komoly, one of the leaders of the Zionist resistance in Hungary wrote in his diary on September 9, 1944 that there was a meeting in the Ministry of the Interior, according to the information he had, at the Department of Public Safety, where those concerned discussed what was to be done if "the understandable and just despair of the Jewish masses" exploded. Miklós Mester, under-secretary of the Ministry of Education, one of Komoly's high ranking patrons went as far as to ask him what the Zionists thought could be done to avert the explosion of the "understandable despair" of the Jews.⁶⁶

If Komoly was really well informed, it has to be assumed that those concerned in the Ministry of the Interior were very much afraid. They were mostly afraid that after Rumania changed sides (23 August 1944) the front would collapse and that the Red Army would be given a happy welcome in Budapest as their liberator by hundreds of thousands of Jews. We should remember that most Jewish men, at least most able-bodied men capable of bearing arms, were at this time doing forced military labour service either on the front or in the hinterland. It takes very desperate or very frightened people to expect women, children and old people to revolt. General Géza Lakatos, the new Prime Minister (29 August to 15 October 1944) openly admitted in the House that "The military advantage today is obviously with the other side."⁶⁷ The 7th detective sub-department of the VII. (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District near the eastern border reported at the end of September that a unit of twenty-one partisans had parachuted in their district, and Hungarian Jewish forced military labourers in a number of prisoners' camps were preparing to fight as partisans on the side of the Red Army. The report mentions seventeen Jewish forced military labourers by name.⁶⁸

The news of the advancing Soviet troops late in the autumn of 1944, after the Arrow-Cross take-over on 15 October 1944, were full of words like blood, death, horror. And the red bandits, the Arrow-Cross press roared, were led by Jewish forced military labourers.⁶⁹ Róbert Haála called the Red Army "Asian hordes organized by Jews."⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Márai, *Napló*, 160, (around May, 1944).

⁶⁶ For the passage in Ottó Komoly's diary in Hungarian, see M. Schmidt, *Kollaboráció vagy kooperáció? A Budapesti Zsidó Tanács* [Collaboration or co-operation? The Budapest Jewish Council] Budapest 1990, 193.

⁶⁷ KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIX, 260. (21 September 1944).

⁶⁸ Report no. 1734/B.1944 (25 September) of VII. (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District to the Gendarmerie Intelligence Centre (OL-K149-651.f.-11/53).

⁶⁹ *Nemzetőr*, 4 November 1944. "They rape even demented women," the newspaper wrote among others.

⁷⁰ Journals of the Arrow-Cross House of Representatives, Sopron, 12 January 1945, 141.

Epilogue

In the words of the Hungarian poet Attila József, the activities of many people (politicians, policemen, gendarmes, those of the middle class, workers, and peasants) in Hungary during World War II were controlled by "cunning fear."⁷¹ Most politicians knew that whatever was being done to the Jews, in however "legal" and "parliamentary" way, was against justice and the law. Not every Hungarian politician wished the Jews dead, though. Many would have been satisfied with having some (or all) of the wealth of the Jews confiscated, and their civic rights curtailed. Even more would have been glad to see them emigrate. The plundering and the death of the Jews were wished by a smaller group, but they, to quote another Hungarian poet, "killed willingly and with pleasure, not obeying orders."⁷²

It would be legitimate to ask whether (one of) the reason(s) the Hungarian Jews were deported to their death was because they were feared. The anti-Semites were afraid of the Jews first of all because of their own anti-Semitic prejudices. They "knew" that the people of the Old Testament were cruel, despicable, and revengeful. But they also knew that the Hungarian Jews were treated cruelly, despicably, and unlawfully. The Nazi and, in its wake, the Hungarian war propaganda changed its tone and subject after Stalingrad. The propaganda of success was followed by the propaganda of fear. The struggle of life and death became a constant central motif. Either we win, or the Jewish bolsheviks will exterminate the Germans, the Hungarians, the press of the extreme right roared. The Hungarian national socialists and the Arrow-Cross, the most faithful collaborators of the Nazis, as we have indicated, were confident in the final victory of the Germans until the spring of 1945. The development of military events, the fear of Jews or of the Red Army never had any impact on the behaviour of civil servants, gendarmes, soldiers, or the people at large. Tens of thousands claimed and obtained the businesses, the lands of the Jews, plundered the movables the latter had left behind. And thousands of civil servants, gendarme and police officers, excepting very few decent individuals, organized the deportation of the Jews in 1944 in a highly orderly manner. Fear of the revenge of Jews was rather selective than general.

According to the Hungarian political thinker, István Bibó, humans are the only creatures who know they will die. Fear of death, of being killed by another human being is one of the oldest fears. Bibó says that the meaning and end of European social development is the humanization of power, the elimination of the dangers threatening the lives of people.⁷³ If we try to understand what happened to the Jews during World War II and why, it will be obvious that the Holocaust was, among other things, a failure of Judeo-Christian European civilisation.

⁷¹ A. József, "Hazám," [My homeland] (1937).

⁷² M. Radnóti, "Töredék," [Fragment] (19 May 1944).

⁷³ I. Bibó, *Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme*. [The meaning of European social development] Budapest 1986, 11–13.

Роль Венгрии во Второй мировой войне

Вступление в войну против Советского Союза
в зеркале дневников и воспоминаний

Юдит Пихурик



Со второй половины восьмидесятых годов прошлого века в Венгрии появляются все большее количество дневников, записок, воспоминаний, автобиографических заметок (в дальнейшем „мемуары“), относящихся к периоду правления Хорти. Часть этих материалов ранее уже публиковалась за рубежом, другие же годами и десятилетиями лежали „в столе“. Мемуары часто оказывались в центре внимания, особенно, когда их авторами были известные лица. Читателя больше всего привлекает субъективный взгляд автора, однако у исследователя как раз это должно вызывать наибольшую осторожность. Действительно, мемуары сознательно выражают точку зрения личности, показывают ее роль и возможности. Мотивом к составлению мемуаров часто служит стремление к самооправданию. Именно поэтому каждое утверждение должно быть многократно перепроверено, не только из-за субъективизма, но и из-за возможных ошибок. Это означает не только проверку по данным источников и специальной литературы, – очень поучительным бывает также сравнение с высказываниями современников. Для определения степени достоверности приведенных в мемуарах фактов и данных очень важно учитывать личность автора, а также условия, в которых рукопись появилась на свет.

Человек может быть творцом или просто свидетелем и участником событий, но в его дневниках всегда отражается то, что он чувствовал, думал, какую систему ценностей исповедовал в данный период, какие имел возможности, и по каким причинам воспользовался или не воспользовался данными возможностями, насколько отвечал ожиданиям общества, к каким целям стремился и какие и почему отверг, как на него повлияли идеи и тенденции его времени. Автор дневников ведет свои записи одновременно с событиями, в его откровенных высказываниях об этих событиях звучат лич-

ные нотки, ведь цель автора не в том, чтобы дать читателям информацию, а в том, чтобы зафиксировать свои собственные впечатления и мысли. Непосредственные высказывания, мгновенные реакции и свободное изложение переживаний способствуют созданию общей картины. Среди публикаций относительно редко встречаются дневники, которые велись регулярно в течение продолжительного времени, чаще автор записывал свои мысли только в период или в ситуации, которую он считал важной, часто мотивом к ведению записок послужил какой-либо резкий поворот в его судьбе, например, плен или нелегальное положение.

Мемуары, воспоминания пишутся задним числом, декларируемой целью их авторов является научное изложение данных, их обзор, может быть анализ, но чаще всего мотивом служит стремление к самооправданию. Автор берется за раскрытие подоплеки исторических событий, корректировку ошибочных, по его мнению, взглядов, или публикует неизвестные до сих пор факты и документы. Тогда, во всяком случае, теоретически, центральное место должен занимать рассматриваемый исторический период, а не личность. В случае мемуаров мы также не можем предполагать, что они всегда создавались в спокойной обстановке. Многие воспоминания писались в условиях плена, эмиграции или вынужденного ухода от дел, забвения, что также не способствовало взвешенному анализу и беспристрастным оценкам. Однако эти обстоятельства могли способствовать и тому, что в распоряжении автора, кроме его собственных дневников и заметок, оказывались другие источники или специальная литература. Таким образом, точка зрения мемуаристов, наряду с другими факторами, может быть в значительной степени обусловлена приобретенными позднее знаниями и опытом. Надо также учитывать и то, что в расчете на публикацию автор мемуаров до известной степени приспособливает, или вынужден приспособливать их к картине событий, сложившейся ко времени публикации.

Запечатленные в мемуарах воспоминания дают своеобразную картину прошлого. Многообразие взглядов делает известный или казавшийся известным исторический период более ярким и близким к читателю. Мы можем наблюдать, насколько осуществляется самоконтроль и объективность в случае дневников, и как память справляется с фактами в мемуарах. Есть множество примеров того, насколько плохо люди помнят имена, факты и даже события, которые они наблюдали собственными глазами, насколько влияет на их воспоминания все, что они позднее прочитали, узнали, часто в противоречии с их собственным опытом.

Учитывая все вышесказанное, мы можем на основании часто противоречащих, но и дополняющих друг друга дневников и мемуаров составить более тонкое представление о спорных вопросах данного периода, о подоплеке тех или иных решений, о том, как сталкивались желания и реальность, как трудно давалось осознание реальной расстановки сил, как судьба Венгрии оказалась практически не управляемой в отсутствии внутреннего контроля и гарантий великих держав, и как из-за мнимых или реальных интересов она втягивалась во Вторую мировую войну. Ниже мы попытаемся

с помощью мемуаров проследить оценки, связанные с обстоятельствами вступления страны в войну, их формирование и изменение. Наиболее часто возникающие и спорные вопросы заключаются в том, было ли вступление в войну исторической необходимостью, кто при этом играл главную роль – Миклош Хорти¹ (Horthy Miklós), Ласло Бардоши² (Bárdossy László), Хенрик Верт³ (Werth Henrik), крайне право настроенные офицеры или немцы, а также кто и почему бомбил Кошице.

После начала боевых действий Второй мировой войны основной целью венгерского политического руководства было сохранение военного нейтралитета. С сентября 1939 до апреля 1941 г. это удавалось сделать, однако 11 апреля 1939 г. Венгрия присоединилась к нападению на Югославию. Последовавшее затем самоубийство премьер-министра Венгрии Пала Телеки⁴ (Teleki Pál), по мнению многих, демонстрировало безысходность ситуации: в сложившемся положении не существовало настоящей альтернативы для самостоятельных шагов. Посол Венгрии в Лондоне Дьёрдь Барца (Barcza György) еще 7 февраля 1941 г. отправил сообщение о том, что министр иностранных дел Великобритании Иден (Eden) вызвал его к себе и выразил желание провести „дружескую, но абсолютно откровенную” беседу. Среди прочего он заявил, что хотя и ясно понимает всю тяжесть положения Венгрии в связи с немецким давлением, в случае победы английское правительство будет делать различие „между вынужденной и добровольной готовностью, стремится страна противостоять давлению, или нет.”⁵ Заметки Пала Телеки от 3 марта 1941 г. отражают его сомнения в связи с вышеуказанным: великие державы и после этого будут относиться к малым государствам в соответствии с собственными интересами, не учитывая „различий в их положении”. Таким образом, очень трудно одновременно соответствовать поставленным англичанами условиям и противостоять „притягательной силе современных идеологий, опирающихся на свои победы”.⁶ Позднее, в воспоминаниях, связанных с вторжением в Югославию (в так называемые „Южные территории”), У. Черчилль также писал, что Венгрия тогда должна была выбирать из двух зол: или немецкая оккупация, или нарушение данного слова⁷. Решение о присоединении мотивировалось стремлением завершить территориальную ревизию, в соответствии с решением Высшего

¹ Правитель Венгерского Королевства в 1920–1944 гг. (1868–1957).

² Премьер-министр Венгрии с 3 апреля 1941 по 7 марта 1942 г. (1890–1946).

³ Начальник Генерального штаба армии с 19 сентября 1938 по 4 сентября 1941 г. (1881–1952).

⁴ Премьер-министр в 1920–1921 гг., а также с 16 февраля 1939 по 3 апреля 1941 г. (1879–1941).

⁵ *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához*. [Дипломатические документы внешней политики Венгрии] V. Под ред. Gy. Juhász, Budapest 1982. (В дальнейшем: DIMK. V.) 860–861.

⁶ DIMK V. 893–902.

⁷ W. S. Churchill, *A második világháború*. [Вторая мировая война] I–II, Budapest 1989, 481–482.

Военного Совета участие Венгрии в боевых действиях не должно было распространяться за ее исторические границы.⁸ В соответствии с триантонским договором 1920 г. после распада Австро-Венгерской монархии прекратило свое существование и единство исторической Венгрии: к появившимся на месте Австро-Венгерской монархии государствам отошло две трети территории страны и 57% населения. Более 30% населения этих потерянных земель составляли венгры. Напряженность обостряло и то, что значительное венгерское население проживало вдоль новых границ, то есть мирный диктат разделил также этнически однородные территории. Главной внешнеполитической задачей периода правления Хорти была мирная ревизия границ, но возможность для этого появилась только в конце 30-х гг. с немецкой и итальянской помощью. Этот факт бросил тень на результаты осуществленной ревизии,⁹ и определил внешнеполитическую ориентацию Венгрии. Весной 1941 г. венгерское политическое руководство в надежде на возврат так называемых „Южных территорий“ приняло решение о присоединении к нападению на Югославию и о пропуске немецких войск через свою территорию. Этот шаг рассматривался как следующий этап территориальной ревизии. Принятие решение осложнялось и тем, что в декабре 1940 г. Венгрия и Югославия заключили договор о вечной дружбе. Однако весной 1941 г. в Югославии произошел антинемецкий политический поворот, следствием которого стало немецкое нападение. Венгерские политики оправдывали вступление в войну, в результате которой были присоединены новые земли, распадом страны, заключившей договор, образованием независимой Хорватии и защитой венгерского населения „Южных территорий“.¹⁰ Успехи ревизионизма способствовали росту популярности правителя Миклоша Хорти, повышали общее настроение, однако многие политики предупреждали об опасности пронемецкой ориентации. После нападения Германии на Советский Союз 22 июня 1941 г. в основном среди высшего военного командования встречались те, кто был ранее знаком с военными планами и считал, что во имя союзнической верности и для борьбы с боль-

⁸ Стоит отметить, что военная операция все же распространилась за эти границы. Быстрый корпус под командованием генерала Листа с 16 апреля по 6 мая 1941 г. был придан 12-ой немецкой армии. Под командованием немцев корпус перешел границы Венгрии 1918 г. и через Восточную Хорватию дошел до сербского города Вальево, однако не принимал участие ни в каких боевых действиях.

⁹ 2 ноября 1938 г. в соответствии с так называемым первым венским арбитражем от Чехословакии к Венгрии отошла южная, населенная в основном венграми часть территории исторической „Верхней Венгрии“. 15 марта 1939 г. с согласия немцев венгерские войска вошли в Закарпатье, где венгры составляли почти 10% населения. В соответствии со вторым венским арбитражем 30 августа 1940 г. страна вернула себе Северную Трансильванию и область Секей с населением в 2,5 миллиона человек, но примерно 1 миллион населения составляли румыны, в то время, как в Южной Трансильвании осталось около 400 тысяч венгров.

¹⁰ Примерно 40% населения „Южных территорий“ составляли венгры.

шевизмом¹¹ Венгрия должна вступить в войну на стороне Германии. Премьер-министр Ласло Бардоши, однако, в то время еще отвергал подобного рода предложения, так как немцы ясно заявили, что не нуждаются в военном участии Венгрии. Многие выдающиеся политики, в их числе и бывший премьер-министр Иштван Бетлен¹² (Bethlen István), указывали на опасность, которую представляет для страны участия в этой войне.

Однако, 27 июня 1941 г. Ласло Бардоши истолковал воздушный налет на Кошице, обстоятельства которого до сих пор не ясны, как военные действия Советского Союза, и с согласия правителя объявил о том, что Венгрия и Советский Союз находятся в состоянии войны. 26 июня 1941 г. три неопознанных самолета, появившихся с юго-восточного направления, бомбили город Кошице, находившийся на вновь присоединенной территории исторической Верхней Венгрии. Было сброшено 29 бомб, в результате бомбежки погибло 32 человека, 60 получили тяжелые, и еще 220 легкие ранения. Был нанесен также значительный материальный ущерб. В тот же день в районе Рахова воздушному налету подвергся следующий в Будапешт скорый поезд. При таких обстоятельствах правительство и обе палаты государственного собрания, мнение которых согласно закону было запрошено задним числом,¹³ поддержали это решение, никто не высказал сомнений в том, что нападавшие самолеты были советскими.¹⁴

Стремление удержать вновь присоединенные территории также укрепляло согласие в этом вопросе, в то время как Румыния и Словакия как союзники немцев уже отправили свои войска на советский фронт. В надежде на быструю победу Германии до декабря 1941 г. последствия не казались опасными. Однако символическое по началу участие Венгрии, по мере изменения хода войны становилось все более важным для теряющего превосходство немецкого командования. В 1942 г. Венгрия была вынуждена отправить войска на советский фронт. Принятие таких тяжелых обязательств и изменение хода войны заставило многих пересмотреть решение 1941 г. В ме-

¹¹ С 21 марта по 1 августа 1919 г. в Венгрии была предпринята попытка установить власть по советскому образцу, которая, однако, провалилась.

¹² С 1921 по 1931 гг. премьер-министр, позднее один из главных советников правителя. (1874–1946)

¹³ В соответствии со статьей закона 1920/XVII. правитель имел право отправлять венгерские войска за границы страны, если существовала непосредственная опасность нападения. Однако он должен был запросить немедленное последующее одобрение парламента.

¹⁴ Позднее многие ссылались на то, что премьер-министр Бардоши скрыл от Миклоша Хорти и венгерского правительства телеграмму посла Венгрии в Москве Йозефа Криштофи, который передавал заявление Молотова о том, что Советский Союз не хочет войны с Венгрией, и не советские самолеты совершили налет. В своих мемуарах Хорти также упоминает этот случай. Мы не можем знать, каким образом заявление могло бы повлиять на принятие решения, так как с венгерской стороны в данной ситуации была полная уверенность в том, что произошло нападение со стороны Советского Союза.

муарах появляется мысль о том, что Венгрию втянули в эту ситуацию „жаждущие славы военные“ во главе с Хенриком Вертом, а также Ласло Бардоши¹⁵, а в 1944 г. некоторые мемуаристы оценивают сложившуюся ситуацию уже как результат немецкого влияния (и даже заговора). В то же время ставится вопрос и об ответственности Миклоша Хорти.¹⁶

Начальник Генерального штаба Хенрик Верт в мае-июне 1941 г. действительно стремился к тому, чтобы было достигнуто соглашение о немецко-венгерском военном сотрудничестве в предстоящей в скором будущем войне с Советским Союзом. Не получив благоприятного ответа на свои меморандумы от 6 и 31 мая, в новом отношении Министерству иностранных дел от 14 июня он выдвигает следующие доводы: „Я твердо убежден, что Венгрия не может оставаться в бездействии в немецко-русской войне. Мы должны принять в этой войне участие:

1. потому что это требуется для обеспечения территориальной целостности страны, а также для обеспечения нашего государственного, общественного и экономического порядка,

2. потому что в интересах нашего будущего ослабление русского соседства и удаление его от наших границ является нашей первостепенной национальной задачей,

3. потому что этого требует наше покоящееся на христианской национальной основе мировоззрение и принципиальное противостояние большевизму, как в прошлом, так и в настоящем,

4. потому что в политическом плане мы окончательно связали себя со странами оси,

5. потому что от этого зависит дальнейшее расширение нашей страны.”¹⁷

Ласло Бардоши, который как премьер-министр оставил за собой и пост министра иностранных дел, тогда же 14 июня на чрезвычайном заседании совета министров зачитал это отношение и ответил на него. Основные пункты его ответа: Венгрия уже предоставила достаточно доказательств того, что она стоит на стороне стран оси, нет необходимости вновь это демонстрировать, а о развитии немецко-советских отношений он не был проинформирован, несмотря на запрос. В отношении венгерского участия он подчеркнул, что немцы не просили об активном сотрудничестве. По его сведениям, Гитлер готовит для не имеющей территориальных претензий к Советскому Союзу Венгрии роль, отличную от Румынии и Финляндии. Бар-

¹⁵ См. Gy. Barcza, *Diplomata emlékeim, 1911–1945*. [Мои воспоминания дипломата, 1911–1945] I–II. *Magyarország volt vatikáni és londoni követének emlékirataiból*. [Из воспоминаний бывшего посла Венгрии в Ватикане и в Лондоне] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1994, (В дальнейшем: Barcza II. 1994), V. Nagybaczoni Nagy, *Végzetes esztendőök, 1938–1945*. [Роковые годы, 1938–1945] Budapest 1986, (В дальнейшем: Nagybaczoni 1986), *Náray Antal visszaemlékezése, 1945*. [Воспоминания Антала Нараи, 1945] ред. S. Szakály, Budapest 1988. (В дальнейшем: Náray 1988).

¹⁶ См. M. Fenyő. *Az elsodort ország*. [Унесенная страна] Budapest 1986, (В дальнейшем: Fenyő 1986).

¹⁷ DIMK V. 1176–1179.

доши один за другим опровергал доводы Верта, однозначно заявив, что „без решительного высказанного желания или призыва Германии” не даст своего согласия на начало военных приготовлений.¹⁸ Этого решения Бардоши и придерживался вплоть до бомбардировки Копице. Хотя и несомненно, что целью Хенрика Верта было скорейшее вступление в войну, а его связи в немецких военных кругах подталкивали его к действиям, как начальник генштаба он принял к сведению решение политиков. Генерал Курт Химер¹⁹ (Kurt Himer) даже отметил в своем докладе, что „Верт не способен осознать величие момента”, так как подчиняется решению политиков, тогда как „сейчас слово за солдатами”.²⁰

Несмотря на эти факты в части мемуаров точка зрения авторов однозначна: ответственность за вступление Венгрии в войну лежит лично на премьер-министре и/или Хенрике Верте. Дьёрдь Барца также обвиняет Бардоши, так как считает, что тот „...без всякого принуждения со стороны немцев одним росчерком пера втянул страну в войну против Советов. ... Однако многим показалось чрезвычайно подозрительным вся история с воздушным налетом, который случился именно в тот момент, когда Бардоши требовался предлог, для того чтобы оправдать в глазах венгерского общественного мнения объявление войны Советскому Союзу.”²¹ Тут же Барца обвиняет и Верта в том, что как „активный германофил” он принял участие в провокации.

Иштван Бетлен также подчеркивает личную ответственность Бардоши. По его мнению премьер-министр был добросовестным политиком, который однако не мог устоять перед „соблазном” и под давлением немцев „объявил войну России и Америке и мы втянулись также в войну с Англией,”²² в то время как Гитлер не призывал Венгрию к вооруженному выступлению и не оказывал политического давления на правительство. Как и большинство мемуаристов, Бетлен подчеркивает иррациональную и опасную сущность войны с Советским Союзом. Он отрицает, что Венгрия связана с Германией „вечной благодарностью”, не верит, что произошла преднамеренная провокация, и опровергает также утверждение о том, что страна защищает мир от большевизма: „...не этот состоящий из горстки людей народ, сами жизненные основы которого подверглись нападению, был призван по наущению

¹⁸ DTMK V. 1180–1182.

¹⁹ Генерал-майор Курт Химер, приданный высшему командованию венгерской армии генерал, начальник штаба связи (март-август 1941 г.).

²⁰ J. Kun, „A német hadvezetés magyarországi politikájához 1941. március-július,” [К венгерской политике немецкого военного командования в марте-июле 1941 г.] *Századok* 99 (1965), 1228–1245. Йозеф Кун (Kun József) отмечает, что журнал штаба связи, назначенного высшим немецким командованием в Венгрии, вел капитан д-р Перси Эрнст Шрам (Percy Ernst Schramm), 1140–1141.

²¹ Наряду с другими Дьёрдь Барца также пишет „объявление войны” вместо „состояния войны”. Barcza II. 1994, 24–25.

²² *Bethlen István emlékirata, 1944.* [Воспоминания Иштвана Бетлена, 1944 г.] ред. I. Romics, Budapest 1988, 113. (В дальнейшем: Bethlen 1988).

кичащихся национальной верностью „героев” на словах, совершенно напрасно, приняв героическую позу, встать на пути русского парового катка, который готовился раздавить не нас, а Германию...”²³ Характерно сжатое резюме Густава Хеннеи²⁴ (Hennyey Gusztáv): „Под давлением премьер-министра Ласло Бардоши, в котором значительную роль играл начштаба генерал-полковник Хенрик Верт, и по призыву Гитлера Совет министров решил объявить войну России...”²⁵

Миклош Хорти, напротив, снимает ответственность с Бардоши. Он не находит объяснения некоторым действиям Бардоши, однако считает приговор народного суда несправедливым, а его казнь называет „мученической смертью”. Объяснение таково: „Кто никогда не совершал ошибок в политике, пусть первый бросит камень в Ласло Бардоши.”²⁶ Сформулированное в 1945 г. мнение Антала Нараи²⁷ (Náray Antal) может служить итогом послевоенных оценок, практически полностью отрицающих политическую ответственность. Общие черты этих оценок следующие: главная ошибка – это слабость, подверженность влияниям, однако виноваты те, кто оказывал влияние, – большей частью иностранцы и деятели крайних взглядов. С этой точки зрения характерно, что пишет Нараи о Бардоши: „Несмотря на многие правильные представления, у него все же не хватило сил помешать тому, что внешние силы и скрывающиеся в их тени амбициозные деятели, часто вводя в заблуждение господина Правителя, постепенно довели нашу страну до посылки на фронт второй венгерской армии и ее печального поражения.”²⁸ Во всех случаях он указывает на роль генштаба, подчеркивая значение влияния офицеров-карьеристов.

В связи с ролью Хенрика Верта возникает вопрос: если даже на основании указанных политических резонов он считал закономерным вступление в войну с Советским Союзом, насколько он считал Венгрию подготовленной для этого в военном отношении? В связи с этим вопросом существуют различные мнения. Воспоминания Ференца Сомбатхеи²⁹ (Szombathelyi Ferenc) указывают на то, что, став начальником генштаба, он попробовал развеять романтические представления, сложившиеся благодаря его предшественни-

²³ Bethlen 1988, 113.

²⁴ Генерал-полковник, с 27 августа по 16 октября 1944 г. министр иностранных дел. (1888–1977).

²⁵ G. Hennyey, *Magyarország sorsa Kelet és Nyugat között. Egy volt magyar királyi külügy-miniszter visszaemlékezései*. [Судьба Венгрии между Востоком и Западом. Воспоминания бывшего королевского министра иностранных дел] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1992, 59. (В дальнейшем: Hennyey 1992).

²⁶ M. Horthy, *Emlékirataim*. [Мои воспоминания] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1990, 245. (В дальнейшем: Horthy 1990).

²⁷ Генерал-майор, с марта 1942 по март 1944 г. председатель Венгерского Телеграфного Агентства и Радио (1893–1973).

²⁸ Náray 1988, 60–61.

²⁹ Генерал-полковник, с 6 сентября 1941 г. по 19 апреля 1944 г. начальник Генерального штаба армии (1887–1946)

кам: он хотел, чтобы пришло осознание того, что венгерская армия малочисленна и отстала и годится только для оккупации.³⁰ Упомянутые предшественники – военный министр Карой Барта (Bartha Károly) и Хенрик Верт. 1 апреля 1941 г. на Высшем Оборонном Совете Барта говорил следующее: „...дух и подготовка венгерской армии отличные. Что касается современного вооружения, то тут есть, над чем поработать, однако выступление на стороне Германии приведет к тому, что немцы могут с избытком снабдить нас вооружением, снаряжением и боеприпасами.”³¹ Мемуары Миклоша Каллаи (Kállay Miklós) полны противоречий: в связи с катастрофой 1943 г. на Дону он подробно описывает недостаточное снабжение венгерских войск и их безвыходное положение, а затем вспоминает, что „до рукопашного боя, в котором так силен венгерский солдат, дело не дошло.”³² В патетических выражениях он описывает выносливость и жертвенность солдат, однако через несколько страниц занимается поисками причин „духовной деформации” армии, сравнивая венгерских солдат, воевавших в Первую и во Вторую мировую войну. Он называет несколько причин изменений. Дисциплина в армии уже не та, что прежде, и исправить положение просто грубостью, как это пытались сделать, по его наблюдениям, некоторые молодые офицеры, невозможно. Другая причина, которую называли многие, заключается в том, что солдаты не видели смысла воевать. Они не понимали, что после успешной ревизии территорий им делать в войне с Советским Союзом, вдали от Венгрии.

Некоторые авторы считают определяющим влияние политизированного офицерства, особенно „пшвабского” происхождения. Еще до 1945 г., кроме всего прочего, большую роль в распространении этого взгляда могло играть мнение Эндре Байчи-Жилински (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre)³³, влияние которого чувствуется во многих мемуарах. Вильмош Надьбацони Надь³⁴ (Nagybaczoni Nagy Vilmos) ссылается на их разговор в 1944 г., и в связи с этим замечает: „Часть деятелей немецкого происхождения склонны видеть венгерские интересы там, где есть интересы не венгерские, а чисто немецкие. Они всегда превозносили Германию и переоценивали немецкие достижения по сравнению с венгерскими. Мы, кровные венгры, лучше, чем они способны любить и ценить своих сородичей даже вместе с их опибками.”³⁵ Многие принимают приведенное выше мнение, и во многих мемуарах

³⁰ Szombathelyi Ferenc visszemlékezése, 1945. [Воспоминания Ференца Сомбатхейи, 1945 г.] ред. P. Gosztonyi, Budapest 1990, 25.

³¹ Náray 1988, 49.

³² M. Kállay, Magyarország miniszterelnöke voltam 1942–1944. [Я был венгерским премьер-министром в 1942–1944] I–II, ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1991, 158.

³³ Политик, депутат парламента, публицист. С самого начала выступал против союза с немцами и войны с Советским Союзом. Как руководитель антифашистского сопротивления после прихода к власти нацистов был арестован и казнен 24 декабря 1944 г. (1886–1944).

³⁴ Генерал, с 24 сентября 1942 г. по 12 июня 1943 г. военный министр (1884–1976).

³⁵ Nagybaczoni 1986, 195–196.

можно найти сходные высказывания.³⁶ Можно считать типичными выводы уже упомянутого Антала Нараи: „У меня сложилось впечатление, что начальник генерального штаба Венгрии вместе со своей оперативной группой и в полном согласии с немецким военным командованием подталкивал венгерскую политику к вступлению в войну. А венгерской политике не хватило смелости сохранить правильную основную линию и заявить исполнительной военной власти: „Sutor, ne ultra crepidam“! Так венгерский государственный муж окончательно проиграл в борьбе с испытывающим сильное немецкое влияние венгерским военным руководством, забыв о том, что таким образом отказался от духовного руководства жизнью государства и необходимости для нашего существования благоразумной осторожности. Опасаясь последствий, он передал бразды правления честолюбивым военным.“³⁷ Нараи также ссылается на то, что „штабные карьеристы“ заявляли: „Защита Венгрии будет осуществляется на Дону.“³⁸ Ни в коем случае не следует обобщать приведенные мнения: восприимчивость к крайним взглядам, „германофильское направление“ части офицерства связано скорее с духом того времени, а не с их происхождением. Попытка после поражения в войне делать обобщения на основании их поведения и установок мотивирована поисками „козла отпущения“, при анализе причин поражения можно было ссылаться на офицеров и генералов „швабов“.

После войны роль немецкого влияния подчеркивалась и в другой связи. Довольно долго бытовало своеобразное объяснение бомбардировки Кошице, согласно которому нападение провели немецкие самолеты, замаскированные под советские с целью провокации, чтобы вынудить колеблющееся венгерское руководство напасть на Советский Союз. Согласно этой версии это наблюдал один из инструкторов аэродрома в Кошице капитан Адам Круди (Krády Ádám) и доложил Ласло Бардоши, который замолчал этот важный „факт“ перед правителем Хорти. Как мы уже упоминали, до сих пор неясно, чьи самолеты произвели налет, а вышеприведенная версия родилась в 1944–1945 г. и может быть опровергнута по многим пунктам. Проблему налета на Кошице подробно обсуждает в своей книге Юлиан Боршани³⁹ (Borsányi Julián), который был членом комиссии, на второй день

³⁶ См. Gy. Kádár, *A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig*. [От Людовики до Шопронкёхда] I–II. Budapest 1978, 255. *Shvoy Kálmán titkos naplója és emlékirata 1918–1945*. [Тайный дневник и заметки Кальмана Швой 1918–1945] ред. M. Ferneki, б. м. 1983, 121 (в дальнейшем: Shvoy 1983), E. Újpeéry, *Végállomás Lisszabon. Hét év a magyar királyi külügy szolgálatában*. [Конечная станция – Лиссабон. Семь лет на службе венгерских королевских иностранных дел] Budapest 1987, 278–279.

³⁷ Nárá 1988, 58–59.

³⁸ Nárá 1988, 61.

³⁹ См. J. Borsányi, *A magyar tragédia kassai nyitánya*. [Кошицкая прелюдия венгерской трагедии] München 1986, (в дальнейшем: Borsányi 1986). Он же: „Az 1941. június 26-ai kassai bombatámadás ‘fehér foltjai’. Visszaemlékezések és személyes észrevételek,“ („Белые пятна“ бомбардировки Кошице 26 июня 1941 г. Воспоминания и личные наблюдения). *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 91 (1991/2), 88–113.

после бомбардировки расследовавшей события. Боршани пишет, что свидетели давали противоречивые показания. Кто-то видел два, кто-то три или четыре самолета, рознятся также описания внешнего вида и технических характеристик: свидетели указывали цвет опознавательных знаков от коричневого до желтого разных оттенков, кто-то видел одномоторные самолеты, – в зависимости от того, что он думал об их принадлежности. Увидев, насколько влияет на память людей полученная позднее информация, автор замечает: „Только немедленная запись и протоколирование фактов может сделать сообщение достоверным.”⁴⁰ Юлиан Боршани собирал документы к своей работе в течение нескольких десятков лет, и на основании своих исследований считает наиболее вероятным, что налет произвела советская авиация по ошибке, но доказательств этой версии, естественно, не существует.

На основании написанных под непосредственным впечатлением от событий дневников складывается картина, отличная от той, которая получается в процессе чтения позднее написанных воспоминаний и мемуаров. Дневники подтверждают, что современники, независимо от их отношения ко вступлению в войну, хотя и были удивлены, но поверили, что произошло советское нападение и не оспаривали необходимости ответных шагов. Мысль о внешнем влиянии тогда еще не возникала. Интересный пример – мемуары Кальмана Швои⁴¹ (Shvoy Kálmán). В 1941 г. он записывает о событиях 27 июня лишь следующее: „Наступило состояние войны между Венгрией и Советским Союзом. – Ласло Бардоши в двух словах объявил об этом в парламенте.” Однако в 1952 г., явно приводя его в соответствие с актуальной тогда оценкой периода правления Хорти, он дополняет свой дневник следующей записью: „Что касается объявления войны, правительство нарушило Конституцию, потому что объявило парламенту об уже состоявшемся объявлении войны, тогда как должно было получить для объявления войны согласие обеих палат.”⁴² В других мемуарах также встречается выражение „объявление войны” или его описание вместо объявления о состоянии войны. Исключение составляет, например, Миклош Хорти, который цитирует официальное заявление: „Из-за неоднократных, противоречащих международному праву воздушных налетов Советской России на свою суверенную территорию, Венгрия считает себя находящейся в состоянии войны с Советским Союзом.”⁴³ В этом вопросе самым существенным является то, что не производилось дипломатического выяснения инцидента. Если бы во Второй мировой войне военные действия, случайно затрагивающие нейт-

⁴⁰ Borsányi 1985, 54.

⁴¹ Офицер генерального штаба, позднее политик, депутат парламента (1881–1971).

⁴² Shvoy 1983, 225. Кальман Швой запечатлел свои воспоминания об этом периоде тремя способами: в 1941 г. он вел дневник, в 1942 г. составил (на основании заметок) воспоминания в виде дневника о периоде с 25 июля 1914 по 31 декабря 1940 гг., а в 1952 г. дополнил все это своими мемуарами.

⁴³ Horthy 1990, 251.

ральные государства, приводили к их вступлению в войну, Швейцария и Швеция также вступили бы в войну с Германией и ее союзниками. Геза Лакатош⁴⁴ (Lakatos Géza), анализируя ситуацию, приводит слова Хенрика Верта: независимо от того, кто ее осуществил, бомбардировка Кошице „пришлась кстати“⁴⁵, так как послужила предлогом для вступления в войну.

В его дневнике 1944 г. имеется замечание о том, что, по мнению автора, вступление Венгрии в войну произошло под немецким давлением, более того, в результате провокации. Хотя предположение о том, что немецкий и венгерский генштаб могли организовать налет, с целью вынудить венгерское политическое руководство предпринять определенные шаги кажется логичным, оно явно не выдерживает критики. Предположение об участии венгров в провокации служило дискредитации режима Хорти и после 1945 г. отвечало политической конъюнктуре. Интересно, что легенду Круди перенимают многие авторы в эмиграции, даже те, кто мог предполагать, что подобная провокация бессмысленна и маловероятна. Естественно, что в данном случае цель была другой, – переложить ответственность за вступление в войну на немцев, на Гитлера.

Микша Феньо⁴⁶ (Fenyő Miksa), который из-за своего еврейского происхождения скрывался в „выходящей во двор-колодец комнатке“, в 1944 г. указывает на то, что имела место немецкая провокация и даже предполагает соучастие Хорти. 4 июля он записывает в свой дневник: „Для него (Хорти) было ясно, что бомбардировка Кошице дело рук немцев, однако он терпел, когда его правительство заявило, что на страну напали русские самолеты. Он объявляет войну США и отправляет на смерть в русских полях четверть миллиона венгерских мальчиков, среди них и своего сына.“⁴⁷ Феньо не указывает, откуда он получил сведения для данного предположения. Возможно, что слухи о немецкой провокации он дополнил собственными предположениями о роли Хорти, так как в эти дни в своем дневнике подвергает деятельность правителя резкой критике.

Иштван Бетлен, который пишет свои воспоминания после немецкой оккупации летом 1944 г. также находясь на нелегальном положении, не упоминает о немецкой провокации.

Миклош Хорти в своих воспоминаниях принимает историю Круди: „Государственный секретарь президиума совета министров Иштван Барци (Bárczy István) в 1944 году задним числом доложил мне о тайном сговоре, возможности которого я никогда не предполагал. На основании непосредственного знания предыстории Барци рассказал, что инструктор аэродрома в Кошице летный капитан Адам Круди письменно доложил премьер-министру Бардоши о том, что видел своими глазами: бомбы сбросили немец-

⁴⁴ Генерал-полковник, с 29 августа по 16 октября 1944 г. премьер-министр. (1890–1967).

⁴⁵ G. Lakatos, *Ahogyan én láttam*. [Как я видел] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1992, 47.

⁴⁶ Писатель, публицист (1877–1972).

⁴⁷ Fenyő 1986, 44.

кие самолеты. Однако в то время уже наступило состояние войны. Поэтому Бардоши призвал капитана Круди молчать и предупредил, что в противном случае он может иметь для себя неприятные последствия. Служащие президиума совета министров также получили приказ молчать. В принципе не исключена возможность того, что наблюдение капитана Круди 26 июня 1941 года было ошибочным, однако это очень маловероятно по двум причинам. Как я уже упоминал, наш начальник генштаба был заинтересован в том, чтобы мы вступили в войну так же, как и Гитлер.⁴⁸ Далее он ссылается на то, что после 22 июня получил от Гитлера письмо с призывом вступить в войну, однако по желанию Бардоши и правительства, и вопреки мнению Верта, дал на него отрицательный ответ. Поэтому он и считает логичной возможность сговора между начальником генштаба и немецким руководством с целью получить „вызов“. Однако нет никаких следов упомянутого письма Гитлера, в отличие от тех посланий, в которых немецкое руководство сообщает о том, что в июне 1941 г. не требует венгерского военного участия.

Кроме бывшего правителя, и другие некритично принимают и излагают различные версии истории Круди, например Пал Ауэр⁴⁹ (Auer Pál): „Бардоши знал о том, что не русские сбросили бомбы на Кошице и Мукачево не только из телеграммы Криштофи⁵⁰ (Kristóffy) и донесения военного министра Барта. Начальник аэродрома в Кошице полковник Адам Круди письменно доложил премьер-министру, а затем подтвердил под присягой, что видел собственными глазами, как бомбы сбросили с немецких самолетов. В ответ Бардоши обязал Круди и своих сотрудников соблюдать тайну. Так он обманул не только правителя, но и весь венгерский народ, чтобы иметь юридическое основание для объявления войны. На следующий день он объявил войну Советской России.“⁵¹ Это уже „развитие“ истории Круди, содержащая множество ошибок ее версия.

Многие мемуаристы согласны, что из-за своего географического положения Венгрия должна была выбирать из двух великих держав, она должна была решить, уступить ей немецкому или советскому влиянию. По их мнению, малые нации беззащитны в поле действия политики великих держав. После войны эти авторы описывают вступление в войну как неизбежный, predetermined судьбой шаг, и, ссылаясь на „роковую неизбежность“, „трагическую венгерскую судьбу“ или на немецкое влияние, не исследуют внутреннюю подоплеку этого решения. Миклош Хорти пишет в своих воспоминаниях: „Рассматривая роль моей родины в тридцатые годы, с расстояния двух десятилетий и с той пришедшей впоследствии прозорливостью, которую дал нам страшный опыт Второй мировой войны, я вынужден прийти к выводу, что развитие исторических событий определяет роко-

⁴⁸ Horthy 1990, 250–251.

⁴⁹ Адвокат, политик Партии мелких хозяев, дипломат, журналист (1885–1978).

⁵⁰ См. сноску 14.

⁵¹ P. Auer, *Fél évszázad*. [Полвека] Washington 1971, 210.

вая необходимость... свобода действий малого государства всегда ограничена..."⁵² Сходную точку зрения высказывает и Антал Уллеин Ревички⁵³ (Ullein Reviczky Antal): "...Венгрия, как и другие страны, как пушинка была подхвачена водоворотом гигантских сил, не будет преувеличением сказать, что в конечном итоге судьбу страны определили эти силы, а не более или менее успешные комбинации венгерской дипломатии. ... маленькая страна, оказавшись в центре мирового переворота, не делает историю, а является ее пассивным объектом."⁵⁴

Объяснения спорных вопросов вступления Венгрии в войну появились еще во время этой войны, а после 1945 г. различные, в зависимости от целей авторов, версии нашли свое место в опубликованных в Венгрии и за границей мемуарах. В опубликованных за границей воспоминаниях часто встречаются столь же критичные мнения, как и в появившихся внутри страны. От живущих в эмиграции авторов не требовалось того, на что мы указывали выше в связи с венгерскими публикациями: они не должны были давать негативную картину режима. Их возможная предвзятость может проистекать из другой причины: трагические последствия вступления Венгрии во Вторую мировую войну естественным образом могли заставить авторов критически отнестись к данному периоду и попытаться возложить на кого-то ответственность за случившееся. После войны все шире распространяются и принимаются оценки, которые, оттесняя на задний план реальные события и тенденции, рассматривают вступление в войну как результат внешнего влияния, а в некоторых случаях предполагают и пособничество венгерских руководителей. Однако есть и авторы, которые, по крайней мере, по прошествии событий попытались раскрыть подоплеку ошибочных решений. Возможно, и им не удалось найти правильных ответов, однако заслуживает уважение уже само намерение, – их мемуары не дают новую пищу для иллюзий, а позволяют приблизить картину событий к реальности.

⁵² Horthy 1990, 175.

⁵³ Дипломат (1894–1955).

⁵⁴ A. Ullein-Reviczky, *Német háború, orosz béke. Magyarország drámája*. [Немецкая война, русский мир. Драма Венгрии] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1993, 5.


Réflexions sur des questions relatives à la reconstruction et à l'inflation dans l'histoire européenne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale

ZOLTÁN SERFÖZÓ



Notre sujet rend problématique la délimitation dans le temps de la période de reconstruction qui a compensé la dépression économique qui a fait suite aux ravages de la guerre. En effet, toutes les périodisations historiques sont toujours un peu arbitraires et, en règle générale, conventionnelles. En outre, lorsqu'il s'agit d'histoire économique, il est particulièrement difficile de définir les différentes périodes par des dates bien déterminées. En ce qui concerne les périodes de reconstruction, on prend comme point de départ par convention les indices économiques de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. Une fois que le niveau de l'économie d'après-guerre a atteint le niveau économique de celle-ci, la période de reconstruction s'est terminée selon les avis contemporains. Cette conception a été évidente dans l'historiographie au cours des décennies qui ont suivi la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Toutefois, l'émergence de la théorie des lignes de la croissance économique de Ferenc Jánosy a profondément mis en doute cette évidence. Un des points de la théorie du Jánosy traite des périodes de la reconstruction. Voici le schéma du déroulement de ces périodes.¹

¹ F. Jánosy, *A gazdasági növekedés tendévonalaról*. [Des tendances de l'accroissement économique] Budapest 1975, 32-39.



Ce schéma semble être évident. Sans en donner une analyse détaillée, on peut toutefois souligner que: la reconstruction ne se termine pas quand l'économie atteint le niveau de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. La période de reconstruction s'achève quand la production reprend son niveau d'avant-guerre en fonction du même rythme de développement économique que celui d'avant-guerre. Dans une période de reconstruction, la croissance économique connaît un vif essor bien qu'elle se ralentisse pour atteindre le niveau de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. La théorie de Jánosy est assez connue dans l'histoire économique européenne.² L'ouvrage de Milward intitulé, « The Reconstruction of Western Europe », traite de la période comprise entre 1945 et 1951, malgré le fait que le P. N. B. dans certains pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest se développait de la façon suivante:³

La production nationale brute (1948, 1950)
 (L'indice de PNB en comptant par les prix invariables)

(1938 = 100)

Pays	1948	1950
Belgique	115	124
France	100	121
Pays-Bas	114	127
Grande-Bretagne	106	114
Allemagne	45	64
Norvège	122	131
Italie	92	104

On peut voir que les économies de marché de l'Europe de l'Ouest ont atteint, voire dépassé, le P. N. B. de l'exercice de 1938 jusqu'en 1948 sauf l'économie de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest qui avait une situation particulière et qui souffrait le plus

² H. Van Der Wee, *A lefékezett jólét.* [Bien être bloqué] Budapest 1986, 41-43.

³ A. S. Milward. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe.* London 1992.; Van Der Wee, 22.

des conséquences des destructions de la guerre. Malgré cela, Milward date la fin de la période de reconstruction à 1951. La périodisation de László Bogár coïncide avec celle de Milward: la reconstruction de l'économie hongroise après la Seconde Guerre mondiale s'est terminée à la fin de 1951.⁴ Selon L. Bogár les résultats extraordinaires de la première année du premier plan quinquennal en 1950 (qui ont largement dépassé les projets) ne s'expliquent pas seulement par les investissements forcés mais également par l'élan de la croissance de reconstruction. Ce phénomène a abusé l'administration communiste de l'époque qui a élevé les chiffres du plan en février 1951 en extrapolant les indices pour quatre ans en se reposant sur l'année précédente qui avait été extraordinaire. En 1952, le cycle de reconstruction – associé à une croissance très rapide – s'est terminé. Ainsi, non seulement les chiffres sont devenus élevés, mais aussi les calculs du plan sont devenus irréels. Malgré la coïncidence de la périodisation, il est évident que Bogár et Milward examinent le même cycle historique en tenant compte de circonstances socio-économiques différentes au sein de l'Europe morcelée d'après-guerre. À ce sujet, il faut souligner l'interprétation différente de la notion de reconstruction qui est exprimée par les mots hongrois *helyreállítás* (rétablissement) et *újraépítés* (reconstruction, renouvellement). Selon certains experts de l'histoire économique hongroise contemporaine – par exemple Sándor Szakács – il faut opérer une distinction nette entre les deux notions parce que la première notion signifie « rétablissement » des anciennes technologies et des infrastructures et la deuxième signifie plutôt « renouvellement qualitatif » de l'économie. Naturellement, au cours de ce cycle ces deux concepts sont présents en même temps et sont inséparables, mais il y a déjà des différences dans cette période entre les deux parties de l'Europe. Pour les économies de marché de l'Europe de l'Ouest, les aspects du renouvellement sont plus décisifs. Pour les pays dirigés par l'Union Soviétique refusant le secours du Plan Marshall, qui sont devenus les membres du COMECON, les aspects du rétablissement sont plus caractéristiques. Cela a exacerbé les différences économiques entre les deux parties de l'Europe même après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et c'est bien sûr l'Europe de l'Ouest qui en a profité.

En même temps, il est évident que dans les deux parties de notre continent la période de reconstruction a lourdement touché la société. Les simples frais de relance ont augmenté le déficit du budget de l'Etat et on a assisté à l'émergence d'un processus inflationniste. L'historien spécialiste de l'économie peut alors poser cette question très intéressante: Est-ce que la reconstruction et le rétablissement sont nécessairement liés à une inflation importante?

Avant d'essayer d'apporter une réponse, il faut tenir compte d'un nouvel élément. Au milieu du 20^e siècle, les différentes politiques économiques faisaient intervenir l'Etat ce qui engendrait de l'inflation. On peut aussi constater une hausse des prix dans les pays qui n'ont pas subi des dommages de guerre importants. Aux Etats-Unis, pays victorieux, si on prend l'indice des prix de gros et de détail 100 en 1938, celui du premier est passé à 210, celui du second à 192 jusqu'en 1949 ce qui veut dire que le dollar a perdu la moitié de sa valeur mar-

⁴ L. Bogár, *Kitörési kísérleteink*. [Nos essais de rattrapement] Budapest 1989, 76–88.

chande au cours de cette décennie.⁵ Au début de l'année 1949, l'élite américaine a réussi à juguler l'inflation grâce au pouvoir de l'Etat, en stabilisant l'indice des prix et des salaires. Il est intéressant de constater qu'en Suisse on peut presque observer la même situation. La Suisse n'a pourtant pas participé à la guerre et elle n'a pas eu de dommages. Toutefois le franc suisse a aussi perdu la moitié de sa valeur marchande. En 1948 la parité du franc suisse/dollar US est devenue égale à celle d'avant-guerre. Il semble logique que dans les pays où, pendant la période de reconstruction, la mesure de l'inflation n'a pas dépassé le niveau « américano-suisse », la reprise économique n'ait pas engendré elle-même l'inflation. Un tel acompte inflationniste favorable ne s'est manifesté en Europe qu'en Grande-Bretagne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En 1948, dans ce pays, l'indice des prix des biens de consommation représentait 180% de celui de 1937 entre 1945-1948. L'indice des prix du commerce en gros est passé de 100 à 122.⁶ Parallèlement aux efforts menés par la politique anglaise stricte et rigoureuse – jusqu'en 1954 un système de coupon a existé avec des rations par tête bien limitées – il faut souligner le fait que les gouvernements anglais ont essayé de faire supporter une assez grande partie des frais extraordinaires de la guerre et de la reconstruction aux pays étrangers. Ce sont les États-Unis et les pays du Commonwealth qui ont aidé la Grande-Bretagne grâce à des traitements de fermage et des emprunts ou grâce à l'accumulation de créances en livre Sterling. En décembre de l'année 1945, les États-Unis et le Canada ont accordé un crédit de 5 milliards dollars. (Cette somme représentait 60 à 70% de l'ensemble des dommages de guerre de la Hongrie!)⁷. Les sources monétaires extérieures ont donc joué un rôle important dans la reconstruction et la Grande-Bretagne a ainsi pu éviter une inflation extraordinaire.

Il semble que l'exemple anglais ait été unique en Europe. Les cycles de reconstruction ont été liés à une inflation bien élevée. Il est vrai que la mesure de l'inflation était très différente d'un pays à un autre. L'historiographie économique européenne nous montre que la politique belge a engrangé quelques succès de ce point de vue. La politique monétaire dirigée par le Ministre des finances belge, M. Gutt a servi de modèle à plusieurs pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest. En octobre 1944, M. Gutt a réduit la masse monétaire de 140 milliards francs à 31 milliards de francs à l'aide de la clôture à la banque et du changement des billets de banque obligatoire. Les dépôts bloqués ont été débloqués prudemment et une partie d'entre eux a été retrouvée par le gouvernement sous forme fiscale. L'administration belge n'a pas engendré lui-même l'inflation après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Pour réaliser cette politique monétaire, le gouvernement a également eu recours à des sources étrangères. Il faut souligner le rôle des sommes en dollar pour les transports d'uranium et de cuivre des colonies africaines aux États-Unis et celui du fermage et de l'indemnisation du port d'Anvers. En même temps, entre 1945-1949, l'indice des prix de gros s'est élevé de 100 à 290 et la reconstruction

⁵ Van Der Wee, 20.

⁶ Van Der Wee, 20.

⁷ R. Cameron, *A világ gazdaság rövid története a kőkorszaktól napjainkig*. [L'histoire courte de l'économie mondiale de l'âge de pierre jusqu' à nos jours] Budapest 1994, 440.

ne s'est pas déroulée sur fond d'une inflation marquée. L'inflation belge est restée supportable et elle n'a pas menacé l'équilibre budgétaire.⁸

Jusqu'au printemps de l'année 1945, il a semblé que la France aurait pu éviter une inflation extraordinaire. En novembre 1944, l'administration financière a réduit la masse monétaire de 644 milliards francs à 570 milliards francs.⁹ Il est vrai que cela a été sans commune mesure avec la réduction opérée par la Belgique. Les pertes de guerre de la France ont été spectaculaire surtout en ce qui concerne de l'infrastructure. 20% des habitations ont été détruites ou ont été lourdement endommagées, sur 17,000 locomotives 3,000 étaient encore en état de fonctionner, sur le territoire du nord et de l'est du pays, occupés par l'armée allemande, ne restaient que très peu de ponts en bon état. Le Ministre des finances français, M. Pleven, soutenant le Général De Gaulle, a rejeté la politique monétaire déflationniste. Entre 1945-1948 le taux d'inflation était de 50 à 70 % par an. Après la dévalorisation de 1948, la valeur du franc français s'est réduite à 20% par rapport à la valeur du dollar et de l'or de 1944. Selon les historiens spécialistes de l'économie française, ces années ont été une période d'hyperinflation.¹⁰ La dépréciation monétaire a surtout augmenté en 1946. Il est intéressant de comparer quelques indices macroéconomiques de cette année-là: le revenu national a augmenté de 53.7%, la production industrielle de 68%, l'indice des prix de 72% depuis 1945. En même temps, les recettes du budget n'ont couvert que 57% des dépenses. C'était déjà une proportion plus favorable que celle de 43% de l'année précédente.¹¹ Le rapport semble être évident: la croissance économique extraordinaire est explicable par l'élan de la reconstruction accompagnée d'une telle inflation. Selon l'historiographie économique française, ce fut la période de la doctrine des investissements « coûte que coûte », celle de « la reconstruction payée par la Monnaie. »¹² La relation entre l'inflation engendrée par l'Etat et les dépenses extraordinaires de la reconstruction semble être évidente. La perte de la valeur du franc a été de deux fois et demie supérieure à celle de la livre Sterling. Il faut mentionner que l'empire colonial de la France et les relations internationales du pays n'ont rien pu faire pour changer la situation.

Nul n'est sans ignorer que la plus grande inflation de l'histoire européenne s'est déroulée en Hongrie entre 1945 et 1946. Ce phénomène n'a quand même pas été unique à la Hongrie. On peut en effet constater une hyperinflation en Europe Centrale (territoires allemands) et en Europe du sud-est (Roumanie, Grèce). Selon notre connaissance, seule la Pologne a pu éviter une hyperinflation dans cette région. Les raisons en ont été assez particulières. Sur le territoire de ce pays, nouvellement dessiné sur la carte de l'Europe, il y a eu des conditions financières tout à fait chaotiques en 1945. Plusieurs moyens de paiement étaient en circulation:

⁸ Van Der Wee, 29.

⁹ F. Braudel-E. Labrousse, dir. *Histoire Économique et Sociale de La France*. Paris 1979, Vol. IV/3, chapitre III, 68.

¹⁰ J.-P. Patat-M. Luftalla, *Histoire Monétaire de La France au XX^e siècle*. Paris 1986, 125.

¹¹ Patat-Luftalla, 120.

¹² Braudel-Labrousse, 680

le mark allemand, le rouble soviétique, le dollar américain et le zloty « d'occupation. » Toutes ces monnaies ont été retirées de la circulation, mais la Banque Nationale Polonaise, nouvellement créée, a fait face au manque d'argent en émettant très peu de nouveaux zlotys. Le 31 décembre 1945, 26.3 millions de zlotys étaient en circulation. En une année, pas de plus de 58.9 millions. Le gouvernement polonais a reçu une allocation UNRRA des États-Unis qui s'élevait à 471 millions dollars. Cela excepté, l'Union Soviétique a prêté à la Pologne 36 millions dollars, les États-Unis 46 millions dollars, la Grande-Bretagne 10 millions livres, la Suède 122 millions couronnes et le Danemark 2 millions couronnes. Les marchandises importées ont été vendues par le gouvernement lui-même avec un gros bénéfice. Le financement de la reconstruction n'a ainsi pas été lié à l'hyperinflation probablement grâce aux allocations et aux crédits étrangers. Une certaine dépréciation monétaire a quand même eu lieu entre décembre 1945 et mars 1949. L'indice du marché libre s'est accru de 50%.¹³ Il est intéressant de constater que cette mesure ressemble à celle de l'inflation du forint hongrois introduit le 1^{er} août 1946 jusqu'à la fin de 1949. Pendant cette période, l'inflation du forint a été à peu près de 40%, en comptant les prix du commerce et du marché libre.¹⁴

Les processus inflationnistes ont commencé en Hongrie dès la première moitié de 1945. Selon Sándor Ausch « ...les frais alimentaires contenant les prix du marché noir ont été 14,6 fois plus élevé entre le 1^{er} décembre 1941 et le 15 juillet 1945. »¹⁵ Après la fin de la guerre, « l'inflation cachée » est devenue visible car il n'y a plus eu de réglementation des prix et on a effacé provisoirement le système de coupons et les autres restrictions. L'autre cause importante de la hausse des prix a été le déséquilibre de l'offre et de la demande en marchandises en raison de la guerre.

En 1945-1946 le revenu national hongrois n'était que de 49% par rapport à celui de 1938. La production de l'agriculture était de 43.2%, celle de l'industrie était de 40% de la production de la dernière année d'avant-guerre à cause des pertes humaines et des pertes matérielles.¹⁶ C'est pourquoi jusqu'à la stabilisation monétaire une inflation par la demande a existé selon toute évidence. Il faut souligner quand même que cela n'a pas été uniquement l'inflation par la demande qui a été la cause première de l'importance de l'hyperinflation en Hongrie qui a commencé dès la deuxième moitié de 1945. L'appareil d'État réorganisé a pris en charge les frais exceptionnels dus à cette situation historique unique en son

¹³ I. Varga, *Az újabb magyar pénztörténet és egyes elméleti tanulságai*. [L'histoire monétaire nouvelle et ses morales théoriques] Budapest 1964, 198-199.

¹⁴ E. Huszti, *Antiinflációs útkeresés – monetáris politika és gyakorlat Magyarországon* [Recherche anti-inflationniste – pratique et politique monétaire en Hongrie] Budapest 1987, 139.

¹⁵ S. Ausch, *Az 1945-46. évi infláció és stabilizáció*. [L'inflation de 1945-46 et la stabilisation] Budapest 1958, 99.

¹⁶ I. Pető-S. Szakács, *A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945-1985*. [Histoire des quatre décennies de notre économie 1945-1985] Budapest 1985, 20.

genre. En 1946, les dépenses du budget de l'Etat dans les différents secteurs étaient les suivantes:¹⁷

Dépenses personnelles et retraites	25.9%
Investissement et reconstruction	10.5%
Frais d'investissements et de reconstruction des usines de l'Etat	19.3%
Réparation	29.2%
Soutien des municipalités	3.0%
Autres obligations internationales	8.4%
Dépenses extraordinaires	3.7%

On peut voir que les dépenses de compensation et des autres obligations internationales (le ravitaillement de l'Armée rouge et de la Commission du Contrôle interalliée) représentaient 37.6% des dépenses du budget. Ces frais ont dépassé ceux de la reconstruction et des investissements – déjà extraordinaires eux-mêmes – de 7.8%! C'est pourquoi, en juin 1945, les recettes du budget n'ont couvert que 7.7% des dépenses. Après la guerre, les institutions financières hongroises ont eu une grande insuffisance en capital et leur activité d'octroi de crédit est devenue minimale. Le gouvernement hongrois n'a pas reçu d'aides ni d'emprunts étrangers. Il ne lui est plus resté qu'une seule possibilité: obliger la Banque Nationale Hongroise à émettre des prêts à découvert. Ainsi, c'est le pouvoir central qui a engendré lui-même l'inflation.

Les économistes les plus éminents de la période qui nous occupe ont vu assez clairement les processus économiques en jeu. Les sources historiques des 4 partis de la coalition gouvernant la Hongrie après les élections parlementaires du 4 novembre 1945 (Parti des Petits propriétaires, Parti Communiste, Parti Social Démocrate, Parti National des Paysans) nous en apportent de nombreux témoignages. Parmi ces sources, je mentionnerai une source de l'Archive du Parti Social Démocrate. L'exposé, adopté par le Comité des Affaires Commerciales, Industrielles et Financières le 13 février 1946 lequel s'est occupé de la stabilisation financière et économique du pays, souligne que:

« Au cours de la vie économique normale, une partie de la valeur financière des marchandises produites qui se compose de biens d'équipements et d'articles de consommations est épargnée... L'investissement pour l'année économique suivante est calculé par rapport à la majeure partie de pengős de comptes courants et de dépôts ... Dès que des investissements énormes sont devenus nécessaires pour la restructuration de la vie économique en raison des ravages dus aux opérations militaires, ce processus n'a pas pu se dérouler parce que une grande partie des pengős en argent comptant avaient disparu. Les prix ont augmenté tout d'un coup à cause du manque de marchandises... Dans ces conditions, les investissements ont simplement été financés à découvert à l'aide de la presse à billet... La relance de la vie économique a naturellement élevé les dépenses de l'Etat.

¹⁷ Ausch, 97.

La réparation, par ailleurs, a un double désavantage: d'une part elle augmente les dépenses du budget et d'autre part une grande partie de nos matières premières, de nos énergies et de notre travail qui devrait freiner l'inflation par l'élargissement des marchandises ad hoc est soustraite à la production ... »¹⁸

Ainsi, les recettes fiscales peu élevées provenant du revenu national déjà réduit ne sont pas suffisantes pour couvrir les frais extraordinaires dus à la reconstruction et aux dépenses liées aux obligations internationales. Ainsi, c'est l'Etat qui engendre lui-même l'inflation ».

En conclusion, il nous semble que la rapide relance des cycles de reconstruction entretient un rapport étroit avec l'inflation. Pour éviter l'hyperinflation, il a fallu des sources financières étrangères. Il est évident que tous les processus inflationnistes sont uniques. Ils se déroulent dans des conditions qui relèvent des sociétés et qui sont déterminées par l'espace, le temps et l'histoire. A ce titre, des recherches interdisciplinaires comparées peuvent donner des résultats intéressants en matière d'histoire économique.

¹⁸ Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára [Archive de l'Institut d'Histoire politique] 283-32/21, pp. 34-38.

L'Égypte et les relations extérieures de la Hongrie, 1947–1957

LÁSZLÓ J. NAGY



La marge d'action de la Hongrie dans les affaires étrangères a été plus que serrée au cours de la période examinée. Son système de relations extérieures n'était en effet qu'un moyen entre les mains de la diplomatie soviétique. Les pays arabes – et l'espace méditerranéen en général – ne suscitaient guère l'intérêt de Moscou.

L'Union soviétique et les pays socialistes se concentraient exclusivement sur l'Europe, notamment sur la question allemande. Ils ont commencé à se détacher de ce concept, que l'on peut qualifier de continentaliste, seulement au lendemain de la mort de Staline. Ils ont ensuite élaboré une stratégie *globaliste* qu'ils ont formulé lors du 20^e congrès du PCUS (février 1956). C'est à ce moment qu'a eu lieu la réhabilitation de la bourgeoisie nationale qui avait été auparavant qualifiée de laquais de l'impérialisme.

Après la crise de Suez, les pays du bloc de l'Est s'engagèrent dans la Méditerranée et, en général, dans le Tiers Monde. Pour ce faire, ils utilisèrent les forums internationaux, ils encoururent aussi parfois des risques de conflit en attribuant une importance grandissante, voire une trop grande importance (on peut le dire), aux nouveaux Etats appelés « alliés naturels » dans leur stratégie en matière de relations internationales.

C'est ce contexte idéologico-politique qui détermina les relations de la Hongrie avec les pays arabes. L'étude de ces relations fournit des éléments intéressants non seulement pour l'histoire de la diplomatie hongroise mais également pour celle de toute la région arabe.

Le ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Hongroise Viktor Cholnoky (gendre du président de la République Zoltan Tildy) arriva au Caire en novembre 1947 et présenta ses lettres de créances le 29 décembre de la même année, événement dont la presse égyptienne a rendu compte en détail. Le 31 mars 1948 le roi Farouk le reçut en audience particulière. Le Journal d'Égypte, dans son compte rendu, annonça également que la Hongrie accordait un crédit de 350 mille livres égyptiennes pour l'achat de coton. Le souverain qui, quelques jours auparavant avait distribué trois mille feddan de sa propre propriété foncière parmi les fel-

lahs, avait manifesté un vif intérêt pour la réforme agraire hongroise et fit remarquer que « de toute manière, l'agriculture hongroise jouissait d'une bonne réputation en Egypte. »¹

L'héritier du trône Mohamed Ali, qui avait reçu Chornoky le 16 janvier, s'intéressait aussi à l'agriculture et déclara catégoriquement que « ce que vous avez fait autour de la réforme agraire a été très incorrect ». Selon lui, c'était exagéré que l'on confisquât les biens de gens honnêtes – comme par exemple ceux d'Esterhazy. »²

Le diplomate hongrois était arrivé en Egypte au moment où la tension était arrivée à son paroxysme dans la région. Le souverain lui-même exprima lors de l'audience sus-mentionnée que la guerre était inévitable et qu'elle éclaterait sous peu au Proche-Orient. Dans le rapport de l'ambassade consacré au problème palestinien une image réaliste est donnée sur la position des Etats arabe: la Ligue Arabe était complètement divisée quoique « ses membres donnent naturellement des déclarations fantastiques. »³

Le ministre, examinant les pays de la région les uns après les autres, constata que l'Egypte était contre l'intervention pour des raisons politique, économique et militaire, la Transjordanie et l'Irak contre la nomination au poste de chef militaire de Fawzi al Kawakidji, la Syrie contre le passage sur son territoire des troupes irakiennes et l'Irak contre le passage des troupes saoudiennes. Il n'y avait pas d'accord non plus sur la formation du gouvernement arabe palestinien émigré. Le problème principal était qu'Abdallah, souverain transjordanien voulait annexer la Palestine.

A propos de la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël, il appelle à la prudence :

« Etant donné nos intérêts économiques importants dans la région, les réactions prévues des Etats arabes, le fort retentissement d'un tel événement dans la presse internationale, à l'occasion de la proclamation éventuelle d'un Etat juif indépendant le 15 mai prochain, je recommande, pour les déclarations des personnalités responsables, prudence et réserve jusqu'au moment où, dans la question de la reconnaissance, une décision soit prise et ce après l'examen de la situation toute entière (c'est l'auteur qui souligne – L. J. N.) Les manifestations de sympathie, sans objectif politique sont à éviter ».⁴

¹ Archives Nationales Hongroises (ANH), Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a boîte No. 17. Document No. 113.

² *Ibid.* Document No. 116. L'héritier du trône connaissait bien la Hongrie: avant la Première guerre mondiale il s'est rendu souvent à Budapest et, dans le Theresianum de Vienne il poursuivait ses études avec plusieurs étudiants hongrois. Parmi eux, il a mentionné le Premier ministre Istvan Bethlen.

³ ANH, AMEA, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XIX-J-11a, boîte No 17. (rapport du 13 décembre 1947).

⁴ *Ibid.* Télégramme le 10 mai 1948.

Dans son rapport rédigé au lendemain de l'éclatement de la guerre, il évoque comme motif principal du conflit le pétrole: « La question du pétrole est peut-être la force motrice la plus importante des intérêts politiques au Proche-Orient, tout lien logique menant finalement au pétrole ».⁵

La Hongrie n'a reconnu l'Etat d'Israël que quelques semaines après sa création. Cela fut apprécié au Caire car « la Hongrie ne s'est pas précipitée dans cette reconnaissance. En revanche, la reconnaissance par les Etats-Unis suscita un vif mécontentement en Egypte. »⁶

Ce fut l'un des derniers rapports du ministre Viktor Chornoky. Il fut rappelé et, deux jours après, le 23 juillet, arrêté. Il fut accusé de haute trahison, d'espionnage, fut condamné à la peine capitale et fut exécuté le 7 décembre 1948.⁷

Le destin tragique de M. Victor Chornoky montre que dans les relations politiques égypto-hongroises, on ne peut guère s'attendre à une amélioration quelle qu'elle soit. En revanche, les relations économiques que régulaient les contacts conclus en 1930, mais qui étaient toujours en vigueur, n'en étaient pas affectées. Selon le mémoire rédigé en 1955 sur les relations économiques entre l'Egypte et la Hongrie, le chiffre d'affaires du commerce entre les deux pays avait été stable entre 1949 et 1955 et le bilan – à l'exception de celui de l'année 1950 – positif pour la Hongrie. Le chiffre moyen total des échanges s'était approché pour les années mentionnées des 3 millions de livres égyptiennes. La Hongrie acheta 40 mille balles de coton à l'Egypte et y exporta des produits industriels (machines-outils, voitures de chemin de fer, produits chimiques).⁸

Dès l'automne 1947, les pays de l'Est, donc la Hongrie aussi, menèrent une politique extérieure conforme à l'analyse de la situation et à la conclusion de Jdanov: celui qui ne s'est pas aligné sur la ligne kominformiste soviétique est considéré comme ennemi. Cela voulait dire, pour l'Egypte aussi, que l'ambassade n'avait guère de relations avec les représentants de la politique officielle et que les rapports mêmes se reposaient plutôt sur des informations obtenues grâce à des groupes communistes concurrents. Cependant, c'est ce qui permit à l'ambassade d'acquérir des informations exactes sur le mouvement des Officiers libres.

Le coup d'Etat du 23 juillet 1952 fut jugé de façon très négative par le mouvement communiste international: il le qualifia de dictature militaire à tendance fa-

⁵ *Ibid.* Rapport du 16 mai 1948.

⁶ *Ibid.* Rapport du 27 juin 1948.

⁷ Il a été victime du complot contre la République monté par les communistes. Il a été réhabilité en 1992. Dans son rapport rédigé sur le rappel de M. Chornoky, le chargé d'affaires M. P. Nagy relate que l'histoire « a fait l'effet d'une bombe » dans les milieux diplomatiques du Caire. Ce n'est que le diplomate russe qui n'a pas manifesté d'étonnement. Il a simplement « pris acte » de la nouvelle. *Ibid.* Rapport du août 1948.

⁸ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 4. Document No. 0037/1955.

sciste, derrière laquelle se trouvaient les Américains qui voulaient supplanter les Anglais dans la région.⁹

Le mouvement communiste égyptien, n'ayant pas d'influence en dehors des milieux intellectuels, était fortement divisé. Le poète et propriétaire d'un journal, Ibrahim Abdel Halim, dirigeant de l'un de ces mouvements communistes, le Mouvement démocratique pour la libération nationale (en arabe: HADITU) raconta en détail les événements de la politique intérieure à l'ambassade au début du mois d'août. Il parla favorablement du groupe des Officiers libres, du « mouvement Négib » comme il le nomma. Il fit ainsi fait allusion au fait qu'à ce moment-là le général était le seul membre populaire et connu dans le groupe. Parmi les 18 officiers dirigeants, quatre sympathisaient avec la gauche, les autres étaient nationalistes. Il ajouta que les Etats-Unis, malgré leurs gestes de sympathie, ne seraient pas à même d'user de leur influence dans le mouvement des Officiers libres.¹⁰ Nous savons déjà qu'Ibrahim Abdel Halim avait disposé d'informations exactes puisque son groupe communiste avait maintenu des relations étroites avec les Officiers libres avant même la prise du pouvoir. C'est dans son imprimerie que le journal intitulé *La voix des Officiers Libres* était imprimé.¹¹

L'ambassade de Hongrie cherchait à profiter des relations existantes pour se renseigner sur le caractère et sur les objectifs du nouveau pouvoir. C'est ainsi qu'a eu lieu, à la mi-octobre, l'entrevue chez Ahmed El Guindi, entrepreneur intéressé dans le commerce égypto-hongrois, avec le colonel des forces aériennes Gamel Salem qui appartenait au groupe restreint des Officiers libres et qui était membre du Conseil de révolution. Lors de l'entrevue à caractère privé Gamel Salem décrit de la façon suivante la nouvelle Egypte: « En ce qui concerne l'influence soit de l'Occident soit de l'Est sur la situation intérieure de l'Egypte, il fait une remarque dont la véracité ne sera justifiée que par l'Histoire elle-même, à savoir que l'Occident prétend qu'ils agissent sur les ordres de l'Est tandis que l'Est suppose qu'ils sont aux mains de l'Occident, or il ne s'agit que du mouvement de l'Egypte pour le bien des Egyptiens. Ils veulent l'Indépendance et une meilleure vie pour leur peuple; ils voient cependant que le chemin sera difficile; toutefois, ils sont sûrs de réussir. »¹²

Les pays socialistes purent prendre connaissance plus tard du caractère nationaliste du nouveau pouvoir: l'Egypte nassérienne ne s'est point révélée « une alliée naturelle en 1952 » facilement. L'image de l'Egypte ne changea pas. La presse hongroise publia les commentaires soviétiques et les informations des agences de

⁹ *Szabad Nép* [Le Peuple libre], les 24 juillet et 12 août 1952; *Tartós békéért, népi demokráciáért* [Pour la paix durable, pour la démocratie populaire], le 14 septembre 1952. Les constatations sur les objectifs des Américains se sont cependant avérées justes.

¹⁰ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 1. Document No. 126. (le 8 août 1952).

¹¹ F.-R. Didor, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942-1990). Du Caire à Alger, Paris et Genève*. Paris 1997, 86-87.

¹² ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 1. Document No. 145. (le 22 octobre 1952).

presse sans commentaire. La prise de position sur les événements d'Égypte se manifesta en fonction de la rivalité entre les grandes puissances traditionnelles de la région – la France, la Grande-Bretagne – et les États-Unis, et aussi en fonction de la question allemande (intégration de la R. F. A. dans le système politico-économique et militaire de l'Europe de l'Ouest).¹³

En ce qui concerne les relations égypto-hongroises jusqu'en 1955, on ne peut parler ni d'élargissement ni d'approfondissement. Or, dès cette date, la situation changea considérablement: le rapprochement entre l'Égypte et les pays socialistes, dont la Hongrie, est de plus en plus marqué. Déjà au début de l'année, une volonté d'élargir les rapports avait été exprimée au Caire. Cette tendance coïncide avec les changements commencés non seulement dans la politique extérieure des pays socialistes, mais aussi dans l'ensemble des relations internationales.

En avril, comme signe de changements et pour refuser le monde bipolaire, le mouvement des pays non-alignés à Bandung vit le jour. C'est ici que la stature politique de Nasser est devenue réellement internationale. C'est à Bandung lors de la rencontre entre Tsou En-laï et Nasser qu'il a été décidé de renforcer les relations entre l'Égypte et la Chine et – selon toute probabilité – que le Caire a décidé d'acheter des armes aux pays socialistes.

L'intention de l'Égypte d'acheter des armes aux pays socialistes n'était pas une idée nouvelle, la proposition ne date pas de la conférence de Bandung. L'Égypte avait fait les premiers pas assez tôt pour tâter même la Hongrie.

Le 27 novembre 1951, le chargé d'affaires égyptien, Amransy rendit visite au premier ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères, le secrétaire du Comité central du Parti communiste hongrois, M. Andor Berei et exprima le souhait de son pays d'élargir les relations commerciales et économiques avec l'Union soviétique et les démocraties populaires. Il signala aussi qu'ils voulaient acheter des armes en Hongrie. M. Berei fit allusion aux demandes précédentes lorsqu'il répondit que « nous n'avons pas pu satisfaire aux demandes précédentes car nous ne fabriquons pas ce genre d'armes » (c. à. d. des armes lourdes – L. J. N.). Le chargé d'affaires précisa que l'Égypte s'intéressait à toutes sortes d'armes. A la fin de la discussion, M. Berei se chargea d'examiner la question.¹⁴

Le 9 février 1955, Anad El Kouni, directeur du Département politique du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, lors de l'entretien avec l'ambassadeur hongrois « posa la question de savoir si notre volonté de coopération économique avec l'Égypte englobait également la fourniture d'armes. » L'ambassadeur, dans sa réponse négative, nota que « la préoccupation pour les armes de la part de l'Égypte s'était déjà manifestée ces dernières années et représentait chaque fois un moment où l'Égypte s'était relativement isolée de l'Ouest ou s'était dressée contre sa pression. » Le directeur voulait également savoir si les autres pays socialistes

¹³ *Szabad Nép* du 15 août publie les informations de l'agence de presse soviétique TASS selon lesquelles dans l'armée égyptienne il y a des officiers de la R. F. A. et ils se sont aussi impliqués dans le coup d'État.

¹⁴ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a boîte No. 1., document No. 87. (le novembre 1951).

étaient prêts à fournir des armes. Quinze jours plus tard, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Fawzi, avec qui « il avait mené des négociations dans une ambiance particulièrement amicale », proposa que la délégation hongroise, lors de sa visite prochaine, se rende chez le général Roghab, inspecteur général des usines d'armement.¹⁵

L'achat d'armes fut à chaque fois une initiative égyptienne; dans ce domaine il y eut une continuité entre l'Égypte monarchiste et nassérienne. C'est surtout après la démarche britannique humiliante de février 1942 que le Caire a voulu renforcer son armée nationale et se débarrasser de tout ce qui l'avait lié à la Grande-Bretagne. C'est, entre autres, à cause de cela, qu'il refusa l'adhésion au système d'alliance militaire (au Commandement suprême allié au Moyen-Orient).

Nasser avait déjà proposé l'achat d'armes à Moscou en juin 1954, mais il avait toujours reporté la concrétisation de la demande. La demande concrète parvint à la capitale soviétique quelques jours avant l'ouverture de la conférence de Bandung et, à la demande du Caire, le 12 avril, les négociations commencèrent à Prague. Le 16 juin, à la session du Comité central du P. C., le maréchal Joukov et le ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères Gromyko proposèrent la conclusion du marché d'armes. Le contrat fut signé le 12 septembre à Prague avec les Tchécoslovaques et, quelques semaines plus tard, au même endroit avec les Polonais qui fournirent des navires de guerre.¹⁶

Le marché d'armes est la première démarche concrète visant à s'éloigner des puissances occidentales. Il renforça la position de Nasser ébranlée par la signature du traité avec les Britanniques. Après la conclusion du marché d'armes, l'Égypte manifesta de plus en plus nettement son désir d'intensifier les relations avec les pays socialistes.

En octobre 1955, Budapest et le Caire décidèrent d'élérer leur représentation diplomatique du rang de la légation à celui de l'ambassade. Lors de la séance de novembre de l'Assemblée nationale, le Premier ministre M. András Hegedűs parla du « développement heureux des relations » avec l'Égypte, l'Inde et la Birmanie. Il mentionna l'échange d'ambassadeurs et annonça que le président Nasser avait accepté l'invitation du gouvernement hongrois et se rendrait l'année suivante en Hongrie.¹⁷

Le chiffre d'affaires du commerce entre le premier trimestre de l'année 1955 et juin 1956 plus que doubla. La Hongrie se présenta au marché égyptien avec 16 nouveaux produits (locomotive à moteur diesel, transformateur, pont etc.).¹⁸ Au

¹⁵ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 3., document No. 0013/11/1955 (rapports des 9 et 23 février). Le chef de la délégation hongroise était M. Ferenc Biró, le ministre adjoint de l'Industrie lourde.

¹⁶ L. Rùcher, « L'URSS et la crise de Suez », *Communisme*, 48-50, 155-156.

¹⁷ *Szabad Nép* (Le Peuple libre), le 16 novembre 1955. L'invitation officielle destinée au président égyptien a été transmise par M. Fathe Radman, ministre des Transports, lors de sa visite en août dernier.

¹⁸ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 4., document No. 0189/1956 (Rapport sur le commerce extérieur de l'Égypte).

printemps 1956, M. Lajos Bebrits, ministre des Transports et de la Poste effectua une visite officielle en Egypte. C'est alors que l'accord sur le transport des locomotives à moteur diesel fut signé.¹⁹

Avec le Soudan devenu indépendant, nous avons aussitôt établi des contacts; déjà au printemps 1955, une délégation hongroise était partie pour Khartoum afin de sonder les possibilités. Le 1er janvier 1956, le jour de la proclamation de l'indépendance, Budapest reconnut officiellement la République du Soudan et établit des relations diplomatiques. M. György Zádor, ambassadeur en l'Egypte a été accrédité à Khartoum et il est arrivé – en premier parmi les représentants des puissances européennes – à la capitale soudanaise au début de février 1956. La présentation de ses lettres de créances a eu lieu le 10 mars de la même année. Il mena des négociations avec le Premier ministre Ismail El Azhari qui déclara qu'ils souhaitaient élargir leurs relations avec les pays socialistes. Il demanda des spécialistes pour faire évaluer les possibilités de son pays. Ils voulaient industrialiser leur pays et se sont particulièrement concentrés sur le développement de l'agriculture.²⁰

La visite à Budapest du président égyptien fait partie d'un tour en Europe de l'Est à partir de Moscou. Selon la première version, Nasser serait arrivé de Prague le 5 septembre et serait reparti pour Bucarest le 7. La date de l'arrivée fut reportée au 8, puis au premier septembre. En juillet le programme détaillé que le chargé d'affaires hongrois avait élaboré avec M. Ali Sabri fut mis au point. Hormi les visites officielles ont figuré dans le programme des événements culturels (spectacle de l'Ensemble folklorique), de tourisme (le lac Balaton), une promenade dans le centre de la capitale, visite du chemin de fer des pionniers, visite dans l'usine Ganz. Nasser aurait été honoré du titre de citoyen d'honneur de Budapest.²¹ La planification économique et les problèmes de l'industrialisation auraient été au centre des discussions.

Cependant, au début du mois d'août, vu la situation internationale de plus en plus tendue à cause de la nationalisation du canal de Suez, Nasser annula ses voyages.

La guerre de Suez eut lieu au même moment que le soulèvement hongrois (« crise parallèle »). L'opinion publique arabe ne s'est pas préoccupée – pour des raisons évidentes – des événements en Hongrie. Cela ne voulait pas dire pour autant que les dirigeants arabes avaient approuvé l'intervention soviétique, mais qu'ils voulaient le même jugement envers les peuples arabes – égyptien et algérien avant tout – qu'envers le peuple hongrois. En d'autres termes que les deux événements ne soient pas jugés sur deux échelles différentes. C'est le président Bourguiba qui l'a exprimé le plus clairement: « L'Union soviétique n'a pas hésité à intervenir de la façon la plus brutale et la plus inhumaine pour étouffer la ré-

¹⁹ *Szabad Nép* (Le Peuple libre), les 1er avril, 28 et 29 mai 1956. Reportage sur la visite.

²⁰ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 5., Rapport sur les relations soudano-hongroises (les 30 mars et 28 avril 1956).

²¹ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, boîte No. 8., XIX-J-11a, documents Nos. 0107/2 et 0107/3 (Rapport du chargé d'affaires des 19 et 21 du juillet).

volte du peuple hongrois. Pendant que certains pays s'indignaient de ce qui se passait en Egypte, d'autres s'indignaient de ce qui se déroulait en Hongrie. Cette indignation nous paraît peu sincère. En matière de relations internationales, la duplicité est destructive et dangeueuse. L'accord est total avec Guy Mollet, quoique cela soit chose rare, lorsqu'il affirme qu'il n'y a pas de paix dans la servitude. C'est assurément vrai pour la Hongrie. Mais pourquoi en serait-il autrement pour l'Algérie? »²²

La lettre de Boulganine de novembre aux Premiers ministres israélien, britannique et français dans laquelle il laisse entendre la possibilité d'une intervention militaire eut un grand retentissement dans le monde arabe. L'opinion arabe l'a bien apprécié et y a vu une nouvelle preuve du soutien indiscutable et ferme de Moscou vis-à-vis de l'Egypte et des mouvements nationalistes d'émancipation des colonies. L'article du Journal tunisien *Al Sabah* exprime bien cette atmosphère: « Nous sommes convenus que c'est la « bombe Boulganine » qui a permis d'aboutir si vite à ce résultat. »²³ (à savoir la cessation des combats – L. J. N.)

L'accroissement du prestige de l'Union soviétique dans les pays arabes permit au gouvernement Kádár, imposé par Moscou après l'écrasement du soulèvement, de tenter avec succès de sortir de son isolement international. En effet, c'était le but de la délégation de bons offices qui, à l'été 1957, sous la direction du Premier ministre adjoint Károly Szarka, s'est rendue dans plusieurs pays arabes et africains. C'est alors que le comité spécial de l'ONU (le « comité des Cinq ») rédigea son rapport sur l'affaire hongroise qu'il voulait soumettre à l'Assemblée générale. La délégation voulut gagner les voix des Etats arabes dans le débat du mois d'automne de la même année. La situation du gouvernement hongrois fut facilitée dans cette ambition par le fait qu'en Egypte et en Syrie – à l'instar de la position soviétique – on avait vu un rapport entre les événements en Hongrie et ceux au Proche-Orient. Nasser qui, le 29 août, avait reçu la délégation de bons offices à son domicile et l'avait assurée de son soutien parce qu' »à l'ONU, l'affaire hongroise servait de propagande et notamment de propagande contre l'Union soviétique. »²⁴ Mais d'ajouter aussitôt qu'il n'était pas probable selon lui que l'on empêcherait la mise à l'ordre du jour de l'affaire hongroise. A part l'Egypte, il était certain que la Syrie soutiendrait également le gouvernement hongrois. A Damas, devant la délégation hongroise, les hommes politiques syriens avaient déclaré que les puissances occidentales ne parlaient de l'affaire hongroise que pour obscurcir leur agression contre l'Algérie et Oman et obscurcir le complot contre les Arabes.²⁵ Nasser trouva que le comportement de la Lybie était incer-

²² *Action*, le 12 novembre 1956. Il a répété la même chose dans son discours prononcé à l'ONU.

²³ *Al Sabah*, le 7 novembre 1956, Archives d'Outre-mer (Aix-en-Provence), 36H1, Présidence du Conseil, Secrétariat général du gouvernement, Afrique du Nord (Articles et Documents).

²⁴ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-11a boîte No. 11., document No. 096/1/1957. (Rapport de l'ambassadeur).

²⁵ *Népszabadság* [Liberté du peuple], le septembre 1957.

tain, le Yemen – comme il cherchait à mener une politique indépendante – pouvait être gagné. Cependant ce ne fut pas le cas de la Jordanie, du Liban, de l'Irak, de l'Arabie saoudite sous influence américaine et du Soudan sous celle des Britanniques. Pour la Tunisie, la délégation hongroise ne reçut pas de visa d'entrée car le pays faisait partie du Comité des Cinq. Le Maroc lui aussi eut quelques réticences à l'égard des relations politico-diplomatiques, mais manifesta son désir d'établir des relations d'ordre commercial.²⁶

La visite de la délégation ne fut pas inutile. Le rapport du Comité des Cinq fut mis à l'ordre du jour. Toutefois, une partie des pays arabes, dans les cinq années qui ont suivi, quand l'affaire hongroise figura à l'ordre du jour de l'ONU, vota soit avec le gouvernement hongrois soit s'abstint. C'est ce que leur intérêt en matière de politique extérieure leur avait dicté de faire.

En 1957, un mouvement politico-diplomatique de tendance opposée commença à se faire connaître. Au cours de l'été et de l'automne, de nombreuses délégations égyptiennes et de syriennes (des parlementaires, des journalistes, etc.) et des ministres (des Transports, de la Défense, des Finances) se rendirent en Hongrie. Avec ces pays, le chiffre d'affaires du commerce augmenta. On y acheta entre autres des équipements militaires (vêtements, instruments de transmission, etc.). L'ambassadeur français à Budapest, faisant allusion à la fréquence et à la réciprocité des visites parle, dans son rapport envoyé au Quai d'Orsay, de « fréquentations orientales » et « d'offensive commerciale » en Hongrie.²⁷

²⁶ ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XIX-J-11a, boîte No. 11, document No. 062 (le 19 juin 1957). La Hongrie a établi des relations diplomatiques avec le Maroc le 25 octobre 1959.

²⁷ Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Fonds Europe, Série 18, sous-série 23, dossier 14, télégramme No. 1462 (le septembre 1957).

Greek Sources of the Avar History of the Ninth Century¹



In this work, the well-known Byzantinologist of the University of Szeged has undertaken a supplementary task. The book described below is unique in that it studies intensively an epoch of the history of the Carpathian Basin, that has not been adequately given its place in the edition of sources until now. It was after the publication of several proceedings of conferences and editions that a work entitled *Az avar történelem forrásai (557-től 806-ig) – Die Quellen der Awarengeschichte (von 557 bis 806)* was published in full by Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss and his colleagues (Cs. Farkas, M. Borsos, É. Csillik, F. Makk, T. Olajos) in 1998. The book presents in thematic order the Hungarian translation of the original sources, written in Greek, along with summaries written in German and commentaries, all referring to the successive events of Avar History. The other work of great importance, elaborates on those sources that refer to the period lasting from the first mention of the Hungarians by Byzantine authors (902) till the end of the Árpád dynasty (1301).² The book, in a bilingual Greek and Hungarian edition, supplemented by a Greek and a Hungarian index, contains those Byzantine sources that provide information on the Hungarians. What the book, described below, basically does, is to link the chronological limits of the two previous works. Before dealing with the book written by Terézia Olajos, I find it essential to allude to another important work, which gives more information on the subject. The book is entitled *Byzantinoturcica*, written by Gyula Moravcsik, in which the author presents us with Byzantine original sources along with specialized literature referring to the Turks.³

Terézia Olajos, author of the book introduced below, is a professor in the Department of Auxiliary Disciplines of the Historical Institute at the University of Szeged. Her major fields of research are Roman Literature in the late period of

¹ Teréz Olajos, *A 9. századi avar történelem görög nyelvű forrásai*. [The Greek Sources for the Avar History of the Ninth Century] Szegedi Középkortörténeti Könyvtár 16, Szeged 2001. pp 207.

² Gy. Moravcsik, *Az Árpád-kori magyar történet bizánci forrásai – Fontes Byzantini historiae Hungariae aevo ducum et regum ex stirpe Árpád descenduntium*. Budapest 1984.

³ Gy. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*. 2 vols. Berlin 1958.

the Empire, early Byzantine literature and history, the relations between Byzantium and the Steppe population in the sixth–ninth centuries and Hungarian pre-history. She is a member of the Committee of Classical Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Moreover, she is the editor of a Szeged series entitled *Opuscula Byzantina* and member of the editorial staff of the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. She is also the author of several books, among which one deserves particular attention, entitled *Les sources de Théophylacte Simocatta historien*.⁴ Furthermore, she has written nearly 150 articles and essays among which many were published in foreign languages in important specialised periodicals. In honour of the completion of Professor Terézia Olajos sixtieth year, a volume of essays and studies appeared which contains her complete lifes' work.⁵

In the book discussed here, Terézia Olajos – as mentioned before – meets a long felt need in many respect. On the one hand, she links the epochs dealt with in Gyula Moravcsik and Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss's source edition, and on the other, she presents (both in Greek and Hungarian) those sources referring to the history of the Avars which had been known before only from the *Byzantinoturcica*'s descriptions. As mentioned by the author, she deals with two such sources that had not been treated before by Hungarian scholars of the Avar period (p. 10.). One of these is the *Chronicle of Petrus Alexandrinus*, of which *editio princeps* came to light from the pen of Z. G. Samodurova after the publication of the *Byzantinoturcica*. The other work entitled *Additio patriarchicorum thronorum* – according to Terézia Olajos – escaped Gyula Moravcsik's attention.

Sources, concerning Avar History in the ninth century, are presented in a thematic order. On every occasion, when Terézia Olajos expounds on a source, she also enlarges upon its authors as well as its original sources, manuscripts and editions but she also includes emerging problematic opinions and comments. These are followed by selected passages in Greek, then in Hungarian, and finally commentaries in Hungarian, which constitute a great help in orienting the reader within the rich specialized literature.

The first thematic part of the book is the chapter entitled *Krum, the Bulgarian Khan and the Avars*. The first source included is the *Lexicon Souda* of which title – according to a debate of the 1930s – as opposed to previous views, does not come from a man called Suidas, as the word is derived from the Greek Σοῦδα ('fence, moat, palisade'), which refers to a well-constructed work metaphorically (pp. 13–14.). From the Greek text editions, in fact only those, put forward by Teubner, collected by A. Adler, are considered to be up-to-date enough (pp. 14–15). From among the sources of the *Souda* it is worth mentioning – already highlighted by Adler – the *Excerpta historica iussu imperatoris Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta* written by an obscure Byzantine author (p. 21).

As regards its content, the source tells about the Bulgarians who completely eliminated the Avars and that the Avars took such delight in the costumes of the

⁴ *Byzantina Neerlandica* 10. Leiden–New York–Kobenhavn–Köln 1988.

⁵ *Kultúrák találkozása*. [Meeting of Cultures] ed. Ferenc Makk, Szeged 2002.

Bulgarians, that, they interchanged their own clothes with the Bulgarians. It also mentions that when Krum (c. 802–814) asked the Avars what they considered to be the main reason for the elimination of their whole nation and their ruler, that the Avars answered – in most cases – the making of repeated accusations against each other, straying from the true path and that thieves became the allies of the judges. Among other major problems, the spread of alcoholism, corruption and trading led to serious trouble for the Avars. Soon after the reply of the Avars, Krum enacted stringent laws, including a decree that all vineyards must be uprooted (pp. 25–28). Owing to this latter passage, the authenticity of the source is often questioned. On the one hand, the uncertainty is due to the fact that the source tells about those soldiers of Nicephorus (802–811), who found a plentiful supply of wine at the residence of Krum, but on the other hand, a total abstinence from wine is a recurring theme with several authors (Strabo, Caesar, Philostratus, Manuel II Palaiologos). However, in the *Souda*, from the letter of Pope Nicholas I (858–867) written to the Bulgarians (*Responsa Nicolai I papae ad consulta Bulgarorum*) laws can be read, which show great similarity to those enacted by Krum. The former source deals with another issue, namely, that the Bulgarians asked the Pope's opinion on the wearing of trousers (*femoralia*), which complements the passage on the dressing habits of the *Souda*. Moreover, in contemporary Frankish sources, among the causes that made the Avars fall, we find very similar ones to those that were given to Krum by prisoners of war, and as such, we can accept the information of the *Souda* as authentic. However, it followed the literary style of its own age, richly decorated with *topoi* (pp. 21–25.).

The most controversial point of the chapters of the *Souda*, referring to the Avars, is the part, in which we are informed about, that the Bulgarian eliminated the Avars completely. However, it seems to be contradiction with historical facts, since nowadays, due to archaeological, linguistic, anthropological and historical research, the general conclusion seems to be, that the Avars survived the Hungarian Conquest (895). This assumption also seems to be supported by the fact, that, according to the *Scriptor incertus B*, when Krum entered upon a campaign against Byzantium, he had a great number of soldiers. Béla Miklós Szőke takes the view that the passage on the complete fall of the Avars is not a real event, but serves only as a proverb or an adage, and that this is the reason for its repetition in the source. Terézia Olajos, after examining the *Souda*, on the basis of philological arguments, considers this assumption impossible. In her opinion, the repetition of certain parts occurs frequently, without being their proverbs (p. 29.), and it is more acceptable to see the complete elimination as denoting a military victory instead of a complete elimination of the whole population (pp. 30–33). She considers unwarrantable the assumptions of Péter Váczy, who supports the idea that, this passage of the *Souda* linked with certain parts of the *Tenth letter of patriarch Nikolaos Mystikos* as well as with excerpts of similar content of the *Povest' vremennykh let*. However, she gives full credit to Péter Váczy, for realising that the Bulgarian campaign, taking place after Krum succeeded to the throne (802–803), played an important role in Frankish military successes. Váczy draws attention to

the fact that, in 803, the region between the Danube and Tisza rivers did not come under the rule of the Bulgarians, but under the Franks. This assumption is supported by Einhard's information on Charlemagne's (768–814) conquering of Dacia on the other side of the Danube. Also in those areas of the Great Hungarian Plain that were previously occupied by Avars, Slavs took up residence, who were called *Abodriti Praedenecenti*. At the time of the Emperor Louis I the Pious (814–840), they occupied Dacia (the adjoining area of the Danube) and up to 824, they belonged to the Frankish protectorate. Obviously, the term Dacia did not denote the Province established by Traianus, but in compliance with early medieval concepts, it referred to most parts of the region between the Danube and Tisza rivers as well (pp. 33–37.). According to Frankish annals, Charlemagne probably conquered these territories in 803. When writing notes of explanation to the *Souda*, it is important to draw attention to one source, entitled Notker Balbulus, which on the authority of Einhard, gives information about when Charlemagne got the Avars into his power after eight years had passed. Those eight years must be reckoned from the recording of 791 of the annals, used by Einhard, but in this case we do not get the date of the end of the Frankish–Avar war. In Terézia Olajos's opinion, the inaccurate data is due to the early transcriber's mistake, who, instead of number XIII read number VIII, and changed the latter into *octavo*. From 791 till 803, till the actual conclusion of the war, exactly thirteen years passed (pp. 39–43.).

The next source, dealing with Krum and the Avars is entitled *Scriptor incertus A*. This source have subsisted in a unique codex of the thirteenth century, which can be found only in the Library of the Vatican. The relevant edition of the source was created by Ivan Dujčev. It was established by H. Grégoire, that, on the basis of stylistic and semantic relations, the *Scriptor incertus A* and *B* are both extracts of the same work. According to Terézia Olajos, from aspect of genre, it cannot be decided whether the work is a *chronica* or a *historia*. She also questions, whether the original source is contemporaneous or it was composed only after the Avars had adopted Christianity (middle of the 860s). On the whole, we can consider the source as authentic, contemporaneous, or almost contemporaneous (pp. 44–49). According to the source, the Bulgarians kept watch on the Byzantines from the mountains, took Avars into their service, provided women with arms, and on 23 July 811 (26 July in reality), by Saturday morning, broke in upon the Byzantines (pp. 49–50.). The final result of the military expedition is quite well known: the complete annihilation of the Byzantine army and the death of Nicephorus. According to an Old Slavic hagiographic text (*prolog*), under the name Ėgre~Vęgre~Ugre, 'soldiers of the people' also battled on the side of the Bulgarians. For Péter Király, the name refers to those Hungarians, who lived in the region north of the Lower Danube at that time. As far as Imre Boba is concerned, the expression denotes the Onogurs. Terézia Olajos shares the view of Dujčev and Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss. As such, she finds it more probable, that an anonymous translator of Slavic origin from a later age, simply replaced the Avars – who had already fallen into oblivion by that time – with the Hungarians, whom he had

known well and who lived on the territory, previously occupied by the Avars. It is worth mentioning, that in about 670–680, a significant number of Onog(und)ur Bulgarian population immigrated into the Carpathian Basin, under the leadership of Kuber's fourth son. At the same time, this population constituted a great proportion of the late Avars (pp. 54–57.).

Another problematic issue while analysing the *Scriptor incertus A*, that, according to the information of the *Souda*, Krum subjugated the Avars in 803, but, according to the records of the *Scriptor incertus B*, in 814 the Avars battled as the dependants of the Bulgarian Prince. Consequently, it is essential to find an explanation for the question, for what reason did Krum take the Avars into his service in 811. In Terézia Olajos's opinion, this Avar population is not identical with those living in the south part of the Great Hungarian Plain, as they were Krum's subjects. Similarly, these people can hardly be identified with those living in the ex-Province of Pannonia under Frankish authority (right of the Danube). Terézia Olajos concludes, that it means those Avars, who lived on the northern part of the Great Hungarian Plain and were independent of Bulgaria. In the *Chronicle of Regino*, produced in about 900, this region is described, as the wastelands of the Avars (*Avarum solitudines*), from where the border of Bulgaria can easily be reached (*Vulgarum fines*) (pp. 57–61.).

The next source included in the book, is the *Scriptor incertus B*, – mentioned several times before – which survived in a manuscript of the eleventh century, preserved in Paris, and its relevant edition can be found in the Vol. 26. of the Corpus of Bonn. This source gives information on Krum's campaign against the Byzantine Emperor Leo V (813–820), and his large army, including the Avars (pp. 64–65.). The campaign was brought to an end because of Krum's sudden death (13 April 814) and it was fraudulently made appear by Leo V as if Krum's death was caused by his arrow. However, after Krum's death the danger of an offensive by the Bulgarians still existed, which is evident from the fact that at the beginning of August 814, the Byzantines asked for help from the Frankish Emperor Louis I, the Pious, against the Bulgarians and other barbarians, whom perhaps might be identified with the Avars, living on the Upper-Tisza region and already mentioned by Regino (pp. 65–66.).

In the *Chronicle of Pseudo-Symeon*, which was attributed mistakenly to Magister Symeon for a long time, except for a difference in one letter only, the same passage can be found exactly as in the *Scriptor incertus B*. The text has survived only in a single codex of Paris and today we examine it only on the basis of an obsolete edition of the Corpus of Bonn. However, A. Markopoulos has been creating a new critical edition of the *Chronicle* for the *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, Series Berolinensis* (pp. 67–69.).

The next large thematic block of the book contains sources, which deal with those christianised Avars who fell under the jurisdiction of the Pope in Rome. The first of these is the *Notitia episcopatum no. 5.*, which shows that the Pope's authority extended over the Avars. The best edition among the preserved six texts is the Berlin one, published by Gustav Parthey in 1866, which was re-pub-

lished in 1967. In the second half of the eighth century, the Pope excepted only the Protectorate of the Carolingian rulers. In this way, among the people living under Frankish authority, the Avars, who once lived on the territory of the ex-Province of Pannonia, got under the inspectorship of the Pope. The *Annales regni Francorum* a. 795, 796. gives information on what happened in 796 when the Avar leader, who possessed the status of the *tudun*, together with his dependants, went to Charlemagne and adopted Christianity. According to the *Conventus episcoporum ad ripam Danubii*, when in 796, viceroy Pippin was on the bank of the Danube with his army, waiting to cross the river and conquer the residence of the Avars' Chief Prince, then an episcopal council, under the chairmanship of the Aquileian Patriarch Paulinus, arrived at a decision on the methods of christening the Avars. According to the information of the *Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum* 6. caput, Pippin annexed the territory, bounded by the Rivers Raba-Danube-Drava, to the Archbishopric of Salzburg in 796, which is also verified by the fact, that Alcuin, in his letters, written in 798–799 to Arno, Archbishop of Salzburg, mentions those Avars who were under the Archbishop's authority. According to the *Annales Mettenses priores* (a. 805) and the *Annales regni Francorum* (a. 805), the reason the Avar *capcanus* Theodorus gained the benevolence of Charlemagne and obtained a new residence for his people (*inter Sabariam et Carnuntum*) who were pressed closely by Slavs, was due to his adoption of Christianity. The *Annales Iuvavenses maiores* (a. 805) and the *Annales Sancti Emmerami Ratisponenses maiores* (a. 805) give information on the baptism of the Avar Khagan, Abraham, on 21 September, in the River Fischa. In this context, it is essential to mention a drinking cup, which was found nearby the River Raba bearing the inscription *Cunpald fecit*. In István Bóna's opinion, the drinking cup served as grave-furniture and was specially made for the Prelate. In the Biography of Constantine-Cyrril, written in Slav in about 867–868, the Avars, among other people, are described as a nation who read texts in their own language and give glory to God. However, it is not clear, whether Constantine meant the Slovenized Avars who were living on the Peloponnesus or a Caucasian ethnic group, or perhaps the Pannonian avars. Terézia Olajos's opinion is that the source probably denotes the Avars living in the Caucasus, although, in the light of the increasing number of runic relics, she does not exclude the possibility that Constantine's information may refer to the Avars, living in the Carpathian Basin (pp. 73–82.).

A manuscript, from Pathmos, comprises the inconsistently redrafted version of the *Notitia episcopatum* (rec. Parthey) no. 5. which occur under the name of *Additio patriarchicorum thronorum* (pp. 83–84).

The source entitled *Notitia patriarchatum* p. 269–270. rec. Parthey, compiled by Doxopatres Nikolaos in the twelfth century, also has a connection with the text tradition of the *Notitia episcopatum*. The work does not have an up-to-date edition, however, Terézia Olajos mentions, that one is being prepared by the Istituto Siciliano of Palermo, on the basis of V. Laurent's posthumous critical work (pp. 85–87.).

The third major subject of the book is the Avars of the ninth century, analysed in the light of a biblical interpretation and the Alexander Romance. From among the sources appearing in this chapter, there is one, which rises above the others. This is the *Chronica of Petrus Alexandrinus*, which was published in the volume of 1961 of the *Vizantijskij Vremennik* by Z. G. Samodurova, on the sole basis of the manuscript of Moscow. The world Chronicle originates the Avars, who are Slavs too, from Shem. Among its sources appears a chronicle, written by the antipope, Hippolytos, in 234/235, in which the Sarmatian Jazigs are mentioned at the place where Alexandrinus Petrus describes the Avars. Consequently, the author of the source had accurate knowledge of the circumstances of the ninth century, namely, that Avars were living on the Great Hungarian Plain by that time and had become more and more Slavonized (pp. 91–96.).

The *Divisio populorum et linguarum*, has survived in two codices, one preserved in Vienna, the other in the Vatican and gives a similar account of the Avars. The source of the work is supposed to be the Chronicle of Hippolytos, written in 234/235, however, the Avars are identified with the *Maramantes* incorrectly here. The name *Maramantes* denotes the *Garamantes*, who were living on the border of the Sahara and whom are frequently mentioned in ancient literature, from Herodotus up to Ptolemy. At the time of Hippolytos, they were identified only from these literary traditions and it is not at all probable that they ever existed. Their identification with the Avars is due to a misinterpretation (pp. 97–100.). The Avars had been inserted fraudulently into the Alexander Romance, in which they appear among the people whom Alexander the Great conquered in the ninth–tenth centuries and which was preserved under the name of Kallisthenes, but often mentioned as Pseudo-Kallisthenes. The text is known from H. Meusel's edition of Leipzig (pp. 101–103.).

The fourth principal theme of the book is concerned with those Avars who were living in Dalmatia till the second half of the tenth century. The source for this is the *De administrando imperio* by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus. The Greek text was translated into English and they were published together in Vol. I. of the *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* by Gyula Moravcsik and R. J. H. Jenkins. The work was compiled in about 948–952 and relates that the Avars were defeated by the Croats, however, some of the Avars continued to live in Croatia, and their Avar origin is clearly recognisable. There are two sources for information on surviving Avars. The first is the one written by Regino – already mentioned before – in which we can read about pagan Avars, living in the northern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, at the end of the ninth century. The other is the *Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum* from 871, which provides information about the baptized Pannonian Avars. In addition to these sources, the existence of a surviving Avar population is confirmed by place names such as Obrov, Obrovo, Obrovac, Obre, Obri, referring to those Avars living in the region between Sirmium (Srem) and Zara (Zadar). Furthermore, the place called Haimburg in Carinthia, whose German name is often associated with the Hun ethnic name – is

also linked with the Avars – and the settlement's name is Vobre in Slovenian (pp. 107–117.).

Information on the Avars living outside the Middle-Danube Region in the ninth century can be found in the appendix of the book. The information of the *Vita Sancti Pancratii auctore qui dicitur Euagrio* gives a flashback to the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century. The source, which is entirely unpublished and survived in several text tradition, gives an account of how Pankratios met pagan Avars living in Greek captivity, in the vicinity of Dyrracchion (Durazzo, Durës) and Athens, who did not speak the Hellenic language and made sacrifices to fire, water and their swords. Theophylaktos, Archbishop of Ohrid (1088/89–1126) refers to the same people in his work, which deals with those fifteen martyrs of Tiberiopolis, who suffered martyrdom at the time of Apostata Iulianus (361–363). Similarly, he identifies those barbarians who destroyed Tiberiopolis (Strumica) with the Avars who arrived from the South. This Avar population might be one of those peoples who spoke Slavic, lived in the Balkans in the ninth century and who, on the basis of a reference to the sword cult, if not their language but had definitely preserved a Scythian–Hunnish tradition (pp. 121–128.).

There are three other sources which provide information on those Avars who lived in the Peloponnesus: the *Chronicon Monembasiae*, the *Scholion Arethae*, and the *Epistola synodalis Nicolai III. Grammatici patriarchae*. According to the evidence of these three sources, the Peloponnesus emerged from the supremacy of Byzantium between 587–588 and 805–806, because of an Avar campaign. It was Nicephorus I, who put an end to the gradual reoccupation of the region in 805/806, when he reconquered the city of Patras and resettled in their former place the descendants of those who escaped to the South of Italy. The subdued Avars of that time probably did not have any link with the Avar Khaganate, since it was cut off by a vast zone of independent Bulgarian, Croatian and Serbian settlers (pp. 129–152.).

The last source of the book is the *De septem climatibus in codice Graeco Parisino* 854. In this thirteenth-century manuscript we can read about a text, composed in the nine–tenth century, which was published by E. Honigmann in Heidelberg in 1929. According to the text, in the sixth Zone lay the Caspian Gates, residence of the Armenians and in the region of the *Pontus Euxinus* we find the land of the Avars. Because the Middle-Danube region is situated in the seventh Zone, the information cannot refer to those Avars who were living in the Carpathian Basin. As far as Terézia Olajos is concerned, the source probably deals with those Caucasian Avars, whom we only know from Oriental original sources (pp. 153–157.).

The final chapter of the book is basically an evaluative section, which consists of a few pages only with a conclusion, based on the sources. This is followed by a rich bibliography. The picture presented by the different sources, is of Avar remnants living under Frankish authority in the ex-Province of Pannonia in 870–871, in the northern part of the Great Hungarian Plain in c. 889, and in Dalmatia in c. 950. These data can be well complemented by those archaeological results, that

prove that much of the late Avar population lived to see the Hungarian Conquest, presumably assimilated gradually into the surrounding Slavs, and from 895 into the Hungarians.

The book contains twenty selected sources, arranged into five themes, which cover the complete Greek text tradition dealing with the Avars of the ninth century. The exhaustive commentaries, on the individual sources, provides information not only on the specialised literature of problematic issues, but also, on the non-Greek sources linked with the subject and in this way they are able to provide a full picture on the history of the age. On this basis, we can say, that the book is an indispensable tool for those historians, archaeologists and linguists whose field of research is not only the Carpathian Basin, but also the contemporaneous Balkan-Peninsula, Byzantium, the Frankish Empire and the Steppe Region.

JÓZSEF SZARKA

Ein neues Buch über die Geschichte Siebenbürgens



Die 1992 ins Leben gerufene „Szegedi Középkorász Műhely“ (Werkstatt der Mittelalterforscher von Szeged) feiert ihren zehnten Geburtstag. 1992 ist von dieser Werkstatt die Buchreihe „Szegedi Középkortörténeti Könyvtár“ (Szegediner Bibliothek der Geschichte des Mittelalters) begründet worden. Der achtzehnte Band der Buchreihe ist ein Buch von Gyula Kristó, einem anerkannten Forscher des ungarischen Mittelalters, das unter dem Titel *A korai Erdély* (Die Frühgeschichte Siebenbürgens) erschienen ist. Seit mehreren Jahrzehnten untersucht der Autor die Geschichte Siebenbürgens, die eng mit der Politik und der Ideologie der verschiedenen Epochen verbunden ist. Die Geschichte Siebenbürgens ist bisher aus dem Gesichtspunkt des ungarischen, des rumänischen und des sächsischen Volkes geschrieben worden. Die Werke der rumänischen Historiker sind im Zeichen der dako-rumänischen Kontinuität entstanden, und im Mittelpunkt der ungarischen Siebenbürgen-Geschichte ist auch nicht Siebenbürgen selbst gestanden, sondern das Ungarn in Siebenbürgen. Die deutschen (sächsischen) Historiker haben zeitweise von Siebenbürgen so geschrieben, als wäre es wie Österreich und Bayern ein rein deutsches Gebiet gewesen. Gyula Kristó stellt die Geschichte dieses Raumes mithilfe der Daten der schriftlichen Quellen, der Linguistik und der Archäologie vom Jahr der ungarischen Landnahme bis 1324 vor. Dieses Jahr kann einerseits mit zwei königlichen Maßnahmen verbunden werden, die den Woiwoden und den Adel von Siebenbürgen betroffen haben, andererseits lässt sich dieses Jahr mit dem Aussterben der letzten Generation der Dynastie der Árpáden verbinden.

Bei der Erklärung des historischen Siebenbürgen wird vom Autor die Ansicht vertreten, dass die altertümliche Provinz Dacia nicht mit dem Gebiet des späteren Siebenbürgens identisch ist. Siebenbürgen erscheint zuerst in lateinischen Urkunden des 11. Jahrhunderts, zum Teil mit einem Präposition wie *ultra silvam* 'jenseits des Waldes', dann *ultra silvas* 'jenseits der Wälder', oder in der Form von adjektivischen Ortsbezeichnungen *Alba Transsilvana*, *Ultrasilvane partes* und *Ultrasiluanus*. Die substantivierte Form *Transsilvania* wird erst von 1462 an ununterbrochen verwendet. Die erste ungarische Erwähnung des Begriffs erscheint bei Anonymus in der Form *Erdeuelu*, die sich auf eine Wortzusammensetzung *erdő* +

el(ii) 'erdőn túl' (jenseits des Waldes) zurückzuführen lässt. *Transsilvania* ist die lateinische Übersetzung dieser ungarischen Form, und auch aus dem Wort *Er-dély* kann man die 1444 zum ersten Mal erscheinende rumänische Wortform *Ardeal* ableiten. Die deutsche Benennung *Siebenbürgen* hängt nicht mit den Burgen der sieben siebenbürgischen Komitate (Burgkomitate), sondern mit Cibinburg 'Szebenvár' neben Szeben (Hermannstadt, Sibiu) zusammen. Der Terminus ist außerhalb Siebenbürgens entstanden, und am Anfang hat er sich auf das Gebiet jenseits des Igyfon-Waldes bezogen. Mit der Ausbreitung der christlichen Kirche mit lateinischen Riten hat sich der Begriff auf immer größere Gebiete bezogen, die sich im 11. Jahrhundert bis zum Gebiet von Gyulafehérvár (Karlsburg oder Weißenburg, Alba Iulia) erstreckt haben. Der Autor hat bei der territorialen Bestimmung Siebenbürgens die Auslegung von Zsigmond Jakó angenommen, also enthält das von ihm untersuchte Siebenbürgen die sieben innersiebenbürgischen Komitate, das Szeklerland, das Land der siebenbürgischen Sachsen, und aus Partium die zwei Komitate Kőzep-Szolnok und Kraszna. Mit einem Wort: Das historische Siebenbürgen fällt überhaupt nicht mit dem heutigen rumänischen Siebenbürgen zusammen.

Nach der Analyse der Quellen behauptet der Autor, dass die landnehmenden Ungarn im 9. Jahrhundert Siebenbürgen nicht besetzt, sondern es nach der Tiefebene, die für ihre nomadische Lebensweise bessere Möglichkeiten geboten hat, besiedelt haben. Die Gräber aus der Zeit der Landnahme, die sich im Halbkreis im westlichen Teil Siebenbürgens aneinanderreihen und die an der tiefebeneischen Seite des Siebenbürgischen Mittelgebirges deuten dem Autor nach auf das Existieren eines doppelten Schutzsystems, das gegen die Petschenegen gebaut worden ist. Durch die Wirkung der Veränderungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 10. Jahrhunderts – die ungarischen Streifzüge sind zu Ende gegangen, die Unterwerfung der freien, aber verarmten Mitglieder der Stämme und Sippen hat begonnen – ist es zur Besiedlung Siebenbürgens durch den Ungarn gekommen.

Der Autor setzt die ersten siebenbürgischen Gebiete der Ungarn in die nord-westliche Teile. Hier kann man auch den Stammesstaat des in den Quellen auftretenden Anführers Gyula, der im 11. Jahrhundert gelebt hat, lokalisieren, und auch hier ist nach der Niederschlagung Gyulas das erste Komitat Doboka zustande gekommen, das seinen Namen von dem siegreichen königlichen Heerführer bekommen hat. Aus diesem riesigen Komitat sind im 11–12. Jahrhundert die Komitate Kolozs, Kraszna und Torda herausgerissen worden. Das zweite Komitat Siebenbürgens war Fehér, dessen Einheit durch die Ansiedlung der Sachsen, dann durch die der Szekler gespalten worden ist. Aus dem Komitat Fehér sind im 12. Jahrhundert das Komitat Küküllő, im 13. Jahrhundert das Komitat Hunyad organisiert worden. Der Gespan des Komitats Fehér hat bis zum Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts die Herrschaft über die anderen siebenbürgischen Komitate erworben und schon 1199 den Titel des Woiwoden getragen. Dieser Titel ist slawischer Herkunft, und früher kann Kean von seinen slawischen Untertanen so genannt worden sein. Der Woiwode – der der Vorgesetzte der siebenbürgischen Gespane war – ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten der Epoche zum Herrn von Siebenbürgen geworden, der aber vom König abhängig war.

Vom Zustandekommen der Komitate und Burrgespannschaften haben wir keine schriftlichen Quellen. Die Komitate haben ihren Namen im allgemeinen von der Burg bekommen, die in ihrem Gebiet gelegen ist, und um die sich diese Komitate organisiert haben. In Siebenbürgen sind im 11. Jahrhundert fünf Burgen aus Holz und Erde gelegen: Dobokavár, Kolozsvár (in heutigem Cluj-Mănăştur), Tordavára (in heutigem Moldoveneşti), Hunyadvára (in der unmittelbaren Nähe von der heutigen Burg), (und Küküllővár, dessen Datierung unsicher ist.). Das Frühere bulgarische Zentrum, Fehérvár (Weißenburg) ist aus Stein erbaut worden.

Am Anfang des 11. Jahrhunderts hat sich auch Siebenbürgen in den neu zustandekommenden christlichen ungarischen Staat eingefügt. Das bezeugt, dass auf dem Gebiet von Siebenbürgen parallel zum Entstehen der weltlichen Verwaltung auch die Kirchenorganisation ausgebaut worden ist. Nicht lange nach der Niederschlagung Gyulas muss das siebenbürgische Bistum von Stephan dem Heiligen ins Leben gerufen worden sein, das der Autor auf das nordsiebenbürgische Gebiet von Gyula setzt. Der Sitz der Diözese muss in der Burg von Doboka gewesen sein, und wahrscheinlich in der Zeit Ladislaus' I. ist es an (Gyula-) Fehérvár gelangt, dessen Name aber nicht mit dem des niederschlagenen Gyulas verbunden werden kann, weil die Form *Alba Jule* (Gyulafehérvár) zum ersten Mal in einer Urkunde aus dem Jahre 1274 aufgetreten ist. Mit der territorialen Ausbreitung der Diözese ist der Begriff von Siebenbürgen auch immer breiter geworden, aber gleichzeitig ist er auch enger geworden, weil Ugocsa und Szatmár zum siebenbürgischen Bistum, nicht aber zum weltlichen Siebenbürgen gehört haben. In dem 12. Jahrhundert haben sich die Begriffe von kirchlichen und weltlichen Siebenbürgen voneinander getrennt. Siebenbürgen ist von dem im weltlichen Sinne verwendeten Siebenbürgen-Begriff vertreten worden.

Neben den weltlich-kirchlichen Institutionen sind im Laufe des 11–12. Jahrhunderts auch die Abteien der Benediktiner und die der Zistenzienser erschienen. Neben der Burgen der Gespane sind Kirchen erbaut worden, und auch die ländlichen Kirchen sind aufgetaucht. Aus den wenigen Quellen geht hervor, dass Siebenbürgen zur östlichen Grenzfestung der römisch-katholischen Kirche geworden ist.

Die in die Tiefebene ziehenden landnehmenden Ungarn haben in Siebenbürgen Slawen vorgefunden, die seit dem 7. Jahrhundert dort gelebt hatten, und im südlichen Teil eine protobulgarische (türkische) Bevölkerung, die die dortige Slawen erobert hatte. Infolge der schon erwähnten Veränderungen des 10. Jahrhunderts hat um die Wende vom 10. zum 11. Jahrhundert eine bedeutende ungarische Bevölkerung im nördlichen Teil Siebenbürgens gelebt. Wegen der im 11. Jahrhundert fortsetzenden Ansiedlung muss man in der zweiten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts auch im südlichen Teil von Siebenbürgen mit einem dichten ungarischen Siedlungsnetz rechnen. Im Kapitel „*Új betelepülők*“ (Neue Ansiedler) behandelt der Autor das Erscheinen der Sachsen, der Szekler und der Rumänen in chronologischer Reihenfolge und auch ihre Rolle im Ungarischen Königtum. Das Auftreten deutscher Ansiedler kann man von dem Ende des 11. Jahrhunderts an nachweisen. Im 12–13. Jahrhundert nimmt ihre Zahl zu. Die zunehmende Be-

deutung der Deutschen zeigt das sog. Andreanum aus dem Jahre 1224, das die südsiebenbürgischen Sachsen von Szászváros (Broos, Orăștie) bis Barót zu einem Volk vereinheitlicht hat und unter die Obergewalt des Gespans von Szeben gestellt hat. Dieser Freibrief hat den Sachsen eine weitreichende Autonomie gesichert, ihre Felder vor den Fremden geschützt und hat ihren Körperschaften eine besondere Beurteilung zukommen lassen. Die siebenbürgischen Sachen sind von 1298 an als *universitas*, von 1305 an als *communitas*, d. h. als eine geschlossene Körperschaft aufgetreten. Von 1302 an sind die Richterstühle erschienen, die als der organisatorischen Rahmen der Autonomie betrachtet werden können.

Die Szekler sind zusammen mit den landnehmenden Ungarn angekommen, und dem Autor nach haben sie eine türkische Sprache gesprochen. Nachdem das System der Grenzgespanschaften geendet hat, können sie vor der Unterwerfung einerseits freiwillig weggegangen sein, andererseits kann es auch die königliche Macht gewesen sein, die die Szekler aus dem westlichen Grenzgebiet und der Gegend von Bihar nach Osten umgesiedelt hat. Die Szekler haben die ungarische Sprache, die sie an ihrem früheren Ort erlernt hatten, und auch die Namen ihrer geographischen Umgebung mitgebracht. Die Analyse dieser Namen hilft den Forschern bei der Bestimmung ihrer früheren Wohnorte und bei der Rekonstruktion des Weges, auf dem sie um die Wende vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert oder am Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts nach Siebenbürgen gelangt sind. In den 1220-er Jahren hat der König einen Szeklergespan an die Spitze des Landes der Szekler gestellt, das ähnlich wie das Sachsenland zu einer territorialen Einheit ausgebaut worden ist. Wie an dem früheren Ort, sind die Szekler an ihrem neuen Ort dem König in erster Linie zu militärischem Dienst verpflichtet gewesen, überdies haben sie mit Tieren Steuern zahlen müssen. Wegen ihrer ethnischen Sonderstellung und der Stelle, die sie in der ungarischen Gesellschaft des 13. Jahrhunderts hatten, haben sie ihre Sonderrechte bis zum 16. Jahrhundert bewahrt. Ihre geschlossenen Körperschaften werden von den 1270-er Jahren an *universitas* genannt. Die szeklerische Verwaltung selbst ist nach der im Buch behandelten Epoche, aufgrund des sächsischen Musters, zu den schon erwähnten sieben Stühlen organisiert worden.

Nach den Verfechtern der Theorie der dako-rumänischen Kontinuität hat sich die Bevölkerung von Dacia, das von dem Römischen Reich 105/106 erobert worden ist, nicht nur ihre Sprache, sondern auch ihre Kultur assimiliert, und als die Römer 271 die Provinz verlassen haben, ist eine stark romanisierte Bevölkerung in diesem Gebiet zurückgeblieben. Anders gesagt: Die Ahnen der heutigen Rumänen leben seit fast zwei Tausend Jahren in ihrer heutigen Heimat, in erster Linie in Siebenbürgen, wo die Provinz Dacia existiert hat.

Der Autor untersucht die Quellen, die sich auf dieses Gebiet und auf das dritte Drittel des 9. Jahrhunderts, also das Zeitalter der ungarischen Landnahme, beziehen. Danach behauptet er ausdrücklich, dass keine Rumänen in Siebenbürgen in dieser Epoche gelebt haben müssen. Die *Wolohen*, welche die Nestor-Chronik unter der Jahreszahl 898 erwähnt, sind dem Autor nach nicht die Nachkommen der seit dem 1. Jahrhundert dort lebenden romanisierten Daken, sondern sie sind mit den den westlichen Teil des Karpatenbeckens im 8. Jahrhundert

erobernden Franken identisch. Die andere, „gemeinte“ Hauptquelle der dako-rumänischen Theorie ist Anonymus, der in seiner romanhaften *Gesta* die Walachen erwähnt hat. Der anonyme Meister hat aber sein Werk 300 Jahre nach der Landnahme geschrieben, und in zahllosen Fällen beweist er in dem Werk, dass er weder die frühe Geschichte seines Volkes, noch die bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten des Zeitalters der Landnahme kennt. Die bei ihm auftretenden und den Ungarn gegenüber feindlichen Völker spiegeln die ethnische-politische Situation seines Zeitalters wider.

Die Rumänen waren am Ende des 10. Jahrhunderts in Griechenland und in der Gegend von Ohrid. Sie sind am nördlichen Teil der Balkanhalbinsel im 12. Jahrhundert erschienen, und in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts (im Jahre 1166) haben sie sogar mit den byzantinischen Heeren Siebenbürgen angegriffen. In den schriftlichen Quellen von Ungarn sind sie in den 1210-er Jahren erschienen. Nach diesen Daten haben sie Siebenbürgen entlang des Flusses Alt betreten. In Siebenbürgen sind sie auch von Süden nach Norden gezogen, und haben sich überall am Rande der Bergländer niederlassen. Infolge des Mongolensturmes sind die Rumänen zuerst von der königlichen Macht, dann von der Wende vom 13. zum 14. Jahrhundert an von den Privatgutsherren in Siebenbürgen angesiedelt worden. Wenn man die auf Quellen basierenden Ergebnisse des Autors ansieht, taucht die Frage auf: Warum erscheinen die ersten Ortsnamen rumänischer Herkunft erst im 14. Jahrhundert – und auch diese in der Gegend von Fogaras, dann in den südlichen Teilen Siebenbürgens, während im größeren, nördlichen Teil des Gebiets weder Rumänen, noch rumänische Ortsnamen zu finden waren – und warum werden die ersten rumänischen orthodoxen Kirchen erst im 13–14. Jahrhundert erbaut, wenn in diesem Raum schon seit 271 eine romanisierte rumänische Bevölkerung gelebt hat?

Die transhumierende Viehhaltung (doppelten Weidewechsel) betreibenden Rumänen haben dem Herrscher mit Schafen Steuer zahlen müssen und sind zum militärischen Dienst verpflichtet gewesen. Am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts ist die Rolle des Rumänentums aus dem Gesichtspunkt der schwächer werdenden königlichen Macht immer größer geworden. Andreas III. hat nach der Organisation der Rumänen nach dem Muster der Szekler und der Sachsen gestrebt. Dieser Plan ist gescheitert, zum Teil darum, weil er das Rumänentum wegen seiner transhumierenden Lebensweise nicht hat ansiedeln können, und andererseits darum, weil die Möglichkeit der Privilegisierung infolge der Ansiedlung durch die Privatgutsherren abgeschnitten gewesen ist.

Mit der Wende vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert ist auch eine Phase der Geschichte Siebenbürgens zu Ende gewesen. Das wird auch vom Quellenmaterial gezeigt, das vom Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts an explosionsartig zugenommen hat. Unsere zeitgenössischen Quellen stellen uns das Bild einer sich bewegenden und sich anpassenden Gesellschaft vor.

Die Ansiedlung des Deutschen Ritterordens im Burzenland im Jahre 1211 und die Verrückung der Ritter im Jahre 1225 hat die Aufmerksamkeit der internationalen Politik auf Siebenbürgen gerichtet. Andreas II. hat die Ritter mit Waffengewalt vertrieben, da der Orden nach der Unabhängigkeit von der königlichen

Macht strebte. Zwischen 1226 und 1235 hat Siebenbürgen eine staatsrechtliche Funktion bekommen. Andreas II. hat seinen ältesten Sohn Béla als Herzog an die Spitze von Siebenbürgen gestellt. Nach den schriftlichen Quellen hat sich Béla während seiner fast zehnjährigen Herrschaft hauptsächlich mit den Kumanen beschäftigt, weil er die Mongolengefahr erkannt hat. Mit der Krönung Bélas im Jahre 1235 ist die Institution des siebenbürgischen Herzogtums verschwunden.

Infolge der Verwüstungen, welche die Mongolen (Tataren) angerichtet haben, können die neuen Kennzeichen der Politik Béla IV. auch in Siebenbürgen beobachtet werden. Mit der Grenzwatche hat er zuerst den 1247 hereingerufenen Malteserorden beauftragt, dann nachdem dieser abgezogen war, wurden die Szekler mit derselben Aufgabe beauftragt. Der König hat die Ansiedlung der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen fortgeführt. Nach 1242 ist es zur Errichtung von Steinburgen gekommen, die anfangs Verteidigungszwecken gedient haben, dann sind sie zu den Mitteln der herrschaftlichen Repräsentation geworden. In dem Zeitalter, das im Buch untersucht wird, sind im Gebiet Siebenbürgens nach dem Zeugnis der Quellen 26 Steinburgen und einige andere Festungen gestanden, die aus anderen Stoffen erbaut worden sind.

An der Spitze Siebenbürgens ist zwischen 1257 und 1270 der ältere Sohn Béla IV., der Thronfolger, der spätere István V. gestanden. Er hat auch den Titel des Herzogs von Siebenbürgen getragen, obwohl sich sein Herrschaftsgebiet auf den ganzen Landesteil östlich der Donau mit der Ausnahme von Brassó (Kronstadt) erstreckt hat. Während seiner Herrschaft hat der Herzog István eine groß angelegte siebenbürgische Politik betrieben, die sich in der Verstärkung des siebenbürgischen Adels gezeigt hat. Siebenbürgen ist 1264 von einem innerlichen Krieg zwischen István und seinem Vater, dann von dem Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zwischen den Sachsen und dem siebenbürgischen Bischof im Jahre 1277, und schliesslich 1285 von einem neuerlichen tatarischen Angriff erschüttert worden.

Im Buch wird neben dem wirtschaftlichen Leben Siebenbürgens auch die Geschichte der Urbanisierung behandelt. Bei der Rekonstruktion des gesellschaftlichen Bildes schreibt der Autor, dass keine Adelsgeschlechter in Siebenbürgen entstanden seien, die siebenbürgische Aristokratie sei also eine Importerscheinung. Die schon erwähnte Politik des Herzogs István hat dem Autor nach zur Erhöhung der Bedeutung des im 13. Jahrhundert entstandenen mittleren Adels und zur Herausbildung ihres eigenartig siebenbürgischen adeligen Selbstbewusstseins wesentlich beigetragen. Die gesellschaftliche Verstärkung des Adels beweist, dass die Adeligen von 1288 an zu den Teilnehmern der siebenbürgischen *congregationes generales*, d. h. Generalversammlungen gezählt haben, sie sind also von der königlichen Macht in die Rechtsprechung einbezogen worden. Parallel zu den anderen Teilen des Landes sind auch hier die adeligen Komitate erschienen. Im Laufe des 13. Jahrhunderts hat sich die Macht des Woiwoden gefestigt. Die Urkunden, die sich auf die ersten zwei Jahrzehnte des 14. Jahrhunderts beziehen, verweisen auf gefährliche Zeiten, die 1322 während der Herrschaft des Woiwoden Tamás Szécsényi aus dem Geschlecht Kacsics friedlicher wurden. 1324, im letzten Jahre der untersuchten Epoche hat der König die frühere Befreiung von der Gerichtsbarkeit des Woiwoden abgeschafft, und damit hat er

die Macht des Woiwoden erheblich erhöht. In demselben Jahre hat er auch dem siebenbürgischen Adel Zugeständnisse gemacht, und das hat zu ihrer Vereinheitlichung wesentlich beigetragen. Die beiden Maßnahmen des Herrschers zeigen, dass die starke königliche Macht mit dem emporgekommenen Adel ein Bündnis eingegangen ist.

Das wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und politische System des aus den Quellen zum Vorschein kommenden Siebenbürgens hat sich zeitlich und auch auf der Art und Weise parallel zu den Geschehnissen des Ungarischen Königums gestaltet. Die Geschichte der den organischen Teil des Ungarischen Königums bildenden Siebenbürgischen Woiwodenschaft kann also nicht von der Geschichte des zeitgenössischen Ungarns getrennt werden.

Dieser mit Karten illustrierte Band, dessen Tatsachen auf der Analyse der Quellen basieren, ist eines der bedeutendsten Werke seit dem dreibändigen Buch *Erdély története* (Die Geschichte Siebenbürgens). Der Autor stellt die Geschichte Siebenbürgens sachlich, ausschliesslich auf den Quellen basierend und mithilfe der rationalen Analyse dieser Quellen dar. Er zeigt, dass alle drei Völker, die heute in diesem Raum leben, Einwanderer, also nicht autochthon sind. Gestehend, dass die Darstellung der Frühgeschichte Siebenbürgens keine einfache Aufgabe ist, zeigt er genauso, dass die von der Nationalpolitik befreite Analyse des Quellenmaterials ein unparteiisches und zusammenfassendes Bild über die 430-jährige Geschichte Siebenbürgens bietet.

SZILVIA KOVÁCS

Acta Universitatis Szegediensis

Acta Historica, Tomus 112.¹



The 112th volume of *Acta Historica* was published in Spring 2002. With two exceptions, the authors of the studies are the lecturers of the Department of Medieval World History of the University of Szeged. The volume contains seven studies, which well reflect the research interests of the department: medieval history of Western Europe on one hand, and that of Inner and Central Asia as well as Eastern Europe on the other (including Hungarian early history, fifth–tenth century, as well).

László Gálffy: *The Beginning of the Saint John Hospital in Angers at the turn of twelfth and thirteenth centuries* (Summary in French: *Les débuts d'un hôpital à Angers au tournant du 12e et 13e siècle*). The author examines the foundation and the earliest period of the Saint John Hospital in Angers. The foundation of the Saint John Hospital in Angers in the last quarter of the twelfth century was important in two respects: 1) The Plantagenet land acquired a charitable institution. 2) The hospital became a reception point of donations. Due to the donations and its prudent financial policy, the hospital acquired a financial monopoly in Angers in the thirteenth century.

Richárd Szántó: *Comparison of Hungarian and English Landowner Society in the late Middle Ages* (Summary in English). The author compares late medieval Hungarian landowner society with its English counterpart. There are important differences between the nobility of the two countries. Hungarian noblemen possessed political rights and they were under the jurisdiction of the king, but villeins belonged to manorial courts. The property of Hungarian noblemen was not feudal fee, because there was no military or other service attached to it. The most important social difference in medieval Hungary was between noblemen and villeins. English noblemen paid feudal aids, poll tax and income tax. Nobility in England did not have additional rights for itself, in comparison with the rights of other free elements of the society. The social differences did not sharpen in late medieval England.

¹ Red. Gy. Galamb, Szeged 2002.

László Balogh: *Lifting up on a Shield; The Eastern Background of the Enthronement of the first Hungarian Ruler* (Summary in English). He analyses a passage of Chapter 38 of *De administrando imperio*. Constantine Porphyrogenitus gave an account of the inauguration of Hungarian Prince Árpád in the form of lifting up on a shield. This ceremony has been connected with Byzantine practice. Constantine however emphasized the Khazar origin of the enthronement. The ceremony of the inauguration of nomadic rulers lifting up a felt rug is attested in oriental sources on Topa, Turks, Uighurs and Mongols. Balogh concludes that Constantine might interpret the nomadic ritual adapting the custom of enthronement to his own civilization.

Mihály Dobrovits: *Buyruq. Career of an Old Turkic Title* (Summary in English). The author studied the title *buyruq* mentioned in numerous Turkic sources. According to Dobrovits the title *buyruq* was a royal office and did not belong either to charismatic clans, or to the tribal aristocracy. The title probably originated in the Turk Empire. The *Buyruq* was the personal representative of the *qaghan* in his court. The author took the later developments and changes in the title of *buyruq* into consideration.

Szabolcs Felföldi: *The Chronology of the Defeat of the Hephtalite Empire* (Summary in English). The author analyzed the date and process of the fall of the Hephtalite Empire. There are Greek (Byzantine), Chinese and Muslim sources for the defeat of the Hephtalites. According to Felföldi, the Persians attacked the Hephtalites at the end of 557 or early 558. The Turks joined the campaign before 561 perhaps in 558. When the Persians had reached the Oxus river (Amu-Darya) in 561, they finished their offensive. The Turk campaign finished before the end of 568 or the beginning of 569.

Balázs Sinkovics: *Vámbéry and the Hungarian-Turkic Affinity* (Summary in German: *Vámbéry und die ungarisch-türkischen Verwandtschaft*). The author analyses the role of Hungarian orientalist Ármin Vámbéry concerning the so-called "Ugric-Turkic war" (a dispute among Hungarian scholars in the nineteenth century on the origin of the Hungarian language and people) Vámbéry defended a theory of the Turkic origin of the Hungarian language. Vámbéry's viewpoint was erroneous, and was considered dilettante by his opponents. Sinkovics proved that Vámbéry and his opponents belonged to different paradigms (taking Thomas S. Kuhn's theory as a basis). There was no consensus in the dispute and lack of understanding between the opposite parties. In the center of the older paradigm was the term *similarity*, whereas the new paradigm was based on the concept of the *origin*. According to Vámbéry the Hungarian language could be in affinity with the Turkic and Finno-Ugric languages simultaneously. His opponents (Budenz, Hunfalvy, Szinnyi) maintained, that the Hungarian language could not belong to two families of language. In spite of the fallacy, certain findings of Vámbéry concerning the Hungarian ethnogenesis are considered correct at present.

István Zimonyi: *Notes on the Differences between Bedouin and Inner Asiatic nomadism* (Summary in English). Zimonyi in his study compares the Bedouins of the Near East with the nomads of the Eurasian steppes. Both the Inner Asian no-

mads and the Bedouins of the Near East founded enormous empires during the Middle Ages. There are significant differences between the Inner Asian nomadic empires and the Arab Caliphate. The author rises the question: how could the Arabs be the founders of a world religion while the nomads of Inner Asia showed indifference to creating a world religion? To answer in brief: The bedouins of the desert were able to change their way of life to a more advanced level than the nomads of the steppes. Some parts of Arab tribes settled in oases and became merchants and peasants. They took part in international trade and could preserve their ethnic character. They had no alternative solution in that particular geographical zone. So they were able to reach a higher cultural level. Islam was a synthesis of the urban, commercial and Bedouin societies of Arabia. The nomads of Inner Asia were able to occupy urban and forest regions, but could not preserve their ethnicity so they were assimilated. As an extreme solution they preferred withdrawing to the steppe or the forest zone. They were unable to become merchants and peasants in large number and they could not create an urban civilization.

SZABOLCS POLGÁR

Magyar Századok Series¹



1. Kristó, Gyula–Makk, Ferenc. *A kilencedik és tizedik század története*. [History of the Ninth and Tenth Centuries] (p222)
2. Kristó, Gyula. *A tizenegyedik század története*. [History of the Eleventh Century] (p182)
3. Makk, Ferenc. *A tizenkettedik század története*. [History of the Twelfth Century] (p223)
4. Almási, Tibor. *A tizenharmadik század története*. [History of the Thirteenth Century] (p221)
5. Bertényi, Iván. *A tizennegyedik század története*. [History of the Fourteenth Century] (p213)
6. Draskóczy, István. *A tizenötödik század története*. [History of the Fifteenth Century] (p246)
7. Pálffy, Géza. *A tizenhatodik század története*. [History of the Sixteenth Century] (p275)
8. Ágoston, Gábor–Oborni, Teréz. *A tizenhetedik század története*. [History of the Seventeenth Century] (p268)
9. Barta, János, ifj. *A tizennyolcadik század története*. [History of the Eighteenth Century] (p249)
10. Csorba, László. *A tizenkilencedik század története*. [History of the Nineteenth Century] (p270)
11. Gergely, Jenő–Izsák, Lajos. *A huszadik század története*. [History of the Twentieth Century] (p526)
12. Almási, Tibor, ed. *A magyar történelem kronológiája, 830–2000*. [The Chronology of Hungarian History, 830–2000] (p281)

The general-editor and the authors of the series entitled *Magyar Századok* (Hungarian Centuries) had embarked a monumental venture, when they decided to present to the general public a comprehensive picture of the more than thousand-year history of the Hungarians. A good opportunity was offered to achieve this ambitious goal with the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian state, since during the celebration, understandably, an increasing demand

¹ Budapest: Pannonica Kiadó, n. d. [2000–2001].

arose for an overview of all the events which had happened to our ancestors and us during the last millennium and/or to sum up what historians actually know about the Hungarian past in our days. Independently of the millennium, the relevance of the preparation of the above series can be easily conceded, as a modern historical synthesis of the past thousand years had been long missing from the shelves of interested readers. The significance of the completed series is increased by the fact that, though several attempts were made at writing an integral Hungarian historical synthesis, all of these undertakings had aborted. Up to the present, the larger part of the medieval history of Hungary is still missing from the ten-volume series planned by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but the other series meant to embrace all the previous centuries, such as the *Magyarok Európában* (Hungarians in Europe), *Magyar História* (Hungarian History), and *Magyarország Krónikája* (The Chronicle of Hungary) which also remained incomplete.

With regard to the history of the present series it must be mentioned that in 2000 only ten volumes were published covering Hungarian history from the eleventh up to the twentieth century, and the first volume dealing with the chronology of the topic as well as the chronology volume concluding the whole series came out only during 2001. As an outcome of this enormous venture, today the whole of Hungarian history can be read in an integrated series of 3,176 pages. The volumes contain the latest results of recent research written by well-known Hungarian historians. The author of the present review – as a medievalist – can only express his opinion of the first six volumes of the series, leaving those volumes dedicated to the second, undoubtedly more documented half of the millennium to more competent expert(s) for criticism.

Concerning the volumes of the *Magyar Századok* series, several questions may occur to the reader. 1) How can the integrity of the past millennium be presented, if it is cut into parts by such units of time mechanically intersecting the historical processes? 2) Is it possible to provide an organic image of the history of the past more than thousand years with the help of “century-histories” written by different authors?

The first question has already been answered in the prefaces of the volumes themselves as the authors attempted to choose breaking points relevant (also) from the angle of the historical processes as starting and ending dates of their monographs. Thus, for example, the volume on the history of the ninth and tenth centuries embraces the period from the 830s till 997, while that on the eleventh century deals with the years 997–1095, the one on the twelfth century about the period 1095–1196, and the volume written on the thirteenth century includes the years from 1196 to 1301. Obviously, due to the proportioning of the different volumes, sometimes it was not possible to choose a clear-cut date that is also close to the turning of the appropriate century. Therefore, the account on the fourteenth century starts in 1301 and goes until 1402/03, while that on the fifteenth century has its beginnings “around” 1403 and ends in 1526. Accordingly, in relation to periodisation, the authors of the series tried their best to keep in mind the significant changes and/or fateful events of Hungarian history. Moreover, in the volume about the eleventh century in one chapter the most important issues (every-

day life, the raids, society, political relations) of the tenth century are also discussed, since otherwise the changes undergone in the eleventh century would hardly be understandable.

Thematically the first, considering its date of publication the last volume of the series is slightly – though rightfully – different from the others, as it spans over two centuries, more precisely it examines the history of almost 160 years. It is an atypical volume in the series, but its material is also unusual, as it deals with a period of Hungarian history when our ancestors were just about to appear in written documents, thus the number and the relevant content of these written sources is both low and limited respectively. The authors of the volume, Gyula Kristó and Ferenc Makk, commendably decided not to include in their detailed presentation that part of the period about which even those few written sources are silent, about which only small “mosaic-pieces” from several other fields of science (linguistics, archaeology, anthropology) are available. Those more interested in this period, however, can obtain an overall picture in the first chapter (*What might have happened before the ninth century*).

Afterwards, the authors survey the migration of the Magyars (ancient Hungarians) from their ancient homeland in Levedia to the Carpathian Basin. The scholarly attitude characterising the whole book is already clear in this chapter, accordingly the authors always indicate in relation to a certain issue if the academic position is still open and/or if several answers can be given to a particular question. It is also apparent that the authors inserted quite a lot of quotations from the written records of the period under consideration. As a consequence, the line of their arguments can be followed more easily and, at the same time, the words of the contemporary writers increase the pleasure of reading. It should also be mentioned that Gyula Kristó and Ferenc Makk place this early phase of Hungarian history into a larger spacio-temporal context and, this way, provide the readers with indispensable background information on the history of the ninth–tenth-century steppe, Central, and Western Europe.

The most debated stage of Hungarian history, the Hungarian Conquest is presented in a separate chapter, touching also upon the pre-Conquest history of the Carpathian Basin and the immediate background events to the Conquest itself. In this chapter the authors draw an overall picture of Hungarian society in the age of the Conquest, the number and the everyday life of the conquering Magyars. The following chapter introduces a fairly stirring period, the age of raids to the readers. The value of this chapter is enhanced by the fact that show the seven decades of the raids as divided into smaller periods accentuating the major characteristics of each. In comparison with the earlier phases of Hungarian history, there are many more sources at our disposal about the age of raids, since the raiding Magyars attacked territories with a high level of literacy. Under the military and foreign political surface of the raids significant economic, social, and political transformation took place. The domestic circumstances of the tenth century are presented demonstrating to the readers the metamorphosis of the Hungarians who, of necessity, left behind their nomadic life style to become settled cultivators. These changes changed their peak during the reign of Prince Géza. The

openness towards Western Europe and the centralising dynastic politics were those milestones marking the way for a long time for the development of the Hungarian state. Accordingly, the reign of Prince Géza is discussed in a separate chapter.

The closing chapter of the book provides an evaluation summary of two decades in a form of summary. Perhaps the most important change during this eventful period was that by the last decades of the tenth century the Hungarians had arrived at the cross-roads: "radical change or, without it, quick perdition." The authors – evolving continuity with the following centuries – emphasise that while basically the reply to the challenges had already been established in the tenth century but, in many respect, the fate of the Hungarians was decided only at the turn of the tenth and eleventh and/or in the first half of the eleventh century.

In the second volume of the series Gyula Kristó grouped the history of the "sacral" eleventh century around four subjects. The first (*The Kingdom*) and the second (*Christianity*) introduce two major areas of transformation – the state and religion – both with profound effects on the lives of the Hungarians. In the chapter entitled *The Kingdom* one can not only read about the coronation of the first king and about the kings and queens of the eleventh century, but also about the ways of exercising royal power, about minting coins, taxation, jurisdiction, administration, war affairs, foreign relations, and also about the issuing of charters that in the eleventh century should be considered as an attribute of royal power. These are all areas of life which were radically transformed by comparison with their tenth-century antecedents, moreover, some of them (minting, jurisdiction) were the consequences of the formation of the medieval Hungarian state. The spread of Christianity, the process of organizing church parallel to the missions, and the accompanying appearance of Western European civilisation also meant revolutionary new developments in the life of the Hungarians. All these are discussed in the chapter entitled *Christianity* in which the missionary activity, the organisation, the bishops, the monasteries, education, literature, the canonisation processes, church incomes, and religious life form the different subchapters. The additional two units of the book introduce the contemporary society (*The People of the Country*) and everyday life of the people (*The Daily Life*). The special value of these chapters that they provide summarising overviews of subjects probably less known to the general public. Thus, for example, one can read about foreigners arriving in the Hungarian Kingdom and about Hungarians travelling abroad. The author clearly demonstrates the transformation of the terms 'freedom' and 'slavery' of cardinal importance as well as the position of the masses marginalised and relegated to vassal status, that is the beginning of an essential transformational process during which the majority of a society that in the tenth century still consisted predominantly of freemen became servants.

In writing the history of the twelfth century, the author, Ferenc Makk introduces a century hardly known to the wider public and which even among academic historians appears to be a grey, featureless period of Hungarian history. However, reading the book, one can be persuaded that this century brought some

exciting changes as well, not only with regard to later events, but also in themselves, even if these changes were not as fundamental as those of the eleventh or thirteenth centuries. The twelfth century brought the perfection of the state-model of King Saint Stephen. The royal power was strengthened, its authority became absolute, therefore, the Hungarian rulers could already think of conquering new lands. As opposed to the defensive foreign policy of the eleventh century, expansion became the determining ambition in foreign affairs, so it is not by chance that Ferenc Makk devoted a significant part of his book to presenting the foreign relations of the country as well. With regard to empire-building, King Béla III achieved the most, his reign can be considered as the peak of the whole period though, at the same time, it is also the closing point of an ascending phase. The history of the century is "strung on the chain of chronology", each chapter discusses the age and reign of one ruler of the period. For that reason, it is no accident that the summarising epilogue of this volume is the longest, as the summing-up of all the changes undergone in the fields of economy, society, population, daily life, and royal power are to be read here.

The thirteenth century presented by Tibor Almási is characterised by far-reaching and profound changes in almost every field of life, it is an era marked by "special contrast of destruction and construction". The history of hundred and five years is divided into chapters according to the reigns of various the kings. However, besides this division an inner caesura is also sensible in the volume formed by the subchapter (*The Bequeathed Country*) dealing with the reign of King Andrew II – practically the first third of the given period. Even enumerating all the inventions of the thirteenth century, from the social and economic changes through the question of settlement-network up to the issues of power and population, would result in a long and formidable list. Among the volumes of this ambitious series, the book of Tibor Almási is enhanced for its literary qualities which greatly increase the pleasures of reading. In the spirit of linguistic elegance, our thirteenth-century kings get appropriate adjectives for their names, so that is how, for example, King Andrew II became "the venturesome," while King Béla IV "the cautious innovator", and King Ladislas IV "the defier of fate". The author's aim is not to present the period only as the autumn of a dying dynasty and the political system has a fundamental significance. On the contrary, Almási tried to bring about the buds of renewal bursting out on the detritus of the old regime, and tried to demonstrate all those processes – the evolution and development of commodity production and a money-economy, urbanisation, the evolution of personal and collective rights, etc. – that will raise the country back among the European powers during the fourteenth century.

Iván Bertényi, while writing the history of the fourteenth century, chose a thematic structure as the main organising principle for his material. The author dedicated a separate chapter to a presentation of contemporary Europe. It is understandable, since Hungary in the fourteenth century overstepped its former spatial frames, not only by its rulers originating from foreign dynastic families, but also by its political status among the great European powers. Setting a time limit for the century was not easy, as it is proven by the fact that the author de-

voted the whole preface to a discussion of this issue. The individual chapters examine all the important segments of fourteenth-century Hungarian history. Separate units are dedicated to the issues of breaking the petty monarchs' power as well as to the society, economy, royal land-donation policy, military affairs, foreign policy, and the governing of the state. A chronological chapter discusses the rulers of the century and, there is a similar chapter for the wives of the contemporary kings. It is already in itself significant that Iván Bertényi discusses, or better to say can discuss the cultural life of the fourteenth century in a separate chapter, as in this period Hungarian culture became an integral part of the mainstream European culture and, at the same time, the number of the surviving records and monuments makes it possible for the author to say more than before about the character of painting, architecture, literature, or even goldsmith work.

The "long" fifteenth century is discussed by István Draskóczy. The period between 1403 and 1526 brought irreversible changes not only for the Hungarian Kingdom, but also for the whole of Europe. The stagnating, declining, then reviving, but already changed Europe defined the historical space of which Hungary could only occupy a peripheral part, though in this period it was still counted among the leading powers of the continent. Though the country was able to preserve this role for a while, its victories were momentary, moreover, they exhausted the resources of the country to the utmost extent. The danger of the Turks appearing at the southern borderland already from the fourteenth century onwards but, in reality, becoming menacing in the fifteenth century forced the Hungarian Kingdom left alone by the European powers into an unequal and hopeless struggle and agony that inevitably caused the collapse of the country. The author investigates this stirring time through into several thematic chapters. After the presentation of the contemporary country and its peoples, separate chapters are dedicated to the world of the villages, towns, and noblemen and also to that of the churches and monasteries, thus embracing the most important scenes of everyday life. The political history of the era (*Domestic and Foreign Politics 1403–1526*) and the functioning of the state (*The King and the Orders*) are discussed in separate chapters. Similarly, there is a separate discussion about the state of intellectuals and education in the fifteenth-century (*At the edge between the Middle Ages and Modern Times*).

At this point, the review of the volumes – if they were disconnected monographs – could finish. However, as they are integral parts of a series, some reflections still need to be made. Inasmuch as the volumes of the *Magyar Századok* series altogether offer more than individual works, their aggregate value is higher than the sum-total of the individual parts. The series – presumably, due to the excellence of the general-editor, Gyula Szvák – offers a firm but flexible, permissive framework for the individual authors who, within the given timeframes, could arrange their material in a structure best fitting their given theme and/or period of Hungarian history. On the other hand, however, it is due to the excellence of the authors themselves, that they were able to keep their eyes on the entire work and, owing to this, the volumes of the series organically fit together. The historical processes – even if they extend over several centuries – are not lost of, but can

be followed throughout. The appendices at the end of the volumes together with the maps on the inner sides of the book-covers, prepared by the authors themselves should also be highlighted, as they also add to the unity in diversity. In these appendices the "mini-archontologies" of the different centuries, family-trees, and maps are to be found. Each volume contains handy indices of names and places as well as an abundant and thematically grouped bibliography for reference. The aesthetic appearance of the volumes is also noteworthy. The hard-cover, the nicely designed binding, the elegant font type, the title-headings, and the system of page-numbering all increase the pleasure of handling the books.

The first six volumes of the *Magyar Századok* series set a definitely high standard both with regard to content and aesthetics, therefore it is easy to stay that for a long the series will be a basic work on the shelves of readers interested in Hungarian history.

TAMÁS KÓFALVI

Die Schlacht von Mezőkeresztes und der Fünfzehnjährige Krieg¹



Die monographische Aufarbeitung der Geschichte des langen Türkenkrieges 1593–1606, der in der ungarischen Historiographie als der „Fünfzehnjährige“ genannt wird, verlangt von einem Historiker, daß er sich sowohl mit dem weitverzweigten Geflecht von diplomatischen Beziehungen von praktisch ganz Europa und den östlichen Grenzregionen des Osmanischen Reiches als auch mit den Ereignissen auf den ausgedehnten Kriegsschauplätzen auseinandersetzt und vertraut ist. Obwohl zahlreiche narrative Quellen und umfangreiche Aktenpublikationen von deutscher, türkischer, ungarischer, italienischer, französischer, spanischer, englischer, rumänischer und polnischer Provenienz reichlich zur Verfügung stehen, blieb die Veröffentlichung des Quellengutes der beiden Hauptkontrahenten unvollendet, bzw. befindet sich noch in der Anfangsphase. Die systematische Veröffentlichung der historischen Quellen kann wohl kaum durch solch ausführliche Teilaufarbeitungen, wie z. B. die Monographie von J. P. Niederkorn über die Türkenpolitik der europäischen Mächte oder die von der Rezensentin verfaßte Arbeit über die Rolle des Vasallenstaates des Osmanischen Reiches, des Chanats der Krim im Krieg ersetzt werden. Das Interesse der ungarischen Forscher an den Geschehnissen am Kriegsschauplatz Ungarn war schon immer bedeutend, weil die langanhaltenden Kriegshandlungen die Vernichtung der Wirtschaftsgüter auslösten und in der ethnischen Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung zu irreversiblen Vorgängen führten. Trotz dessen wurde bisher keine umfassende Darstellung in ungarischer Sprache von dieser wandlungsreichen Ereigniskette veröffentlicht. Der Verfasser ist ein engagierter und bedeutender ungarischer Forscher des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges. Seine Monographie ist nach zahlreichen Vorstudien und ausdauernden Archivforschungen entstanden.

Die in zehn Teile gegliederte Monographie folgt dem traditionellen Aufbau-schema. In den einleitenden Abschnitten werden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und diplomatischen Zusammenhänge der Vorgeschichte des Krieges erläutert. Es wird ein überzeugendes Bild über die Mächteverhältnisse der beiden Kontra-

¹ László Sándor Tóth, *Die Schlacht von Mezőkeresztes und der Fünfzehnjährige Krieg*, Szeged 2000, S. 479.

henten, der Habsburger Monarchie und des Osmanischen Reiches präsentiert, weiters werden die machtpolitischen Überlegungen und Interessen, die die Stellungnahmen der einzelnen west- und osteuropäischen Staaten in diesem Konflikt entschieden, in detaillierten und treffenden Analysen dargelegt. Aus der diplomatiegeschichtlichen Rundschau wird lediglich nur die Zurückhaltung des katholischen Polens und der vom Heiligen Stuhl organisierten türkenfeindlichen Liga viel zu einseitig begründet. Das passive Verhalten Polens ist aber nur dann zu verstehen, wenn außer der innenpolitischen Lage auch die Tendenz der türkisch-polnischen Beziehungen näher in Betracht gezogen werden. Der Dauerfrieden, den Polen mit der Pforte 1533 geschlossen hatte und die kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen der beiden Mächte für beinahe 100 Jahre einstellte, wäre deutlicher zu akzentuieren gewesen, da die osmanische Diplomatie die Habsburger Monarchie als Erzfeind betrachtete und bewußt einen Zweifrontenkrieg in Ost-Europa zu vermeiden versuchte.

Das Kapitel über die logistischen Probleme des Krieges ist besonders interessant. Darin sind sowohl die Ergebnisse der europäischen Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung, als auch die Feststellungen der türkischen Forschungen, die auch große Fortschritte erzielten, hervorragend verwertet. Die Adaption der neuen methodologischen Ergebnisse wurde dadurch erleichtert, daß die kaiserlichen Armeen auf dem ungarischen Kriegsschauplatz zum ersten Mal die technischen Neuerungen der militärischen Revolution und die neuen Formen der Heeresführung gerade während des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges anzuwenden begannen. Die ausführlichen Vorstudien ermöglichten die Unterschiede in der logistischen Rüstung der kriegsführenden Parteien darzustellen. Die Heerverpflegung konnte von der zentralisierten osmanischen Verwaltung auf einem höheren Niveau und erfolgreicher gelöst werden, als von dem habsburgischen Hofkriegsrat, der über eine schwerfälligere Administration verfügte. Während der Feldzüge konnte die kriegstechnische Überlegenheit der kaiserlichen Armeen durch den besser organisierten Nachschub von Verpflegung und Kriegsmaterial der Osmanen ausgeglichen werden.

Das Ausmaß der dem Prager Hof gebotenen ausländischen Hilfgelder wurde von dem Verfasser auf Grund schon veralteter ungarischer Arbeiten angegeben. Das Gesamtbild wäre realistischer ausgefallen, wenn er die neueren Forschungsergebnisse von Niederkorn in Betracht gezogen hätte. Die Beschreibung der osmanischen Kriegsverfassung und die des Finanzsystems ist korrekt, obwohl die Angaben über die Größe der türkischen Streitmacht einige Korrekturen bedürfen. Ohne Zweifel ist es außerordentlich schwer die Stärke der einsetzbaren osmanischen Armee zu bestimmen. In erster Linie lassen sich Angaben über die Heeresstärke der Osmanen aus solchen Daten folgern, die auf innertürkischen Quellen beruhen. Es mag zwar der Wahrheit entsprechen, das solche Kalkulationen in der Literatur der Turkologie sich auf die Ära Suleimans des Prächtigen beziehen, doch die Verhältnisse können auch auf spätere Epochen angewandt werden. Obwohl am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts ein starker Zuwachs bei den zentralen osmanischen Truppen bemerkbar war, wurden gleichzeitig die militärische Besatzungen in den Provinzen mindestens im gleichen Maße abgebaut. Eine all-

gemeine Tendenz war doch unverändert vorherrschend, daß über den europäischen Teil des Reiches ein doppelt so großes Heer wachte, wie über die östlichen Provinzen. Die während der ungarischen Feldzüge hierher versetzten Truppen der asiatischen Beglerbege stärkten zwar die osmanische Hauptarmee, doch weitaus nicht im dem Maße, wie es von dem Verfasser vermutet wird. Das irreguläre Kriegsvolk, das sich am Anfang der Feldzüge in der Hoffnung auf Beute der osmanischen Hauptarmee anschloß, machte etwa 20% der regulären Truppen aus. All das in Betracht ziehend scheint die Behauptung des Autors über das Kriegspotential des Osmanischen Reiches, wonach die Stärke 400.000 überschreite, als übertrieben (p. 123). Tatsächlich erreichte sie kaum die Hälfte.

In den letzten sechs Kapiteln, die den zweiten Teil des Buches ausmachen, werden vor allem die Kriegseignisse chronologisch beschrieben, weiters das Problem Siebenbürgens während des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges und der Bocskai Aufstand behandelt. Ausführliche Darstellungen werden über die Belagerungen der wichtigeren Befestigungen, so wie Raab Erlau, Kanizsa, Gran geliefert. Bei der Beschreibung der Kriegseignisse wurde erst die Ursache, der zum Feldzug führte, analysiert, dann wurde der Aufmarsch der gegenüberstehenden Heeren rekonstruiert und auf einer Karte eingezeichnet, anschließend die Heeresstärke der kriegsführenden Parteien festgestellt, schließlich der Ablauf der Belagerung oder die der Schlacht geschildert. Wo es möglich und nötig war, wurden in diesen Kapiteln die früheren Feststellungen der Fachliteratur mit neueren Archivdaten ergänzt.

Von den Kriegshandlungen wurde der Schlacht von Mezökeresztes eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Die äußerst detailliert und anschaulich beschriebene Schlacht wird nach neueren kriegsgeschichtlichen Prinzipien beurteilt, wobei das Erreichen des strategischen Ziels, die Bewahrung des Schlachtfeldes und die erlittenen materiellen und menschlichen Verluste untersucht werden. Der Beurteilung des Verfassers zufolge kamen eindeutig die Osmanen als Sieger aus der Schlacht heraus, doch es hätte auch solche Momente während des Kampfes gegeben, in denen die Kräfteverhältnisse ausgeglichen waren. Die Schlacht entschied zwar nicht den Ausgang des Krieges, doch die Auswirkungen trafen beide Parteien äußerst negativ.

Die Monographie, die beinahe die ganze ungarische und ausländische Fachliteratur des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges nach einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten bearbeitet, dient als ein wertvolles Handbuch, das nicht nur verlässlich in einem stürmischen Zeitalter orientiert, sondern mit ihren klaren Fragestellungen auch zu den weiteren Forschungen anregt. Doch im enormen lexikalischen Stoff des Werkes könnten sich die Leser leichter zurechtfinden, wenn ein Namens- und Sachregister vorhanden wäre.

MÁRIA IVANICS

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